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

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THE INTERNATIONAL
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OCTOBER, 1917.

THE HAMMER OF THOR.

HORACE MILBORNE.

IT IS our painful privilege to-day to be spectators of the greatest conflict of recorded history. We follow each alternation of the crisis with the mingled exultations and despairs of the Athenian army at Syracuse, as they helplessly watched the sea fight which was to secure their safety or seal their ruin. And as our thoughts turn to them, so will the thoughts of future ages dwell on these momentous days: for it will need no genius of Thucydides to immortalise a conflict which transcends his theme as much in lasting import as in scale.

Yet on our more imposing scene is enacted the same tragic conflict. The same principles are at strife, though happily some of these principles have changed sides. Again from trivial and obscure occasions the same broad issues rise; the same political and moral ideals contend for the same prize, the domination of the civilised world. Athens stood for democratic freedom and individuality, Sparta for oligarchic subordination, discipline, the merging of the individual in the state. And the same moral principles were invoked. But here the parallel becomes inverted. It was Athens who preferred the claim of "culture," Athens who asserted that "might is right" in milder form by the mouth of Pericles and through Cleon and the Melian delegates with a brutality merely more lucid than the German. And it was Sparta who was the champion of the

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rights of small nationalities against one overshadowing power.

Even in detail there are many curious resemblances. It was a struggle of land against sea power, a fight in Bismarck's phrase between the elephant and the whale. On the one side a great military machine, on the other the power of finance. Sparta proclaims the freedom of the seas: and we are ever told by a recent historian that the real aim of the seemingly incoherent operations of Athens was to control the external food supply of the Peloponnesus and to starve her enemies into submission by blockade.

Let us hope that victory may fall again to the moral and not to the political Sparta.

It would be foolish to attempt to forecast the future; but it may be interesting to try to isolate some of the warring principles and ideals and to note those newly emerging or vanishing away.

In our land the first thing that strikes us is the great mortality amongst principles. Each party sheds its own, and shamefacedly covers its nakedness with the cast off rags of others.

We see the propertied classes cheerfully throwing away millions by the thousand in absolute loss, whilst a little while ago they assured us that to resign a small fraction of one hundredth as much for social betterment meant economic disaster and "the end of all things." We see them nationalise the railways, seize and work the chief industries under state control, and, worse still, appropriate what they will of the proceeds for the state, and never a word of "compensation." Where, oh where are the sacred rights of private property, which they have so often told us are the bed rock of all morality? And the Labour party. It was theirs to stand still and see the salvation of the Lord, and they stand still—and strike. They see the war actualising their wildest dreams, and they would stop the war. They are state socialists and state and society may perish before the least of their class interests. They are for liberty but for one liberty only will they strike—the liberty

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to be slaves. They would put down militarism,—by turning the other cheek to the mailed fist; by accepting the only militarism they have to fear, which they must rid Germany and the world of, if their dreams of national and international beatitude are even to be dreams. They oppose conscription: and they do not see that it flows directly from the very essence of socialism, that whatever its terrible effects may be, it in no way endangers social democracy in France, though we must admit that it has succeeded in tainting it with that virus of patriotism, which sets the national existence before the interests of the class, or the crotchets of individuals. At any rate it must not continue after the war. And they do not see what William James has pointed out that by such service in peace time the nation may gradually be familiarised and led to that form of national service which is their ideal. Above all things they say it must not serve as a pretext for industrial conscription. Industrial conscription—the very definition of socialism. If we scratch these Socialists we find them but bourgeoisie. The workers ape respectability—in second hand Liberal garments. And Liberalism. What words can depict the humiliation of a party, doing penance for a war they have directly caused, by having to conduct it themselves, finding what satisfaction they can in the consciousness that they are doing their best to fail, accepting Protection, discarding voluntarism, forcing conscription, outraging that Holy of Holies, the conscience of the political dissenter. With what joy would Matthew Arnold have seen the Liberal party smash its dearest idol, the right of the Englishman to do what he likes, and nothing he dislikes.

This time all the parties have been caught bathing together. Snatching the nearest garment, the Tory again robs the worker,—of his principles. Labour walks respectable—in Liberal broadcloth. For the Liberal nothing is left but to hang his head in martial uniform.

If the clothes philosopher could come again with what grim delight would he watch the formulas, the old clothes,

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flying down the whirlwind. And what would the old Teuton think of the stark and shameless splendours now bare to every eye? Let us not be too sure.

Now all the petty antagonisms, all the fantastic hates are stilled which the heart of man devises to support the tedium of peace, all passion is polarised to one world issue. It is no cheap and meaningless antithesis of "might and right." It is the clash of equally noble, equally vital ideals, of liberty and discipline. Which will prevail we cannot tell; but we may surely say that whichever in the end prevails, will only do so by large absorption of the spirit of the other.

However obscure its beginnings, there is no doubt of the meaning and object of the war. Its prize is the domination of the world by the principle of the one side or of the other. On the German side, this is the conscious aim. Germany has learned the Roman secret. She has formed a compact central power, Prussia, Germany, Austria, Hungary, graded in privilege, divided in interests, unified by the support of the aristocratic elements throughout, and now to be knit indissolubly by blood and iron. She has surrounded herself with a ring of dependent kingdoms, *socii atque amici*. With these she will exploit the outer dung folk, beat down the proud, give laws and Roman peace to the whole world. The autocrat of Prussia, the constitutional sovereign of a greater Germany, the suzerain of the Balkans, will hold the hegemony of Europe. Then *delenda est Carthago*, and the master of the seas is the master of the world.

On one side the principle of aristocracy, centralisation, organisation, subordination, initiative, the will to power as a conscious end clearly conceived and methodically pursued. It is not so easy to see what three democracies and autocratic Russia[1] stand for, but mostly for the opposite of these. All are at least anti-aristocratic. They stand for the one or the many, not the chosen few. They stand they say for the principle of nationality, that is for decen-

[1] This was written before the Russian revolution.

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tralisation. All stand for liberty in its most elementary form, liberty from foreign domination. Of ultimate aims and deliberate constructive policy we see little. Both sides alike stand for peace.

It is perhaps not without reason that our peace enthusiasts are in tendency pro-German. For the triumph of Germany is the surest way to their end. Then at the cheap price of liberty they will attain that sure and lasting peace which they hold so dear. And then this war will, indeed, be the last.

But if we win is the millennium so sure? The principles of the German empire might indeed bind the world to unity if not concord. Could the principles of the British empire do as much? It is the glory of that so-called empire to have offered a perfect solution of the historical problem how to combine complete autonomy of the parts with an absolute solidarity of the whole. It is noticeable, however, that this complete attainment of the ends is accompanied with and consequent upon the total lack of the form and structure of empire, and of any aims at internal domination for which such structure alone could give opportunity. The autonomy existed before: the solidarity is shown in the hour of common danger. It is furthered also by community of race and culture; by wide geographical dispersal precluding mutual rivalries, and necessitating mutual support, by the vast preponderance of the mother country unifying the whole by a hegemony without jealousy and without question. A wider world-sown Hellas combining all her freedom with the unity she lacked. A unity all the more harmonious for the lack of those paper bonds which though weak to bind, are strong to hamper and confine. Most of these favouring circumstances are lacking in Europe to-day. The Allies are of different races, religions, cultures, developments: in close contiguity within Europe and without, and with partially conflicting interests: with no clearly predominant partner. If they are victorious, attempts to constitute and formalise a union, which Lord Salisbury thought the chief danger to the British empire

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of his day, will present still greater difficulties. The world may be unified by power: will it be by the principles of liberty and brotherhood?

Will England, Russia, France and Italy never again fall out? It will be harder for them in future. Not easily will the French turn their arms against the nation whose little army died to save Paris, and whose fleet undoubtedly saved France, or against the Latin republic which sprang to their side when things were darkest, nor any with the Russia without whom the cause of liberty was hopeless. And already we hear of a commercial unity between the allies which is often the prelude of stronger ties. But most of all because the same unity will be necessary to keep the prize as to win it. Germany will remain burning for revenge. As she was the creator she will be the preserver of the league of liberty and peace. Bismarck when he created a nation, seized Alsace and Lorraine with the express design that France should never cease to cherish revenge and that the constant fear of France might give the new empire firm and lasting cohesion. William II sets out to consolidate a greater empire by blood and iron, and like Croesus when he crossed the Halys, does so, but not his own. So the league of liberty may endure and become the league of peace, over-awing Germany and suppressing war by that highest right which is born of might. The amiable founder of the Hague tribunal may after all have helped to lay the foundation stone of the temple of Peace, whose builders, like those of Jerusalem, build with their swords girded by their sides, and Mr. Bryan might have found something better to do than signing scraps of paper called arbitration treaties —he probably does not know that there was a perpetual arbitration treaty between Athens and Sparta when the Peloponnesian war broke out—by bringing America to the side of the European democracies and confirming the supremacy of the armed league of peace. Kant showed long ago that universal peace is a dream save as enforced by some overmastering power. What Goethe said of individuals is true also of nations that they who would en-

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joy liberty must every day conquer it for themselves afresh. The message of Germany is the message of history that the feet of Pragness are iron shod and red with blood. And whether she wins or loses that message is confirmed.

A writer in the cause of peace has pointed out that the modern tendency towards aggregation of smaller states in a few great empires, implies an advance by the formation of ever larger peace areas, of unities within which strife is eliminated. We have seen a further aggregation of empires in two rival groups, two areas of internal peace. And we may see by the victory of one, Europe at last reduced to one actual peace area. And with Europe the world.

War cannot cease till there are no aggressors, till all are satisfied with their place in the sun, or acknowledge a superior force. Whichever side prevails will be able to defy external aggression, but if the looser aggregate wins there will still be danger of internal dissension, though we have seen reason to think that unity will be promoted in nature's informal but most effective way, by the pressure of antagonising forces. There will be many suggestions of more formal bonds. The air will be thick with scraps of paper. But there is a great force which we may hope to see set free and tell heavily for peace. The chained force of democracy itself. The interest of the democracies is peace and they know it. They know that whoever gains by war, it is not they, that *quidquid delirent reges plectuntur Achivi.* One of the reasons why this war was rushed was to anticipate any concerted action of the popular parties. The interest of the Athenian democracy was war, and they knew that. But the interests and instincts of our modern so-called democracies are emphatically for peace. Our sham democracies do not even possess that fundamental right of all free peoples, the final voice on war and peace, enjoyed by our Teutonic ancestors, by the Romans and the Greeks whether oligarchies, democracies or kingships. I can imagine a league of really free democracies defying external aggression, and so far limiting it internally, that none can take place without the sanction of the whole people. Such

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a check, though not absolute, will be more effective than many scraps of paper. I can imagine military service in Britain as elsewhere, the indispensable and only qualification for the franchise, and the conscientious objector left to make his own quietus. I can imagine the burden of armaments gradually lightened with the growth of the league and the dwindling of its possible foes, as the peoples sufficiently advanced to assert that primary right of freedom, the determining voice on war and peace, are admitted to its privileges and protection, till some day the golden age of the Antonines return, when a few hundred thousand men held all the world at peace—for a season.

But all this is if the democracies win which is looking a long way ahead. And peace, the democratic dream, is that in truth the ideal, or is war as the Germans hold, necessary, and unavoidable and good in itself? Can man so far deny the nature in which he is rooted, the nature that is behind him and about him and within him, nature that cares nothing for peace or comfort or happiness, but much for strength and courage and efficiency and patriotism? What nature wants she will see that she gets. Man may expel her for a while yet ever she returns, testing, battering, breaking at the last. Man may not long enjoy the liberty he does not conquer for himself afresh.

There are then two ideals, two spirits in conflict. The one democratic, utilitarian, cultivating the religion of happiness and the inoffensive virtues, the other with the religion of valour, aristocratic, adventurous, self assertive and overbearing as Achilles, *qui jura negat sibi nata, nihil non arrogat armis.* The democratic ideal of perpetual peace and happiness laid on by the state, of minimum work, of maximum pigwash: the rule of public opinion, that is of the average sensual man, with his sentimentalism, a finer sensuality of soul, his humanitarianism, that is kind only to be cruel, and abhors the hardness that is true child of pity, and born of these, feminism, that would hand the whip to the tyrant slave who is either slave or tyrant, the last logical unreason of the right of weakness: socialism, the

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right to comfort, the devil abolished by act of parliament; anarchy, of the private will, private judgement, private conscience: all these are the well known stigmata of social degeneration, and were as prominent as now in the days of Euripides and Plato: though it had been left to later days to render the whole sacrosanct under the name of religion as private judgement reads, in the light of public opinion, its own grossness into its oracles.

Against the spirit of the sheep stands the spirit of the wolf, the aggressive predatory aristocrat. The spirit of modern Germany is found in its truest and deepest sense in Nietzsche, notwithstanding his sneers at Bismarck and Treitschke, his alienation from the modern materialised Germany, his good Europeanship, his cheerful admission of the essential barbarism of the Germanic character and culture. It is not for nothing that many a German private carries a copy of Zarathustra in his knapsack.

According to Nietzsche all elevation of the type of man has hitherto been the work of an aristocratic society, self assertive, barbarian in temper. It rests on slavery. The lower grades of society exist only for it. It is kept vigorous and true to type by continual strife with neighbours, or by continual repression of the subject Helot population. It is born of war and sustained by war and perishes in the peace of its own decisive victory. The higher type disappears with the struggle that fostered it, and his battle field becomes the happy pasture of the average man. But the end of life is not the production of mediocrity. It is not happiness, nor the good of the greatest number, nor of the whole. The whole exists solely for the superior caste. Neither is the end of that caste happiness. "After all," he says, "man does not really desire happiness, only the Englishman does that." Utilitarianism is the deadly English heresy. The hero's motto is "Live dangerously." The meaning of history is the production of genius. The end of society is the high and dangerous life of the nobler few who work out in nature's way the end of nature, the coming of the higher man, who by native right of power and creative will must and will rule the lower.

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Nietzsche has been aptly described as an inverted Schopenhauer. He learnt from Schopenhauer the futility, the endless self punishment of the will to happiness, and reverses his conclusion. Instead of his master's oriental Buddhistic message to kill the will to live, the individual craving for happiness, in the impersonal play of intellect, in disinterested contemplation, in art and music, and in sympathy with the suffering victims of the pitiless world will, Nietzsche wrings a tragic optimism from the pessimistic vision. Not in denial but in assertion of the will to live, which is the will to power, not in sympathy and compassion, the last temptation of the great, whereby sorrow is multiplied, the roots of pain are cherished and the sick infect the whole, but in tragic sternness steeled as much to the sacrifice of others as oneself. Of this doctrine the modern German will to power and calculated atrocity is a characteristically whole hearted and clumsy caricature.

In the tragedy of the world, Nietzsche finds a tragic optimism, the stern joy of the warrior hero, whose gods are Dionysus and Apollo, the gods of tragedy, the gods of joy: the Dionysiac ecstasy of life, of battle, of joy in pain, the passion of the will to live affirming in Apolline self mastery an Apolline vision of the future. The pessimist is he who would not live his life again. He would shrink with horror from the old fancy of the Greek philosopher that as infinite time exhausts the finite possibilities of a universe of limited elements and unchanging law, the present life must recur again and again to its minutest details. Socrates must wed Xanthippe, world without end. But to Nietzsche the doctrine of the "endless return" comes as a revelation. He affirms and joyfully welcomes this ghastly nightmare of the defeated and despairing, and proclaims it the final test of the optimist, who accepts life, lives it to the full, and would live it again and again.

It is curious that Nietzsche's idea of the best state is practically the same as that of Plato, whom with Socrates he is never tired of attacking. Lowest of all is the servile class, who supply the material basis of the structure in the

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fitting pursuits of industry and commerce. They must be left their traditional beliefs, their slave morality, the full liberty to pursue the only happiness they know, material comfort and the making of money. Above them is the military caste who preserve the superior type of man, the spirit of honour, the religion of valour, the virtue which is manliness, the master morality of the masters. And higher again the philosophers, the true rulers, and their task as in Plato is the formation and transformation of moral values, which the inferior classes accept on faith from them. But the philosopher's eye is directed not upwards as in Plato to an eternal pattern laid up in the heavens, but forward to a nobler type in which humanity is to be transcended.

A prophet is never more national than when he rails at the backslidings of his people, and Nietzsche with all his denunciations of the Germany of his day, is possessed by her profounder spirit. The German state itself is an adumbration of his idea. Its greatness is founded on commerce. Her industrials pay willing honour and obedience to the ruling military class, and both to the intellectual who in the universities really mould the thoughts and ideals of the nation, and animate the whole with a single spirit. That spirit is the self assertion of the strong. It shews itself in commercial enterprise and expansion which colonises and exploits not the outlying barbarisms but the highest civilisations of Europe and America, in military aggression, in creative activity of thought, and in the intellectual loyalty which faithfully translates its new ideals into life. It is the denial of *laissez faire*, the assertion of the human will and its primacy in that nature of which it is the crown, by conscious activity to freely chosen ends. In the war of culture also she holds the advantage of initiative.

The self assertion of conscious superiority is the mark of the aristocrat. An aristocratic society whilst quick to assert itself upon the weak and undisciplined, is marked internally by subordination to its own best elements.

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The Teuton, a "radical aristocrat" in Nietzsche's phrase, yields honour and obedience to what is really and radically the best. He reverences power, military power and intellectual power: his religion is valour, soldierly valour, and discipline and intellectual valour which fights for truth, to which truth is a conquest not a heritage (is truth not The Truth?) and having won it faithfully and fearlessly follows it out in action: who may be wrong in conception but never indifferent, brutal in application but never hypocritical.

This culture he now feels called upon to impose upon the world by forming a world state of like type. The Germanic stock, as a military and intellectual aristocracy, will rule and exploit alike the ignorant valour of the barbarian and the degenerate civilisations who love neither truth nor valour, but public opinion, uniformity, and comfort, and in return for material support may be left free to seek their happiness in the pursuit of riches, that true happiness of the greatest number.

We too are largely Teutonic and also of aristocratic instincts. But our reverence is perverted. We hate militarism and despise intellect. The English idol is the gentleman and however we define that word what we really mean by it is the man of leisure, the noble sportsman. Carlyle held up his hands to find the leaders of the people preserving their game, but that is what we like them to do, that is why we like them. A German will tell you that the sure mark of the Englishman is that he never does any work. Even amongst political personages whom we honour so highly—perhaps because they take credit for other people's work—we honour most those constitutional functionaries who do not function.

The difference of the two peoples is well brought out in their use of the term "culture." To us it is individual, the fruit and sign of leisure, a personal elegance, a sterile accomplishment. To them it is a national spirit energising through all their institutions. It is patriotic devotion, willing subordination to those marked as their natural superiors by those aristocratic virtues of the ancient Per-

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sians, love of valour and love of truth. Truth of science and truth of world envisagement, and the energetic and loyal application of knowledge to action and ideas to life. The love of learning, of thinking, of working, of fighting for their own sakes. Initiative, the power to will, and the will to power.

German culture then is not a thing to sneer at. Instead of shrieking at her essential doctrines the right of might and the virtue of salutary sternness, as distorted in the barbaric passions of warfare, it would be well to face those great verities which underlie all German thought and action, to understand and to learn from the enemy.

For us German culture is already interpreted. It is the message of Carlyle, faithful in its force and in its weakness. He was little affected by the purely intellectual achievements of Germany. His voice was the harsh and grating cry of the man who has no music in his soul. He too in the manner of prophets was brought by constant reiteration and heightening emphasis into exaggeration and caricature. But his doctrines are the fundamental convictions, the inner soul of Germany.

He stands for aristocracy, the true aristocracy of strength and insight, the rule of heroes, and one of his deepest intuitions is the instinctive hero worship of the mass. More than for equality, liberty, self-government, they yearn for a master. But they do not know him when he comes. Left to themselves they choose a Saul and murmur at him. They love and follow him who asserts his will to power and rules by right of might.

And he stands for the eternal verities against the shams: for the authentic powers of will and insight, crowning themselves like Napoleon in Milan, with their own right: against the democratic shams of public opinion, with its worship of catchwords, formulas, and paper justice of sentimentalism, which is the denial of eternal justice, a popular dispensing power against the laws of nature: of humanitarianism which would make weakness weak and melt the waxen hearts of men. He stands for work not comfort: for doing

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what we must, not what we like: for the joy of battle, not the ingemination of peace, peace, when there is no peace. Amid all doubts, disbeliefs and denials he is very sure of the devil, that to doubt of him is sure damnation: a devil not to be laid with rosewater, nor any pious exorcism: for there is no good without evil, no light without darkness, no life without death no peace without war.

He who saw the French Revolution as the judgement of an age which had forgotten right, might see to-day a greater judgement on an age which has made an idol of right, and forgotten the power which is its foundation and authority and final test: on democracy as the huddling of sheep that have no shepherd: on public opinion and popular values as the herd instinct of one sheep to be like another sheep,the gregariousness of a flock that moveth altogether if it move at all: on the popular religion of peace and happiness as the faith of the sheep that there are no wolves now, that the whole world is a paradise of sheep in unlimited clover, and when the wolf too finds his paradise of unlimited sheep bleat shame on the barbarity of "might is right"—for how should sheep understand that fundamental truth that "weakness is wrong"? who bleat of Huns and Attila: yes, Attila if you will—but Attila the scourge of God.

To-day the hammer philosophises. Again, as at the stroke of the Revolution, the world and the thoughts of man are irrevocably changed. None can foretell into what new shapes the world will be wrought, yet some of the inner changes of the thought that shapes the world, are clear enough. Thought is unfixed from its moorings. The anchors of principle are dragged. The hammer revalues all values.

Innate ideas expelled from philosophy entrench themselves in morality, the last refuge of the philosophically defeated, as principle that is, innate conviction, subjective self certainty, the fixed idea, insanity by definition. From postulates of consciousness they become postulates of conscience: that is, in reality, of the private wilfulness which

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is ready to make absolute any, save the one absolute principle the *salus populi*. Those who invoke it do not even know what conscience is, that it can prescribe no concrete duty. Kant's Ethics is the final exhibition of the futility of the attempt to deduce them from the mere formal respect for principle as such. Conscience merely prescribes loyalty to such rules of conduct as have already been accepted from other sources, from the authority of churches, sacred books, eminent thinkers, admired persons, floating tradition, hypnotic suggestion, or last and least independent thought which can only in the rarest cases escape the suspicion of self will.

The hammer that falls on current moral and political conviction, falls on current religion also. Not on the creeds and mythologies which are sufficiently hammered already, but on those all potent ideals and ends which men actually follow and preach to themselves in the churches they build as receivers and reverberators of their own spirit. For there is never a religion born but the devil builds its tomb in a church. But they have forgotten their Bibles. There are two testaments, not one. The second is not the abrogation of the first but the capital of its column. Power is the prius of the good. The fanatics of either are the convicted heretics of the other. The faithful, according to Tolstoi, are the blasphemers of the God of Joshua and Gideon, of Luther and Cromwell. The Kaiser has well reminded us of the tribal god who authorised and prospered a conquest of sheer aggression in defiance of every right of prescription, and of the chosen people who smote the idolaters of Right in the name of the God of battles. With all development of human conception, not of the essence, of the divinity, the tribal god remains its root and core, and patriotism the type and essence of morality. Greece and Rome, chosen and conquering peoples of antiquity found in patriotism their real religion, and offered in battle the only true and reasonable self-sacrifice. And yet we have seen the religion of self-sacrifice itself stand silent and helpless before the great spiritual crisis of a man's life, viewing

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the supreme self-sacrifice with open aversion, or faint condemnation or shamefaced approval. It has forgotten half of its message, that out of the strong comes forth sweetness. Good itself is not unconditional. Good is the restraint of the strong, not the weakness of the weak. It is strength that makes virtue virtue. *La faiblesse est plus opposée à la vertu que le vice.* "Be strong" is the universal commandment of nature, and the flower of human good is grafted on nature's stock. Beneath and before the will to good is the will to power.

The true, the beautiful, the good, are the three fold aspects of the divine, the three fold path of religion, and power is the root and touchstone of them all. Severed from that root the three fold revelation becomes the devil's gospel of sentiment, prettiness, comfort. Plato declared that the good was the useful, Socrates that the beautiful was the useful, and many voices tell us to-day that the true is only the useful, the means to power. The truth of the world without, we are told, is energy, the truth of the self is will, and knowledge but power in a deeper sense, a useful fiction. Power is the touchstone of truth and falsity. Keats in a flash of the philosophy which was stirring within him, proclaimed, "the eternal law, that first in beauty shall be first in might." And to Herbert Spencer, beauty was the suggestion of power exerted with an ease and mastery which heightens of itself the sense of power. Style is only economy of power, the effect with the fewest strokes. Beauty is the unconscious suggestion of power in activity to ulterior ends: prettiness its pose and conscious counterfeit. Power is the touchstone of beauty and prettiness. To the paradox of beauty that it only comes unsought, answers a paradox of good. For the good which the righteous pursue is but moral prettiness. Goodness is not sought but found in the following of external ends: the only felicity of man, the only happiness he will not scorn, lies in the consciousness of continual advance, the growing sense of power. Growth of power then is the human end, economy the human art, knowledge economy of thought, beauty economy of power, virtue power in poise.

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There are two sermons from two mounts: and Sinai first. Or rather there is no priority and no contrast: no gospel of mere power: no gospel of peace and happiness either over against it or to follow. But both transcended in one: peace and happiness transmuted to something higher in the tragic calm of strife.

Optimism, the democratic miasma, now breathes from the old religion of pessimism and the chosen few. Yet all the great religious teachers are at one: the same voice sounds in every age and clime: Buddha or Schopenhauer, the conquest of happiness: Mahomet or Nietzsche the scorn of peace. Happiness the common end of man and brute, the great illusion, the mocking hope, the undying fire of nature's hell, is first denied by man, the rebel Prometheus, who sees the end of nature and foresees his own, who kills her hope and kindles his, who knows her secret, wrests from her the arts that over-ride her, tames her and drives her to what end he will: Prometheus the crafty rebel against earth and heaven, who steals from Jove his own divinity, ethereal fire, and plants it in the heart of man, who puts out the stars of heaven, and recreates the world in his own image.

In that great denial and conversion of nature, man sets his foot on the slippery rope-walk of the passage to the man in whom he shall be superseded and transfigured, with the clear eyed tragic acceptance of unequal conflict and predestined defeat, the tragic peace of surmounted happiness, the tragic welcome of a fate he would challenge again and again.

Tragedy moves all hearts and is yet a problem for the wisest. Perhaps from its very simplicity. For the meaning of tragedy is the meaning of life. It is the endless ache of the eternal will, the blind yearning of nature's abortive travail, the passion of Dionysus, the dying god: the vision of the passing of youth, the waning of strength and beauty, the deception of hope, the swift revisitation of loss, the slow conviction of failure, the slacking tide, the greying future, the desecrated present, the sting of the irrecoverable past:

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and all that shadow of death projected as the idle passion of a play, by the spirit that affirms, and affirms it good.

Tragedy we are told was born of hero worship, the oldest and still the living root of religion. Its celebration in Greece, as still in Rome, was the typical and culminating act of religion. It is the essence of religion which is the meaning of life. It is the purification of the soul from pity and fear, from sentiment and cowardice, from happiness and peace, the Dionysiac draught of the cup of sorrow, the stern optimism of the conquest of happiness.

HORACE MILBORNE.

SOUTHSEA, ENGLAND.

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SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND THE PROBLEM OF A HIGHER NATIONALITY.

HAROLD CHAPMAN BROWN.

MANY humanitarians seem to believe that the boundaries of the nations might be swept away and a federation of all mankind substituted without loss. But the psychologist can hardly concur in this opinion. Most, perhaps all, human activities require co-operation with its attendant groupings. They result in forms of organization that may come to be dignified as institutions and are justified by their success in accomplishing something of which their participants approve. The nation is such an institution. Primarily it seems to have had as its function the task of repressing unsocial tendencies in wayward individuals, but in the course of a vicissitudinous history, replete with examples of "trial and error," it is gradually taking upon itself the more constructive task of handling matters of common interest that can be more efficiently administered by the aid of its organization than by individual initiative.

Also the nation has become something more than an administrative entity for, sanctified by common interests, it has stimulated common ideals. Whether it be a question of the arts, literature, or philosophy, there is always some touch that marks the nation and time. In philosophy the dream of cosmopolitanism has always meant either a rapid mixture of races, where conditions are not such that they participate in strong nationalistic bonds, political, religious or cultural, or a furor of self-satisfaction in which a people are fired to spread the blessings that they enjoy throughout the entire world. Of the first sort was the cosmopolitanism of the Stoics, recruited from the Hellenistic mixed races of the Orient, without compensation under Rome for the loss of their political liberty. Of the second is the cosmopolitanism of Fichte who writes, "While cosmopolitanism is the

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dominant will that the purpose of the existence of humanity be actually realized in humanity, patriotism is the will that the end be first realized in the nation to which we ourselves belong, and that the achievement *thence* spread over the entire race." Both are unsatisfactory. The Stoic ideal of humanity is too general to inspire the concrete attitudes and acts that give an ideal life, and Fichte's Pan-Germanism intensifies, if it did not precipitate, the most terrible struggle the world has ever known.

It has been suggested that the nation be retained as a cultural, but abolished as a political entity. Thus its ideal values might be retained and difficulties that arise from its political aggressions be done away. It is a grave assumption that this separation between ideal values and actual operation is really possible. There may be truth in the words Émile Faguet puts into the mouth of the youthful Plato: "I believe that a people who cease to be a people lose something even of their non-political qualities, and that the Athenians will have less intelligence, and will make less beautiful statues and write less beautiful tragedies when they shall be a province of some vast empire. National autonomy is a pride that sustains even the individual man, even the artist, even the poet, even the philosopher, and that gives him or protects in him all his energy and all his productive and creative capacity."

The more closely one looks at the psychological phenomena underlying political organization, the more suspected does the suggestion of such a separation become. "Man is governed," to quote Fichte, only to a small extent by law and legality on the one hand, and by the dictates of the individual conscience on the other." He must meet demands put upon him with a certain receptivity which common habits alone can supply. These the Germans call "Sittlichkeit," defined by Fichte as "those principles of conduct which regulate people in their relations to each other, and have become matter of habit and second nature at the stage of culture reached, and of which, therefore, we are not explicitly conscious." But if such habits are

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formed, they must penetrate the whole life of a people and it would be a hopeless task to try to separate culture and politics except as different phases of the expression of human nature developed along certain lines. A radical modification of either will show its effects on the other, as the pages of history bear witness.

The real problem of the formation of a higher nationality is then the problem of attaining an universal "Sittlichkeit" from which both an universal cultural and political organization can grow. It might be objected that at this price such a higher nationality would be undesirable. If the progress of man demands the autonomous working out by different peoples of their several capacities, to bring them to sufficiently common habits of thought and action might kill initiative and defeat real growth. If adequate autonomy sometimes results in war, though war be wholly evil, it might, if the price of individual freedom of national development, be worth the cost. The attainment of national as well as personal goods may involve undesirable by-products. No man would destroy his digestive system because it sometimes fills his body with toxins nor give up his work because it may lead to fatigue. But whether international organization must be abandoned on this ground cannot be discussed here. Probably not, and we shall proceed on the assumption that an adequate "Sittlichkeit" can be attained without this cost and limit ourselves to the discussion of the conditions that must be met if a cultural and political higher nationality is deemed worthy of realization.

In a remarkable address delivered before the American Bar Association at Montreal, September 1, 1913, on the Higher Nationality, Lord Haldane accepted this "Sittlichkeit" as the psychological equivalent of the General Will, and on it as a basis, laid down the conditions prescribed by it, if a higher nationality is to be realized. In a nation, the general will, if of a high type, raises men above themselves to deeds of sacrifice and heroism of which, as individuals, they would be wholly incapable. The General Will is also a common ideal. "Can nations," asks Lord Haldane,

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"form a group or community among themselves within which a habit of looking to common ideals may grow up sufficiently strong to develop a General Will, and to make the binding power of these ideals a reliable sanction for their obligations to each other?"

"There is," he continues, "nothing in the real nature of nationality that precludes such a possibility. . . . Renan tells us that "Man is enslaved neither by his race, nor by his language, nor by his religion, nor by the course of rivers, nor by the direction of mountain ranges. A great aggregation of men, sane of mind and warm of heart, creates a moral consciousness which is called a nation." Another acute critic of life, Matthew Arnold, citing one still greater than himself, draws what is in effect a deduction from the same proposition: "Let us," he says, "conceive of the whole group of civilized nations as being, for intellectual and spiritual purposes, one great confederation whose members have a due knowledge both of the past, out of which they all proceed, and of each other. This was the ideal of Goethe and it is an ideal which will impose itself upon the thoughts of our modern societies more and more."

"But while I admire the faith of Renan and Arnold and Goethe in what they all three believed to be the future of humanity, there is a long road yet to be travelled before what they hoped for can be fully accomplished. . . . The world is probably a long way off from the abolition of armaments and the peril of war. For habits of mind which can be sufficiently strong with a single people can hardly be as strong between nations. There does not exist the same extent of common interest, of common purpose, and of common tradition. And yet the tendency, even as between nations that stand in no special relations to each other, to develop such a habit of mind is in our time becoming recognizable. There are signs that the best people in the best nations are ceasing to wish to live in a world of mere claims, and to proclaim on every occasion, 'Our country, right or wrong.' There is growing up a disposition to believe that it is good, not only for all men but for all

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nations, to consider their neighbors' point of view as well as their own. There is apparent at least a tendency to seek for a higher standard of ideals in international relations. The barbarism which once looked to conquest and the waging of successful war as the main object of statesmanship, seems as though it were passing away. There have been established rules of International Law which already govern the conduct of war itself, and are generally observed as binding by all civilized peoples, with the result that the cruelties of war have been lessened. If practice falls short of theory, at least there is to-day little effective challenge of the broad principle that a nation has as regards its neighbors duties as well as rights. It is this spirit that may develop as time goes on into a full national 'Sittlichkeit'." [1]

Lord Haldane is right as far as he goes but there is one group of factors that his psychology has omitted. Beneath the above mentioned mental attitudes that, according to Morton Prince, "may be reduced to common habits of thought and conduct derived from the mental experiences common to a given community, and conserved as complexes in the unconscious of the several individuals of the community," there is also a residuum of suppressed habit and instinctive systems that may at any time break through the more superficial system and modify conduct in a fashion inexplicable even to men themselves and quite against their saner judgment. With normal individuals such moments of disruption are rare unless it be among the criminal and pathological members of society. But the events which make social psychology noteworthy are more often momentous crises that arouse impulses to fever heat and realize the conditions under which suppressions fail. Panics, lynchings, massacres are their fruit.

Since within the nation there are individuals whose atavistic and suppressed tendencies frequently break through, and more individuals in whom they will break

[1] Remember that Lord Haldane was speaking in 1913. Perhaps history will find the greatest crime of the present conflict in the obliteration of this dawning universal conscience.

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through under the stress and strain of hardship or emotional excitement, "Sittlichkeit" never gives adequate control. The nation is therefore obliged to hold threats of force over its citizens, perhaps not always of force wisely directed, but of force nevertheless. The same necessity must rest upon the group of nations howsoever strong the common habits of mind that have been built up. The great practical problem is the organization and administration of this supra-national force. The problem of handling the refractory individual is receiving careful study by the criminologists, the psychologists and the sociologists. But who has made a beginning of a study of the parallel problem for a realized Higher Nationality? There is some talk of international tribunals with armies and navies at their disposal but we need positive knowledge as to the causes that make a social group refractory, its state of mind, and the ways of treating it to bring it back to a suitable conformity.

The manipulation of an international army and navy is after all only like that of a police force. It is tradition to arrest and punish individual offenders and many are dreaming of applying that tradition to the treatment of nations. Yet our investigations are almost daily making it clear that the jail punitive methods never did anything but confirm criminals and increase their numbers. History also suggests that a chastised nation is not reformed but embittered. True this chastisement has hitherto been administered by a stronger fellow, but it is not clear that the situation would be materially affected if an international army or navy were the instrument instead.

We have learned that the individual's crimes result from many causes. There are characters so fortified by social habits that no environmental pressure will bring them to conduct that society formally condemns as criminal. But most men, and often the extremely able, are not so sturdily constituted. It may be the spontaneous energy of youth in a monotonous environment that leads to pernicious mischief. It may be bad associates and criminal education.

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It may be the man of vivid imagination, a John Gabriel Borkman, whose vision of ends obscures the justice of the means. It may be illness, shiftlessness or force of circumstance, which through economic pressure lead to social downfall. It is possible that, in some cases falling under these heads, prison experience will awaken a new reflective and corrective attitude or, at least, produce inhibitions that will lead to a superficial resemblance to a restitution of acceptable modes of conduct. It will surely protect society, but at a high cost, during the incarceration of the victim. Nevertheless, we are learning that this method is wasteful. It is more economical and efficient to furnish outlets for the energy of youth, to train the imagination of genius, to aid those in temporary need, to re-educate and relocate misfits, and to better general economic conditions as far as lies within our power and vision. We are but feebly advancing in our means to accomplish these things, but as a new social ideal, they mark an epoch in the development of civilization.

There is a second class of social offenders whom we may call variants from the normal. They include feebleminded persons, those whose mental age tests show that they never pass beyond the capacities of children, and those of exaggerated impulses or defective inhibitions that make them socially unfit in the common social environment. Inability for self support adds economic pressure as a disruptive force. But we are beginning to study these unfortunates. Some of them can be specially educated for particular tasks under controlled conditions. The psycho-pathologist may be able to do something for others, tho this work is still in its first infancy. Practical eugenics may also contribute to lessen the number of these patients. It is at least certain that, altho punishment may sometimes have value in the handling of our first class of delinquents, for this second class it is worse than useless.

There remains a third class, the irredeemably incompetent, the insane, those incurably ill and dependent, and the needy aged who must be segregated in many cases and are at least a permanent charge upon the community. They

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have, for the most part, escaped the primitive system of punitive methods.

This page from the experience of the state in dealing with unsocial individuals cannot be neglected by those who are dreaming and planning for the realization of a higher nationality. We may accept Lord Haldane's vision of an universal "Sittlichkeit" as prerequisite to international organization. We cannot, however, depend upon its power here any more than within the state. This is the justification of the internationalists who demand courts, armies, and navies. But there is the genuine problem of the functions of such courts and of the use to be made of such armies and navies. It would be a pity to try to preserve in a higher nationality a merely punitive system that is breaking down in the nation. Here is an important problem for the social psychologist: What are the psychological tempers of the nations and the conditions that lead them to war? How can they be controlled?

It is not to be hastily assumed that types of social groups will present exact equivalents to the types of individuals. There are undoubtedly wars due to economic pressure upon healthy nations. There have been wars due to unemployed energy. Vivid and aspiring imagination has given us national Borkmans. A people can be swept off its feet by egoistic, vengeful, or dominating impulses. How guard against these things? Economic injustice between nations can perhaps be lessened and succor extended to those temporarily embarrassed. Who has a plan for educational and environment supervision that shall preserve the individuality of the nations and at the same time keep them amenable to conditions necessary for the welfare of a society of nations? What is the psycho-pathology of social groups and the means by which their abnormalities can be corrected or restrained? Are nations ever "insane" or "feebleminded"? These questions have to-day no answers. We need more adequate studies of different national temperaments and "Sittlichkeiten." It is important to draw up administrative plans for an international

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court and for international policing but if such plans are to be more than utopian, an indispensable prerequisite is the study of the kinds of problems these courts may be called upon to solve and the means that may contribute to their elimination. It is no longer the function of justice merely to exact reparation for wrong doing but to remove the conditions, in so far as may be, thru which wrong doing arises. When this ideal begins to receive concrete embodiment in the plans of internationalists, we shall have taken a new step forward in the march of civilization and the realization of the vision of eternal peace.

From the point of view of the philosopher and social psychologist, the problem of internationalism is not then so much the problem of establishing an international tribunal, with power to enforce its decrees, or the problem of establishing a concert of powers. Not that these things are unimportant, but they are the problems of the practical jurist, and require the highest constructive legal ability. Our problem is rather that of finding the facts with which this administration must deal and pointing out concretely what ends it must accomplish. The welfare of humanity and eternal peace are too abstract ideals to do more than stimulate aspiration. They cannot direct achievement. If success is to crown our efforts we need to know what we are dealing with and how it can be affected, a problem for the social psychologist; what results it is possible and desirable to attain, a problem primarily for the philosopher; and, finally, to organize the instrumentalities through which they can be attained, a problem for the practical jurist. These tasks are not, of course, wholly independent of each other and the partitioning of them is merely meant to suggest the division of labor of broadly trained specialists.

The basis must be a new cosmopolitan philosophy that shall lack both the aggressive ferocity of Fichte's and the indifferentism attendant upon Stoicism. America is well suited to bring it forth, for our mixed population has given us the cosmopolitan understanding for which the Stoics longed, and our political institutions have striven for a

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democracy in which each man has a share of responsibility and may acquire respect for his own abilities and those of others. Democracy should teach respect for individual capacity.

The first tenet of our international philosophy must then be no interference with the individuality of nations in so far as that individuality is not incompatible with the healthy existence of other nations. There must be no encouragement to the doctrine of the survival of the fittest among nations but rather a pressure toward the fitting of the greatest possible number to survive. As a last resort only the essentially unfit may be eliminated, and this only after the failure of every educational and corrective measure to restore them to at least a condition of innocuousness. The practice of eugenics among men and nations has only attained justification for limited restraint. We yet lack that knowledge that can make constructive selection advantageous. No one could desire a perfectly healthy but perfectly mediocre race nor a perfectly peaceful association of nations where all lacked "punch."

Nations will probably still persist for, though it may be possible to develope a sufficient human "Sittlichkeit" to bring them together for ultimate organization, there are likely to remain wider and deeper ranges of concrete interests that demand their special political organization for effective development. On psychological grounds a group can be either too large or too small to be a nation, a matter difficult for a formal logic to understand but nevertheless real to the logic of fact. But the existence of a plurality of nations is not necessarily a conflict of nations. Contemporary ethical writers are fond of talking about the social individual. The concept may have the German interpretation of seeing in such an individual nothing but a mystical incarnation of an identified race, culture, and State. It then leads, if applied to the nations, to Fichte's aggressive cosmopolitanism. But it may mean individualities developing severally with mutual respect, consideration, and service, not trying to realize a preconceived idea of human-

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ity but trying to find, by the method of trial and error, an ever higher and richer content for this idea. It believes that while to seek to realize a perfect social ideal in man may be to bring God down to man, to find a nobler content for a social ideal is to raise man toward God. The former has as its consummation the contemplative blessedness of the Aristotelian God, the latter the more human blessedness of the religion of good works.

At present the American philosophy of cosmopolitanism may appear absurd to the German à priorist and frivolous to the British empiricist. Perhaps we shall be obliged to modify our sun-clear ideas to harmonize them with those of other peoples. Our present road, however, seems to me to have been admirably sketched by Professor Dewey:[2] "America is too new to afford a foundation for an à priori philosophy; we have not the requisite background of laws, institutions, and achieved social organization. It is too new to render congenial to our imagination an evolutionary philosophy of the German type. For our history is too obviously future. Our country is too big and too unformed, however, to enable us to trust to an empirical philosophy of muddling along, patching up here and there some old piece of machinery which has broken down by reason of its antiquity. We must have system, constructive method checked up at each turn by results achieved. We have said long enough that America means opportunity; we must now begin to ask: opportunity for what, and how shall the opportunity be achieved? . . .

"Any philosophy which should penetrate and particulate our present social practice would find at work the forces which unify human intercourse. An intelligent and courageous philosophy of practice would devise means by which the operation of these forces would be extended and assured in the future. An American philosophy of history must perforce be a philosophy for its future, a future in which freedom and fullness of human companionship is the aim, and intelligent co-operative experimentation the method."

[2] German Philosophy and Politics, pp. 129–132.

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These words were, of course, directed toward the development of an American philosophy. They are, however, easily translated into a philosophy of internationalism and I believe, so interpreted, will be the basis of America's highest contribution to that problem. An international organization would also be big, new, and have its history in the future. It also demands knowledge, constructive imagination and a carefully checked up experimental development.

HAROLD CHAPMAN BROWN.

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SOME RECENT LITERATURE UPON A LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE.

MARGARET JOURDAIN.

WHEN Emperor Alexander I, almost exactly a century ago, proposed an Universal Alliance, Lord Castlereagh replied that "the problem of a Universal Alliance for the peace and happiness of the world has always been one of speculation and hope, but it has never yet been reduced to practice, and if an opinion may be hazarded from its difficulty, it never can." The difficulty is fairly well recognised; some thinkers, such as Mr. Alison Phillips, make no doubt about its impossibility; what has drawn the question out of the academic debating room is the fact that the idea of a League of Nations has been blessed in the years of war by the highest authorities in public life, both in England, France and America. While some Continental pacifists, like Fried and Otlet, have published valuable schemes, discussion in England and America has mainly centred round Lord Bryce's project for a treaty. Lord Bryce's scheme was drafted two years ago, and published for the first time in the *Manchester Guardian* of April 12; and in book form, *Proposals for the Prevention of Future Wars*,[1] shortly afterwards, but its outlines had been made familiar for a considerable period before its publication by the propaganda of the League to Enforce Peace and the League of Nations Society. The proposals are limited to a practical minimum, and favourable criticism concerns itself chiefly with the possibility of setting up something a little more radical and comprehensive than this mechanism, and doubts as to whether the mechanism, if set up, will work in practice without an executive.

Even a critic like Lord Bryce, who states the obstacles in the way of International control, gives his opinion that the obstacles are not insuperable.

[1] London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1917.

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"If the free peoples of the world really desired permanent peace, desired it earnestly enough to make it a primary object and to forego some of their own independence of action to attain it, the thing might be tried with a fair prospect of success. What is needed is the creation, not only of a feeling of allegiance to humanity, and of an interest in the welfare of other nations as well as one's own—what in fact might be called an International Mind—but also of an International Public Opinion, a common opinion of many peoples which shall apply moral standards to the conduct of other nations with a judgment biassed less than now by the consideration of the particular national interests which each nation conceives itself to have."[2]

The alternative is Canning's notion of a wholesome state of things in Europe, "every nation for itself and God for us all"; which seems to us all less wholesome now than it was even in Canning's day.

The International public opinion Lord Bryce speaks of is at present very difficult to foster when the press rarely steps outside the narrow national circle in which public opinion is bidden to "think imperially" or nationally. "The press is either an agent of the very government it should exist to criticise (it is so notoriously and admittedly on the Continent, and to an extent which we cannot measure also in this country) or it is, with a few honourable exceptions, an investment to make money for certain individuals or syndicates."[3] An internationally-minded press seems a desideratum.

The Historic Argument against the League of Nations.

Two arguments are used against the League of Nations idea, firstly, that it is "visionary." It is difficult to give very much weight to this criticism. The Channel Tunnel has been described as "visionary": *i.e.*, it does not exist, and very likely will never exist. But that is no reason

[2] Bryce, *Some Historical Reflections on War, Past and Present*, p. 27.

[3] G. Lowes Dickinson, *The War and the Way Out.* London: The Chancery Lane Press. 1915, p. 13.

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why a Channel Tunnel could not exist, from the engineer's point of view. Secondly, there is the historic objection, put very ably by Professor W. Alison Phillips, in the *Confederation of Europe* and in an article upon "President Wilson's Peace Programme" in the *Edinburgh Review*, April, 1917. He considers effective and peaceable co-operation between nations as impossible to-day as it was a century ago. A coalition of great Powers, a coalition *ad hoc* might be prepared to "enforce the principles which now stand unanimously acknowledged by the Second Peace Conference at the Hague," but it would be impossible to extend the coalition into an universal union based on "the general right of the world organisation to coerce its refractory members."[4] For what would become of the sovereign independence of nations and, especially the independence of small nations? "For, though international law recognises the equality of all sovereign states, no international system which should attempt to translate this theory into practice would survive." If, on the other hand, the voting power of the central "directory" were to be proportioned to the size and importance of its constituent states "the result would be precisely such a hegemony of the great Powers as was exercised by the Holy Alliance after 1815."[5]

The analogy of a proposed league of civilised nations to-day with the Holy Alliance is not sufficiently complete to warrant such a positive prediction. The Holy Alliance failed, why should not a new League of Nations, is Professor Phillips' contention. Nations are nearer to one another in structure and tendencies than a century ago. To-day Europe no longer consists of six great powers, and some minor states, but of two groups to which many of the minor states are attracted; and "it is easier to conceive of this amalgamation into a loosely knit league than to imagine their dissolution into their elements."[6]

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[4] *Edinburgh Review*, April, 1917.

[5] *The Confederation of Europe*, p. 295; also article in the *Edinburgh Review*.

[6] *Towards a Lasting Settlement*, ed. by C. R. Buxton. London: G. Allen & Unwin. 1915, p. 155.

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A second criticism made by Professor Phillips is that "pacifists" propose to establish their international system on the preservation of the *status quo*, "indeed there is no other practical principle conceivable."[7]

That basis, however, is not the case of the advocates of a League of Nations, such as Mr. H. N. Brailsford, Mr. L. S. Woolf and others. The existence of a league to preserve peace will of course attempt to prevent the wars of conquest in which one nation overruns its neighbours' domain. But it does not necessarily present a barrier against change and expansion by settlement. The proposed Council of Conciliation would probably find its chief task in adjustment and rearrangement in certain areas.

The defect of Professor Phillips' attack is indicated by a passage in his *Confederation of Europe* in which he says that "The morality which inspires this (peace) agitation, moreover, shocks the consciousness of those, *happily the majority*, who still regard patriotism as the supreme political virtue and are not prepared to hold with the late Baron von Suttner that 'in any case the interests of humanity and of absolute right are superior to those of any one country.' "[8]

As to the question of the abrogation of the sovereign independence of nations; emphasis has frequently been laid upon the reluctance of independent states to submit to what has been called a coercive super-state. Lord Bryce speaks of the deep unwillingness of every nation, and especially a proud nation, to submit any part of its "rights" to the decision of an external tribunal. . . . "An American statesman, than whom there is none wiser anywhere, recently observed that one of the greatest difficulties the negotiator has to encounter is the displeasure of his fellow citizens at any concession, even when he feels his own cause to be none too strong, and believes his country would gain by the removal of friction. Nations seem to be as sensitive on what is called the 'point of honour' as were members of the *noblesse* in France and England three cen-

[7] *Confederation of Europe*, p. 294.
[8] *Confederation of Europe*, p. 13.

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turies ago. They hold out against arrangements which individual men would accept."[9] The answer to this would be that the states, retaining the ultimate right of making war, would not cede their sovereignty even though they submitted to a Council of Conciliation.

The Programmes.

The programmes of the American League to Enforce Peace and the British League of Nations Society suppose an union of civilised states; distinguish between judicial settlement and conciliation, prescribe coercive military action by the leagued states against the state which fails to observe the programme. (The American draft does not provide for defence if a member of the League is attacked by an outsider or seceder.) The third point (No. 3 in the American and English League) is the vital one, because it binds the signatories to use force if necessary, and so lifts the whole matter out of the region of speculation.

The central idea of the projects, both English and American, is the turning of a solid, united resistance against the aggressor. The idea is an obvious one: "Let all the states," wrote M. Nobel to the Baroness von Suttner, "undertake solidly to turn against the first aggressor. Then wars would become impossible, and even the most quarrelsome state would be forced to appeal to a tribunal or keep quiet."[10] These schemes give us for the first time an objective test of aggression and enable us by means of it to limit the scope of alliances to an honestly defensive purpose.[11]

The two programmes with Lord Bryce's "Treaty" are really a minimum programme, designed to carry the moderates with them. Lord Bryce speaks of the scheme as dealing with only one branch of a very large subject, and

[9] Bryce, *Some Historical Reflections on War, Past and Present.* Being portions of two Presidential Addresses delivered to the British Academy, June, 1915, and July, 1916. London. 1917.

[10] Suttner, *Memoiren*, p. 272.

[11] *Towards a Lasting Settlement*, p. 158.

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of those who drafted it as "duly sensible of the obstacles to be overcome before even these limited and tentative proposals could be likely to find acceptance with those who direct the policy of states."[12] They have been careful to avoid the chief difficulty which became apparent in the discussions as to the institution of a permanent court,—the question of the *ultimate power of the Court.* If the Court were to have authority to settle every dispute, instead of the authority to offer advice, it is obvious that there would be hesitation on the part of governments in placing the fortunes of their people in the power of the Court. Experience has shown that even among the nations which are most ready to accept the principle of arbitration, hardly any of them have consented to give themselves over absolutely into the hands of a tribunal. They have generally reserved specifically questions affecting national honour and vital interests.

Membership of the League.

It is commonly postulated that membership of the League must be open to all civilised sovereign states; but that the League have the right to expel any state that had violated its constitution. This opens the question as to what states are civilised. Japan is admittedly civilised, but could China be so considered? A limited League of Peace, consisting of a few nations, would not differ substantially from other defensive alliances; its defensive character would be suspected by nations outside the League who would tend to coalesce into a counter alliance.

The Prospects of a Small League.

Some internationalists expect the universal League to come by degrees, preceded by a League of liberal nations such as Great Britain, France and the United States,[13] perhaps with Switzerland, Italy, Holland and the Scandinavian countries. As stated above, a counter alliance would probably be formed, and if such a powerful state as

[12] *Proposals for the Prevention of Future Wars,* p. 7.

[13] So J. M. Beck, *The War and Humanity.* London: G. P. Putnam's. 1917.

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Germany was not included, this "outlaw" would compel the liberal alliance to maintain such a powerful defensive force that much of the advantages of the League would be neutralised. Germany would intrigue incessantly to detach members from the League; and the United States would probably never remain in an alliance from which Germany was excluded.

The Cooling-off Time.

Each member of the League will pledge itself to a certain period of delay, in order to allow of the discussion of every dispute submitted to the Court or Council of Conciliation. That is the minimum on which any League of Peace can be founded. American writers commonly refer to this as the "cooling-off time," and consider it generally favourable to conciliation. The period of delay is usually defined as one year from the date of the submission of a dispute to the Council. Of course, such a concession presents obvious difficulties. "Some disputes arise from continuous injuries so serious that they must be suspended while they are examined by Court of Arbitration or a Council of Conciliation. No power will wait a year for justice if the offender continues to repeat his aggression, or completes a wrong whose beginning was already an offence. The Court or Council must be always in being to issue a preliminary injunction in urgent cases before the question of principle is debated."[14] But, these acute questions apart, delay will often make the difference between peace and war. "What precipitated the present war was first the ultimatum of Austria with its forty-eight hour limit, and then that of Germany, with its twelve hour limit. The war was rushed."[15] Mr. J. A. Hobson, speaking of the Permanent International Commission concluded in the autumn of 1914 by the United States of America with Great Britain and France (in which Reports are to be furnished by an International Commission within a year

[14] *Towards a Lasting Settlement*, p. 160.

[15] G. Lowes Dickinson, *After the War*. London: A. and C. Fifield. 1915, p. 31.

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from the beginning of the investigation), writes that the year's delay "exerts a cooling and a healing effort, allowing time for the facts disclosed by a full and impartial inquiry to make their right impression on the intelligence of the disputants."[16] Of course the value of mere delay can be overestimated. The assumption is that nations will rarely go to war on a cool and reasoned view; and that the "cooling-off time" will promote a wise and reasoned view. But, writes Mr. Brailsford, both assumptions are questionable. "Some nations will cherish for a generation the project of some necessary change, scheme and arm for it for the inevitable struggle, bend all their minds to it and march with full knowledge into a war of which the last details have been thought out. This is what Bulgaria did in 1912 against Turkey in order to win Macedonia, and no moratorium would have cooled her perfectly cold and deliberate resolve."[17]

The Action of Members of the League in Relation to Recalcitrant Members.

Doubts will arise whether the parties to the League can be trusted to fulfil their respective obligations, except when it is their interest to do so. Cases might be imagined in which some member or members of the League, having at the moment nothing direct to gain by supporting the policy of the League, or through unwillingness or unreadiness to fight, or through the hope of some advantage to themselves might be induced to stand aside. "The ultimate benefit of mutual protection and of the repression of any disturbance of the general peace may be admitted. But in politics the avoidance of a near evil is usually preferred to the attainment of a more remote good, for all can recognise the former and only those of large minds and large views can appreciate the latter."[18]

A method of securing decision may be to make the statu-

[16] J. A. Hobson, *Towards International Government*. London: George Allen & Unwin. 1915, p. 51.

[17] *A League of Nations*. London: Headley Bros. 1917, p. 291.

[18] Bryce, *Some Historic Reflections on War*, p. 26.

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tory obligation of the League very drastic—"to exact from all its members the pledge that in the event of a breach of its fundamental provision they will, if necessary, go to war against the offender."[19] This is the basis both of the American League to Enforce Peace and of the British League of Nations Society. No executive has, however, been provided, in the published schemes, and if the action of each member is left to its own interpretation, there would be disputes such as those mentioned by Mr. Brailsford: *i.e.* (1) Will any Power really promise to take an active part in coercing an ally?[20] (2) Will a small and exposed European state, such as Denmark, make war (if the case should arise) on Germany? (3) Will the non-European members interfere in every European war, and *vice versa?* Is it, for example, likely that Japan or the Latin-American Republics will promise to share in every common war in Europe? Mr. Brailsford[21] suggests the following formula:

"When a breach of the fundamental obligation of the League is threatened, the Executive of the League shall forthwith determine by what means, military or economic, its observance may be secured."

The International Executive.

The institution of an international executive authority with power to call into action the forces of the League when the occasion should arise, and to direct operations in its name is indicated in *The Prevention of Future Wars*,[22] but the League, according to the draft, is not provided with an executive; it has a voice but no arm. Most critics are agreed that there must be an international executive, entrusted with the powers requisite for the execution of international mandates quite apart from and distinguished from the members of the Council of Conciliation and the Court of Arbitration, for "the very qualities for the performance of this judicial and conciliatory work are defects

[19] *A League of Nations*, p. 295.

[20] The tendency of the League would, however, be to weaken special alliances.

[21] *A League of Nations*, p. 296–297

[22] *The Prevention of Future Wars*, p. 16–17.

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for the performance of executive duties." It is evidently of the utmost importance that an International Executive . . . should consist of members who are in direct touch with the public sentiments of their countrymen." All internationals are agreed upon the importance of the members of the Executive. The representative of each Power would be "a more important personage than the Foreign Minister," and in touch with his Cabinet. The executive would thus be a cabinet of the cabinet of the Great Powers.

Mr. Brailsford suggests a fixed seat for the Executive, Constantinople, if any sort of international *régime* is established there, Berne, or Geneva, in neutral Switzerland; or the Hague, which has some associations. The military and naval, legal and commercial *attachés* would form an advisory general staff for the League.

The League executive might act in various ways in relation to a recalcitrant member, by using the weapon of a temporary boycott or embargo against one or both the disputants. A whole series of such measures can be conceived, differing in their severity and in their application to different cases: *e.g.*, an embargo on the shipping of the recalcitrant state; a prohibition of loans to it; cutting it off railway, postal, telegraphic and telephonic communication; prohibition of exports to or imports from it, supported if necessary by what international lawyers call a "pacific blockade";[23] (2) supporting one party, (3) holding the ring, and limiting the quarrel; or reminding the allies of the warring states that it expects them to remain neutral, or to give their support to such common measures as the executive may prescribe in accordance with the undertakings which each of them has given on its entry into the League.

The Council of Conciliation.

The question of the composition and procedure of the Council of Conciliation has been studied in detail by the Fabian Society. The project of a standing Council of

[23] *Proposals for the Prevention of Future Wars*, p. 17.

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Inquiry and Conciliation for non-justiciable disputes is a contribution towards International control. Members of the Council are to be appointed for fixed times; and are not to be hampered by instructions from their Government, differing thereby from diplomatists at the old diplomatic congresses and conferences summoned for the occasion. What is required is a standing body of sufficient prestige and character to take action as a whole, upon its own initiative, in cases of actual or impending differences, and to offer its advice in the form of a public report. As to the bases of representation, a simple proposal is that the eight Great Powers shall each send three representatives, and other civilised states one each, but by that "Italy and Japan would be over-represented and Spain under-represented.[24] By this scheme the Entente would have a permanent majority, commanding 20 votes.[25] It is also obvious that Montenegro is over-represented, as compared with Spain. The neutral votes would be ten.[26] A possibility would be to give Italy, Japan and Spain two votes each, thus reducing the Entente majority.

To ensure the efficient working of the Court of Arbitration and the Council of Conciliation, it seems requisite that some joint Standing Committee representing both bodies should watch the rise of controversies and differences and in default of an appeal from one or both parties concerned, should take the initiative by inviting them to submit the matter to arbitration or the Council of Conciliation.

Is International Force Justifiable?

Assuming a number of states, including a majority of the great Powers, are willing to enter a League, and agree to submit any disputes either to arbitration or to a Council of Conciliation. They agree to accept the award on arbitrable issues; they also agree to a cooling-off period while submit-

[24] *A League of Nations*, p. 306.

[25] Great Britain, France, Russia, Italy, Japan = 15. Belgium, Serbia, Roumania, Montenegro, Portugal = 5.

[26] United States = 3, Holland, Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Spain, Greece.

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ting non-arbitrable questions to the Council of Conciliation. We may ask whether the finding of the Council is likely to be carried out, and whether the moral and intellectual sanction for the fulfilment of the treaty obligations would suffice. Some pacifists rely on public opinion and conscience of the civilised world as a sufficient sanction, and even a statesman such as President Taft, writing before the war in support of a Court of arbitral justice, states the issue thus: "But the query is made, 'How will judgments of such a court be enforced? What will be the sanction for their execution?' I am very little concerned about that. After we have gotten the cases into Court and decided and the judgments embodied in a solemn declaration of a court thus established, few nations will care to face the condemnation of international public opinion, and disobey the judgment. *When a decision of that Court is defied it will be time enough to devise methods to prevent the recurrence of such an international breach of faith.*"[27]

Now, the existence of this war has definitely weakened the current faith in the plighted word of nations, and in the restraining power of public opinion. Generally, the abler writers such as Mr. Hobson and Mr. Brailsford, are for enforcement by international power. In the existing rudimentary condition of the society of nations, it would seem necessary to secure the integrity of the treaty by express provisions for its enforcement, but some idealists object to the coercive element of force, and the sanctions of moral force and reason are degraded and impaired by placing in the background a sanction of physical coercion.

MARGARET JOURDAIN.

BROADWINSOR, DORSET, ENGLAND.

[27] *The United States and Peace*, p. 150.

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THE GERMAN AND THE ANGLO-AMERICAN VIEW OF THE STATE.

VICTOR S. YARROS.

THE controversy over "Man vs. the State" is very old. It was old when Herbert Spencer published his once famous attack on "the great political superstition," the right of the majority to govern, and his protest against the inroads of socialism and the alleged shameful surrender of British liberalism. It is, of course, a familiar fact to students of social and economic phenomena that Spencerian individualism lost ground steadily during the last decade of the nineteenth century and the first of the twentieth. The tendencies Spencer and his followers deplored continued to gather strength and momentum. Legislation became more and more "paternalistic" or socialistic; the trade unions shed more and more of their "independence," their distrust of political action; labor parties came into existence, and their platforms registered almost annual victories for socialism. Anglo-Saxondom appeared to be resigning itself to what Professor Huxley called "regimentation."

Even if we go back only a few years—say to 1910—we must candidly admit that we find no disposition among thinkers to draw sharp distinctions between the Teutonic idea of the state and that of the Anglo-Saxon peoples. It was, in fact, generally assumed that, while Germany was certain to liberalize and democratize her governmental machinery, Britain and America were equally certain to adopt important German ideas concerning the duties and functions of the state.

Since the outbreak of the great war the old controversy regarding the state and the individual's place therein has been vigorously revived everywhere, and many are asserting that there is some radical, momentous, inevitable difference between the German conception of the state and our own, or

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the Anglo-Saxon, conception. German aggressions, crimes, brutalities have been attributed to a blind and fatal worship of the state. The Germans, we have been told, are what their peculiar philosophy, their perverted Darwinism and their distorted evolutionism have made them. If the Germans believe in frightfulness and ruthlessness, the argument runs, it is because their general philosophy condemns pity and compassion as sins against God and nature, as emotions that cannot be indulged without retarding the development of supermen and superwomen. On the other hand, the Anglo-Saxons and the Latins are more humane and merciful because they have worked out a sound philosophy of life and progress; because they know that mutual aid has been at least as important a factor in evolution of animal and human societies as struggle and competition, and because they know that amity and justice are just as possible and necessary in international relations as they are in the relations among the members of any given modern state.

Now, if these representations were not only true in the rough and for immediate practical purposes, but absolutely true and challenge-proof, the most high-minded and ethical of inquirers would be content to stop where the popular magazine writer or platform orator invariably stops. But, as a matter of fact, reflection and analysis suggest qualifications to the statements currently made regarding German misconceptions or superior Anglo-Saxon and Latin views of the state, society, the individual, and the scientifically ascertained conditions of human progress. What are the qualifications in question, and what differences and contrasts emerge after all the allowances and disclaimers are made?

As to the qualifications, let us begin by quoting a passage that has done considerable illustrative duty of late in animadversions on German philosophy. Eduard Meyer, an eminent German savant, wrote as follows in a work on the present war:

"To us the state is the most indispensable as well as the highest requisite to our earthly existence. . . . All individualistic endeavor . . .

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must be unreservedly subordinated to this lofty claim. The state eventually is of infinitely more value than the sum of all the individuals within its jurisdiction."

So detached and penetrating a writer as Prof. Thorstein Veblen cites this passage by way of confirmation of his own view that in Germany the dynastic ruler holds dominion by divine grace, and that it is impossible to determine where "the dynastic powers end and the claims of divinity begin." "There is something of a coalescence," concludes Veblen.

Of course, a half divine dynastic state cannot consent to submit its decisions to any parliament or referendum. Of course, in a political sense a half divine state is "irresponsible"—that is, responsible to God alone. Such a state is, in truth, of infinitely more value than all its subjects taken together. It may order them to fight foreigners or one another, and it may keep up the fighting indefinitely, without condescending to give reasons. But the question is whether, rhetoric and loose writing aside, any educated German can seriously maintain that the constitution of the Teutonic empire expressly or by necessary implication recognizes the sacrosanct and divine nature of the state, or the insignificance of the individual.

That constitution was, of course, a compromise. Bismarck, the junker and tory, made only such concessions to democracy as he deemed absolutely necessary. Equal, secret and direct suffrage for elections to the imperial Reichstag, or lower house, was a necessary concession; without it the empire probably could not have been formed. True, the Reichstag is in many respects powerless; it has no voice in foreign policy; it cannot prevent war; it has not even security of tenure, for the emperor may dissolve it at any time and for any reason. But, unwise and unmodern as these things are, they do not prove the thesis under consideration. If the German state were really considered absolute and irresponsible, the government would not tolerate interference and dictation from the Reichstag in financial affairs. The "power of the purse" is one of the

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tests of democracy, and the Reichstag controls the purse of the empire. It cannot prevent war, but it can refuse supplies; it can reject bond and tax measures introduced by the government, and thus make it impossible for the "irresponsible" government to carry on any particular war. A half-divine state begging, bargaining, coaxing, blustering, threatening dissolution in order to obtain money from a representative chamber to carry on a war is certainly a strange spectacle and a poor illustration of semi-divine absolutism!

Germany's political and social development has been retarded by militarism, by lust of power and conquest. The events of 1870–71 intoxicated not the junkers and their imperial lord alone, but the majority of the German people as well. Democratic and liberal tendencies were inevitably impeded or checked. But it cannot seriously be doubted that, war or no war, Germany was bound gradually to modernize her mediaeval and reactionary features, to democratize herself. The advance of socialism, trade unionism, industrialism and internationalism made the political emancipation of the German people merely a question of time. "Divine rights" of the dynastic state would have quickly lapsed.

Let us turn now to the political principles and institutions of England and the United States. What conception of the state animates and characterizes the institutions and constitutions of these free, democratic countries? Prof. Eduard Meyer asserts that the German idea of the state "is nowhere to be found in the English constitution, and is quite foreign to English thought, and to that of America as well." American and British thinkers hold the same opinion, and glory in the fact that the German scholar disapproves and condemns. But is the alleged fact a fact?

Under the British constitution sovereignty is theoretically vested in the crown and actually in the parliament. The authority of the parliament is unlimited; it can change the organic law itself; it can pass "unconstitutional acts"—indeed, not a few recent acts were denounced as unconstitu-

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tional by conservative jurists and professors—for there is no superior authority to annul its acts. Practically, therefore, parliament is sovereign, but parliament speaks in the name of the people—or of the majority of the electorate. The upper house, being appointive and hereditary, cannot in any true or democratic sense represent the people, and for this reason its power has lately been seriously curtailed Its legislative veto, long absolute, is now merely suspensory. An act passed three times by the House of Commons, although it may have been twice rejected by the Lords, becomes law in spite of the upper house. Thus the Commons is really supreme in British politics and legislation, and the Commons represents an accidental popular majority. Britain's suffrage is fairly democratic, and contemplated amendments will make it fully democratic, since poor laborers and women are to be enfranchised. In any case, the Commons speaks for the majority of the voters of the kingdom, the ministry being nothing more than the executive committee and instrument of the majority of the elected commoners.

In England, therefore, the laws are made by the majority of the people, albeit rather indirectly. The minority has no choice, once a law is on the statute books, but to obey it. By what right does the majority of the British electorate claim this power over the lives, the possessions, the consciences and the convictions of the minority? By what right, under what principle, does the majority of the electorate—actually a minority of the adult population—govern the country?

The answer is clear. The majority speaks for the state. It decides all questions in the light of the crude but practically workable doctrine of the greatest good of the greatest number. It may be mistaken, wrong, blind, reactionary. Ibsen may be right in saying that a truth accepted and enforced by the majority has already ceased to be a truth, and has become half a truth. The majority is apt to be conservative and intellectually indolent. Advance, inquiry, doubt, originality, destructive and constructive criticism

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have always come, and will continue to come, from the minority. Still, no modern political philosopher advocates minority government. It cannot be denied that majority rule is, historically and practically speaking, an improvement upon autocratic or oligarchical or caste rule. Democracy is assuredly better and safer than any of the superseded forms of government, and democracy has long meant, and still means, the rule of the majority—at least within certain constitutional bounds.

The important point to bear in mind is this—that under any form of human government some agency must speak in the name of the state. The state cannot speak for itself. No voice from Heaven tells us what the state needs and demands from us. The autocrat speaks for the state. The oligarchy speaks for the state. The ruling caste speaks for the state. In democracies as we know them the majority (the actual minority often) speaks for the state. The individual must obey, even when the majority orders him to risk his life for the good of the state. It is idle for him to urge that he knows better what the state needs; he is not the chosen instrument of the state for the interpretation of its demands.

This being indisputable, how can it be argued that in England the individual is not subordinated to the state, or that the conception of state supremacy is alien to British thought?

As to the United States, its governmental system is in some important respects different from that of England, but none of these has any bearing on the question of state sovereignty. We have our own "checks and balances," our own ways of ascertaining and interpreting—and testing—the popular will. We have a written constitution that limits the powers of government in certain directions. We protect minorities and individuals in certain "inalienable" rights against the commands of the government or the majority back of it. But even our constitution is amendable by certain majorities. We cannot get away from majority rule. Sooner or later, after delays and obstacles

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intentionally provided to hamper majorities, the latter carry out their will. And they do this because, and only because, under our system, as under the English, the majority speaks for the whole body politic, for the state.

True, neither England nor the United States has what is called absolutely democratic—direct and popular—government. Many political radicals are working for the further democratization of the American federal and state governments. They would adopt the referendum and the initiative, and perhaps also the recall. They would reconstruct the Senate, perhaps abolish it. They would deprive the Courts of the power to set aside legislation on constitutional grounds. They would, in a word, remove certain obstructions that lie in the way of "the people." But what, after all, do they mean by the people? Always a majority of the electors. These radical democrats would increase the power of the majority over minorities, over individuals. They may be right or wrong, but the object is plain. And why do they want to increase the power of the majority and facilitate direct action by it? Because, manifestly, they believe that majority rule is more likely to be just and equal and enlightened than minority rule or autocratic rule. They want the majority to be the state's instrument and interpreter. They are not opposed to compulsion, to government by force, to the *principle* of state supremacy. They are merely opposed to such forms of government, such uses of compulsion, as may enable *any group short of a majority of the electorate* to interpret the needs of the state.

Thus, in the last analysis, the peoples now arrayed against Germany are not fighting any peculiar conception of the state. The conception of the state is the same all over the civilized world. The state is supreme; but who shall speak for it—one man, a few men, a caste, a class, or a majority of the citizens composing the state? The struggle is between various forms of autocracy and various forms of democracy, and no one who has reflected on human evolution can have any doubt as to the issue. Autocracy is doomed. Democracies are certain to become more and

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more genuinely democratic. Majorities will have their way more and more, except as to certain departments of human activity that we have learned to withdraw from the sphere of politics and compulsion and to leave to the individual. As to these activities, anarchy, not state-ism, is the recognized principle. The individual is sovereign, and he is allowed to be as eccentric, as "different" from the rest, as may suit his mental and moral bent.

Those who reject the principle of state supremacy, of the subjection of the individual to the constituted authorities that speak for the state, are anarchists in theory. They do not admit that any group or number is entitled to speak for the state. They are opposed to compulsion except where plain, criminal aggression—attempted murder, burglary, etc.—render it necessary as a measure of defense. They abhor majority rule as profoundly as they do autocratic rule. They hold that majorities are often more tyrannical and bigoted than autocrats. They rail at the referendum and all the other democratic devices. Nothing would satisfy them, in theory at any rate, except government by unanimous consent. All co-operation, they hold, should be voluntary. Any individual may secede from the organization, and cease to support it, without incurring the least legal penalty.

Now, the philosophical anarchists are consistent. They do not believe in compulsory taxation for any purpose whatever, and they do not believe in conscription under any circumstances. They would stick to the voluntary policy at any cost. Even invasion and defeat of the country they deem preferable to the use of compulsion against any non-aggressive individual. If the anarchists ever succeed in establishing a society on their basis of complete voluntaryism, that society will have abolished "the state" for itself and substituted for it the régime of individual sovereignty.

How many centuries, or millennia, separate humanity from the anarchistic régime; we need not stop to inquire. Anarchy may in fact be an impossible condition. But, if

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ever reached at all, it will be reached very slowly, and reached through many democratic stages. The fight for democracy is not so much a fight for certain evolved forms of political organization and economic institutions, but a fight for the freedom of nations and communities to experiment, to change, to advance.

The fight for democracy is a fight for the very conditions of growth—for free discussion, local autonomy, individual and group rights under the law. The anarchist who says that all governments are alike, that tyranny is tyranny, and that the war does not concern him—and, alas, there are not a few who say this—simply reveals his ignorance of the course and conditions of human evolution. Progress there has been, and progress there will continue to be—if societies and states preserve their freedom and society is not rebarbarized by the Prussian type of government. The anarchist who assumes that institutions can be suddenly changed, and that whole nations can lift themselves by their bootstraps, needs an elementary course in political science and political history. But such a course, coupled perhaps with a few advanced lectures, would also greatly benefit those who write and talk superficially about the difference in kind between the German view of the sovereign state and the Anglo-Saxon view. The differences are those of degree, though their importance is undeniable. But under any form of organization except the anarchistic—which contemplates unanimous consent of the organized—the state is necessarily sovereign and the individual is necessarily a subject of the state and of the group that, for the time being, represents and interprets the state.

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FEMINISM AND THE FAMILY.

ELSIE CLEWS PARSONS.

ALL modern reform movements are made up of many currents, so complex is modern society, and the reformers in any movement are variously classifiable. Feminism and feminists are no exception. There are at least two main currents in feminism and there are two conspicuous classes of feminists. There is feminism which is a form of sex consciousness and there is feminism which is a form of humanism. There is the feminist who seeks privilege and the feminist who seeks opportunity, she who wants a bigger share for women, more wealth or power or liberty, and she who is less concerned with the question of distribution and more concerned with the question of developing personality, the greedy feminist, shall we say, and the arduous feminist.

The greedy feminist wants to eat her pie and keep it. In the same breath she talks of equal pay for equal work and encouraging chivalry in men. In government she insists that women must not be discriminated against, but she wants the vote of women counted as a woman's vote, and women's influence, she ever argues, will elevate politics. Elected to political office previously shut to women just because of sex, she wants a special hearing and she wants to be treated with peculiar distinction—does she not represent her sex?

"But politics is not a function of sex at all," answers the arduous, opportunity seeking, humanist type of feminist, "and it is for that very reason I am a suffragist, whereas the man or woman who sees sex in politics is an anti-suffragist. As for chivalry, whether in politics or economy or life at large, chivalry is not a function of sex either. It is quite possible that the helpless or necessitous be a man, an old man, a boy, or even a strong man victimized by circumstance or passion."

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As in this matter of chivalry so in other particulars the humanist feminist is far more concerned over the theory of sex boundaries and far more scrupulous than the greedy and avaricious feminist, she who sees in sex boundaries merely an invitation to encroach. It is merely more territory that the privilege-seeking feminist wants, and it never occurs to her to offer to relinquish territory. She is a frank imperialist.

Nowhere is this imperialistic trend more apparent than in sexual questions and in questions of family organization. Actions for seduction or for breach of promise or provisions for alimony, seem in no way grotesque to the woman who, as she sometimes says, is out for all she can get for women. As for economic independence in marriage, of course she is all for that—independence that is plus support. And so she favors the compensation for housekeeping system, that most ingenious of plans to keep what you have and grab more.

In the economic interpretation of marriage in general the privilege-seeking feminist shows her colors. A particular touchstone for distinguishing her from the humanist feminist is offered, I think, by the question of parental responsibility and, in particular, responsibility for the illegitimate child. Sometime ago I was present at the reading of a paper on parental responsibility[1] to a group of New York women supposed to represent the most advanced feminist opinion of the country. It was the discussion which followed the paper which more than any other single expression of opinion determined my classification of feminists. All the women present stood for free motherhood, for *Mutterrecht*, the right of a woman, whether married or unmarried, to control her child. On that point there was no dissent whatever. But almost all believed likewise that it was the father who should support the child, and that he should be compelled, if need be, to accept the responsibility, that is my friends advocated laws for the

[1] See Parsons, E. C., "The Future of the Family," in THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, July, 1915.

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determination of paternity, for the recognition of illegitimates by the father, and for paternal support, according to economic status, of both legitimate and illegitimate children. Much the same kind of bastardy legislation as that recently passed in Scandinavian countries, a highly patriarchal bit of legislation, was commended. As for the support of legitimate children, more drastic enforcement of the law against desertion was also in order. To the point raised that without economic control it would be not only difficult for women to acquire legal control, but perhaps not even just, nobody paid any attention. "Women have enough burdens, as it is," was the only rejoinder. "They do their part and more in merely bearing a child. Men must be *made* to do *their* part."

The acute note of sex antagonism there was in this discussion I pass over to note the indifference it revealed to the desire that women should make good, make good, not merely individually along the economic line of earning enough to support their children, but make good by the kind of social experiment and organization which would increase through education the earning capacity of women, raise through unionization their wages or salaries, and insure them through forms of maternity insurance against the economic risks of child-bearing. No, it was not primarily through such types of foresight or endeavor that my New York friends were for benefiting women. What they wanted was the compulsion of men, they were for enforcing upon men women's standards, the single code of morals and that women's, or paternal responsibility. They were depending on the old, old method of social control, of group tyranny. They were for women putting it over men just as men have put it over women, as the senior has put it over his junior, the rich man over the poor, the man of magic or of professional equipment over the ignorant or unspecialized.

Not long ago I heard a physician argue that he was opposed to birth control because the fear of having a baby was the only way to check the spread of veneral infection.

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But for that fear, he reasoned, any girl would live with Tom, Dick or Harry and consequently become diseased. It was, therefore, the duty of the physician to keep the knowledge of contraception esoteric. The idea that fear or suppressed desire might be just as bad for people as venereal disease had not, of course, occurred to him—he was too thorough a disciple of St. Paul—(and yet when we remember the dictum "better to marry than to burn," perhaps not thorough enough). At any rate he was enough like that Saint not to be aware of the arrogance of his own professional will-to-power.

Bred to this type of control by men, I am suggesting, women would in turn make use of it against men. Instead of taking nature or reality as it is and by facing it learning to control it, women, like men, overlook it and would work their will on other human beings. The consequences of sexual intercourse *are* more grave for women than for men. Why dodge the fact? The consideration of rape aside, conception and child-bearing are functions women, not men, are primarily responsible for. Why not then in our social theory put the responsibility where it belongs, at the same time giving the more responsible sex means to meet their responsibility, giving them knowledge of contraception and knowledge of veneral disease, and, of course, as far as possible a realistic understanding of men? And we should have to free the exercise of the function of maternity from the social stigma not uncommonly attaching to it. The mere legitimizing of the illegitimate child would not do this. The whole conception of illegitimacy must go into the discard.

Nor should economic means for responsible maternity be overlooked. I have referred to educating women to greater economic efficiency and to making their economic demands more effectual, but education and triumphant unionization are a long road. Meanwhile it seems fair that women should be helped over the economic bankruptcy maternity may bring on them. By those who esteem child-bearing a social service, social aid to maternity must be

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considered, moreover, a permanent desideratum. A word or two then about maternity insurance.

We are familiar with the beginnings of a system of state insurance of maternity made in Europe. To some of us its provisions seem very inadequate, glad as we might be to have even that measure of public insurance in this country where the old proprietary theory of marriage has hitherto precluded any aid to mothers except the widow pension, a practice which takes its hat off to proprietary marriage. But it is to possible private systems of maternity insurance I would draw attention. Why should not private insurance companies write maternity insurance, the policy to be taken out either by the beneficiary herself or by her relatives or friends, even by a friendly husband? Indeed, the plan might slip into use as a kind of dowry or wedding present. A woman told me the other day that enough useless silver was given her at marriage to have paid for all her confinements. She has six children. Another woman once remarked to me that her husband had given her a pearl necklace which, were she to sell, she could live on very comfortably for at least five years. I recommend to the determinedly chivalrous American to give his bride instead of a pearl necklace or an engagement ring a paid-up maternity policy thereby ensuring her against being economically dependent upon him during periods of child-bearing. Seriously, the paid-up maternity policy at marriage would be, I think, a rather happy social device, even if it is one of those transitional devices so favored by—the greedy feminist. As for girls who do not move in pearl necklace or silver wedding present circles, maternity insurance premiums might well be paid for their benefit by solicitous parents. The middle class French father is very thrifty, the better to marry off his daughters. Why should he, why should the American father not be thrifty for the sake of his daughter's independence, for the sake possibly of her health and happiness? In many cases girls themselves, wage earners or salary earners, might choose to save to be able to become mothers without foregoing

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economic independence. A man is supposed to earn his right to have children. Why not *a priori* a woman?

Maternity insurance, insurance through a variety of methods, is a way out of the dilemma of having to choose between maternity and economic independence, between childlessness and economic dependence. That dilemma presents itself already to many women and it will present itself to an increasing number, but for a great many women, let us remember, it has never existed and it never will exist. There will always be women who do not desire economic independence in marriage just as there will always be men who want to support or keep women. There is no reason, as far as I can see, why that system, the prevailing system to-day, should not be tolerated in the future; it is only objectionable when it is taken for granted and imposed on people as the only possible system. And people are coming more and more to rebel against the imposition. "The more variety and freedom in marriage the better," wrote recently the editor of a New York newspaper.[2] In the circumstances was not the utterance a bit of liberalism not insignificant of the trend of contemporaneous opinion?

Variety in marriage is what law and custom will come *in time* to recognize. With that recognition, with the realization that requirements in mating vary and must be variously met, society will come to see *in time* that the whole or almost the whole question of mating is no concern of the state. This does not mean of course that the state should not undertake to recognize and enforce contracts for economic support, support of one adult by another. If the contractors are male and female people may choose to call the contract marriage.

Mating, the sexual relationship, as distinct from the economic, is a private relationship. Parenthood, on the other hand, is a public as well as a private relationship. The state is necessarily concerned about the proper care of children. Again and again we acknowledge or assert this concern, but strange to say we have hitherto failed to

[2] The *New York Tribune*, February 23, 1917.

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work out either in theory or practice any adequate system of relationship between the parent and the state.

In the article in THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, to which I have already referred, I tried to develop a theory for the parent-state relationship. I proposed a parent register and a parent contract system whereby a parent or expectant parent would publicly record the birth or expected birth and would contract to care for the child. Either parent or both parents might undertake the contract.

What if neither parent is willing to contract? Then, whatever measure of compulsion the public sees fit to impose, and it would be well, I think, for it to impose no small measure either through legal machinery or social disesteem, this compulsion should be on the mother. As I have said before, the woman, not the man, is primarily responsible for the existence of the child, and on the mother the state should place the ultimate responsibility for the care of the child. Until the theory of this responsibility is frankly accepted in social theory I see no real solution for the logical problems raised by what we call the questions of illegitimacy or of free motherhood or of economic independence in marriage.

Let me say in conclusion that practical developments are going to be determined but little or at any rate very indirectly, I fully understand, by any such new matriarchal theory. But here we touch upon the relation between social theory and practical developments and that—is another story.

ELSIE CLEWS PARSONS.

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LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE.

ÉMILE BOUTROUX.[1]

THERE is one lesson that clearly results from the trial through which we are passing: the necessity of extirpating from our society, religious intolerance, that scourge so productive of barren strife. Not only is it too evident that, in attacking people's consciences we divert towards imaginary or inaccessible objects, forces which might effectively be employed in opposing palpable evils, forces which our country claims for the defence of its very existence, but events have proved that Frenchmen, in presence of a common duty and in spite of the barriers which politics has endeavoured to set up between them, are spontaneously united in thought, heart and will. Who could persuade a soldier who is also a free-thinker that he should feel less love than he does to his captain, under the plea that this latter is an ecclesiastic? And does the believer enquire as to the opinions of this comrade who will perish unless he comes to his aid? How could these men, who with like faith and self-sacrifice have given themselves up to their ideal and their country, consent, once peace is restored, to come from the lofty heights of enthusiasm into that arena of individual ambition and passion where power and rule are the only things of which men think?

But, in order that a thing may be realised, it is not enough that it is in the highest degree desirable or even desired. If there are real difficulties in the way, these may always check the most generous desires. And so we may usefully examine the problem. The will is by no means weakened by union with the reason, rather is it all the more powerful because exercised with a keener vision into reality.

The struggles dealing with liberty of conscience offer a strange assemblage of noble or legitimate claims and un-

[1] Authorised translation by Fred Rothwell.

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worthy intrigues, and we are greatly tempted to take up in detail the historical sequence of facts, to think of what would have happened if, at any particular time, some other line of conduct had been adopted. The effort of liberty of conscience to be denizened within human societies is one of the essential facts of the world history. What does the name of Socrates stand for if not the claim of the right to think and teach in conformity with what is believed to be the truth? What are religion, philosophy and science but the triple command to cultivate the rights of the ideal, of reason and experience?

Now, the appearance of conscience in human society naturally occasions great struggles and difficulties. Conscience is an inspiration whose origin is inapprehensible and it is possessed of something absolute and imperative in its nature. On the other hand, the man in whom it awakens is no isolated being, like Crusoe on his island; he belongs to a human community which has its own traditions, beliefs and laws.

The individual whose conscience is awakened naturally aspires to express his thoughts in speech and action. But if, as may be the case, his words and deeds do not accord with the maxims recognised in his community, the latter will naturally be inclined to become uneasy and mistrustful. If the individual who claims his liberty of conscience refuses to act along the lines of the rest, evidently he does harm to the community. If he obeys in body but reserves his liberty of soul, he still injures the community, because devotion is necessarily less whole-hearted when purely exterior than when it proceeds from the intellect and the affections.

Thus liberty of conscience, through the influence it is bound to exercise on the conduct of the individual, necessarily interests the organised community; and this latter is at once disposed to solve the problem by permitting the individual to find, in the ideas received by the community itself, the principles of his own personal beliefs.

Again, even if conscience were to create within itself a

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life apart, and to refrain from expressing its thoughts by public deeds; the liberty it claims would still meet with contradictions. The beliefs of conscience necessarily depend upon truth. Apart from individual consciences, however, are there not established symbols and forms of truth? What right has an individual to continue to hold thoughts opposed to recognised truths?

Thus we find Socrates put on his trial, not only on the charge of compromising the security of the state by his outer acts and the instruction he gave to youth, but also on that of nourishing, in the secret of his conscience, beliefs opposed to the official teachings: *e.g.*, his belief in the warnings of divine intervention.

In our days, it is not only traditional beliefs but science itself as built upon experiences and reason, that many minds contrast with liberty of belief. Is there any room, we are asked, for liberty of conscience, in mathematics, physics and chemistry? In proportion as science takes possession of any one domain of reality, it drives out imagination and simple belief. When science holds the principles of all reality, *i.e.*, both of the moral and of the physical world, liberty of conscience will have had its day, for it can be accepted with some appearance of legitimacy only when truth is but imperfectly known. And, in the mind of some of these apostles of science, the principles necessary to explain all things are now fully established, so that nowhere can liberty of conscience be any longer tolerated.

Very real and serious then is the conflict between liberty of conscience and the external powers. What means have been employed to end this conflict?

The simplest and the one of most ancient standing is persecution. He who possesses or thinks he possesses force, does not doubt but that he will succeed in suppressing unpleasant beliefs either by constraining or by destroying his opponents.

The advent of conscience in man, however, represents the appearance of a wholly spirtual power, which is deter-

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mined by reasons that cannot be reduced to force; such as the ideas of truth, justice, duty. The greatest force, therefore, breaks before the most disarmed conscience. Socrates, without defending himself, calmly drinks the hemlock; and his thought enters forever into the substance of the human mind. Christianity penetrates men's souls with prodigious rapidity and might, not only in spite of, but thanks to, persecution. In modern times, the Puritans, persecuted in England, founded the United States. The revocation of the Edict of Nantes raised against France the most bitter hatred and ill-will abroad.

How comes it about that, after such striking lessons, men have not ceased to employ force, constraint, material means, against conscience?

Manifestly, at first, beliefs are expressed in external acts, against which force believes itself victoriously armed. Again, subtle minds distinguish beliefs according to the degree of vigour and vitality they attribute to them. They admit that profound beliefs cannot easily be destroyed by force. But if a belief is no more than a survival, to use a popular expression, a passive habit devoid of living faith, they think it legitimate to admit that such a belief will fall before the powerful organisation set up against it.

Moreover, certain present psychological doctrines, recommended by imposing names, tend to prove that constraint, cleverly employed, is not so powerless to modify belief as one is wont to declare. Our ideas and beliefs, according to these doctrines, are in the final analysis no more than our deeds and habits expressed by conscience in its own language. Hence our attachment to our beliefs and ideas is really no more than that force of inertia which makes us continue in our mode of life. If what one believes is but the expression of what one does, force may indirectly act upon belief, for it can impose acts and impress habits.

Whatever credit this theory may have enjoyed, it has not triumphed over the classic doctrine of the autonomy and originality of conscience. They are not mistaken who regard belief as a principle which cannot be reduced to

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external life and consider that acts inspired by serious beliefs are more difficult to repress than purely mechanical acts.

Now, in the emancipation of conscience there dwells a form of existence superior to the mechanism of matter or to the impersonal tendencies of animal colonies. If then it were possible arbitrarily to train the conscience and change a person into a thing, such a task would be odious, it would mean the triumph of the inferior over the superior. Aristotle's God is truth and good: he leaves force to matter. God, says Christianity, is essentially love and sacrifice. Would not the restoration of force to supreme rank and the subjection thereto of conscience mean blotting out the work of Hellenism and Christianity from the history of mankind?

Whatever influence force may exercise over belief, he who regards moral excellence and human dignity as realities will unhesitatingly condemn its use against liberty of conscience.

Besides, force does not solve the problems in which conscience is engaged. Hence the use of a second method: compromise. If liberty of conscience is, *per se*, an idea, an ideal object, those who claim it do not of necessity limit themselves to the use of spiritual means. They also have recourse to force, engaging in material strife with their opponents. These wars too are followed by treaties of peace.

However artificial may seem the use of formulas and compromises in assuring liberty of mind, this means is in conformity with human habits and is of undoubted practical value. A contract has always been an effective instrument of reconciliation. Inspired by a true spirit of justice, frankly accepted on both sides and loyally put into practice, a concordat may peacefully settle relations as delicate as those of the state with religious communities.

A régime simply created by events appears something contingent and provisional. However skilfully forms were made out, they responded to the difficulties of an epoch;

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there is no guarantee that they would satisfy the needs of later periods.

The words of the Gospel have often been repeated: Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and unto God the things that are God's. Was not this a realisation of the great precept that a radical distinction must be made between the rights of the state and those of conscience? For the state, material power, the making of laws, responsibility for public order and national security; for conscience, liberty of thought, reflecting on the nature of things and on human destiny and holding to the ideal it regards as truest and noblest. If each of these two rivals is really itself, regulating its activity by its own principle, no conflict between them is possible, for they could never again meet. The one lives in the outer world of force, politics, national solidarity, the other uses outer things only to create for itself an invisible world, inaccessible to natural forces, where it holds communion with pure spirit, the ideal, God.

The state and conscience, it is thought, are both entirely free and apart from each other, just as the infinitude of space in no way encroaches upon the infinitude of spirit.

A seductive theory, though no more than a practical expedient. Is it not evident that two persons who cannot endure each other will cease fighting if they never again happen to find themselves together?

Applied, however, to the relation between political organisation and conscience, such a comparison does not hold. To suppose a world of conscience wholly independent of the external world is to substitute artificial logical concepts for veritable realities. This radical distinction between the temporal and the spiritual has no better scientific than historical foundation. Man is a whole whose elements are mutually inseparable. Neither body nor soul can be separated, nor does conscience exist apart. Every real idea is also the beginning of an external action; every strictly human action is the manifestation of an idea.

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This condition is found in the activity proper either to the state or to conscience, as regards morals or religion. The state represents force. How can we help desiring that it should be used in the realisation of the truest and loftiest ideas, measuring the greatness of its duties by the extent of its powers? Conscience is the domain of liberty. Would this liberty be aught else than an individual's vain mental state and barren enjoyment did it not tend to effort, and, when necessary, to strife, in modifying the world according to the ideal it conceives?

We must courageously face the truth. As regards the relationship between the political community and human conscience, all real and lasting peace is impossible, unless, amid all differences in principle and point of view, human beings have mutual understanding and esteem. The classic maxim is constantly being repeated: *Quid leges sine moribus?* Now or never is the time to apply it. Laws, undoubtedly, are capable of exercising profound influence upon morals; it is by no means a matter of indifference that they should outstrip morals if the latter fail to correct themselves.

In examining these questions, it is impossible to keep to purely political or legal considerations. It is necessary to ask oneself if consciences which regard truth and justice as laws can really come to consider religious beliefs as absurd and baleful, or at least as useless and devoid of foundation.

Now, if we closely examine the objections raised against religious beliefs in the name of reason and science, we find that they refer to conceptions of religion and science which are neither adequate nor legitimate. There is a contradiction between a science which regards the material element of things as the true reality, the essence of all that is, and a religion which denies to creatures any existence and value of their own. Science, however, may follow out as far as possible its mechanical explanation of things without, therefore, maintaining that mechanism is the first and sole principle of being. And religion may show God present and acting in all that is without denying to creatures true

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existence and action. "God," said Pascal, "willed to endow his creatures with the dignity of casuality."

Thus religion is not opposed to the fact that beings should possess a certain nature, capable of being studied in itself. And science admits that the world of facts in which it moves is connected with a world of true causes, which eludes its mode of investigation.

Nor can it be without advantage to religion to know exactly and profoundly, by means of science, the nature of the given world. Science too, as it ascends the scale of beings, encounters regions where matter is more and more impregnated with spirit, where the real seems to be increasingly determined by the ideal.

If then religion and science, so far as they consider each other only from without, may be led to mistrust each other or even to regard each other as irreconcilable enemies, on the other hand when they endeavour to understand and know each other in spirit and in truth, they see that their coexistence is natural and necessary and that they can and ought to render mutual services.

The minimum of mutual human obligations is what is called tolerance. In every manifestation of conscience, there is occasion to consider conscience itself, the reality and dignity of which are set beyond doubt by the most exact science. To oppress conscience is to wish to lower humanity, to snap the link binding it to the ideal, to separate it from the principle of truth, justice and beauty.

But is it enough that men should tolerate and bear with one another? Such a doctrine was repulsive to Mirabeau who said: "The very word tolerance seems tyrannical in a way, since the existence of the authority which has power to tolerate is an attempt upon liberty of thought, from the very fact that it tolerates and so has the power not to tolerate." This remark is quite true. In reality, man's conscience is something more than a possibility to strive after truth and goodness. As Plato pointed out, we seek only that whereof we possess at least some idea, germ or rudiment. "Be of good comfort," said the Saviour to

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Pascal, "thou would'st not seek me had'st thou not found me." The reason why conscience aspires after the true and the good is that in its very nature are found some beginnings of science and justice. For this reason, consciences owe one another respect as well as tolerance. Conscience, that secret and living communion with the ideal, is essentially the power to confront material force by obeying moral laws: this very character confers on it a positive dignity and makes it something sacred, to every intelligent being.

Nor does respect, in its turn, exhaust the whole of our duty towards the conscience of our fellow-men. The one quality which man, when attempting to conceive of God, is necessarily led to attribute to Him, is infinity in perfection. No man, then, however great his intelligence, can compass the divine nature, for the finite cannot contain the infinite. The diversity of mankind, however, enables the human race, in a measure, to ponder and fathom these various aspects of divine perfection. Thus mankind, as a whole, profiting by its natural richness and fecundity, may tend to realise more and more fully that resemblance to divinity which is its end. And so, to each of our brothers in humanity, a collaborator like ourselves,—differently perhaps from ourselves,—in divine providence, we owe not only tolerance and respect, but also sympathy and friendship. "Love one another," all morality which falls short of that is a failure.

Though insoluble so long as each of the two parties nourishes a secret scorn for the other, the problem of the relations between established power and liberty of conscience becomes simplified if every man is able to find the substratum of truth in the beliefs he does not share. Though divided in the expressions and forms of their faith in the ideal, men who are eager to fulfil to the end their destiny as human beings are united in the inmost aspirations of the conscience. Let them build upon this common basis, become imbued with their mutual duty of respect and sympathy as well as of tolerance, and legal

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arrangements, rendered supple or capable of extension if necessary, will readily be interpreted and applied along the lines of liberty.

To recognise liberty of thought without granting men the slightest right to manifest and translate this liberty into action would be to misinterpret the unity of human nature and the meaning and value of thought itself. Not only the individual but society is interested in the external realisation of thought. The tasks to perform in our modern societies become increasingly numerous and complicated; the state neither can nor ought to claim to accomplish them all, of itself alone. Undoubtedly its influence is more than ever necessary in times of public danger, when co-ordination of effort is particularly indispensable. Nor can it be admitted that individuals or associations, under the pretext of maintaining their liberty, should adopt the "dog in the manger" attitude. All alike, state, individual or association; believer and free-thinker, should devote their special powers to the task of making human society ever more keenly enamoured of truth and justice.

Amongst the manifestations of social activity, beneficence and instruction more particularly could not be the object of a monopoly. The former is based on brotherhood and is a matter of the heart as well as of the mind, of devotion as well as of organisation. Instruction also deals with the soul as well as with the intellect. Xenophon, the disciple of Socrates, was wont to say that if a master cannot inspire love he is incapable of imparting true instruction to his pupils. Science and literature, art and morals cannot be confiscated by any one, they form the common possession of every member of a human society.

As regards religion especially, since it is essentially an education of heart and conscience, with a tendency to free man from his natural passions, to civilise him, in the highest sense of the word, it is right that the state should loyally guarantee its free practice and the conditions of its existence.

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Cordial collaboration on the part of all who are devoted to virtue and to their country, however different their beliefs; such is the duty our reason dictates. This too will be the blessing left to us by the immense sacrifices, the deeds of truest devotion and the superhuman efforts made in common, without respect of rank or opinion, by all the children of France.

ÉMILE BOUTROUX.

PARIS, FRANCE.

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MILITANT PACIFISM.

MARY WHITON CALKINS.

THE one thing which unites the world to-day is the desire for the end of the Great War. The larger desire which animates many men is the passionate longing for an end of all war. But checking this desire, strangling this hope, are two widespread dogmas: the psychological dogma that man is inevitably a fighter and the ethical dogma that through war, and through war alone, he can rise to the supreme height of self-sacrifice. This paper proposes to subject these teachings to a brief examination.

I.

It is unquestionably true that those who dare to hope and to work for the end of war must meet the protest of the critics who hold that this instinct is irrepressible and that war is, therefore, ineradicable. It is vain, these critics insist, to hope, to plan, to work for a league of nations, a world-state, a reign of perpetual peace. Such dreams belonged to the prophets of Israel who foretold swords beaten into ploughshares and to Roman poets who sang of a returning golden age of peace. But we moderns, it is urged, with our scientific training—we, alas, know that we are very much lower than the angels and only a little higher than the beasts who must prey upon each other in the fierce struggle for survival on which depends the development of living beings. The hopeless ideal of abolishing war should, therefore, make way for the intelligent purpose of replacing unjust, cruel, and dishonorable fighting by just, humane, and honorable warfare. To estimate properly the argument from the nature of instinct to the dogma of perpetual war it is necessary to study in some detail the instincts lying at the heart of war and, in particular, pugnacity. By instincts are meant feelings and bodily reactions reappearing in every generation, either born in individuals or else arising at a definite period of their

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lives as original endowments of their nature. Like all the instincts pugnacity has two aspects, the mental and the physical, and appears in the forms of anger and of combat. In both its forms, it is a very early, a very permanent and a tremendously powerful instinct. Its outward signs, bared teeth, stiffened body and the rest, are known by everybody and explained by the biologists as the persistence, in bodily attitude, of reactions useful in the preservation and propagation of animal species. Pugnacity is widely diffused among animals, and very early observed among children; and it persists, a strong instinct, throughout adult life. People differ, to be sure, in the degree of their combativeness; and one man's pugnacious feelings and actions are far more readily excited than another's. Yet every normal man is a potential and, at times, an actual fighter; and everybody knows by his own experience how the flame of an intense anger may devour all other feelings and obliterate all memory and all thought, and how it may lick one's mind clean and bare of every control and restraint.

Pugnacity is always incited by opposition. Animals and men alike fight when they are thwarted or balked in the free play of any instinct, or (if we confine ourselves to human pugnacity) in the exercise of any volitional activity. It follows that pugnacity is excited in many specifically different ways and that it is affiliated now with one and now with another instinct. For our purpose this intimacy of interrelation is of utmost significance, and our valuation of pugnacity must hinge largely on our estimate of the fellow-instincts by which it is excited and which, in turn, it may reinforce and invigorate.

Pugnacity, in the first place, is sometimes excited when the instinct of curiosity is thwarted; as when a child shows anger if balked in his investigation of the contents of a wastebasket. Curiosity is an instinct common to animals and to human beings and so strong that hunters often appeal to it in decoying wild animals. It has many forms, appearing sometimes as component of the play impulse, and again, when it involves awareness of danger, as daring.

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Now daring, morally controlled, is the virtue of courage; and so it comes about that the fighting-instinct, called into play by curiosity and daring, is closely associated with this heroic virtue of courage. In the thick of the fray, the fighters know no fear; they ignore danger; they hurl themselves against the bayonets of the enemy; they rush recklessly into the open swept by murderous shell-fire; they worm themselves along, half underground, to place the explosives by which they themselves, as well as the enemy's barricades, will be blown to fragments. And because pugnacity gives impetus and scope to heroic courage, therefore the fighting instinct will ever be glorified by men.

A more hesitating estimate will be placed on the very frequent coalition between pugnacity and the instinct of acquisitiveness, in its two forms, getting and hoarding. This is the instinct illustrated, at its extremes, by the squirrel who fills the hollows of the trees with nuts and by the financier who first makes and then prudently invests his money. Everybody knows that pugnacity is far more often excited by balked acquisitiveness than by thwarted daring. The dog fights to get and then to defend his bone; the militia is called out to protect mill or mine; the nation fights to extend or to defend its boundary, its prestige, or its trade. And here, again, pugnacity is estimated not for itself but according to the moral value of the instinct which excites it and to which it lends its support. The individual or nation which fights gallantly for an object rightly gained and rightly held is known as a heroic defender; whereas the attack on property or rights possessed by other men is condemned as burglary or piracy.

Pugnacity, in the third place, is as all biologists know very often the outgrowth of fear. Fear, like pugnacity, is a primitive reaction in the face of danger. It is one of the earliest and most compelling of the instincts—shown by all animals, early observed in babies, directed toward objects, animate or inanimate, of the most varied sorts, and manifesting itself in the sharply contrasted forms of flight and immobility. Fear is, therefore, absolutely in-

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compatible with pugnacity since no animal can at one and the same time shrink back and make attack, feel afraid and feel angry. And yet it is plain matter of observation that fear incites to pugnacity, and in two ways. On the one hand, the fleeing animal, brought to bay, turns on its pursuers and the desperately frightened child suddenly attacks his tormenter and thus the instinct of fear suddenly gives way to anger. And, on the other hand, fear may stimulate the deliberate and premeditated creation of the machinery of attack.

Pugnacity, finally, may be excited in an altogether different way and may reinforce instincts of an entirely different character. Men and animals alike sometimes fight not through balked courage, or thwarted acquisitiveness, or in swift reaction against paralyzing fear but to protect or succor others, that is, because their social and sympathetic instincts are violated. The neglect, even the denial, of these social instincts was one of the unfortunate results of the superficial popularization of Darwinian teaching. But every biologist recognizes *gregariousness*, approach in its social form, the basal instinct which crowds animals into herds and is manifested in the flight of birds in flocks, *protectiveness*, the instinctive attitude of parent to offspring, and *imitation*, the instinctive attitude toward leaders or parents, as primitive endowments of animal and of human selves. In their higher manifestations these developed social instincts are directed toward ever widening groups of persons and are transmuted into the virtues of generosity and sacrifice on the one hand, into loyalty and obedience on the other. We are here concerned with the abundantly established fact that the fighting instinct normally lends force and vigor to these social instincts. No battles for private ends are so fierce as those which the animal or human mother wages to protect her young; and the glory of war is the lavish sacrifice of life and love and work for the beloved fatherland.

At their surface value these considerations seem to support the theory of those who disparage the war against war.

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For pugnacity has appeared in its true colors as a strong and widely diffused instinct, excited when any other instinct is hampered or thwarted. And those who assert the inevitableness of war assume that a man is the prey of his own instincts and helpless in the face of them; that they have a right of way and must ride rough shod over the paths of his life even when these intersect the ways of other lives. This psychological naturalism is, however, contrary to all observation. Not merely the higher vertebrates but metazoa and (according to good observers) even certain unicellular animals learn by individual experience, that is to say, they modify their instincts; and man, too, possessed as he is of more instincts than any animal, has advanced precisely in proportion as he has controlled these instincts. This acquired habit of controlling the instincts must be sharply distinguished from any form of ascetic practice. The effort to crush the basal instincts betrays a very inadequate conception of the place of the instincts in human life. For they are the very springs of life and we should impoverish ourselves if we checked their outpouring of life and energy. But as has just appeared, biology and psychology alike abundantly attest the fact that it is possible to modify instincts without destroying them.

A consideration of the methods of controlling instincts is, therefore, abundantly justified. Such a study at once discloses the fact that the effort to modify an instinct in a purely negative way, by merely willing that it subside or change its direction, is utterly futile. By such a method the attention is simply turned full upon the instinct-to-be-modified with the inevitable result of stimulating it. The control of the instincts is, in truth, always positive and it takes two main forms. Either the instinct is directed toward new objects or it is subordinated to another instinct. Many illustrations of each of these methods suggest themselves. When the dog is taught to retrieve, his instinct is directed away from chickens toward wild birds. And the boy in Miss Alcott's classic tale diverted his fighting instinct from boys to gnarled roots of trees and was seen

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"wrestling with the ungainly knots, with red face and wrathful eyes, till he had conquered them, when he exulted and marched off with an armful of oakwood in triumph." The pointer whose instinct to kill is checked by his instinct to return to his master illustrates the modification of one instinct by subordination to another. And, similarly, the shyness of a little child may be wholly neutralized by the curiosity which drives him nearer with every puff of the red balloon which the strange person holds out to him. There is no reason to suppose that these practical, psychological methods, so constantly employed in the education of animals and human beings, are inapplicable in the self-discipline of nations.

II.

The outcome of our study of pugnacity is, thus, the assurance that war is not the inevitable result of unmodifiable instinct. But this conclusion leaves us with our ethical problem still on our hands. We have still to examine the ethical doctrine that war is morally, if not psychically, inevitable—that war must be cherished as an awful but necessary human experience which purges men's souls of cowardice and selfishness and fans to a flame the fires of courage and devotion. That war may—nay, always does—create and invigorate daring and sacrifice no student of history will deny. And the world has need of these human qualities. We would not if we could blot out of the great book of human history the names of the warriors: David and Hector, Leonidas and Cæsar, Richard of the Lion Heart and Henry of Navarre, Wallenstein and Gustavus Adolphus, Drake and Farragut, Sir Philip Sidney and Rupert Brooke. And we could not press forward in the struggle toward a righteous social order unless men were nerved to fight in the great causes of truth and justice. In the words of William James, the "martial virtues . . . intrepidity, contempt of softness, surrender of private interest, obedience to command must still remain the rock upon which states are built."

The bold ideal of militant pacificism is, however, to pre-

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serve and even to strengthen the fighting instinct, with all these martial virtues which it inspires, but to direct it to radically new ends. The militant pacificist, in other words, expressly challenges the assumption that pugnacity can find moral expression only in the war of human being against human being. He believes that men should go on fighting but that they should attack no longer human lives but human ignorance, human injustice, and the great nature-evils. In this conviction, the pacificist is evidently in line with the psychological teaching that an instinct may be modified and still cherished by being supplied with a new object. And in his effort to divert pugnacity from the ends of war, he is seeking to preserve for human use not merely lives—for which, as physical values, he claims no special exemption—but the great spiritual values, human love, human virtue, human toil.

And the whole gruesome record of war attests the urgency of the pacificist's claim that pugnacity must be redirected toward inanimate instead of human objects. For the great lesson which history imprints on the mind of the candid reader is the tragic certainty that all wars gain their ultimate ends, whether great or petty, by the violation of personality, by the destruction of homes, by the paralysis of art and industry and letters. The irony of the terrible situation is precisely this: that even wars entered on from high motives must rouse greed, cupidity, and blind hatred; that even in defensive warfare a people can defend its rights only by inflicting new wrongs; and that chivalrous no less than self-seeking war entails relentless destruction. This truth, that there is inherent inconsistency at the heart of every just war, and the sad fact that a war, unless it is on both sides the outgrowth of popular fear, must be, on one side at least, a war of aggrandizement, illumine with blinding light the truth that no individual or nation can be trusted to define its own rights and then to fight for them, to act, in a word, at once as advocate, judge, and inflicter of punishment in its own cause. In this crisis of conflicting needs—on the one hand the crying need of all nations for men of

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courage and self-sacrifice who will fight for the ends of justice and humanity, on the other hand, the dire need of nations desolated, blighted and impoverished, to be rid of war—the militant pacificist, in season and out of season, preaches his fighting gospel of a war against obdurate nature-evils, against floods and fires, famine and disease; and, even more insistently, he urges the necessity of organized and tireless war against human error and human selfishness in individual hearts and in social customs and institutions. Such a war, it is true, is fought with intangible weapons but it is, none the less, literal fighting and it involves all the vigor, the passion, the unyielding determination of the warrior. In truth, these warriors have need to put on "the whole armor of God" for they wrestle "not against flesh and blood but against principalities and powers and spiritual wickedness in high places." This spiritual warfare demands also, in a manner as yet only dimly apprehended, a systematic organization of effort and a rigid training of combatants. For only by disciplined obedience to their leaders, by the harmonious exercise of their powers and by the outpouring of their common toil, their time, their talents, their fortunes, their lives, if need be, can men successfully attack opposing nature-forces and entrenched human evil and victoriously fight for better customs, better laws, better men—in a word, for a regenerated and redeemed society.

There remains the insistent practical question: how, precisely, may we redirect pugnacity? How may we teach ourselves to make war no longer against the lives and homes of our fellow men but against their errors and ours, and against our common enemy, hostile Nature? It is, of course, beside the restricted purpose of this paper to answer this question in sociological terms—to explain, for example, the constitution of international courts and international police, to set forth the methods of the general strike as applied to international relations, or to debate William James's great conception of a "conscription of the whole youthful population" as part of "the army enlisted against

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Nature." For we are here concerned with the human instincts and volitions that control all social machinery and we are urging, against upholders of the dogma of perpetual war, that the abolition of war is psychologically possible and even reconcilable with the retention of martial virtue. But the difficulty of the undertaking, the obstacles in the pathway of such a redirection of our fighting instincts, must certainly not be minimized in an outburst of mere emotional enthusiasm. The abolition of war requires nothing less than the divorce of pugnacity from the great egoistic instincts, fear and avarice, with which since the dawn of human history it has been most intimately affiliated. For fear and acquisitiveness are instincts so strong and so primitive that, reinforced by pugnacity, they lead almost inevitably to the attack on personality, on home and on society, which is war. Those who bewail war as inevitable reiterate their conviction that such a separation of pugnacity from fear and greed and physical aggressiveness is impossible. And those who idealize war as the "sacrifice of individual motives to group motives"[1] insist that the only alternative to war is a selfish, cowardly and supine peace. But students of animal and human life know the power of the social instincts. And students of history attest the fact that even nations, though public opinion so largely exempts them from moral obligations in their international relations, do yet on rare occasions in circumstances which might well lead to war voluntarily and without compulsion treat each other with justice tempered by courage—yielding and exacting the fulfilment of international obligation. Thus, on the basis of actual experience we may assert the conviction that the fighting instinct of a virile people may be under the control of its social instincts. For it can not too often be reiterated that liking and sympathy, as well as anger and acquisition, are instinctive impulses—impulses which may be transmuted into the virtues of generosity and justice. War against human life will cease when these social instincts dominate

[1] Frederick Lyman Wells, in *The Atlantic Monthly*, July 1916, Vol. 118, p. 46.

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pugnacity. But the New War, against Nature and against human greed and sloth and cruelty, will only then be fairly initiated. In this new war unjust nations, like unjust individuals, will be resisted but not destroyed. And the people for whom this new war is fought will be no longer the tribe, or state, or nation, but the great world-self, the universal community of sentient beings. For this great war which shall liberate men from the blight of nature, and from the neglect and injustice of their fellows, the time is overripe. From the one side, the heroic bodily risks of physician, explorer, and engineer make their claim on men's courage and devotion. And on all sides are walls of privilege to be demolished, strongholds of public inefficiency and graft to be stormed, attacks on democracy to be repelled, insidious influences of sloth and luxury to be checked; and human rights to be defended against relentless industrial competition and selfish social content. This Greatest War will never be brought to victory until it enlists us all. And those who arm for this conflict must have eyes open to descry injustice and misery, minds trained to judge fairly, hearts pulsing with sympathy, and loyal spirits strong to fight to the finish.

Like Socrates, we have followed whither the argument has led us; and now, with this last turn of the path, light fully illumines the problems which we set for ourselves, in the beginning. We asked whether war is an inevitable expression of human instinct and whether anything less than war can move a man to supreme self-sacrifice. And we have found that the instincts lying at the heart of war can be converted to the uses of a strenuous and militant peace and that the instrument of their conversion is loyalty to the Great Society, a loyalty rooted in the deep-lying social instincts. *Sed sine dolore non vivitur in amore.* The law of this loyalty, also, is sacrifice.

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THE FEAR OF MACHINES.

HARTLEY BURR ALEXANDER.

THERE are few traits of human nature more curious than is our awe of human nature itself. In the mode of attraction this awe becomes veneration, sometimes idealistic, sometimes superstitious. Idealistic is the veneration of hero, sage, and saint, whose high humanity seems to us a transfiguration wrought by some superhuman grace. Superstitious is our quaint credulity in the wisdom of emotions and intuitions, and above all in the sacrosanct sagacity of tides of public sentiment—the divine voice of the people. 'Soul,' we say, is manifested in these things,—'soul,' a hidden treasure, not well understood, be it the perquisite of a private temperament or sacramentally shared by a mob. In this mode of attraction our awe becomes a veneration, which may descend to superstition; in the opposite mode of repulsion this same awe of our nature and its manifestations begins with suspicion and mounts to superstitious terror. The suspicion is directed to the unresolved motives with which we credit men, for we deem that there is a subterranean level of impulse beneath human conduct, to which reason gives only a specious surfacing; and, as with all dark vulcanic forces, we fear it. The terror is most shown in the presence of those great material and social agencies which form the outward bodiments of our inward desires, and in horrific mode image the soul's hid lineaments in soulless machines. In all nature there is nothing more brutal than is human device, and on the face of nature is no scar so black as those inflicted by the hand of man. And yet the thing need not be: it is but a crude self-fear that perpetuates the shudder.

I.

Idiocy is the most horrible of monstrosities—reasonless instinct bearing the mask of man. The like vacant mentality in the scaly saurian moves us only to curiosity or

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contempt; it is as a parody of humanity that idiocy becomes frightful. Doubtless this is in part due to the fact that the human parody conjures up to us those saurian instincts, sleeping within our own souls, of which we are all squeamishly aware,—sleeping, but with a restless and uncertain sleep which only the perpetual commands of a vigilant intelligence can keep them from breaking: for the brutish ghost of unreason, buried deep in our being, is never securely laid. Its emergence in what we call the 'mob soul' seems to us a bestial thing; but when it comes forth in the apparel of reason—as now and again it does, both in individuals and in nations,—then it inspires in us the horror which besets all idiocy.

It is this same quality which makes our own created machines seem frightful. A machine has all the device of rational purpose, and none of its soul. In the parsimonious constriction of its elements and in their relentless application to determined motions, the machine is the very image of efficiency,—governed, deadly, predestinarian. But it is an efficiency against which nature cries out; it is an efficiency destitute of that adaptability of means and idealization of ends which is the humane essence of true reason. A theologically monstrous God administers a justice untempered by mercy; a soul made monstrous by its own miserliness warps life to one idea; nature without accident is ugly, and device with no latitude of adaptation is hideous. The poetry of tools attaches to the most primitive and the most generalized forms,—to the smith's hammer, the woodman's axe, the tiller's hoe, to spindle and distaff, hearth and crane; the pen will never be replaced by the typewriter in the imagery of letters, nor the sword by the machine-gun in the imagery of war. Those old-fashioned locomotives with polished brass bands, floral ornaments, and personal names, were far more intimately human than the modern Molochs of the rails, serially numbered and mechanically interchangeable.

No author has pictured the horror that is inherent in mere device with more vivid imagination than has H. G.

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Wells in such novels as *The First Men in the Moon* and *The War of the Worlds*. The first-named shows the fate of a man who here on earth is the arch embodiment of the 'coldly scientific reason,' when transported to the moon. That orb he finds honeycombed by a colony of ant-like beings, mocking man in size, but gifted in superhuman measure with intelligence of machines, so that they have reduced the whole lunar world to one efficient state, utterly 'socialized' and utterly soulless. In the presence of such monstrosity the earth-born scientist, still feeling the tug of his humanity, becomes insane. In this novel Wells holds up to deserved satire the conception of a mechanically organized world-polity; in *The War of the Worlds* he portrays with no less frank imagination the hideousness of mechanical efficiency when bent on destruction. His octopus-like Martians are in fact no more than embodied appetites provided with the narrow machinery of self-gratification. Until the present War, when Germany has displayed to the world their hateful likeness, such possible antagonists seemed indeed as remote as Mars. The striking difference in the two struggles, the fictive and the real, is that whereas Wells depicted human heroism as futile when thrown into contest with machine-endowed appetite, the War in Europe reads a different value into human heroism.

In material engines, things of wheels and levers, we see the exteriorization of one distortion of our natures,—undeviating application of all force to one determined end, which eliminates both the need for judgment and its exercise, and hence eliminates individual will. In our social machines,—all the carefully organized device of politics, industry, and war,—we see a similar exteriorization of distorted humanity, similarly precluding the general exercise of reason, enforcing intolerance, and destroying liberty. Publicly we have long felt a fear of such social machines, without any clear understanding of their import. In politics our distrust of party organizations, bosses, and professionalism, is such a fear; in industry it is reflected in our antipathy to irresponsible unions and 'soulless' cor-

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porations, and again in our wistful harking back to the day of the likable jack-of-all-trades and to the poetry of handicrafts; in the matter of war it is present in our abjection before what we call 'militarism.' We vaguely realize the need of such social machines; we helplessly employ them; but all the time we regard them with animosity and assail them with abuse. If at times we concede a timorous admiration to their 'efficiency,' this is only to point the evil of their misapplied power. Especially since Germany has reared for us the specter of an organized mob, a reasonless appetite guided by reasonless ambition, have we become obsessed with panic,—now manifested in a clamorous demand that we surrender our reason and liberty in the building of a machine that will enable us to gratify our own meaner appetites, now in a weakling plea that we bury our heads in the sands, a trembling invitation to destruction, until the storm pass.

Both of these policies are contemptible surrenders to contemptible fears. There are facts that must be faced. Among them, first and inexorable, is the fact that human machines, social and physical, are growing in complexity with the increase in the numbers of men, as well as with the natural complexification of human wants. Primitivism is as natural to the mind burdened with the problems of civilization as is Utopianism; but it is even more visionary to dream of a return of an Arcadian past than to hope for a Millennial future. Democrats from Aristotle to Rousseau have framed as their ideal polity a small state, secluded in its prospects, moderate in its demands; yet both Aristotle and Rousseau lived on the eve of huge experiments in empire. Tacitus, amid the artifice of Cæsar's court, idealized the simple virtues of the German; while the whole mind of the artificial eighteenth century sought philosophic relief in its fantasy of the 'natural man.' But such dreamings are mere sirups for a jaded taste. The forward-facing man knows that human artifice must not and cannot be wrecked. Even were it desirable, there is possible no 'back to nature'; on the contrary, every coming

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year must inevitably see mankind laying a more unhesitating and a more commanding hand upon Earth's body, until all her five continents and all her seven seas are bounded in his polity.

The future is not in the hands of those who fear human organization. But is it to be in the hands of men who command or of men who are commanded by the organizing machines? This is the radical question, and on its solution turns the way of our world,—whether it is to become an arena of free and rational endeavor or a circus given over to painted shows and the glutting of beastly appetites. There is no manner of doubt that the apparatus of organization is dangerous to the very intelligence that creates it; that in complicating the instrument we obscure the end; and that there is an unceasing peril lest we be blinded by our own device and snared by our own inventions. Hoist with their own petard, Americans are drowned by submarines of American contrivance; while the irony of the goosestep is that it is self-imposed. There are monarchs puppeted from birth, statesmen become the fools of their own diplomacies, soldiers who are but the mechanic slaves of the art of war,—all no better than the Siegesallée's nail-studded block in the image of Hindenburg;[1] but assuredly all no worse than are those pastes and casts of manliness which, in democracies, are blocked and reblocked to suit the raw greeds of political parties. It is no part of wisdom to deny the danger created by the machine, or that there is peril to its makers in social device. It may well be that the danger besets democracy even more than other forms

[1] African colonies bulk large in the War's controversies, and the place in the sun which Germany demands is mostly in the tropical sun. But is there no Nemesis in empire and has Germany got only good and learned no evil from her black colonies? To me, at least, the Hindenburg colossus is a grisly sign. The West Africans have a type of fetish called Fetish-into-which-Nails-are-Driven. The making of a fetish of this sort is a matter of tribal importance (I cite Dennett). "A palaver is held, and it is there decided whose kulu [soul] it is that is to enter into the Muamba tree and preside over the fetish to be made. A boy of great spirit, or else, above all, a great and daring hunter is chosen. Then they go into the bush and call his name. The Nganga priest cuts down the tree, and blood is said to gush forth. A fowl is killed and its blood is

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of government: for democracy is, by its nature, nearer than are other forms to easy surrender to the sway of the reasonless mob. The ends which guide democratic societies are necessarily complex; indeed, complexity of end is just what makes them democratic,—"full of variety and disorder," as Plato ironically puts it. Oligarchical states, on the other hand, have relatively simple ends, reflecting the fewer wills which define public purposes; and this simplicity of end makes easy not only that efficiency of self-seeking which we profess so to admire, but it also enables such states to keep in view their purposes with a directness which is impossible to the complex and disorderly democracy. Imperial Russia could follow the policy of a Peter for centuries, whereas America must blunder bloodily into the nationalism its institutions assume. Reason is assuredly put to a harder trial by the tumult of the Forum than by the devils of the Den.

But shall we therefore yield us to our fears? Legions have destroyed the Cæsar who created them, and the armies of republics have imperialized consuls. Arms forged for protection have been perverted to conquest, and federations for defense into empires of oppression. But must we for this abjure the right of freemen to maintain their liberty?

Militarism is not an embodiment in arsenals and armies; militarism is a surrender of the passion for righteousness to the panoply of war, and for a nation which can keep that passion strong and pure arsenals and armies present no peril. Those who cringe at the thought of the nation in

mingled with the blood that they say comes from the tree. The named one then dies, certainly within ten days. His life has been sacrificed for what the Zinganga consider the welfare of the people. They say that the named one never fails to die. . . . People pass before these fetishes calling on them to kill them if they do, or have done, such and such a thing. Others go to them and insist upon their killing so and so, who has done or is about to do some fearful injury. And as they swear or make their demand, a nail is driven into the fetish, and the palaver is settled so far as they are concerned. The kulu of the man whose life was sacrificed upon the cutting of the tree sees to the rest." Has not Germany immured the soul of humanity in her nail-studded idols? *Africa capta ferum victorem cepit!*

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arms are but visibly expressing their own moral weakness and their want of faith in the possibility of a just democracy. There is peril in a loaded gun; there may also be safety: in last analysis, it is the alertness of the controlling intelligence that decides. The same is true of the locomotive and its engineer; and the same of medicine and its practitioners, of industry and its captains, of courts of law and their magistrates, of all mechanical and social device and its devisers. We live in a kind of world and in an age of the world where devices of all sorts are growing in complexity, where, therefore, the necessity for alertness and self-mastery in the control of device is ever more urgent. If we are democrats we know that especial perils beset us, both because of the confusion of our aims and because it is easier for the mob than for the individual to mistake appetite for reason, and advantage for right. But if we are men, we shall not be craven because our world happens to be dangerous; and remembering that our machines are of our own make, we shall refuse to succumb to superstitious terrors.

> hunc igitur terrorem animi tenebrasque necessest
> non radii solis nec lucida tela diei
> discutiant, sed naturæ species ratioque.

II.

Naturæ species ratioque! The cure of superstitious terror is knowledge of Nature in her outward forms and knowledge of Nature in her inward reason; and this Lucretian cure is double because the peril of ignorance is double, outward and inward. The outer peril is that fear of mechanical things, grim mobilizations of material and personnel, which give us so huge an impression of power. But is not this monstrousness and deformity of machines due just to the fact of their automatism,—to their purposelessness or to our ignorance of the uses to which they may be put? And is not this ignorance itself an ignorance of our own intentions, of our own purposes and reason,—for machines are human tools? The inward peril is more

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terrible than the outward, and it is the cause of the outward: what we see exteriorized in machines is human purposelessness, but purposelessness endowed with force. That force can act only under some direction; if the directing power be not foresight, it must be impulse and appetite, and impulse and appetite too often and too fearfully it is. Here is the deep peril of the soul. Our terror of things outward is due to the gloom of things inward—*terror animi tenebræque*,—and of these twain superstitions 'tis the latter is most damning.

A Washington despatch, in the days just succeeding the breaking of relations with Germany, stated that President Wilson could not then define what, in his opinion, would constitute that overt act on the part of Germany which would bring him before Congress. But, said the despatch, the President is certain that when the time comes he will "feel" that it has come, Congress will "feel" that it has come, and the whole neutral world will "feel" that it has come. Intuition, emotion, the imperative inspiration of public feeling, these, rather than foresight and reason (so the despatch implied), were to govern the United States of America in a supreme crisis of her history. The event has proven the President wiser than the press, but it has not altered the fact of our public distrust of the public reason. When the citizens of a democratic nation are asked to repose an unenlightened confidence in its official leaders, leaving to them knowledge of the facts upon which national policy is to be based, and the option of its disclosure, this can only be because the self-reliance of reason is no article of the national faith,—because, in short, it has no belief in the democracy of rational judgment. The secret diplomacies which precede wars, and the political (as distinguished from military) censorships which accompany them are the inevitable expression of this unfaith, whose harsh corollary is flattery of impulse and idolatry of appetite.

Distrust of reason is the first descent. Beyond looms an altar to the Genius Publicus, and the wild adulation of a

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sovereign mob running amuck beneath the pillars of the Forum. Choice between beasts of the arena and incense to Cæsar is next, and beyond that the images of grim Pharoahs and deathless majesticals asserting sway over men as insouciant gods. The Divine Right of the Lord's Anointed, be he Kaiser Wilhelm II or the Sovereign Voice of the American People, is the right of unreason over reason, of superstitious fear over intelligent purpose. In the history of political theory there are just two key conceptions. The one finds the source of sovereignty in blind and emotional acquiescences,—in belief in the holiness of rulerships (and even Dante was moved to this); belief in the right of the lust of power (which Machiavelli and Nietzsche proclaim); belief in the contagious benevolence of our natural sympathies (which is the text of Rousseau and the modern democrats). The other conception is the Greek, the Aristotelian conception, that the source of sovereignty and the authority of states is, or should be, reason and reason alone, and that the best state is that which is based upon the most intelligent inquiry into the purpose of human life. In the period of recorded history most states have blindly gone the blind way of superstition; few have followed the light of reason. But has this brought wisdom into human affairs?

The answer is the Great War, nation after nation, in the glass of disaster, revealing its deep stupidity. Latest is America, paralyzed in mind, waiting for a flood of emotion to give it guidance,—for whatever has been the intention of our leaders, this has been the public temper. Behind us is England, blundering haplessly, almost grotesquely, into a struggle she should have foreseen and prepared for. France, with her initial trust in the Belgian buffer, Russia, massive in ignorance, Austria, no less massive in recklessness,—all in their measure show the same unintelligence: for they seem to have entered into the conflict with the notion that it was to be a game, played according to political rules, and eventuating in political defeats and victories,—an illusion now long dissolved in their own spent blood.

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But of them all none has suffered the delusion of a more colossal unintelligence than has Germany; none has so ghastlily grained the horror of unreason into the souls of men. The delusion is older than the War, which, indeed, is born of it; and it is a delusion doubly deceptive because veiled with the apparition of the reason it denies. I refer to that form of the divine right theory which Germany has made peculiarly her own, serving as her conscious vindication of the War, and in no small part as its pretext. Citation of source is beyond necessity, since the apostles of the "over-individual state" and the "trans-individual national soul" have proclaimed their creed unto all ears. But it is worth while to point out that this mystical super-state, whose sacramental body is the transubstantiated flesh of its citizens, is not (as is often enough inferred) a modern replication of the classical model. Greek and Roman lived and died *pro patria;* but in each case theirs was a fatherland looking directly and humanly to that good life of the citizen which their sages regarded as the end of statecraft. Socrates died out of fidelity to the law; and Vergil made law—sustaining the weak and abasing the arrogant—the justification of Rome. Even Marcus Aurelius, Stoic of the Cosmopolis, announces: "My will is to my neighbor's as unrelated as my breath to his. Though we be, and in high degree, made for one another, yet in the inner self each has his own sovereign right." The debate of the Athenian envoys with the Melians, on the verge of outrage, has been more than once cited as the ancient parallel to Germany's outrage upon Belgium; but even here there was no ghastly pretence of righteousness urged as excuse of cruelty; on the contrary, the Athenians employed (as William James remarked) a "sweet reasonableness" which is entirely open in its appeal to what is consciously brutal in human nature. "As for the gods," they said, "we expect to have quite as much of their favor as you: for we are not doing or claiming anything which goes beyond common opinion about divine or men's desires about human things. For of the gods we believe, and of men we know, that by a law of their nature wherever they can rule they will."

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The true parallel to the doctrine of the divine right of *Kultur* is the Muslim *Allah ilah Allah!* sung to the naked scimetar; or better, it is the benign blight spread by the pious Incas over Andean America. Indeed, there is no book which so brilliantly illuminates the pages of contemporary history—when the understanding of Germany is the problem—as does the *Royal Commentaries* of Garcilasso. When Manco Capac received his commission from "Our Father, the Sun," the Divine One said to him: "I take care to go round the earth each day, that I may see the necessities that exist in the world, and supply them, as the sustainer and benefactor of the heathen. I desire that you shall imitate this example as my children, sent to earth solely for the instruction and benefit of those men who live like beasts. And from this time I constitute and name you as kings and lords over all the tribes, that you may instruct them in your rational works and government." Naturally this large commission from on high was given a liberal interpretation; and speedily we find Lloque Yupanqui, the third Inca, resolving that "arms and power" as well as "prayers and persuasion" should form an agent for the spread of the light. "But the natives of Ayaviri," writes the chronicler, "were so stubborn and rebellious that neither promises, nor persuasion, nor the examples of the other subjugated Indians were of any avail. They all preferred to die defending their liberty. . . . So they came forth to fight, with no wish to hear reason, obliging the Incas to arm their men rather in self-defence than for attack." This was the prologue—the first 'defensive conquest' by which the Children of the Sun obeyed that inner *Drang* which, in its epilogue, clamped their tyranny over civilized South America, obliterating those peoples who "had their own gods with whom they were at accord, desiring no other," and converting the valleys into cemeteries of lost art.

Superstition of this type—asserting the inspiration of a reason that is above reason—is the last refinement of the barbarous soul. We see it in the Germany of to-day, is-

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suing like a murk Jinni at the summons of the Lord of the Lamp, to horrify mankind. In it is no trace of the Greek devotion to the law of human nature (fair or foul); none of the Roman reverence for the *leges regiæ*, *jus gentium*, and *mos pacis*, that

totum sub leges mitteret orbem.

Rather it embodies all the monstrosity and frightfulness of human instincts when recognizing no excess in their satisfaction, and of brutish credulity made only the more hateful by its assumption of the mask of rationality. When men pose as gods, humanity is lost. In a recent play (Dunsaney's *The Gods of the Mountain*) a woman pleads with the beggar who would be god:

"Master, my child was bitten in the throat by a death-adder at noon. Spare him, master; he still breathes, but slowly."

"Is he indeed your child?"

"He is surely my child, master."

"Was it your wont to thwart him in his play, while he was strong and well?"

"I never thwarted him, master."

"Whose child is death?"

"Death is the child of the gods."

"Do you that never thwarted your child in his play ask this of the gods?"

"Master!"

"Weep not. For all the houses that men have builded are the play-fields of this child of the gods."

III.

The Greeks were the first democrats, and the Greeks best understood the virtues of democracy. Virtue, they said, is a mean between indulgence and abnegation,—as we might say, between impulse and automatism,—and the anchorage of virtue is self-knowledge, self-control, and self-trust. Autocracies take away individual responsibility, substituting the dark commands of imperious rulers, who sardonically hide their own mean appetites behind a pious countenance. But democracies, which grant responsibility without a corresponding appeal to reason, kindling indulgent impulse rather than stimulating the labor of

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thought, play with a dreadful fire. Irruptive and explosive passion, not the dry and stringent truth, guides their behavior, which is rather to be described as a gambling with human nature than as a true politic.

Fortunately, as there is a mean in private conduct, which is private virtue, so there is a mean in political conduct, which is democratic virtue. It is founded upon faith in human nature, but upon that part of human nature which is most like daylight, man's reason. It abjures fear of human instruments, be they corporations or armies, because it understands their use and its own purposes in employing them. It banishes superstitious reverence for impulse, because it recognizes in intelligent will a safer guide. It owns no loyalty save to truth; it knows no liberty save in its own exercise; it champions no equality that is not proportionate with the good. For its maintenance this democratic virtue demands of the democratic citizen that he keep a militant vigil over his citizenship. In the moral world there is no *laissez-faire:* responsibility is relentless. Virtue, like life, is an equilibrium with a high center of gravity; and human societies, like upright human bodies, must preserve their precarious balance by unceasing effort. Nay, the truest image of the democratic state is that which the battle-field affords in the flight and contest of the aviators; for the salvation of democracy depends upon that same combination of unflagging activity and alert judgment which makes the aviator's duty so perilous and so inspiring. As with aviators, so with democracies, destruction is swift and easy; and as with aviators safety is measured by the power of the machine and the sagacity of the training, so in democracies there is no security save in strong engines guided by clear vision and hands trained beyond trembling. And back of these, and supporting all, what makes both aviators and citizens is belief in the manliness of men.

The United States is at war, and in a just cause. If the even hand of justice be maintained, the war, though it will surely be hard, will be no lasting evil. Our peril is not

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lest we shall not fight effectively. Our deeper peril is lest we do not think cleanly, answering the justice of our cause with just action, and purifying our judgment of others by as stern and true a judgment of ourselves. The Greeks were the first democrats, and over the shrine of the god of enlightenment they placed the word:

ΓΝΩΘΙ ΣΑΥΤΟΝ

HARTLEY B. ALEXANDER.

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WAR AND THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION.

DONALD W. FISHER.

I.

IN ITS ideal aspect the Christian religion maintains an unqualified opposition to war. It condemns the human impulses and motives without which war would be impossible. At the same time it is true that the teachings of Christ nowhere show a specific condemnation of war, or of participation in war. Christ's condemnation of war is not specific, but is contained in a general principle. The principle in question is plainly the one concerning Christian love. Christ enjoins peace, and peace of a particular kind, in enjoining love of God and of fellow men. He condemns war, in condemning all uncharitableness. The ideal meaning of the Christian religion, while it does not condemn war specifically, and of course not exclusively, does condemn war in principle, and along with a great many other things, without any qualification.

In its historical aspect the Christian religion shows a different attitude to war. The Christian ideal became a matter of fact and of history in the Christian Church. The Church has never condemned war in its doctrine. In the first three centuries certain Christian writers maintained, for various reasons, a more or less consistent opposition to war: but the most that can be said is that opinion among the early Christians was divided on the subject; and in practice the early Churches, perhaps from the very first, permitted Christians to serve in the armies of the Empire. After the association of the Church and the Roman State at the time of Constantine, there was no thought of maintaining the inconsistency of war in general and the Christian religion. The Church often exerted its influence in favor of peaceful rather than warlike methods; but it did not condemn war without qualification. Saint Ambrose and Saint Augustine distinguished between just

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and unjust war, that is, they taught that war might be just and lawful in certain circumstances. Saint Thomas Aquinas, and later Suarez, developed this doctrine—a doctrine which was put in lay form by Grotius and which has been held by Christian communities generally.

The attitude of the Church refers directly to the question of participation in war rather than to the question of war as a whole, and its place in the universe. But an attitude to the second question is implied in it; and it is the second question of the phenomenon of war as a whole, and its relation to Christianity, that we here wish to consider. And we wish to go beyond the explicit attitude of the Church and to consider fundamental reasons and connections. War and the Christian religion of history are connected in fundamental ways by the action of common enemies: they are connected, not indeed by virtue of the Christian ideal taken by itself and in isolation, but by virtue of the world-conditions in which this ideal was under the necessity of being realized.

II.

War and the Christian religion of history have a point of contact in the fact that both of them, to make any headway at all, must disrupt and break through a level of human life which is sometimes described as materialism, sometimes as sensualism. I shall call this level of life sensualism; and it will be necessary to give a few words to an account of the meaning of sensualism or absorption in the life of the senses.

The sensual, or the sensuous, level of life can be called "life" only in the broad and animal meaning of the word. If by "life" one understands right and true life, the proper life of man, then sensualism is not a kind of life at all. It is not life, but the vice which kills all life. The most general idea of sensualism is the idea of idleness or sloth. We need not suppose that slothfulness is confined to those who are outwardly or even inwardly motionless. The slothful and the sensuous may move, and in the pursuit of their goal they often do move with great rapidity. But

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though the slothful may move, they are not moved by any ideal or spiritual considerations. Their motion does not constitute activity; for all activity lies in spirit and its free and self-directing operation. And all real and true life consists in such activity. To this real life, sensualism stands opposed as dead indifference and inertia.

If we wish to define sensualism further we can do so by saying that it is a form of life in which a wrong place is held by the body and its satisfactions. It moves among the desires and wants which begin in the body and terminate there, without the admixture of any element of soul or spirit. The abstract end of these wants is pleasure, comfort, sense-satisfaction. It could not be supposed that all who follow in the sensualist way of life find actual satisfaction or comfort; it is certain that many do not. But the principle is the same, whether men find this sense-comfort or merely believe in it as the proper end of human existence.

The sensuous way of life is again characterized by the place which it assigns to physical things. The things which are not seen are to it unreal and unmeaning. Its thought moves among things visible and tangible. It may indeed be admitted that visible and tangible things, and the perception of them, are innocent enough: they do not of themselves constitute sensualism. The sensualist vice is more radical. It lies in the blank awareness of things seen without the awareness of unseen and eternal meanings and principles present in them.

Sensualism, in so far as it gets embodied in individual men, entails the destruction of social life and organization. By confining men's interest to pleasure and comfort it in principle confines them to themselves. In those among whom the sensualist scheme of life finds its appropriate satisfaction the social consequence is indifference and "pot-bellied equanimity." Or where, for whatever reasons, conceptions in their essence sensualistic are made to move in altruistic and socializing directions, there is this to be observed: the sensualist creed never supplies an adequate conception of men, of their nature, destiny and needs, and

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never produces a real principle of social organization. The net result of satisfied sensualism is in any case more apt to be stolid equanimity. In those among whom sensualism is unsatisfied, among whom it operates as an outlook on life rather than as a present fulfillment, we cannot speak of equanimity. The result here is unrest and discontent with existence. But such discontent is in itself essentially impotent and can produce no real principle of social unity and action; nor can it be appealed to by such a principle from without. Sensualism is the eternal death of individuals, and a chief factor in the earthly death and dissolution of societies.

The Christian religion—not unlike certain other religions—has worked against sensualism. "While we are at home in the body, we are absent from the Lord." Over against the life which is at home in the body, the life which centers round interest in sense-satisfaction, the Christian religion has set the conception of life in the spirit. The meaning of Christ's saying: "I came not to send peace, but a sword," is found doubtless in this connection: the sword is the sword of spiritual warfare against natural sensuous sloth and inertia. In its action in history the Christian religion has been a spur to the sensuous and indolent; it has quickened the will and lifted up the mind of the slothful. It has imprinted on men's belief the conception of things which, though not bodily, are real and potent and universal. To sensuous perception it has opposed the idea of faith; to things seen, the idea of things unseen and eternal; to pleasure, the paradox of duty and sacrifice; to finite satisfaction, the idea of endless endeavor with its hope of heaven and its fear of hell; to sensuous separation, the idea of a spiritual community, in which men are members one of another. It has effected, in some measure at least, a destruction of the power of sensualism.

The war spirit too has effected, among other things less creditable to it, a partial liberation of men from the sensualism all too natural to them. It has done this in various ways. War fills men with a new conception of the world.

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It forces upon the minds of common men an unusual amount of interest in supersensible things, such as right, justice, duty, truth, and principle. In war time the intensified awareness of unseen and untouched things finds its center—how rightly or wrongly I do not inquire—in the consciousness of country, the nation, and the national cause. The nation and the national cause themselves transcend the immediate and the present and are in large part—like the objects of religious faith—supersensible. War also fills men with a new conception of life and its purpose. With the grasp of the cause or principle goes love and devotion to it; and this implies that men are led to concede an uncommon place in life to unselfish purposes and values. The socializing effect which war has within a nation, the levelling of all (partially at least) in work for a common cause and before a common danger, needs no special emphasis: it is plainly akin to the effect contemplated by religion. But not only is the purpose of life changed from its ordinary egoistic and individual shape into something superindividual; it is also changed into something supersensuous. This is perhaps of all the spiritual effects of war the most fundamental. It is shown in the soldier's attitude toward life and death. The soldier must love life, and yet scorn it. He must feel that life is valuable; for unless life is in some sense great and valuable the national cause itself is without point or meaning. Yet he risks his own life with utter detachment. He must love life in a certain form and under certain conditions, and at the same time scorn the mere sensuous and bodily continuance of life without duty performed, without the supreme exertion, without honor, without principle. The teaching of war here touches closely that of religion. War makes men comprehend that life too tenaciously clung to and too much cherished in its bodily and sensuous form may be lost in a higher form. In doing this the war spirit effects a fundamental liberation of men from the bondage of sensuous life.

A certain unity of action is thus discoverable in war and

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the Christian religion. The war spirit is indeed not identical with the spirit of God; it is not entirely spiritual. Only because of the intimate connection of man's body with his soul and spirit is war possible at all. But war represents the world much more obviously than it does the body or the flesh; it represents a movement away from the flesh and its particular sins. On the level of "grace" this movement may be effected by other means and in other ways, but on the level of "nature" it has been the warfare of nation with nation more than any other thing which has operated as a check to sensuality, to the flesh and its corruptions. The spirited is the natural foundation of man's grasp of the spiritual. The soldier may seem to have little in common with the "low in spirit," the "meek," and the "humble"; but he has much more in common with them than he has with the sensuous, who are neither high in spirit nor low in spirit, but impervious to all forms of spirit whatever. War has nurtured in man's nature, by violent means indeed, the spirit which religion strives to turn into an apprehension of the Spirit of God and finally of the universal spiritual community of men.

III.

It may be doubted whether ordinary men think much about war in the abstract. They may have in them a latent attitude to war in general, but what explicit thinking they do is mostly concerning this or that particular war and the advisability of their country entering upon it. They do not formulate opinions about the advisability of war in general. On the other hand writers of a philosophic tendency do often formulate opinions about war in the abstract, and its function in the universe. I should like now to notice briefly the way in which in the history of thought opinions on the subject of war are connected in the minds of the people who hold them with opinions on the subject of religion.

Views on the subject of war may be divided into those held by pacifists and those held by non-pacifists. With



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regard to the value of war, pacifists hold that war is entirely evil, or that whatever good may pertain to it is inconsiderable. Writers who are not pacifists hold that war is in part evil and in part good, and that the good pertaining to it may be considerable. No one, so far as I know, holds that war is entirely good. But the question of the good and evil of war, while it may be the more obvious issue, is really not the fundamental issue between pacifists and non-pacifists. The pacifist thinker always holds, not only that war is the greatest of evils, but also that it is something whose eradication from human affairs is approaching or easily possible. The non-pacifist holds that as a matter of fact war is not a thing whose disappearance from human affairs is approaching; and his practical attitude with regard to the policy of his own country is based on this consideration. Non-pacifist writers do not first hold that war is a good thing, and then add the precept that nations ought to see to it that wars occur from time to time; they first hold that wars between nations will occur for some time to come whatever pacifists may think about the matter, and they add the consideration that war is not so entirely evil as pacifists think. The pacifist and non-pacifist groups in the history of thought are divided with regard to both the value and the reality of war—and what I wish to point out is that pretty much the same groups are divided in the same sense with regard to religion.

The pacifist view of war has usually been associated with a rationalist or free-thinking view of whatever is characteristic in Christianity: this can be verified in the opinion current at the present time as well as in the broad movements of human opinion in the past. The pacifist view of war was firmly held by Herbert Spencer and Buckle; it was held perhaps even more firmly by Jeremy Bentham and his immediate school of Utilitarians; it was held by David Hume and Thomas Hobbes; it was held by Comte and the Positivists generally; it was held by St. Simon and Fourier; it was held never more firmly than by the *philosophes* and Encyclopædists of the eighteenth century—

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by Voltaire, Holbach, Diderot, Helvetius and Condorcet; and altogether one is justified in the conclusion that a very large proportion of its most distinguished adherents have been equally zealous against war and against the Christian religion. It is also true that if we consider a list of rationalist thinkers we find that a still larger proportion of them—indeed nearly all of them—have been partisans of radical pacifism.

And non-pacifist opinion has usually been associated with essentially Christian opinion. Hegel and Cousin are perhaps the philosphic writers who are best known for the theory that war has a positive value in world-history. Kant, while difficult to classify in this matter, expresses in many places a sense of the positive value of war never found among radical pacifists. Joseph de Maistre in his *Soirées de Saint-Pétersbourg* undertakes a thorough-going *apologia* of war. Wordsworth, Coleridge, Carlyle, and Ruskin—not to mention many English ecclesiatic writers of the last century—show themselves sensible of the virtues of war and of warrior nations generally. Milton speaks in a decidedly martial strain in his *Defence of the English People* and *Ikonoklastes*. Luther justifies war under certain conditions in his essay, *Ob Kriegsleute auch in seligem Stande sein koennen*. It is indeed true that many writers who may be cited as non-pacifist may also be cited as pacifist—that many of them exemplify what Ruskin said of himself: "It is impossible for me to write consistently about war, for the groups of facts I have gathered lead me to two precisely opposite conclusions." The subject of war is complex—except indeed to pacifists—and opinion about it may easily be inconsistent. All I wish to say is that in general where we find opinion which acknowledges in war any considerable element of worth we also find, not a materialist or rationalist philosophy, but a religious and essentially Christian philosophy. And in proof of the fact that where a Christian philosophy is held there is generally an inclination to grant some justification to war in the abstract, we have only to recall that the doctrine of the

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Christian Church is that summed up by Suarez: "bellum simpliciter nec est malum, nec Christianis prohibitum."

We have said that the pacifist view of war is usually associated with a rationalistic view of Christianity. It may seem that in sects such as the Anabaptists, Quakers, etc., a pacifist view of war is combined with a view of Christianity which is essentially Christian. Granted that Quakerism is essentially Christian, it is not as a matter of history of sufficient moment to cause us to change our generalization. But it may be questioned to what extent Quakerism is essentially Christian. Quakerism (like the doctrine of most religious sects which have made war a special object of denunciation) rests more or less squarely on what in the philosophy of religion is known as mysticism. In its general form mysticism is a doctrine and way of life which turns the mind inward towards itself and ends in the denial of all separation and distinction in physical or mental existence. It is in its essence inimical to war; this is perhaps most clearly shown in both the theory and practice of the thoroughly mystic system of Hindu Buddhism. And mysticism in its purity is also inimical to the Christian religion: it is just as certainly inimical to the Christian religion as is rationalism—though in the Western world it is of much less frequent occurrence and of much less significance.

We said too that non-pacifist opinion was usually associated with essentially Christian opinion. It might seem that modern thought presents a significant exception in the case of Nietzsche. Nietzsche has a sense—and of course an exaggerated sense—of the value of war and conflict, and it would at the same time seem strange to say that he was essentially Christian. But it should be observed that his attitude to Christianity is far from being that of ordinary rationalism; and of course far from being that of mysticism. To the Christian religion Nietzsche opposes another religion, that of pagan Dionyseanism. He leaves standing at least the Christian idea of spirit, and the Christian idea of individuality—just those parts of the essentially Christian

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temper which make it non-pacifistic. And a similar consideration would be found to apply to Ernest Renan, who expresses an appreciation of war in *La Réforme Intellectuelle et Morale.*

IV.

The mode of thought known as rationalism, that described in Lecky's *Rationalism in Europe,* has been the basis of significant opposition to war in the abstract. So much may be gathered from the history of thought: we have now to examine somewhat more closely the inner essence of this opposition. Rationalism is a philosophic continuation of sensualism. Spirit in all its manifestations may be opposed by sense: but it may also be opposed by common sense reason or rationalism; and in this fact lies a principal point of contact between war and the Christian religion, and indeed between war and religion generally.

As sensualism is a mode or condition of life, rationalism is primarily a mode of thought. It is of course hostile to religion. We need not dwell on that point: we need only examine the sense in which it is hostile to war. It is hostile to war in two ways. In the first place, it fabricates a certain conception of war—a very derogatory conception—and in the second place, largely on the basis of this, it acts as a force in society tending to make war impossible. It does these things in accordance with its general characteristics and principles, that is, in accordance with the same principles by virtue of which it opposes religion.

One of the general characteristics of the rationalist creed —one which determines to a considerable extent its view of war—is the rationalist and generally radical idea of "progress." The rationalist believes firmly in a kind of progress which lies along straight lines and leads steadily to goals which are obvious and well defined. The world of rationalist thought is always plain, simple, direct and well defined, a world in which things lie flat, in which there is no mystery and no indirection. The rationalist believes in progress in straight lines, progress by addition. He misses the real and much more complex logic of living and organic

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things, and the real logic of progress. He fails to apprehend the progress which lies through deep valleys, the life which arises from death and sacrifice, the gain in the whole which comes of loss in the part, and comes in a greater than common sense degree, the reality which requires negation for its very reality. He has no conception of the world as being, what it largely is, in *his* sense of the word an irrational knot—a knot in which the threads run in irrational and unexpected directions. The rationalistic thinker, to put it shortly, has no sense of paradox in human affairs, and war, as well as religion, abounds in paradox.

Another characteristic of the rationalist creed is its idea of what may be called human nature. This is of course fundamental in rationalism, and affects greatly its conception of war. The rationalist sets out to interpret things in terms of common sense reason, and easily neglects the more mysterious and wayward forces of human nature, such as instinct, will, passion, sentiment, and intuition. It is in these forces that war is ultimately rooted; but of these forces the rationalist is only imperfectly conscious. In line with this is the rationalistic predilection for the economic interpretation of man. The form of rationalistic doctrine known as Utilitarianism has done much to spread the conception of human life as a matter of hedonistic and particularly economic calculation. In accordance with this idea, rationalists often hold that alleged reasons of economic advantage—which in fact may or may not be real reasons—are rapidly making war impossible, or have already made it impossible. They look on the world "with the vision of the bucket-shop"; they see "money, interest, materialism, credit"—everything but "the will of man." They fail to grasp in its true import the fact that neither individual men nor nations can be counted on to follow economic advantage solely. A further part of the rationalist view of human nature is an extreme confidence in man's fundamental innocence. The rationalist passes very lightly over the aspect of human nature which in Christian theology is known as original sin. As he has

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little conception of the will of man, he has little conception of the extent and meaning of human willfulness. He may picture man as intent on economic self-interest, but he has little notion of other and intenser kinds of selfishness. The rationalist underestimates the intensity of the forces which divide men and nations: he furthermore underestimates the intensity of the forces which actually bind men together, particularly within nations. This final part of rationalist thought may be called a belief in the *atomistic* composition of human nature. As in natural science things are dissolved into separate atoms, so in the rationalist account of man. The soul is dissolved into separate mental atoms or states; moral life, otherwise connected with some idea of law or duty, is broken up into separate feelings and interests; society is dissolved into separate and more or less disconnected entities called "individuals." It is the last of these forms of dissolution which specially concerns us. The rationalist mode of thought, viewing human nature from a generally atomistic standpoint, sees in society what it considers individual men, but only vaguely the forces which bind men together into organic wholes and unities. It sees individual men, but it has a defective sense of the underlying reality of states and nations, and consequently of the feelings and actions of which men, when they feel and act as states and nations, are really capable.

In accordance with these general principles, rationalistic thought fabricates its conception of war. Just as rationalism underrates the value and reality of religion, it underrates the value and meaning of war in human affairs on the one hand and on the other hand war's reality and permanence. The evil pertaining to war is doubtless great; but rationalism exaggerates it. It ignores or underestimates the positive value of war in human affairs; and it does this chiefly in connection with its idea of progress. In accordance with its idea of man as essentially a hedonistic and economic calculating machine, and as essentially innocent and mildly private and individualistic, it greatly underestimates too the reality and permanence of war.

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But rationalism does something beyond fabricating this conception of war. Partly by virtue of this conception, partly by virtue of other aspects of its nature and tendency, it acts as an effective force opposing the occurrence of war. In so far as it is embodied in the thought and belief of people composing states it reduces the chance of states manifesting themselves in warlike activity. In so far as rationalistic ideas and beliefs are current in the world the phenomenon of war between states is made to just that extent impossible.

It might appear that in that case the best thing the world could do would be to become rationalistic. The gain would, however, not be clear or unmixed. Rationalism makes war impossible by displacing the ideas without which *all* social life would be impossible. It strikes at war by striking at the conceptions of faith, duty, and loyalty to larger social wholes—conceptions on which all life in society, all social aggregation and unity, must ultimately be founded. The pursuit of wealth and material happiness never has been and never will be a bond sufficient to hold together a human society. The sensualistic ideal of rationalism, in so far as it succeeds in realizing itself, may cast out war between states; but it puts in place of it social death and dissolution, perhaps civil strife within states. It may destroy war between states, and a great deal more besides; but it can construct no vital unity of mankind: it can generate no real principle of social life and organization. The words of Mazzini are worth recalling: "Without the religion of duty any great social transformation is impossible."

The antagonism of the forces we have been tracing is of course mutual. War and religion offer to rationalism, just as they do to sensualism, a certain opposition. Religion does this directly; war rather more indirectly: as a fact or condition war opposes in rationalism something which is essentially a theoretical conception. The rationalistic theory makes the fact of war appear meaningless and impossible. The fact, in so far as it occurs, makes the theory untenable—untenable as a theory of human nature and of the world in general.

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V.

Whatever connection may exist between war and the Christian religion holds only with regard to the Christian religion of history. No connection is discoverable between the concrete phenomena of war and the ideal and absolute essence of the Christian religion.

In an imperfect world war has a function which it would not have in a perfect world. War is connected with the Christian religion of history through the imperfection of the world, and in particular through the imperfection of certain kinds of peace. War in itself has never been regarded by historical Christianity with unqualified hostility; and there are very fundamental reasons which make such hostility impossible. In an imperfect world war and the Chrirtian religion have many common enemies. The Christian Church could never agree with radical pacifists in thinking that war in itself is the "foulest blot" on human existence, the greatest evil which besets mankind. To Christian minds it cannot but be plain that other things may be even more displeasing than warfare in the sight of God—things which tend to produce the state of peace in society and thrive in the midst of peace, things which both war and the Christian religion have the effect of overcoming. Peace founded on mysticism, on spiritual nihilism, the peace which has settled over Buddhist India, is not a Christian kind of peace; but in any case the forces producing it are not active among western peoples. Peace founded on sloth, the peace which has often come to decadent societies, is also not a Christian peace. Peace founded on the forces of sensualism and rationalism—forces represented by a large part of the pacifist feeling in the world to-day—would be equally destructive of war and of the Christian religion. In the imperfect world which actually exists, peace may be attained in human society which is in its essence anti-Christian. Through this fact war acquires the connection we have seen it to have with the Christian religion of history.

But peace, not war, would characterize the world pro-

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jected in the Christian ideal. This peace would be of a particular kind. It would differ greatly from the usual dream of rationalist pacifism. It would be reached, not by suppressing spirit, but by making it more spiritual; not by rooting up will, but by converting it into good will; not by eliminating national loyalty, but by placing beside it a wider and perhaps somewhat different loyalty. It would be reached, not by turning spirit into sense or common sense reason, but by establishing in spirit a greater degree of universality and unity. A Christian kind of peace would be the peace of men who love God, and love their neighbors as themselves. It would obtain in international relations; but that would be perhaps the least of what it would do. It would obtain also within nations and in individual men. The principle of such peace would be spiritual rather than material or political; it would be a world church rather than a world state. In the world marked out by the ideal meaning of Christianity peace would be founded on the union (though not the identity) of all men in a spiritual and divine community, a community which, just because divine and above nature, might be above nations without being subversive of the real values of nationality.

Peace of this kind, peace of the kind defined by the ideal essence of the Christian religion, has never been completely realized. It may be doubted if there exists in the world any very sincere or single-minded desire to see it realized. Yet peace of this kind is the only peace which the world would find sufferable, the only peace in which the human spirit could escape extinction; and it is the only peace which the world would find lastingly possible.

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DISCUSSION.

Statistics of Belief in God and Immortality.

Certain remarks made in the April number of this JOURNAL, in a review of my book,[1] invite discussion of a question of considerable interest. The failure to take proper account of the distinction between a technical and a non-technical conception of God involved in that question, is one of the many indications of the lack of psychological insight apparent in discussions of belief in general and of religious beliefs in particular.

I shall best convey my meaning by means of a comparison. Let us suppose that we desire to find out how many members of a semi-civilized tribe believe in the existence, in a neighboring forest, of a monster that can and at times actually does destroy men who venture into it. Persons that entered the wood are said never to have returned; others came back, dreadfully frightened, with discordant accounts of a devastating creature vaguely seen through intervening foliage. How are we to formulate the question that is to bring out the fact we desire to ascertain? Shall we have a naturalist prepare with learned minuteness a description of the animal he surmises to be in the wood, and ask the natives to say whether or not they believe in the existence of the animal described? If that which we want to ascertain is whether or not they accept the existence of the animal described by the naturalist and nothing else, the procedure would be adequate. The chances are, however, that the persons with whom we are dealing have not observed the many features by which the monster is characterized; they have not had the opportunity and do not possess the necessary knowledge to do so. Nevertheless, it will be granted, I think, that a great many of them will answer affirmatively, not because they have seen the creature *as described* to them, but merely because they have seen or heard a terrible

[1] *The Belief in God and Immortality. A Psychological, Anthropological, and Statistical Study.* Sherman French and Co., Boston. The second of the three parts composing this book is a statistical study of two religious beliefs. The figure (750) given in Mr. Kantor's review as the number of answers to my questionnaire is wrong. It is that of the answers from the physical and the biological scientists only.

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creature and that they know men and animals have disappeared. It turns out, thus, that although the question is properly formulated for the purpose in view, the statistics would not be at all reliable.

But the purpose of the statistician might be another one. He might want to find out not whether the natives believe in, let us say, a python-like monster; but merely whether they believe in *any kind* of creature that sometimes destroys men venturing into the wood. In that case, the question should not describe any particular animal; it should assume something like this form: "Do you believe in the existence of a creature that sometimes destroys those who enter the forest?" The answers to that question would, as a matter of course, be useless to our imaginary naturalist; it is too general a question. But they would provide the information desired by the inquirer; and, despite the undiscriminating form of the query, that information would be perfectly definite and of substantial value.

The application of this fiction to the statistics published in Part II of my book is obvious. I did not want to find out what proportion of the members belonging to the several classes I selected for investigation (American physical scientists, biological scientists, historians, sociologists, psychologists, and college students of non-technical departments) believed in the Absolute of Bradley or of Royce, or in Bergson's *Elan Vital*, or in Rashdall's limited God, or in any other of the God-conceptions known to the philosophers. Had I entertained that purpose, I should have failed; for, probably not one in a hundred of the men belonging to the classes named would have been in a position to answer the finely discriminating questions that would have been necessary. My purpose had reference not to philosophy but to religion as it actually exists in its organized forms. I desired to determine with some degree of accuracy the percentages of believers and of non-believers (dis-believers and doubters) in personal immortality and in a God able and, under certain undetermined conditions, willing to act upon man or nature or both, at man's desire, request, or desert.

The professional philosophers did not find it possible to express their full ideas of God by means of my statements—it was not intended that they should. Several of them, not understanding my purpose, wrote in substance, "None of your statements express my belief adequately. Therefore I cannot answer."

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These philosophers had before them no more than a circular letter requesting an expression of opinion upon certain statements. There is, therefore, some excuse for their misunderstanding. Mr. Kantor, with the book before him, had no such excuse. When he writes, "There are no indications as to precisely what is believed concerning the matters in question," he illustrates a complete failure to realize the methodological requirements imposed upon me by the task I had set for myself.

I might add that there is hardly any line of cleavage between the many conceptions of God that is of more vital significance to religion than the one drawn in my questionnaire. The dynamic characteristics by which God is defined in it, are essential to religious worship as now organized.

So much for the question of definition. There were other statistical difficulties. If I have succeeded, as I hope, in overcoming them, we are now for the first time in possession of substantially reliable figures, valid for the entire classes mentioned. Mr. Kantor apparently accepts these results, but the explanation of them suggested by the author does not seem to him sufficiently firmly established.

The more striking facts discovered are that, regarding the number of believers, the classes arrange themselves in the following descending order, historians, physical scientists, biological scientists, sociologists, and psychologists; that in each class the more distinguished group counts a much smaller number of believers than the less distinguished; and that there is a much larger number of believers among the women than among the men (82 per cent against 56 per cent).

I attempted to explain these facts by reference to two main factors: (1) General knowledge and knowledge in particular fields, such as physics, biology, psychology, cannot fail, it seems, to have a definite influence upon the acceptability of the God defined in my statements. (2) Mental independence and self-reliance obviously play a considerable role in connection with all traditional beliefs.

Regarding the first factor, I wrote, "Psychologists, sociologists, and biologists in very large numbers have come to recognize fixed orderliness in organic and psychic life, and not merely in inorganic existence; while frequently physical scientists have recognized the presence of invariable laws in the inorganic world only. The belief in a personal God as defined for the purpose of

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our investigation is, therefore, less often possible to students of psychic and of organic life than to physical scientists. The place occupied by the historians next to the physical scientists would indicate that for the present the reign of law is not so clearly revealed in the events with which history deals as in biology, sociology, and psychology. A large number of historians continue to see the hand of God in human affairs. The influence, destructive of Christian belief, attributed in this interpretation to more intimate knowledge of organic and psychic life, appears incontrovertibly, so far as psychic life is concerned, in the remarkable fact that whereas in every other group the number of believers in immortality is greater than that in God, among the psychologists the reverse is true; the number of believers in immortality among the greater psychologists sinks to 8.8 per cent. One may affirm, it seems, that, in general, the greater the ability of the psychologist, the more difficult it becomes for him to believe in the continuation of individual life after bodily life."

The second factor, mental independence and self-reliance, works against beliefs that are not sufficiently supported by "reason." It seemed to me that mainly to this factor should be referred the difference between men and women students; for, since these persons are of approximately the same ages and belong to the same college classes, their knowledge should not be very different.

I have also drawn attention to the fact that the more strongly affective nature with which women are usually credited is intimately related in its effect to mental independence. One is less hospitable to ideas threatening estrangement from the circles in which one has been reared when one clings to them in affection. This same trait opposes, direct resistance to the surrender of God when loving relations have been established with him.

If few will deny the existence of the differential traits to which I have just referred (whether they are true sex-differences or the product of education, is not one of my present concerns), none will gainsay me when I affirm that mental independence, a readiness to "prove all things," makes for eminence in the vocations with which we are concerned. In view of the statistical differences between men and women students, and in the absence of other plausible factors, I ascribed to mental independence and initiative the marked differences observed in each class between

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the more and the less eminent men. Mr. Kantor remarks, supercritically as it seems to me, that this would be a suitable explanation did I actually show that the greater men reject these beliefs because of a critical examination of them. If it be agreed that the greater men are more critical than the lesser men, why not of their religious as well as of their other traditional beliefs? And even though both lesser and greater men should spend the same amount of time and the same effort upon a critical consideration of their beliefs, would not the greater men, because of this trait possessed by them in a higher degree, give up more readily than the lesser men, beliefs that do not seem to stand the test?

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It sounds like irony for Professor Leuba, in replying to my review of his book, to suggest that there was a failure to distinguish properly between various concepts of God, when that lack of distinction was the theme of my criticism. One is constrained to ask what kind of psychological insight is required to request scientists and philosophers to reply unconditionally to such questions as Professor Leuba asked them. It does not require much psychological insight to understand that such persons when asked about God or immortality, would put content into these concepts which I insist Professor Leuba made no provision for. It is impossible that the questions should be answered unless content is put into the concepts asked about. Such lack of provision of course invalidates the type of study made. My criticism would have been even more severe had I thought that Professor Leuba meant to insist that the scientists limit themselves to such primitive questions, as the reply to my review indicates. It seems unbelievable that a study would be instituted which allows for no development of fundamental concepts. It seems that Professor Leuba offered a concession in saying that scientists are ordinary men (p. 223) when they really may be compared to semi-civilized natives. My point is that philosophical conceptions (in Professor Leuba's sense) aside, when one wishes to know what men believe with respect to religious matters, one must take into account the meanings of the ideas forming the basis of the inquiry. Replies of yes and no to questions formulated as in this study, cannot yield any worth-while informa-

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tion. The difficulties that were experienced in answering the questions (p. 227 ff.) indicate that Professor Leuba did not allow for such meanings. God and immortality have more meanings than the two Professor Leuba grants them, and each person will have some one of them in mind in answering questions.

I cannot, therefore, plead guilty of illustrating "a complete failure to realize the methodological requirements imposed" upon Professor Leuba by the task he set for himself. My difficulty is rather in completly failing to realize how Professor Leuba could set himself such a meaningless task involving so unscientific a methodology.

Another point of difficulty which I find in Professor Leuba's work is this, that with the clear cut attempt to rule out any interpretation on the part of his subjects, he still insists upon some intellectual superiority as an explanation of unbelief. If Professor Leuba wants to show that the more critical a person is of his experiences, the less belief has that person in religious matters, the least that can be asked of him is that he should ascertain something of the subjects' beliefs. In this study, for example, there is absolutely no clue as to why the physicist should be more liable to believe in the type of God that Professor Leuba indicates than any other type of presumably informed person. It is easy to see that Professor Leuba wants his concepts to be so defined as to fall below the critical horizon of any informed individual. On this basis his results might be formally true, but entirely irrelevant. The entire statistical study then, in its emphasis of a primitive concept with the intellectual criterion of rejection, illustrates an attempt to break logic with the usual disastrous consequences.

J. R. KANTOR.

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BOOK REVIEWS

CREATIVE INTELLIGENCE: THE PHASES OF THE ECONOMIC INTEREST, by Henry Waldgrave Stuart; THE MORAL LIFE AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF VALUES AND STANDARDS, by James Hayden Tufts; VALUE AND EXISTENCE IN PHILOSOPHY, ART AND RELIGION, by Horace M. Kallen. Pp. 282–467. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1917.

These essays are the three last of the series entitled *Creative Intelligence.* Whereas the other five deal with logical and epistemological topics, these deal with what has recently come to be known as "theory of value." Although there are no signs of collusion other than the appearance of occasional cross-references, the book has a keynote which Professor Dewey sounds in the opening essay, as follows: "the pragmatic theory of intelligence means that the function of mind is to project new and more complex ends—to free experience from routine and from caprice"; "the doctrine that intelligence develops within the sphere of action for the sake of possibilities not yet given is the opposite of a doctrine of mechanical efficiency." With this keynote the essays of Stuart and Tufts are clearly in unison or harmony; that of Kallen, I think, not.

Professor Stuart is mainly concerned to show that "Instrumentalism" is not relative to the elemental biological interests, or to any set of already existent interests, but is essentially progressive and constructive in its implications. He develops this contention with special reference to the economic activities. The consumer's demand is not merely for the familiar and tried, but also for the novel. And having achieved the novel, he is from thenceforth a different self for that fact. "At each forward step the novelty makes possible not merely satisfactions more adequate as measured by existing requirements or more economical in terms of cost, but new satisfactions also for which no demand or desire before existed or could possibly exist—satisfactions which, once become habitual, make the contentment of former times in the lack of them hard to understand or credit" (p. 291). This view of the matter is to be contrasted on the one hand with hedonism, which is the "routine" view, according to which we seek only a repetition of satisfactions already

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experienced; and on the other hand with idealism, with its empty contention that what appears to be novelty was somehow already "latently" or "implicitly" present.

Professor Stuart does not, I think, do justice to the motives of the views which he rejects. What they seek is some way of making the old and the new commensurable, so that it may be possible to judge whether the new is better than the old, or merely different. The hedonist accomplishes this by construing the new as a greater or smaller quantity of the same measurable satisfaction, the idealist by construing it as a more or less complete unfolding of the same potentiality. Now Professor Stuart's solution of this problem is by no means clear. He gives us very convincing empirical evidence of the important rôle which is played by the interest in novelty, such, for example, as "the interest one feels in spending a day with a friend or making a new acquaintance or, say, in entering on the cares of parenthood" (p. 301). This insistence on the explorative, outreaching character of interest, is the best thing in the essay—admirably presented, and wholly conclusive. But I think the author does not clearly see that all this is merely an addition to the popular conception of human nature. Over and above the more familiar interests, we have an interest of which we have failed sufficiently to take account, the interest, namely, in novelty as such. We are moved by curiosity, and we suffer *ennui*. "Will it be disputed that a *relation* of a quality or feature to ourselves which we can know, name, and recognize—like 'novelty'—must be known, as anything else is known, through an interest of which it is the appropriate stimulus?" (p. 300). I, for one, should not dispute this contention, especially after reading Professor Stuart's essay. But I still fail to see that Professor Stuart has met the essential point of either hedonism or idealism. With his love of novelty gratified is a man better off or not? The hedonist would say 'Yes, because it affords him additional satisfaction, and enables him to escape the pain of tedium or baffled curiosity.' The hedonist could even construe the performance in terms of his own psychology. He could say that the man has already experienced that specific satisfaction which his love of novelty affords, and is now seeking more of it. The idealist would say, 'Yes, because his self is now more completely expressed; he is better in the sense that the man is better than the child.' What would Professor Stuart say? The man is *changed*, certainly;

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but is that all? Is there nothing to "creativeness" and "progress" but novelty?

The author speaks of what he calls "constructive comparison"; but the constructiveness of it appears wholly to vitiate the comparison. It has to do with "prospective and retrospective views across a gulf that separates two 'specious presents,' not judgments of static inequality in terms of a common measure" (p. 338). Having chosen something new which one was unable to anticipate, one has become something new and so incapable of appraising things as one formerly did. The result is that the old and the new never get properly compared at all. The difficulty is aggravated by the author's failure (a failure characteristic of his school) to recognize any difference between judgment and the motor-affective dispositions or attitudes. They are both comprised and fused in "valuation." There is, then, no judgment of comparative value, other than the fact of preference, or the relative strength of desires at any given moment. Just now I am more attracted to *a* which I have never tried and know only by repute, than to *b*, which is familiar. At a later moment, having experienced *a*, I am a changed man, and am perhaps more fond of my newly relished *a* than of the old and half-forgotten *b*. Now even Professor Stuart would doubtless admit that I may thus describe the two states, and that the correctness or incorrectness of the description is somehow determined by the facts. But he seems unwilling to recognize that there may also be some fact regarding the relative value of the two states, which would constitute the one's being "better" or "higher" than the other, and which would determine the correctness or incorrectness of a comparative judgment which was not colored by the peculiar motor-affective bias of either. To put it in the old-fashioned way, what the hedonists and idealists are after is a common *standard* which shall be applicable to two or more states of life. An account such as Professor Stuart's must be construed either as omitting the question altogether, in which case it is "merely psychological" and cannot fairly be compared with a critical theory such as hedonism or idealism; or as adopting the standard of temporal posteriority, according to which any state of life is better than another when it grows out of it, or supersedes it historically. The latter, the commendation of recency, change, and futurity for their own sakes, is identified by the vulgar mind with the pragmatist, instrumentalist and vitalist

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tendencies in philosophy. The present essay certainly does nothing to discredit this judgment.

Following the customary procedure, Professor Tufts divides his ethical discussion into two parts, the first having to do with the psychological and anthropological description of the moral life, the second with the analysis of the concepts of good and right. But the essential teaching of the essay is the inseparability of the two problems, since the concepts are in flux, and since it is the characteristic function of the moral life to generate and renew them. The moral life is surveyed under four aspects: life itself; the life in common, with the peculiar social relations, instincts and emotions; intelligence; and "the process of judgment and choice." This last is the crux of the matter, and is the thread which unites the present essay with the rest of the book. This process compares, objectifies and universalizes, thus creating new concepts; and at the same time develops a new self which expresses itself in the final decision.

Now in all this the process of comparison, deliberation and judgment is treated as though there were no reference whatever to facts. There is a kind of activity called "judging and choosing" which struggles in the dark with varying fortunes against obstructive and antagonistic forces. "This is right," "That is good," are strokes made more or less at random with weapons picked up on the ground and proved in the combat. Universal judgments are ejaculations of this sort made in chorus by a group acting in concert. It is exactly as though a judgment were a sort of spell or enchantment by which to exorcise evils of dark and dubious origin. It is naive, I know, to speak of facts. But in all this account of moral judgment I am able to find a footing only when the author lapses into such naiveté. Thus, for example, he tells us that "the world of men and women who must live together and co-operate, or fight and perish, forces upon consciousness the necessity of adjustment" (p. 368). I was very grateful for this statement. It seemed to mean that the moral facts are facts of organization or maladjustment among units of life. It suggested to me that the judgment "This is right" might mean "This course of action if generally adopted will effect organization and reduce maladjustment." Which in turn suggested that were the action to be tried, or were it exemplified in history, there would be the fact regarding such effect which would constitute its rightness or wrongness,

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and would, if appealed to, verify or disprove my moral judgment. But all the time I knew that this couldn't be instrumentalism, just as I know that when I enjoy a detail of Matisse or Picasso it can't be futurism, but must be some atavistic survival of conventional beauty. At any rate it soon appeared in the sequel that the judgment "Killing is wrong," does not mean the moral fact that killing is a form of maladjustment, but that "the necessity (a) of acting as if I either do or do not approve it, and (b) of either making my attitude agree with yours, or yours agree with mine, or of fighting it out with you or with the whole force of organized society, compels me to put my attitude into objective terms, to meet you and society on a common platform" (pp. 369–370). In other words, for Professor Tufts the important thing is not the human effects of killing, but the formation of an opinion (about *what* it would be difficult to say) which shall have all sorts of adventures with other opinions.

Of course there is another interpretation of this example, which is open to us. The socially necessary thing with reference to homicide is that there should be a general avoidance of it so as to afford a sense of security, and a general sentiment against it so as to inhibit the sporadic homicidal impulse. Respect for life is socially useful only when it is *generally* observed and felt. Then the moral fact is conformity to the rule, and the moral judgment is the judgment about *that* fact, as regards *its* social consequences. But apparently all this is beside the point. There are occasional references to a state of society, such as "a healthy, sound, vigorous life of all the people" (p. 405), which would presumably be good and justify such courses of action as led to it. But the substantial truth is this: "The only test for the rightness of an act is that persons of good character approve it. The only test for goodness is that good persons on reflection approve and choose it—just as the test for good persons is that they choose and do the good" (p. 382). Since this is written down quite explicitly and unapologetically, whereas I should regard it as a conclusive *reductio ad absurdum*, it cannot appear to its author as it appears to me. I can only confess my blank amazement.

As against the view that the rightness of action lies in its good consequences, Professor Tufts argues pertinently that while it would be absurd to regard the condemnation of Socrates as "right," nevertheless "considering all the good to literature and

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free inquiry which has resulted" from it, "it is highly probable—or at least it is arguable—that the condemnation had better results than an acquital would have yielded" (p. 385). Of course what Professor Tufts means by "good" and "better" in this passage is entirely problematical. His own view, I presume, would be that the condemnation of Socrates was right or wrong according to what persons of good character you appealed to, these persons of good character being approved on reflection by other good persons, and so on, either *ad infinitum* or *ad* Professor Tufts. The only trouble is that when you have said this, in effect that an act is right or wrong according as someone deems it so, you have said nothing. On the other hand, let us suppose that Professor Tufts believes in good consequences such as the development of literature and freedom—good consequences that flow causally from acts, independently of any judgment pronounced on these acts. What would this causal beneficence of actions amount to? It would be a fact, and could be judged. Would it be an extra-moral fact, and would the judgments on it be irrelevant to ethical criticism?

But let us see if Professor Tufts's objection to the consequence theory of right action is fatal to it. He shows that if we were to look to the direct results of the action of Socrates's persecutors we might be brought to the conclusion that the action was beneficent in the long run and therefore right. But the consequences of the act may be otherwise considered. The act, let us assume, was an act of persecution; it was a tyrannical and oppressive misuse of political power. And *such action*, we say, is socially disorganizing and corrupting. Right action would then be such action as conforms to rules, which in turn are of the sort that when generalized effect adjustment and harmony. In other words, we judge the individual act by the social consequences to which the generalization of the act conduces. This would be the absolute rightness of the act, difficult to determine because of the complexity of the phenomena involved. But virtually all verdicts upon historical action are of this sort. They are retroactive judgments made in the light of all one knows about the human consequences of different sorts of action. The condemnation of religious intolerance, for example, is of this sort. On the other hand, there is what may be called "formal" or "relative" rightness, which is the conformity of action to such rules as were in vogue at the time of its performance, or

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conformity to the conscience of the agent, regardless of his enlightenment. The conduct of the Spanish inquisitors was right in this sense. Such a judgment may be recorded without prejudice; or it may be taken to imply that it is absolutely right for a man to live according to his lights or according to the standards of his day. This proposition would be debatable, and would hinge upon the consequences that tend to flow from such human qualities as self-criticism, conscientiousness, rigorism or censoriousness. In other words, Professor Tufts is quite correct in emphasizing the importance in the concept of rightness of the relation of the act to the rule; and advocates of the consequence theory, such as Mr. G. E. Moore and the present reviewer, have laid themselves open to the charge of neglecting it; but the consequence theory needs only to be amplified, and not rejected.

Professor Tufts, like Professor Stuart, insists that every moral decision involves the bringing of a new self into existence. Whether the new self is better or worse than the old is a matter that would require a fresh moral decision, which would evoke a new self that preferred itself to either of the other two. The result is that there is no criterion of better and worse, or of higher and lower, except that of earlier and later in the series of decisions. And even the decision that a certain self was better than another because it was later, would either be merely the expression of a third self, or no moral decision at all. These difficulties do not trouble Professor Tufts any more than they do Professor Stuart. Both fall back in the end on a sort of faith in change. "Moral progress involves both the formation of better (that is, *later?*) ideals and the adoption of such ideals as actual standards and guides of life. If our view is correct we can construct better (?) ideals neither by logical deduction nor solely by insight into the nature of things—if by this we mean things as they are. We must rather take as our starting-point the conviction that moral life is a process involving physical life, social intercourse, measuring and constructive intelligence. We shall endeavor to further each of these factors with the conviction that thus we are most likely to reconstruct our standards and find a fuller (?) good" (p. 404).

Dr. Kallen's essay on "Value and Existence," is, in spite of a certain self-consciousness and straining for effect, the best written of the three, the only essay in the book having any distinction of

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style. Its content lacks the characteristic instrumentalist touch. Values here are not valuations, or valuing judgments, but motor-affective facts,—"relations, responses, attitudes, immediate, simple, subjectively obvious, and irrational" (p. 414). "The world we live in is not one which was made for us, but one in which we happened and grew" (p. 409). The human mind endeavors to compensate itself for its repugnance to existent fact by imagining things as it would like them to be. Thus unity, spirituality, eternity, immortality and freedom, are at one and the same time the cravings of human nature, and acknowledgments of what nature in the larger sense is not. Art satisfies these cravings vicariously by creating images of their satisfaction. But it is to be remarked that Dr. Kallen so far simplifies the rôle of art as not to deal at all with the central problem of artistic detachment. Why is the shop-girl not made more covetous by representations of luxury, as the thirsty man is made more thirsty by the mirage, or as the shop-girl herself is made more covetous by witnessing the plumage of her neighbor? In other words, how can fiction satisfy the craving for fact?

Religion, which starts with "the perception that the actual world, whatever its history, is now *not* adapted to human nature" (p. 441), postulates an environment which is so adapted, puts it on the same level as the actual world, and makes use of it to control and rectify the actual world. But to the emancipated mind the fictitious character of the objects of religion as well as of philosophy is unmistakable. They are "value-forms," "the desiderated traits of a perfect universe," "ideas hypostasized," "expressions," "reconstructions," and "refuges" of interests. "The visible world, being not as we want it, we imagine an unseen one that satisfies our want" (p. 454). This is the dualism of Santayana and Russell, according to which the nostalgic soul abandoning nature to the control of mechanical laws, plays with beautiful dolls, knowing well that they are dolls, in the nursery of the imagination. But this "Life of Reason" is the precise opposite of the "Creative Intelligence." "Reason" lives its own life in purity and impotence, building castles only in Spain. The "Creative Intelligence" mixes in, compromises and soils itself, but gets things done. "Reason," as Dr. Kallen conceives it, projects the excellences and perfections which the heart desires, not as a substitute for the world, but "as an addition to it" Creative Intelligence, however, reconstructs the world. The

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one is a resigned and wistful quietism; the other a builder's plan and a complete equipment of tools for remodelling existence. Dr. Kallen has done his best to glue these two views together. After having devoted several paragraphs to convincing the reader that philosophy is the place of exile to which reason retires from an alien world, he quotes from "somewhere in Dewey" the teaching that philosophy is "a mode and organ of experience," and adds by way of climax that "it is the concrete incarnation of Creative Intelligence," thus appropriately concluding the book.

The most important philosophical statement in Dr. Kallen's essay, if not in the book, is that with which he begins, "The world we live in is not one which was made for us, but one in which we happened and grew." This statement is a generalization from experience, which owes its truth neither to its being a congenial illusion nor to its being a fruitful plan. The motive which prompted the author to make this generalization—the desire to express and report things as he found them, curiosity and love of knowing, purged so far as possible from predilection, and freed so far as possible from ulterior motive,—this is the one point of contact between philosophy and life which somehow fails to obtain recognition in this essay.

RALPH BARTON PERRY.

Harvard University.

STANDARDS OF AMERICAN LEGISLATION. By Ernst Freund. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1917. Pp. xx+327.

On its concrete side, the present work may be said to be a continuation of the standard treatise, "Police Power," by the same author. It is an expansion of a series of lectures delivered at Johns Hopkins University, and is presented as "an essay of constructive criticism." The object sought "is to suggest the possibility of supplementing the established doctrine of constitutional law which enforces legislative norms through *ex post facto* review and negation, by a system of positive principles that should guide and control the making of statutes, and give a more definite meaning and content to the concept of due process of law."

The discussion leading up to the last chapter is intended "to indicate the existence of principles of legislation apart from recognized doctrines of constitutional law." "Principle as applied to legislation . . . is something that in the long-run

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will tend to enforce itself by reason of its inherent fitness, or if ignored, will produce irritation, disturbance, and failure of policy." It will thus be seen that "principle" is more than a rule; it is a social fact; and when it becomes a rule, it is a kind of rule which will "tend to enforce itself." The question raised by the author "whether our legal science has developed an adequate system of principles of legislation in this sense," hardly needs an answer. In a scientific sense, lawyers, although they know a great deal about rules of law, and are in position to discover by legal projection many others, are wholly unfamiliar with legal rules which are "principles" because of their "inherent fitness." Such knowledge has not heretofore been considered a necessary part of a lawyer's training. All that is left to a nondescript sociology. The legal establishment is a great business enterprise which keeps no books of account. It never knows whether it is solvent or insolvent. The reason a system of legal rules operating in this manner does not oftener "produce irritation" is that, as Tolstoy somewhere has stated, "only a thousandth part of our lives pertains to the laws; the rest is governed by custom and the opinion of society." Gnæus Flavius (Kantorowicz) has had the same thought when he says that the man-in-the-street is governed not by juridical law, but by natural law. Anyone who has had any experience with business practice, and who also knows something of the juridical system, must often have been struck by the discordance between legal rules and commercial dealings. And yet the two are able to coexist, each for the greater part ignoring the other.

The criticism of the situation does not lie here. It is entirely tolerable and even satisfactory when two systems can coexist in this happy mutuality of indifference. But, inevitably, a fractional part of the commerce of life must be strained through the sieve of the law. Certain parts go through and others do not. We record the operation, and stop there. We do not seek to inquire either into the moving causes of the process, or its after-effects. This, too, is regarded as sociology, and not law.

In this connection, the author takes the stand that as a practical matter "we should refuse to incumber the science of legislation with the tasks of social, economic, or political science." Again he says, "a science of legislation desirous of establishing a status of its own, would treat the data of the social sciences as lying outside of its own sphere, and consider that its task begins only when their conclusions have been reached and formulated."

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These views represent the tradition of the law which has always thought itself competent to regulate social relations by reliance on its own invincible wisdom. Thus, as the author himself points out, "the factory acts were carried against the protests of economists, while the public health laws were largely based on theories of the spread of disease which are now rejected." Doubtless, it would be an unworkable demand, and would result in large part in a denial of legislative activity, to require of the legislator that he be an expert in all the subjects affected by the legislative will; and yet a liberal acquaintance with the achievements of the arts and sciences is not too much to expect of legislation on a high plane of efficiency. To carry the separation between law and other arts and sciences to a rigorous conclusion would result in a type of legislative obscurantism which also would mean obstruction of all activity. The art of writing and knowledge of the rules of grammar are not within the sphere of law. What would a system of law be without them? Now we have only to extend and deepen the field of knowledge with which and upon which legal rules operate to reach a point varying from country to country and from one decade to another, where the legislator must rely upon the expert knowledge of others.

It is true, as the author points out, that "undisputed conclusions" are not always available. In this situation, three courses are possible: (1) to await the time when conclusions are no longer disputed; (2) to legislate on hypothesis and observe the experiment; and (3) to institute an investigating commission to collect data, and study the problem in hand.

The question of classification of the sciences, whether sociology, economics, and politics are embraced by legal science; whether one or more of them includes legal science, in whole or in part; or, finally, whether they are independent spheres, is immaterial here. But it is very important that legislative action be intelligent and intelligible. Abundant examples in the text under review show that frequently legislation has lacked both qualities. If, for example, when legislating upon an economic question,the legislator is able to draw upon a sufficient fund of his own knowledge of the subject to satisfy the requirements of economic science, as well as legal technic, well and good; but if such legislation is attempted in absence of knowledge, and without an effort to obtain it, the course pursued cannot be commended as even within the bounds of ordinary prudence. A private citizen acting

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with no more circumspection would be denominated "negligent"; and yet "negligent" legislation is the ruling type.

On the point under discussion, our disagreement with the learned author, if any, we hope is only one of emphasis, and the observations made are suggested by what appears to be a somewhat rigidly traditional point of view with respect to the relation of law and other social sciences.

The science of legislation has two leading aspects: (1) the development of legislative policy and the application of legislative principles; and (2) legislative technic. Both fields have various subdivisions. The first six chapters of the book give an historical statement of recent problems of social legislation principally within the field of constitutional law, with a critical discussion of the leading cases, and a consideration of various legislative principles suggested by the cases. These chapters, in the main, represent the first of the two aspects of legislative science. The last chapter seems to be one largely dealing with the formal side of legislation and represents the second aspect. There is, as is apparent, a considerable disproportion in the treatment allotted to the two sides of the science; and yet, we are constrained to regard the last chapter as the most valuable of the entire book, without in any way minimizing the considerable fund of historical, comparative, and technical information brought together with large industry in the earlier chapters. The last chapter has been in part also incorporated in the volume of essays recently published under the title "Science of Legal Method" (IX Philosophy of Law Series).

The present writer has had occasion elsewhere to comment on the dearth of writing on legislative science. This is easily explainable for countries where the bulk of the law is *jus non scriptum*, but a satisfactory reason for this aridity of literary production is not so clear for countries where legislation preponderates over judge-made law. This is one of the very few books on legislative science, and is the first in the English language which has come to our notice since W. Jethro Brown's "Underlying Principles of Modern Legislation" (London, 1912). The field occupied by Professor Freund is therefore a new one in nearly all its avenues of approach; and it is extremely fortunate that a writer of his wide professorial experience, and interest, in the subject, has undertaken to publish the results of his research and reflection. The author modestly rejects the idea

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of claiming for his book the pretensions of a systematic treatise, but the limitations which he has imposed upon himself will not detract in any wise from the usefulness and value of the work presented.

From the adverse side, we believe the title does not accurately represent the matters treated, and yet we would have great difficulty in suggesting another. The index is not altogether satisfactory; for example the author's use of the terms "policy" and "principle" is important for an understanding of his argument, but they are not to be found in the index. This defect is in part relieved by a chapter summary which, by the way, no one should read as a substitute for the book. Scores of cases are discussed in the text, and, in several instances, this discussion is of considerable technical value, but there is no index of cases, although a few cases are entered in the general index.

ALBERT KOCOUREK.

Northwestern University.

ALPHA AND OMEGA. By Jane Ellen Harrison, LL.D., Litt.D. London: Sidgwick and Jackson Ltd., 1915. Pp. vii, 259.

"These scattered essays," says Miss Harrison in her preface, "bear the title *Alpha and Omega* because in subject they verge from primitive magic to post-Impressionism." They are, indeed, extraordinarily comprehensive in range and wide in sympathy. Most of the essays are altogether charming, glowing with humour and sparkling with wit, the products of a vivid and kaleidoscopic mind. But not all that Miss Harrison says should be taken too seriously. Many of the essays were given as addresses to societies at Cambridge and elsewhere; and a good deal must be regarded as of the nature of *jeu d'esprit* and *tour de force*. Still, there is a philosophy of life underlying these essays, and animating every one of them. It is a real philosophy, but it is instinct with so many conflicting tendencies that it is not easy to give it a name. Is it an emotional stoicism, or an altruistic individualism, an idealistic realism, or a benevolent anarchism? Is Miss Harrison a Mystical Positivist, or a Calvinistic Darwinist, or a Unanimist Heretic? A series of essays which make all these impressions on the reader's mind is naturally extremely interesting, though a trifle bewildering. The impos-

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sibility of classifying Miss Harrison's philosophy is due to what she has termed a resonance of her mind. In the essay entitled *Scientiæ Sacra Fames* she develops the view that while man's mind is essentially insulated and independent, woman's is resonant and sympathetic.

Miss Harrison's philosophical sympathies are wide enough to include William James and Dr. McDougall, Mr. Russell and Mr. Moore, and last but not least M. Bergson. Different as these thinkers are, they agree more or less in their reaction against intellectualism; and it is as a convinced anti-intellectualist that Miss Harrison appears in these essays. She agrees with the psychologists in insisting on the importance of the instincts and emotions of men as against his reason; she is at one with the realists in her extreme particularism, her conviction that the world consists of isolated reals, the relations between which are blatantly external; and she is a disciple of M. Bergson in the value she sets on immediate experience and intuition. Miss Harrison's resultant point of view is expressed in the sharp distinctions she everywhere draws between life and theory, feeling and thought, experience and reason, morality and ethics, and religion and theology. Life, feeling, experience, morality, and religion are in touch with reality, or rather, are themselves aspects of reality; but thought, theory, reason, ethics and theology are usually both superfluous and mischievous.

Miss Harrison's attitude to morality and ethics, is closely akin to the usual sociological standpoint. Miss Harrison says that we do not know enough about morality to justify us in copying the ethical attitude of praise and blame. Virtue and vice are very convenient labels. They are not real. Morality is a purely practical matter, which neither needs nor admits of ethical theory. It is defined as "a balance maintained between the interests of the individual and the interests of the race, the better relating of the two" (p. 137). Miss Harrison believes in the existence of distinct egoistic and altruistic sentiments in mankind, and holds that the truly moral life is that in which both are present in the proper proportion. This view implies (1) that morality is essentially a practical compromise; (2) that this compromise is rendered necessary by the radical inconsistency of the interests of the individual on the one hand, and of society on the other; and (3) that moral progress consists in the successful imposition of this compromise on the individual by the society (see p. 199).

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In an epilogue Miss Harrison applies her point of view to the international situation. She finds that the Allies are inspired by an anti-intellectual realism. Realism is characteristic of modern Russian literature, France is being profoundly moved by an explicit and logical anti-rationalism, and Britain also is experiencing a vague but deep-seated anti-intellectualist reaction. But Germany has had neither part nor lot in this movement of salvation. "Untouched, it would seem, by modern realism, she still worships abstractions: she is a belated idealist" (p. 247). The mixture of truth and error in this application is a good example of what occurs more than once in this book. In spite of Miss Harrison's realism, in spite of her contempt of theory, she is constantly being dragged away from reality by her own theories. But from the point of view of the reader of these essays, that is no doubt clear gain; for reality, I suspect, is not nearly as interesting as Miss Harrison's theories.

G. A. JOHNSTON.

University of Glasgow, Scotland.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY. New Series. Vol. XVI. Containing the Papers read before the Society during the Thirty-Seventh Session, 1915–1916. London: Williams and Norgate, 1916. Pp. iv, 378. Price, 10s. 6d. net.

The papers in this volume which are of special ethical interest are two in number: "On the Relation of the Theoretic to the Practical Activity," by Miss Hilda D. Oakeley (pp. 133–155), and a symposium on "The Nature of the State in View of its External Relations," by Messrs. C. Delisle Burns, Bertrand Russell, and G. D. H. Cole (pp. 290–325). Miss Oakeley asks whether the attempt has ever been made to reach a philosophical satisfaction on the basis of practical life itself. Is the question a valid one *ab initio* or is it to be ruled out as self-contradictory, or may not the possibility of philosophically understanding practice have been hindered by the choice of the standpoint from which the subject has been in general approached? (p. 135). Mr. Burns argues that, both as to fact and as to principle, the traditional view of the nature of the state is vitiated because philosophers have failed to recognize the importance of external relations. Then he shows that the state is, among other things, an association of men with important moral relations to those

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who do not belong to the association. Mr. Russell agrees very largely with Mr. Burns. "We may say, broadly speaking," says he (p. 307), "that there are three great evils in existing states: (1) Internal Injustice; (2) The fact of not being world-wide; (3) Interference with Liberty." "The state is a combination of men for common defence and attack, produced in the main by two motives: desire for security on the part of subjects, and desire for power on the part of rulers. Internal defence and attack are conducted generally according to rules laid down in advance, and constituting the Criminal Law. In spite of the fact that the Criminal Law has always been inclined to condemn many things which do not deserve to be condemned, including some of the most beneficent actions that a man can perform, the internal security which we owe to the state has on the whole been a gain to civilization. But in order to win this security men have set up a worship of the state which has led to a sacrifice of individual liberty and initiative far greater than any that the motive of security would have warranted. And in external affairs, every increase in the strength of the state has been a new disaster to mankind. For in external affairs the motive of dominion has triumphed over the motive of security by the wholly illusory argument that only the means of dominion would insure security. There is only one road to the security which armies and navies are nominally intended to secure, and that is the establishment of a world state which shall alone possess armed forces" (pp. 309–310). Mr. Cole agrees with Mr. Burns's general conclusion that the state is bound by moral considerations just as the individual is bound, and that the only difference is that a sanction has been established for the judgment of individuals' offences, whereas no sanction, save the force of the parties, exists in the case of states. Mr. Cole thus sums up (p. 325) the points which he tries to make. "In the first place, the introspective method in political theory has all the same disadvantages as in the theory of knowledge. It leads straight to political Solipsism, which is otherwise known as Imperialism. Secondly, the theory that states are ends in themselves is a false application to politics of Kantian ethical theory. Thirdly, the threefold problem of the individual, the state, and the political world, cannot be conceived simply in terms of a dual relation of greater and less. Individual citizens are not absorbed in their states, but have other loyalties no less binding than their loyalty

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to their states. Fourthly, states are not different in kind from other forms of human association; and, as these other forms may be international or cosmopolitan, as well as national, they cannot be absorbed in national states, or, indeed, in any form of territorial organization. Fifthly, it is not enough to point out that there are of necessity practical limitations to state absolutism: the theory of state absolutism is wrong, and must be abandoned. Sixthly, the obligation which the state can impose on the citizen is limited both by the duties which the citizen owes to other associations and to himself, and by the democratic or undemocratic character of the state, not only generally, but in relation to the particular obligation which it seeks to impose. Lastly, it is implicit in all that has gone before that the state is not identical with the nation, and that the external relations of states cannot be identified with those of nations. States are only, at the most, partial embodiments of the national consciousness. The problem of conflicting social obligations appears no less in the external relations of states than in their purely domestic relations with individuals and associations within their borders."

P. J.

THE ORIGIN AND MEANING OF CHRISTIANITY. By Gilbert T. Sadler, M.A., LL.B. London: C. W. Daniel, Ltd., 1916. Pp. 222. Price, 5s. net.

The author of this book, which is dedicated "To the Church of All Aspiring Souls," is, or was, a Congregationalist minister. His temper is religious, his sincerity obvious, his misinformation wide. He "humbly urges reasons against the historicity of Jesus Christ." So Whately urged reasons against the historicity of Napoleon Bonaparte. And with equal plausibility. Mr. Sadler's thesis is one which no theologian, however heterodox, takes seriously. Mr. Conybeare's "Historical Christ," whose publication by the Rationalist Press Association guarantees its freedom from conventional influences, is conclusive on this point.

This element of paradox neutralizes the saner elements of Mr. Sadler's thinking: to use a colloquialism, he rubs his hearers up the wrong way. His views on the ethical issues underlying contemporary politics are strong, and strongly expressed. So strongly, indeed, that, had he been a philosopher rather than a divine, he would have had reason to fear the Defence of the Realm Act: philosophers have suffered under it for less. But preachers

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can say what philosophers cannot; Gallio is a wise Censor, and cares for none of those things.

The Anglo-French Entente meets with his disapproval: "The secret and sinful Entente (1900) was the result of atheistic fear of Germany." And the Belgian bloodbath of 1914 is accounted for as "largely caused by the German officers and men being 'exasperated' by the action of the Belgians at the forts of Liège. They shot down thousands of Germans. No doubt technically (note the word) the Germans were in the wrong in crossing Belgium, but the resistance of that wrong by a greater evil, killing those who would take a way across Belgium, exasperated the Germans." So, we may believe, the armed burglar is "exasperated" by the resistance of his victim: but this exasperation is not commonly held to be an excuse for his adding murder to burglary. Mr. Sadler, under whom the criminal classes would have an easy time, differs. "All penalty is a relic of revenge," he tells us. "To punish even as a deterrent to others is unjust to those who suffer." *Que messieurs les assassins commencent!* was the answer of a statesman to the opponents of capital punishment. Mr. Sadler reverses it: *Que messieurs les gensdarmes commencent!* "Why (he asks) should ruffians *desire* to kill the police? So that they can thieve? Are they very poor and illiterate in moral knowledge, then? And whose fault would this desire to thieve be but the fault of the State?" In any case, "No violence is to be resorted to: severe penalties do not lessen crime." The crudity of the doctrinaire could go no further; it is Rousseau, but Rousseau without inspiration, and run to seed.

If sentimentalism of this sort were Christianity, the days of Christianity would be numbered. But it will seem to most of us that Mr. Sadler's conception of the meaning of that religion is as wide of the facts as his view of its origin.

A. F.

Ashby St. Ledgers, England.

THE DRINK PROBLEM OF TO-DAY, IN ITS MEDICO-SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECTS. Edited by T. N. Kelynack, M.D. London: Methuen and Company. Pp. 318. Price, 7s. 6d. net.

This book is a revised and enlarged edition of an earlier work published in 1907, which has long been out of print. It consists of fourteen chapters on various aspects of the Drink question, such as the Biology, Pathology and Psychology of Alcoholism;

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Alcohol and Life Assurance, Alcohol and Crime, Alcohol and War, etc. Each chapter is written by an expert. The book is a mine of easily acquired information on all points of this much debated question.

Among the most interesting chapters are Dr. Harry Campbell's Biology of Alcoholism, giving the history of alcohol from the earliest times; Alcoholism and Poverty by the Rev. J. C. Pringle, Secretary to the Charity Organisation Society, who has had unrivalled opportunities of practical acquaintance with his theme, and Sir Alfred Pearce Gould's Alcohol and the War. This last is a real trumpet-blast, calculated to arouse the nation from its supine attitude so far at least as drink is concerned, and forcing the lesson home to military and civilian populations alike, without bitterness or fanaticism, but with a whole-hearted belief in the doctrine of austere moderation.

This war may indeed be taken as a great experiment on an enormous scale on the whole drink question, beginning as it does with the prohibition of absinthe in France and of vodka in Russia. Failing such drastic measures in Great Britain, moderation has been forced on our men at the front with the happiest results, and should, it is to be hoped, teach them a wholesome lesson when they return to civil life. Professor Woodhead, who goes beyond most of his fellow-contributors in his doctrine of total abstinence, objects even to the tot of rum still allowed to men on active service, and declares that the use of alcohol is an agent for harm in cases where it would be least suspected, as for example in men suffering from "shell shock," frost-bite and trench-foot. But his theory needs corroboration and is not so well supported as his contention that tuberculosis among the soldiers is promoted by alcohol as a devitalizing agent, and is a disastrous factor in cases where operations have to be performed, or where the men are exposed to infective diseases.

To turn to more general aspects, Dr. Claye Shaw touches on the interesting question why one man can take large quantities of alcohol with apparent impunity, while another is "upset" by a single glass. We are left, however, in doubt whether the first man's immunity comes from a naturally good digestion or from a particular composition of his nervous system.

Major Eccles in an instructive chapter gives tables taken from various life assurance societies proving that excessive alcohol does tend to shorten man's life, from which he draws the corol-

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lary that total abstainers do on the whole live the longest. Sir Thomas Whittaker refers to this again in his excellent article on Alcoholism and Legislation, and quotes the classic case of Warner the Quaker, who in 1840 founded the first temperance life office, in righteous indignation at the action of the life assurances he had at first approached, who told him his abstinence was in danger of causing premature death.

Mr. Rae gives a charming account of the gradual development of national sobriety. The more enlightened half of the nation was apparently horrified by the universal gin-drinking of the early Georgian period, with which Hogarth's engravings have familiarised us. This resulted in a solemn "Remonstrance against the Common Sale of Ardent Spirits," addressed to the public in 1725 by the Royal College of Physicians. Fifty years later Dr. Tobias Smollett in his travels through France and Italy preaches the unexpected doctrine that "water is best for the exhilaration of spirits." But the eighteenth century offers little more in the defence of sobriety. Early in the nineteenth century Dr. Beddoes astonishes his patients by saying that the true place for strong drink is on the apothecary's shelf. Then in 1832 comes the founding of the first temperance society, while simultaneously the American Army Surgeon, Beaumont, makes an experiment on the gastric juices in the stomach of a wounded soldier, showing the deleterious effects of alcohol on the walls of that organ. In 1839 seventy-nine members of the Medical Faculty of London advanced the theory that alcohol is not beneficial to health or even necessary to labour, a surprisingly modern pronouncement for the date, and foreshadowing Dr. Kelynack's own prophecy, ninety years later, that the future of medicine rests far more in hygiene than in therapeutics.

The chapter on the history of alcohol is perhaps the newest to the lay reader, and gives rise to the question whence comes the instinctive and often irresistible attraction of intoxicating drink to the human race. It certainly does not lie in the pleasures of taste for the first fermented liquors were in many cases horribly nauseous and the idea of making them agreeable to the palate is of comparatively small importance still.

Alcohol was unknown in pre-agricultural days, and it was something like thirty thousand years ago that, as we believe, man first learnt to till the soil and brew strong drink. Fruit, starchy substances and sap of plants were all drawn upon to fur-

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nish material for fermentation; but, besides their production, knowledge of the potter's craft was needed, as no drink could be brewed without large vessels in which to store the material. Thus we learn that all savages knew the use of alcohol before they came in contact with so-called civilisation, except the few pre-agricultural aborigines of Australia, who made no pottery. Hops were a very late addition in the history of alcohol, and were unknown before the fourteenth century, when spirits were also for the first time distilled.

Originally drunkenness appears to have been spasmodic only and was mostly confined to religious festivals. This may account for the ancient conception of Paradise as a place of refreshing largely connected with liquor. Homer's Olympus consisted of an "everlasting drunken orgy," we are told, and the Scandinavian Valhalla was built on rather similar lines.

On the whole the tone of this whole book is wise and moderate, the horrible and undeniable results of intemperance are clearly put forth, and the question is asked, in reasonable terms, what, under any circumstances, are the benefits of alcohol. Yet we are definitely told by one writer that "the idea of making a nation of total abstainers is not feasible, even if it were really desirable, and by another that "warnings against strong drinks are at least as old as the art of writing itself." The outlook would be rather a black one, were we not convinced that a strong individual desire for sobriety is the only basis for a really temperate national life.

RUTH HEAD.

London, England.

THE ADORNMENT OF THE SPIRITUAL MARRIAGE, THE BOOK OF TRUTH, THE SPARKLING STONE. By Jan van Ruysbroeck. Translated into English from the original Flemish by C. A. Wynschenck Dom. Edited, with an introduction by Evelyn Underhill. London: J. M. Dent & Sons, Ltd., 1916. Pp. xxxii, 259. Price, 4s. 6d. net.

The ever-widening circle of those who study the life of the spirit will be grateful to the translator for this excellent rendering into English of three of the finest writings of Jan of Ruysbroeck, which have never been fully accessible in our own language. M. Maeterlinck has indeed given us extracts from them in his well known essay translated by Miss Jane Stoddart, and Miss

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Underhill has quoted largely from them in her most excellent monograph in the *Quest* series; otherwise all we possess of direct translation is the short and difficult treatise *The Book of the Twelve Beguines*, done into English by Mr. John Francis. The standard text of Ruysbroeck is of course the French translation by the Benedictines of St. Paul de Wisques. It is difficult to account for this apparent neglect, as Jan of Ruysbroeck was certainly one of the greatest of the Christian mystics. His influence was felt far beyond his own age and country, and had its share in the emancipation of the human mind in the Reformation. Miss Underhill, in an admirable preface, touches on his life and times, and sums up his teaching with great clearness and insight. She disposes of the notion (popularised by M. Maeterlinck) that Ruysbroeck was an "ignorant monk," and shows that he was familiar with the works not only of the early Christian authors, but of Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus.

Up to his day Christian writings had chiefly taken the form of scholastic speculation, but now came a demand for a religion of experience, more simple, practical and social. With his foundations firmly rooted in Catholicism (he himself declares that he submits all he has written to the judgment of Holy Church) Ruysbroeck was yet one of the great constructive mystics who represent and sum up the spiritual knowledge of their own and other times, transfusing and co-ordinating, in the light of their own rich experience and personality, the universal vision of God, and of man's relation to Him. As the Greek bishop has well said: "Our systems (of religion) are like walls to protect us against the storms of the world, but above they are all open to the same God." It is to this universal and rarefied atmosphere that Ruysbroeck lifts us, interpreting and vivifying the doctrines of the Catholic faith till they form what he himself calls "a sparkling stone" capable of reflecting the radiance of the Uncreated Light.

The Christian life he tells us is useless without the power of rest and of action. In *The Adornment of the Spiritual Marriage* when "Christ our faithful Bridegroom united our nature with His person," he treats of the active life and of the necessity for *moral* training, before treating of spiritual training. Like many of the spiritual thinkers of those days, he speaks much of the "spiritual ladder" or three stages of development. The first stage is the active life of the servants of God, moral and

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virtuous. The second stage or inward life of the friends of God, is marked by a change of intention. All is now done from the motive of love "when Christ the Eternal Sun rises in our hearts and sends his light and fire into our wills." The third stage is the superessential life of the sons of God "who have raised themselves into the absolute purity of their spirit by love, and stand in God's presence with open and unveiled faces."

The *Book of the Sparkling Stone* is perhaps the finest and most inspired of all his writings, and that in which he reaches the greatest heights. Man is given the Sparkling Stone or Nature of Christ, the goal of human transcendence.

In the *Book of Supreme Truth* he reviews some of his teachings, combats the pantheistic and quietist doctrines preached by some of the heretical sects of his day, and makes clear that "as the air is in the sunshine and the sunshine in the air, so God is the being of the soul but the Creator always distinct from the created."

The translator has done a great service in opening out to us the experience and teachings of one of the most lofty and spiritual minds of the Christian era. The English is excellent and shows no trace of the original involved Flemish or rather Brabant dialect in which Ruysbroeck himself wrote.

G. K. S.

London, England.

SHORTER NOTICES.

A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy. By Cardinal Mercier and other professors of the Higher Institute of Philosophy, Louvain. Authorized translation by T. L. Parker, M.A., and S. A. Parker, O.S.B., M.A.; with a preface by P. Coffey, Ph.D., Professor of Philosophy at Maynooth College, Ireland. Vol. I. London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Company; St. Louis, B. Herder, 1916. Pp. xxvi, 573. Price, 10s. 6d. net.

This work, which will be complete in two volumes, is in large part an abridgment of the well-known Louvain philosophical series, six volumes of which had appeared before the beginning of the war. The present work includes, besides a prefatory introduction to philosophy, Cosmology (by D. Nys), Psychology, Criteriology (Epistemology), and Ontology by Cardinal Mercier. The second volume will contain Natural Theology, Logic, Ethics and History of Philosophy.

No student of contemporary philosophy can afford to neglect the neo-scholastic movement since 1879. Great efforts have been made to bring the teaching of Aquinas up to date, and, as in Walker's *Theory of Knowledge*, the non-Romanist philosopher will find his colleagues recognised and dealt with. The "Manual" is decorated with four physiological plates, and Evolution receives five pages. Physical theories, which are divided

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into dynamism, represented by Leibniz, Kant, Boscovich and others, and energism, represented by Ostwald, Mach, Duhem and others, are discussed at greater length. The reader who wishes to see how a modern philosopher is handled should turn to p. 381 for a refutation of Kant. While the book should benefit especially those who have been accustomed to underrate Aristotle, it should be in the hands of all philosophers who do not know the larger, but incomplete work. The translation appears to be good, and the book is very well printed.

T. S. E.

PROGRESS AND HISTORY. Edited by F. S. Marvin. London: Oxford University Press (H. Milford), 1916. Pp. 314. Price, 8s. 6d. net.

The volume of twelve lectures, a sequel to the *Unity of Western Civilisation*, has, like the latter, varying levels. The earlier volume—also a symposium—described some of the unifying factors which hold Western civilisation firm, while the present group of lectures, given at Woodbrooke Settlement, show these forces in growth. The book is a series of scholarly *comptes rendus* by specialists, of progress as it appears in prehistoric times, Hellenism, the middle ages; in religion, industry, philosophy, science and art. Many of these like Mr. Zimmern's two chapters and Professor J. A. Smith's, are excellent in matter and manner; the slightest is Mr. Clutton Brock's contribution, which expresses little but his hope or opinion that we may be able by an exercise of will, to achieve even a new renaissance in art, and which has the qualities and defects of a college debating society paper.

The position of the editor and of these combined papers is that though some deny the possibility of progress and claim that we are mistaking a progressive materialism for progress, the concrete material advantages of organised civilisation, the conquests of science, make for the liberation of human energies. Ethically our general progress is doubted by few who have had the opportunity of comparing the evidence as to any previous state of morals. But Mr. Jacks, in his "Moral Progress," asks some embarrassing questions; and tells us that belief in moral progress cannot be proved by appeal to history or to human experience. We cannot prove moral progress by appeal to any objective standard, such as the amount of happiness existing in the world at definite dates. Mr. Zimmern also declares that we cannot measure progress in terms of organisation, or efficiency, or culture, or knowledge; and the editor finds that achievement has been, hitherto, ever needing correction "by another movement more one-sided still."

M. J.

TOWARDS RACIAL HEALTH. A Handbook for Parents, Teachers and Social Workers on the Training of Boys and Girls. By Norah H. March, B.Sc., M.R.San.I. With a Foreword by Professor J. Arthur Thomson, M.A., LL.D., and Illustrations by Jessie M. Lawson, B.I., A.R.C.A (Sculp. Lond.). London: George Routledge & Sons, Ltd., 1916. Pp. xxii, 338. Price, 3s. 6d. net.

Miss Norah March is known both in Britain and America as a trained biologist and educationalist, and a lecturer of unusual ability. She has here outlined a scheme of sex education which is extremely comprehensive, ethically idealistic and illustrated by a wide range and detailed accuracy of knowledge. Special stress is laid upon the value of the "biologic approach" to the facts of reproduction, as tending towards a mentally

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alert yet unembarrassed frame of mind, and sense of wonder and sublimity. The portions of the book dealing with microscopic work, the keeping of pets, etc., are very fascinating, and should have a distinct humanitarian value, and help to cultivate sympathy and interest in animal life and a sense of responsibility and "universal kinship."

The "suggestions for parents on how to answer childish questions" are full of beauty and delicate dignity; happy the children whose parents *could* or *would* thus enlighten them and *how few!*

Yet obstinate questionings will arise respecting the author's fundamental theories: *e.g.*, certainly the sex impulse might with advantage be *sublimated* to a much greater extent than is posible in most cases under present social conditions: but is the solution *entirely* sublimation and control pending life-long monogamy? Is not a certain amount of direct functional exercise and expression necessary in most cases, for bodily health and mental perspective? And granting that the Mendelian law of heredity may prove to govern the transmission of many physical and mental peculiarities and defects—does not the justifiability of parentage become very doubtful in the case of many "impure dominants" who may be most useful to the community as individuals?

If the much needed educational reconstruction is now really to take place in England, Miss March's high idealism, clarity of mind and special knowledge should do the State great service.

F. W. Stella Browne.

The Flogging Craze. By Henry S. Salt, with a foreword by Sir George Greenwood. London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1916. Pp. 160. Price, 2s. 6d. net.

Mr. Salt's vigorous and well-written polemic on the horrors of flogging will be read with interest by educationalists, even though, like all pieces of special pleading, it fails to convince by the very violence of its claims. He cheerfully assumes that when leaders of religious thought, such as the Dean of St. Paul's, defend the use of the birch on the score of its "wholesomeness," they must be profoundly unaware of the existence of sadism. This is taking too much for granted, and, unfortunately, the underlying suggestion of the whole book is that such a morbid love of inflicting torture is at the bottom of all analogous punishments, from the schoolboys' caning to the floggings recently sanctioned by the Criminal Law Amendment Act. This is absurd. Few educated adults are ignorant that such forms of vice exist, but they know also what a happily small percentage of the human race are handicapped by this lowest stigma of degenerate humanity. That no child must be whipped for deliberate naughtiness because one father in ten thousand has a criminal enjoyment of the act is a pronouncement few would endorse, and the boy whose character is permanently degraded by a caning received at school would be of such a temperament that the likelihood of his becoming a useful citizen of the world would be small indeed.

Mr. Salt speaks repeatedly of the "indecency," of the "obscenity" even, of flogging, but to the unprejudiced mind, the choice between one brief unpleasant experience of bodily pain and five years of severe discipline in a reformatory (the one punishment available to the courts for boys between the ages of fourteen and sixteen), shut away from the natural pleasures of a free home-life would not be hard to make. When discussing a similiar case the Lancet suggests that these young Hooligans should be turned into active Boy Scouts; and that a bad Boy Scout should be

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whipped when naughty appears to the normal man only in the light of ordinary discipline.

In two stirring chapters Mr. Salt denies the use of the lash, either as a purifier or as a deterrent where criminals are concerned, and in his "Fallacies of Flagellants" he makes an amusing list of the usual arguments said to be brought forward by upholders of this ancient form of punishment, arguments which he demolishes easily and at full gallop, in the manner of those who are able to raise their own obstacles.

RUTH HEAD.

London, England.

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THE INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL OF ETHICS

JANUARY, 1918.

THE PRINCIPLES OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE.

ARTHUR K. ROGERS.

IN THE present article I propose to set aside questions of expediency, and of practical method, and to confine myself simply to the consideration of general ethical principles. Are there any such principles to be discovered for telling us how in detail the distribution of wealth ought theoretically to be carried out?—principles that will appeal to thoughtful men so universally as fair and just, that one point of expediency will plainly be that it will not be safe to violate them in any actual industrial scheme. There are a number of suggestions here that have been proposed, sufficiently plausible to call at least for consideration.

A first suggestion might possibly be, that the just basis of property is possession, and existing custom. Practically, in the common talk about the rights of property, this often is appealed to as if it were an ultimate ground. Men have always shown a disposition to resent any attempt to hinder them from 'doing what they please with their own,' and to think of as inalienably their own whatever custom has left hitherto in their hands. But society has of course successively repudiated one after another of such claims, until now we rather wonder how, for example, anyone could ever have thought that rotten boroughs, or human flesh, or any of a number of other things, were to be regarded as that to which a man had indefeasible rights. The suggestion has perhaps this measure of truth in it, that, other

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things being equal, continuance in things already settled is a ground of stability; and stability is one essential to any just system of property. It is therefore a point of expediency that possession should count. But it quite evidently does not settle the matter of fairness, unless we are ready to maintain that every form of property division has, while it lasted, been fair. Where the test of possession is relatively legitimate is in connection with claims based on the historic past. It is plainly inexpedient to go back too far in considering questions of title; and when, accordingly, a claim is advanced on the basis of a former title which has lapsed, it is convenient to fall back upon possession, in order to keep matters from being continually unsettled. So too, possession is relevant in law, the justice of the legal system not being for the moment in dispute; since if men were allowed without due legal process to oust those in possession, the occasion would be given for a state of private war. But when the essential justice of existing distribution is questioned, it is never relevant to answer criticism simply by appealing to possession; this is to beg the whole question. There is, as I have remarked, a point of expediency which ought to be considered, in that stability is essential to the proper workings of a system of property. But if we were to take this as if it justified always stopping with possession in order to avoid the dangers of uncertainty and change, we should be failing to note that such an insistence might well be the surest way of sacrificing stability. Possession gives security only where it does not come into conflict with what any large number of men regard as justice; the more the indictment of injustice is made, the more an insistence on the bare right of possession is bound to create an unsettled and dubious situation, in which no one can be sure what is to happen on the morrow. So when we find the complaint made against various reforms that they 'unsettle business,' without the question first being raised whether there may not be conditions in business which demand reform, we have such a short-sighted policy; the surest way to perpetuate business uncertainty is

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to stop short of settling questions of business justice, and settling them right. A short spasm is far more in the interests of stability than a long reign of continued agitation.

At the opposite pole from the conservative plea of possession, is the radical claim that equality in distribution is the demand of justice. How this might come in conflict with expediency needs no elaboration here; but also its justification as an ethical ideal is far from self evident. It gets its primary force through the abstract appeal to 'equality,' which, as a word, has a sufficient moral flavor to lend some apparent sanction to whatever it gets attached to; but when we go beyond the word, we neither find the meaning very clear, nor the proof at all obvious. Do we mean that every human being should have literally the same income, independent of his needs, his services, his general deserts, his industry? One has only to put the question to see that this cannot maintain itself unequivocally as a demand of justice; to many people it will seem self-evidently unfair. Or is it that every one shall get the same reward for an equal amount of work? This might avoid the more flagrant difficulties in the first interpretation; but it still leaves a number of questions open. What does equal work mean? Does it mean work of equal value?—that would be to abandon the principle in any sense in which its upholders take a practical interest in maintaining it. Does it mean work done in an equal number of hours? As a matter of fact, this seems to be the only simple method of determining equality; and it is the one most commonly proposed. But then how about the fairness, again, of rewarding equally the man who loafs through his job and the one who takes it conscientiously, the bungler and the efficient artisan, the man who by special gifts adds a special value to his product—artistically for example,—and the mere routine worker, the man with an easy job and one who has to undergo much that is disagreeable or painful? And if to obviate this last objection one makes equality of effort the standard, we should have

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to ask first what possible method could be devised for determining accurately differences of effort; and even then there would remain some of the other demands unsatisfied. Thus there is no necessary connection between effort, and quality or service; and within certain bounds it is even true that the greater the effort that has to be expended, the less intrinsically valuable the product is likely to be. Should we for example pay the apprentice more than the master workman, on the ground that he finds at the start the work much harder than it afterwards becomes by practice? I am not saying that, if it could be worked out, a principle of this sort might not be, in one or other of its forms, the most expedient way of dividing the proceeds of industry. All I say is that, if so, the justification would be in terms of expediency, and that no self-evident *fairness*, such as will appeal irresistably to all minds on an impartial survey, exists to give such a scheme a clear preliminary advantage.

Another suggestion, less frequently made, is that division should in fairness be determined on the basis of human *needs*. This has a minor and relative justification, perhaps, in so far as it calls for at least a minimum standard, and implies that any method of distribution is bound to seem unjust if there is in it that which leads to the frustrating of legitimate needs of life. In two senses this may enter into the statement of an ideal goal. The greater the need,—the more *needy*, that is, an individual,—the more insistent is the demand upon society to give attention to it. Or, in a more important sense, the higher the kind of need, in terms of its social value, the more urgent is our duty to provide opportunity for its satisfaction. But this amounts after all to no more than a restatement of the practical problem; on the manner of its solution it sheds almost no light at all. What for example shall determine, as between different people, the difference of needs? If the desires of the individuals themselves, we should soon have confusion multiplied; as a job to be put in the hands of experts, there would be present all the risks, and all the impossible requirements, of an extreme paternalism.

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The next suggestion comes much nearer to the plain man's notion of essential fairness. It is the suggestion that there belongs by right to a man what he produces by his own labor. In the abstract this is something which appeals to our natural, and indeed almost inescapable way of looking at the matter. A man goes into the forest, gets his materials, and makes for himself a bow and arrow. A portion of himself, as Locke puts it, has gone into the object; and a consequent association is established which it is difficult to break. Especially does this appear when we ask the question, If it does not belong to him, to whom does it belong? Obviously there is no other individual whose claim is at all comparable; and the attempt to enforce a rival claim would be sure to arouse that natural antagonism which is the emotional accompaniment of a violation of right. And almost equally unfair would be the appropriation of the article for the use of society in the large, except as there could be enforced for the maker the communistic claim to a similar participation in the product of every other man's industry.

Accordingly, this is likely always to furnish a limiting principle to determine the just distribution of property. Wherever it can be shown that a product is due directly and solely to the skill and effort of an individual, the argument against depriving him of it can always be counted on to make a strong appeal to the sense of natural fairness. Compare the difference between the claim of a man upon a thing that he has made, and a thing that he has found by chance. The latter case has this degree of community with the former, that there is no other single individual who would be regarded as having a right to take it from him. But if society were to step in and claim a title to wealth that came by chance and without effort, while we might have a natural reluctance to give up the result of our good fortune, or might hold it practically inexpedient not to allow the individual to retain it, I hardly think our sense of justice would be seriously outraged, as it undoubtedly would be in proportion as effort had had to be expended.

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So a proposal to conserve for society as a whole mineral resources, or to take over the unearned increment, whatever practical difficulties it might have to meet, can hardly be attacked on the ground of inherent injustice without the objection seeming far-fetched and artificial. On the other hand, compare the moral fervor which attaches to an appeal for justice to the laborer, on the ground that when he has done the actual work, some one else steps in and takes from him a part of what he has produced.

But now the last illustration indicates the difficulty that attaches to making this principle a final one in the actual process of distribution. It would, I think, be ethically a satisfactory principle if it could be carried out; but it could only be carried out with precision in a society where wealth takes the form of objects in which the handiwork of the maker can be definitely assigned, and where therefore, in particular, the complications due to a separation between laborer, employer, and middleman do not exist. The fatal difficulty at the present day lies not in the principle itself where it can be applied, but in finding cases where the application is unambiguous. What is true actually, in vastly the greater number of instances, is not an uncomplicated creation of *things*, but a creation of *values*, in such inextricable confusion, and often of so subtle and immaterial a character, that the attempt to identify them in terms of clear justice loses its convincingness. Consequently when the effort is made to render the matter simple, as when the workingman appeals to the supposedly obvious principle that the product belongs to the worker, what is done is to pick out only the most obvious element in a very complex situation,—manual labor,—and ignore all the other things entering into the value of the finished object. Furthermore this substitution of the idea of value for that of things, as a presupposition of the industrial situation, shows in another way. The workman no longer gets the thing which he produces, but a money payment instead; and since he usually is employed under conditions which secure him his wages whatever the later fate of the article

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he works at, this obscures for him the fact that labor and value are not identical. If he had himself to dispose of the results of his work, he would quickly discover that there is no inevitable connection between labor expended, and the real results or rewards of labor in the shape of a right to enjoy other things; he might easily give a large expenditure of labor to something which would simply remain on his hands. This is a customary fate of those whose industry is not yet organized—the poet or story writer for example. The workingman would usually be quick to see the disadvantages of paying a poet for the work he had expended irrespective of the value to other people of the outcome; but the more material quality of his own effort blinds him to what is clearly the same situation there also, though of course in less degree. The theory that the worker should receive the product of his labor breaks down therefore, in practice, because under modern industrial conditions the worker seldom can receive this; for it there will have clearly to be substituted the principle that he should receive the *value* of his labor. The first formula almost necessarily reduces itself to terms of manual work. But apart from the fact that even manual labor is, in a given article, usually mingled inextricably, this is to ignore many other determinants of value; and so it would, if carried out, contravene the principle of justice on which it is supposed to rest.

The alternative form of the theory is, accordingly, that each man should receive, not the article which he produces, but the equivalent of that part of the value in the article for which his efforts are responsible. It may be stated in various ways,—that rewards should in justice be proportional to merit, or contribution, or service rendered, or value created. And here also there is one ambiguity first to be noticed. The ethical appeal in such a statement would undoubtedly be strongest if we could interpret the words as meaning genuine *social* merit, *real* service to society. But this is impracticable. There is often no possible way of estimating in money terms the relative social value of different kinds of work, nor is there, so far as

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I am aware, any special call to carry out in a thoroughgoing way such a system of rewards. Conceivably under it the poet and religious teacher would be our millionaires, an outcome for which there is no popular demand. But now, furthermore, even the endeavor to estimate accurately the different elements of *industrial* value, by any method of *a priori* computation, seems entirely beyond the capacity of man. When accordingly the formula is really proposed as an attempt to meet the concrete issue, what it is very apt to turn out to be is an effort to justify ethically that already existing automatic form of distribution which we are familiar with in the competitive system. This is confessedly a rough way, at least, of equating reward with economic merit, since in theory a man gets rich only as he supplies something that the public wants, and supplies it better than his rivals. What remains to ask, therefore, for our present purpose, is whether there really is anything in such a method to give it an *ethical claim* upon us, so that any attempt to interfere with the disposition which it makes of the industrial product violates our native sense of fairness.

The more general ground for such a claim has just been stated. Supposing it is true that the rich man gets his money only by contributing to society in the process, why does it not belong to him by ethical right? Those who secure great portions of the general wealth have, we are assuming, not simply dipped their hand in an existing fund and taken for themselves what otherwise would have fallen to others, but they have, many of them, really added this, and more, to the common resources; and therefore they have an actual right to it, and it would be unjust to deprive them of it. If the inventor reaps a fortune, it is not at the expense of his fellows, who are in reality better off for his services. Or the man who organizes a great business may become a multi-millionaire, and still may fail to absorb all the wealth his greater efficiency has created.

Now it will probably be granted, by all except the extreme radical, that such a claim contains at least an element

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of truth. But if we are after anything like exactness, there is more to do before we have justified existing distribution. In view of the complexity of industry, what sound reason can we give, not pure faith or guesswork, for supposing that competitive distribution comes anywhere near the actual differing contributions of the various factors? What principle will enable us to say, in particular, that the manager of a factory really adds just such a special amount of value to the output, which forms his fair recompense, therefore, over and above what is due to the employees?

To such a question I am acquainted with only one definite answer, which has been put most explicitly by Mr. Mallock. Mr. Mallock argues that the separation is theoretically possible, and even easy. If a number of men working without direction can turn out ten articles a day, and another man by introducing superior organization and methods can double the output, the extra amount is clearly due to him and no one else. If then we subtract an existing product from the larger product that arises on the appearance of a new factor, we shall have the amount for which this last is responsible. The earnings of management are equivalent to the output of the factory over what it would have been had the workmen tried to get along without a boss. It might indeed be asked how large a product we should get from the man of organizing ability if the workmen made up their minds to quit. But to this Mr. Mallock replies that the workmen *cannot* quit unless they choose to starve, whereas the manager can easily refuse to exercise his special skill; and consequently if it is a question of the amount of practical difference we have to make allowance for, we can ignore the former possibility.

Now the thing that this clearly may be made to measure in a fairly accurate way is the relative merits of different *managers*. But applied to the real point at issue, the division between the laboring and the employing class, I cannot help feeling that it is considerably more plausible than convincing. Even allowing that it has a certain abstract justification, so many qualifications appear when

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we come down to the actual facts in detail, that it seems very doubtful whether it can be allowed much weight as an ethical argument to defend the employer against robbery at the hands of his workmen. To begin with, it is at any rate much less clear in its application to the rewards of capital, than to the rewards of special ability. It is hard to see why *justice* is essentially violated in refusing a special reward to the man who merely happens to be the owner of capital, when he does no more than permit the money to be used, if precisely the same results would have accrued with the capital in the possession of any one else, or of society at large.

The ethical case is stronger when special ability is in question; but here also qualifications have to be made the moment we begin to examine the concrete situation. When special productive excellence is plainly due to me alone, the strength of the claim, as I have said, reaches its maximum. I doubt if many people grudge a large reward to the occasional successful artist, because everyone can see that it is to him the results are due, and that no one else could have quite taken his place. If, however, luck, or chance, begins to enter in, rather than ability or hard work, our attitude insensibly changes. Wherever an element of luck is present, we feel that plenty of other men might have done precisely as well; and therefore there is really no intrinsic connection between this particular man and his accomplishment, or between his ability and the need the public has of it. And when we turn to the cases—and they are vastly in the majority—where the industrial product is the outcome of a complicated co-operation, this possibility becomes so omnipresent that it largely nullifies any force of enthusiasm for the essential justice of competitive distribution. When we stop to think how very often a man wins his chance simply by being a hair's breadth ahead of others who could equally have performed the service, how intellectually trivial is the effort that may precipitate some widespread reaction—no more perhaps than the hitting upon a catchy name for an article no better than a

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dozen others,—to what extent success even in big business depends upon skill in bartering and driving a hard bargain, which apart from the larger money denominations is precisely the same in kind as that which condemns as ignoble the trade of the huckster and the pettifogger, the confidence which Mr. Mallock shows in the ability of his principle to justify present inequalities seems a bit extreme. Even when the effort is intrinsically more meritorious, we have to remember on what uncertainties depends the chance that a given man will get the opportunity to show what is in him. By the possession of wealth, in particular, or by getting in on some other basis with the right set who will use their influence in your behalf, men are constantly being enabled to get opportunities for which they are no better equipped than a multitude of their fellows. One strong point against aristocracy,—and wealth through its community of interest is always on the way to creating an aristocracy,—has always been that, while it claims to be founded on merit, in its actual working it is bound to violate the principle of merit, and to bolster up mediocrity through the influence of personal or family pull. Furthermore, even where superior ability is real, and where the increased product is due to a given man not merely in the sense that he happens to be on the ground to do the work, which would have been done equally well by a number of other men if they had been lucky enough to get the chance, but in the sense that no one else is practically available with an equal skill, the element of chance in another way may still enter, carried a step farther back. Is the man's superiority really inherent, or may it not be due simply to the fact that he has been, through no merit of his own, more favorably situated for having his latent powers developed? If there is any truth in the claim which the colleges are always making for the business value of an education, then the college man is given an extraneous advantage which frequently seems to rest on no principle of merit; in justice we could only tell whether he had greater claims in case the handicap he now possesses were removed, and he still could show his superiority.

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And now finally, even supposing that the superiority is really intrinsic, and that no one else could have added the same value to the product, there is a more indefinite, but still a real character of the situation to be taken into account before we accept this added value as a just measure of the man's claims to reward. This is the ultimate fact of the dependence of each man upon the resources of mankind in general, and upon the co-operation of other men in particular. What he is, he would not have been apart from countless influences in the past and present. So of the contribution which he makes; however unique it may be, it usually is only one last link in a long causal chain, which surely does not deserve all the reward just because it happens to be the final condition that precipitates the reaction. And again, the use to which a man puts his powers would be impossible did not other contemporaries in innumerable ways also play their parts. Here it might seem that Mr. Mallock takes rather too lightly the objection that, if the workmen cannot produce the maximum apart from the captain of industry, there is nothing at all that the latter can do without the workmen. For practical purposes this may indeed set a limit to the claims that at a given moment can be made effective; but it seems hardly relevant to an argument in terms of essential fairness. A claim of justice founded on lack of power on the part of one of the claimants, so that he has to accept certain terms or starve, will scarcely appeal to the modern ethical sense.

And this negative conclusion, as regards Mr. Mallock's contention, finds a theoretical backing also in the notion of justice itself. I think it would be possible to defend the thesis that the fundamental claim of justice reduces itself to this, that no man should be denied the opportunity to make free use of his powers. In so far then as it conduces to this, the man of special ability will have a right to the extra product his labor may contribute; but not of necessity any further. The force of the appeal of justice cannot, accordingly, be separated from some rough notion of a standard of life. To the one who is barely making a

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living, and whose cravings are constantly thwarted by a lack of money, the belief that some one else is securing what he has himself produced becomes the source of a passionate demand for his rights. In the man who has already enough to gratify every healthy taste, and who has to invent ways to get rid of his possessions, an equal passion on the basis of Mr. Mallock's claim for him would strike every one as rather absurd. This is the ground in equity for any scheme of graduated taxation—that the just claim of a man upon his income lessens in proportion as this becomes less necessary to the expression of recognized and genuine human needs. Writers who, like Mr. Elbert Hubbard, or Chancellor Day, set out on a crusade to right the wrongs of the wealthy and successful, never can expect to be taken very seriously.

What I have been trying to maintain is twofold. Whatever the claims of special ability may be, I see no reason to suppose that they are relevant to a very large part indeed of present actual distribution. And even when we do have cause to think that the rich man himself brings into existence, by means of his ability, the added wealth which he secures, this relationship of production still does not constitute any absolute and final claim in equity. And practically indeed this has to be admitted even by writers of Mr. Mallock's persuasion. They seldom fail to assert that as a matter of fact the rewards which business ability receives are not identical with, but rather are much less than, the wealth it actually produces; and this extra wealth they seem to allow can equitably go to society. But if a portion of the outcome can rightfully be turned aside from the pockets of the producer, why may not at least a little more? for no one supposes that the producer gives any of it up of his own free will. Why should just the amount that the chances of modern business are responsible for be the last penny that can be estranged in harmony with the laws of right? Strictly, he who maintains that justice requires each man to receive what he produces, in Mr. Mallock's sense, should also urge society to modify its workings so as to restore to the millionaire the portion of his earnings which

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it now unjustly appropriates. Supposedly he declines to do this because he does not want to appear ridiculous; but it is difficult to see why he is not compromising his theory.

A good case in point is to be found in the modern doctrine of efficiency in management. On Mr. Mallock's reckoning, the extra profit is due to the efficiency expert alone. The workman, in theory at least, works no harder than before; what is added is only intelligence, and intelligence supplied from the outside. But any attempt to convince the world at large that there is essential justice in a claim on the entire extra product by one set of men only, will certainly be time wasted. To say nothing of the owner, the workingman also is going to demand some share of it before he is ready to co-operate in its attainment; and few disinterested people will find his attitude preposterous. What is still more to the point, it is evident that there is a growing sense on the part of the consumer that he too in justice ought to profit somehow in the operation. Strictly speaking he of course can claim no credit for the increase. But if you try to argue with him that in asking for a part of the benefits he is robbing others of the legitimate fruits of their industry, you may confuse him, but he will remain unconvinced; and more and more he is likely to enforce his notions on the business world.

My general conclusion is, then, that if we look for any decisive principle of justice that shall give a definite advantage to some one scheme of proportional distribution over others, we shall be disappointed. Certain aspects of the situation bring in ethical ingredients; but no decisive solution of the practical problem in the large is possible on ethical grounds. What it comes to in the end is a question, not of estimating the relative shares in production on some theoretical basis, but the making of a practical arrangement such as will approximately satisfy all the parties concerned, sufficiently to induce them to perform their part in the needed co-operation. This adjustment is indeed governed by the sense of a rough sort of justice; but the nature of this is not simple, but at least twofold. On the side of

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ability, a real though very indeterminate feeling exists that there ought to be *some* special return for services that are relatively more valuable. But on the other side also, and actively limiting this, there is a still more fundamental demand that all men alike be given the chance of attaining to a genuinely human life, such as does not involve the cramping, through lack of financial independence, of those powers of accomplishment that constitute human nature. And the limit to this adjusting process is simply the limit of the willingness on the part of each factor to make its special contribution—a limit to be determined on experimental grounds. The consumer might indeed carry his demands so far as to eliminate the motives for efficiency in the producer. So might the worker carry his claims to the same extreme; and equally the employer might show himself too greedy with a similar result. And the moral is, again, that the mere principle of a claim to the product of one's labor is quite insufficient in modern industrial complications; and that, under conditions at least where, as is becoming continually more true, all the parties to the dispute have some means of enforcing their desires, the tendency is toward a division very largely empirical in its nature, guided, however, by a rude notion of equity and fairness which refuses to accept too extreme differences in reward as required by the after all not very extraordinary merits of the more successful, and limited in the process of equalization only by the danger of destroying the motives of industrial effectiveness, and killing the goose which lays the golden eggs.

The method of division, then, is not something that can be settled either on principles of abstract justice, or by appeal to the necessary laws of economics, though both enter into the solution. Rather it is a matter of expediency,—of satisfying the various classes involved to a degree that will make them willing to co-operate for the best interests of all. It is the human equation that is decisive; and a solution in which any of the powerful interests remain permanently dissatisfied is no solution at all. But while this leaves very

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much to be settled by experiment, it does have something to suggest also about the direction in which an issue may plausibly be looked for. In a general way, we may say that a successful solution must satisfy a few simple demands. It must provide for harmony rather than permanent warfare and suspicion. It must elicit so far as possible the full capacities of men, and must offer such rewards as are necessary in order to do this, whatever they may turn out to be. This will include an incentive to special ability; but it also will mean, quite as necessarily, the full enlistment of that great mass of ordinary ability by which the bulk of the world's work is done. Briefly, it must enlist all the available energy of society with the least possible friction. And to accomplish this, it is essential that, for one thing, it should see to it that as a rule success is going to depend on real ability, not on chance or pull; and for another, that men generally shall have, as a consequence of their work, a chance at the essential good things of life, and so that the present standard of living shall be substantially raised, while at the same time the power, even the benevolent power, of the few over the many is lessened. By what industrial changes this would seem to stand the best chance of being realized, I shall leave it to a second article to consider.

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THE ALLEGED PRUSSIANISM OF THOMAS CARLYLE.

HERBERT L. STEWART.

IT HAS been said that one of the incidental results of the war has been to destroy for ever that reputation for moral and social insight which was once enjoyed to a unique degree by Thomas Carlyle. Such a judgment seems to the present writer grotesquely exaggerated. It will be the purpose of this article to inquire just how far the old Scottish prophet upheld a gospel of force as present-day Germans have been shown to understand it.

Those who are acquainted only with isolated fragments from his works may be excused for getting the impression that he was spiritual brother to Clausewitz and Treitschke. They are confirmed in this when they learn that passages from *Frederick the Great* are prescribed as patriotic literature in German schools, and when they recall the famous letter to *The Times* written while the German army was encamped before Paris in 1870. Carlyle's justification of the raid upon Silesia has certainly something in common with the Chancellor's argument about a scrap of paper.[1] And his impatience with those who objected to Bismarck's annexation of Alsace-Lorraine makes us wonder how he would have regarded von Jagow's avowed purpose to rob France of her colonies. These words have an unpleasant ring in our ears to-day:

> That noble, patient, pious, deep, and solid Germany should be welded into a nation, and become queen of the continent, instead of vapouring, vainglorious, gesticulating, quarrelsome, and over-sensitive France, seems to me the hopefulest public fact that has occurred in my time.[2]

Nor is the suspicion of Carlyle confined to those who remember against him that pro-Teutonic sentiment which he shared with very many in England and America during the

[1] Cf. esp. *Frederick*, Bk. XI, chap. 9, Bk. XII, chap. 2.

[2] Letter to the *Times*, 1870.

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Franco-Prussian war, but which most of us have now seen reason to revise. Beyond doubt his philosophy of history is pervaded by respect for strength. His Hero-Worship, his admiration for successful despots, his contempt for Parliamentary institutions, his ridicule of Bentham and the 'philosophic Radicals,' his advocacy of paternalism in government, his defence of West-Indian slavery,—all these are very suggestive. But Carlyle, like every other prophet, must be his own interpreter, and the admission that he resembled a Prussian war lord is being far too freely made. No doubt his so-called 'gospel of force' contained a great deal that is profoundly untrue, a great deal which experience both before and since—but especially since—amply entitles us to discard. He was again and again a special pleader for pieces of statecraft that were really inhuman. But he did not mean what Treitschke meant. The untruth which we feel sure that we can now detect, and the obsessions for which we must make allowance, are not of the order which comes from Berlin. In justice both to his memory, and to our own Anglo-Saxon race, we must distinguish things which so widely differed.

I.

To begin with, what Carlyle constantly tells us is, not that Might is Right, but rather that Right is Might. He was suspected during his own lifetime of entertaining the heresy in question, and he has himself recorded an indignant denial. Lecky had spoken of a great and venerable author who worshipped Force. "I shall have to tell Lecky one day," was the retort, "that quite the converse, or *reverse*, is the great and venerable author's real opinion,—namely that Right is the eternal symbol of Might, . . . and that, in fact, he probably never met with a son of Adam more contemptuous of Might, except where it rests upon the above origin."[3] Many passages can be cited in corroboration of this apologia. For despite the gloomy view

[3] From Carlyle's *Journal* quoted by Froude, *Carlyle's Life in London*, Vol. ii, p. 451.

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which he took of his own age, especially when he wrote *Latter Day Pamphlets*, he remained an unflinching optimist in regard to the moral order. For him Providence does not take the side of the stronger battalions, but those battalions which, in dark times and against fearful odds, keep fighting for eternal justice, will find that Providence will in the end *make them the stronger*. It might take time. But whether it were one of these days, or only 'one of these centuries,' the issue was sure as life and sure as death. The great soul of the world was just.[4] "One strong thing I find here below; the just thing, the true thing. My friend, if thou hadst all the artillery of Woolwich trundling at thy back in support of an unjust thing; and infinite bonfires visibly waiting ahead of thee, to blaze centuries long for thy victory on behalf of it,—I would advise thee to call halt, to fling down thy baton, and say 'In God's name, No!' Thy 'success'? Poor devil, what will thy success amount to?"[5]

What, exactly, did he mean by this? It is clear that he applied it both to the fate of individuals and to that of nations. In what sense did he hold that the righteous man, or the righteous people, must conquer 'in the end'? Not, certainly, that defeat here will be compensated in a future life. The chapter on Reward in *Past and Present* makes this apparent. Carlyle did not hesitate to express his sympathy with belief in heaven and hell, particularly in the latter.[6] But he has many a denunciation of the "morality by profit and loss" which keeps too keen an eye upon punishment and reward. Nietzsche himself has not breathed deeper, or—as it seems to me—more foolish scorn for "eternal indemnification." Are we then to understand that, although defeated, one's consciousness of right will make the defeat more glorious than any victory? That, in short, properly estimated it *is* a victory, just as the service of God is perfect freedom? This thought of the hero de-

[4] *Past and Present*, Bk. I, chap. ii.
[5] *loc. cit.*
[6] Cf. esp. *Past and Present*, Bk. III, chap. ii.

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fying lawless Might, and thus proving himself stronger than the tyrant who has failed to subdue his will, is a familiar one. It is common in Greek Tragedy, and in the Roman Stoics; moreover, it is the inspiration of a memorable paragraph in *Sartor.*[7] But, surely, unless we are content with a mere play upon words, what it comes to is this, not that the good is certain to prevail, but that, whether it is likely to prevail or not, the good should be chosen rather than the evil. It is plain, however, that Carlyle, though in some passages he intended this, in a multitude of other passages intended much more. It seems to me that in different places he had in mind three quite distinguishable contentions:

(a) He holds before us again and again two alternatives for the explanation of life. The first is, as he picturesquely puts it, that "the world is Beelzebub's";[8] if so, we need not expect that even after countless generations any moral progress will be shown. Rather the reverse; for Beelzebub will strew the path of integrity with ingenious and tantalising disappointments. Our author submits with intense conviction the second hypothesis, "that God made this world, and a Demon not."[9] It follows that although the ups and downs may be long drawn out, there will be increasing confusion of the evil, and increasing advancement of the good. Thus Right has in it the potentiality of Might, and Wrong contains the seeds of its own overthrow.

Whence does this assurance come? Intuitively? Or from revealed religion? The distinctive thing about Carlyle's way of coming by it was that he saw it written in letters of fire across the page of history. His was no struggling yet persistent faith, believing where it could not prove. The triumphant moral order was indeed, he well knew, often concealed; but it was concealed only from a darkened eye. As S. Paul said of the gospel, it was hid only from them that

[7] *S. R.*, Bk. II, chap. 9.

[8] Cf. esp. *Frederick*, Bk. I, chap. i, and Bk. III, chap. ii. Also *Essay on Boswell's Life of Johnson.*

[9] Cf. *Past and Present*, III, 14. oc.

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were lost. The law of justice was the universe's open secret.[10] We needed only, like those who inspect a great painting, to observe from the proper standpoint, that the significance may disclose itself. To vary the figure, we have to thread our way through the past as through a jungle, and we know that we have hit the trail only when what was before a senseless journeying round and round becomes a luminous progress towards a clearer and clearer end.

This is what our pious ancestors would have called the doctrine of a moral governance. Almost every historical work from Carlyle's pen was an effort to verify it. For our present purpose it is irrelevant to ask whether his history was accurate as to fact or fair as to interpretation. For what we wish to make clear is the nature of that law of justice which he used the past to illustrate. To do this, we must, at least provisionally, assume that the cases to which he appeals were as he conceived them. As Coleridge has warned us, we cannot appreciate the value of a writer unless we concede to his point of view 'a certain portion of gratuitous and, as it were, experimentative faith.'[11] In particular the critic who belongs to the Church of Rome must not in this case be deterred by the fanatical Protestantism which so often obtrudes itself. And the critic who belongs to no Church must allow for the fact that this author was incapable of taking the secularist standpoint. Since the days of Herodotus there has perhaps been no historian so theologically minded as Carlyle. But his theology is not that of William II. It is that of the Puritan divines and the Puritan soldiers.

For instance, rightly or wrongly, he held that the Reformed Faith had constituted a touchstone by which the moral fibre of western Europe had been tried. What then were the wars of religion in the seventeenth century? The savagery of a Ferdinand, the zeal of a Gustavus, the ambition of a Wallenstein, the astuteness of an Oxenstierna? Was it the mere clash of individual wills? This might be

[10] *Latter Day Pamphlets*, "Jesuitism."

[11] Preface to *Aids to Reflection*.

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a sufficient explanation for Cause-and-Effect Philosophy. But for him it was to make moral chaos out of the past. The strife was not between men but between ideals. It was the travail pang of Protestantism. Truth when it came into the world had in general a stormy welcome. But the flaming Magdeburgs had been worth while, for through them God's Truth was vanquishing the Devil's Falsehood.[12] In the same way his *French Revolution* was an historic Theodicy. The death-bed of Louis XV showed not the physical sickness of a French king, but the moral sickness of the French kingship,[13] and each Act of the succeeding drama was the nemesis of a long injustice. The eighteenth century, he somewhere exclaims, would have overturned one's faith in God if there had *not* been a French Revolution at the end of it. And in *Cromwell* the central motive, which gives unity to the whole, is the idea of invincible Puritanism, sweeping before it the frauds and falsities of a perjured king. It was Oliver's task to prove again to the world that life is neither a lie nor a grimace.[14]

(b) But there is a second sense in which Carlyle identified Right with Might, a sense very different from the sanguine belief that God is in heaven and that all is right with the world. We find it especially in the political pamphleteering of his middle age and of his later life. It amounts to this, that wherever one sees a great social convulsion, a movement which stirs public energy and passion to the depths, one should look for the key to it in an impulse or a demand which is at bottom *just*.

An obvious example is in his lecture on Mohammed, where he warns his audience to cease thinking of a great religion as the outcome of fraud and chicane, but to seek the principle of its strength in the good that underlay it. No edifice, he assures us, has stood for long, unless it was somehow built after the laws of Statics.[15] And "the first of all

[12] Cf. esp. the treatment of the Thirty Years' War in *Historical Sketches*.
[13] *F. R.*, Bk. I, chap. i.
[14] *Cromwell*, Introduction, chap. v.
[15] Cf. *Heroes*, II.

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gospels is this, that a lie cannot endure for ever."[16] But the best illustration for our purpose is in his pamphlet on the People's Charter. It seems strange indeed that so many critics should have stigmatised the author of *Chartism* as a political cynic. For a cynic is one who disbelieves in human nature, especially on its fervid or idealistic side. He is what George Eliot called "that antipole of all enthusiasms,—a man of the world."[17] Could the opposite of political cynicism be more clearly affirmed than in the doctrine that popular agitations derive their force, not from the deceit or insincerity which may be mixed with them, but from the element of truth and justice which invariably constitutes their root? To use a chemical figure, Carlyle held that it is always the honesty beneath such things which forms their active principle. And when, in the troubled year 1839, he issued his great manifesto about the Rights being identical with the Mights of Man, he spoke the wisest word which England was then given a chance to hear and to disregard.

The Chartist Petition, bound with iron hoops, and rolled on a trolley up the floor of the House, asked for six concessions, nearly all of which have since been granted. Doubtless it would have been premature and unsafe to grant them at the time. But what would have been neither premature nor unsafe would have been to take into genuine consideration the distress of which the Charter was symptomatic. The Petition was refused a hearing, amid explosions of laughter from both sides of Parliament. Lord John Russell and Macaulay made elegant speeches in which they explained how a cultured Whig differs from a vulgar Socialist. Peel found it excellent sport to taunt the Ministry with having once "encouraged Manchester to march upon London," and then finding to their cost that sedition was two-edged. A few men, like Dickens, and Disraeli, and Charles Kingsley, saw that before long something else must be done with the Chartists besides either

[16] *F. R.*, Bk. II, chap. i.
[17] *Daniel Deronda*, chap. xl.

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laughing at them, or using them for purposes of party recrimination.[18] But it was Carlyle who embodied in his paradoxical phrase about Mights and Rights the deepest moral of the movement.

These poor Chartists, he said, are quite likely to be asking for something that is absurd, for something that would ruin them if they got it. They are no experts in the science of government. What they know is that they are starving, and that they are *unjustly* starving. They know that by hundreds of thousands they are ready to work for a living wage, and no work is to be had. It is not for them to tell Lord John Russell what to do, any more than it is for the patient to diagnose and treat his own disease. The Charter is like an eruption of the skin that betokens a virus festering inwardly. The sense of injustice, diffused over great masses of men, is an explosive which, if not wisely dealt with, will burst as tragically in England as it did in France. Let something be done, lest something do itself in a manner which will please nobody. The Reform Government, forsooth, has "put down the chimera of Chartism"! True; it is the *chimera*, not the reality of Chartism which has been put down. To tell the destitute workman that commerce is prospering, and that according to Political Economy the steam engine must increase work, is like a farmer dismissing his horses at the end of the season with advice to go seek cartage, of which there is assuredly abundance in some continent of the globe. The horses will leap the fence, "eat foreign property,—and we know the rest."[19] If a Birmingham riot cannot cure social ills, at least it should reveal them, as a boil on one's neck "announces that it continues there, that it would fain not continue there."[20] Let the upper classes set themselves to discover what it is that the lower classes intrinsically mean. Let them make articulate those needs which are proclaim-

[18] Cf. esp. Dickens, *Little Dorrit*, I, 3; *Hard Times*, II, vi; Disraeli, *Sybil*, III v; Kingsley, *Alton Locke*, xxxii.

[19] *Chartism*, iv.

[20] *Ibid.*, i.

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ing themselves inarticulately. Honourable members are either spokesmen for the dumb class, or they are nothing that one can well specify. "No man at bottom means injustice; it is always for some obscure, distorted image of a right that he contends."[21] And unless all history be a lie, just in so far as he *has* a right, it will one day invest itself with might.

No reader who knows Dickens's *Hard Times*, Disraeli's *Sybil*, or Kingsley's *Alton Locke*, can fail to appreciate how close to the root of the matter Carlyle had reached. No one who reflects how we have travelled in social legislation during the last thirty years can doubt that his voice was prophetic.

(c) There is yet a third sense in which the Carlylean epigram is to be understood. Our author believed intensely in Napoleon's maxim, "The tools to the man who can handle them." By this he meant that if there is any part of the world's work for which a particular person or a particular group of persons has more capacity than others, to that person and to that group the work justly belongs. And, conversely, what he intended to deny was that mankind should tolerate unskilful performance in any field,—performance by which the general interest is sacrificed—simply because of a supposed title on the part of someone to keep exclusive possession of it, whatever the quality of his execution may be.

This is the source of two great diatribes, for which, more than for anything else, he has incurred resentment,—his attack upon democracy, and his defence of slavery. It is but fair that even the most convinced democrat and the most ardent abolitionist should realise the precise character of Carlyle's position. For although they will judge that he omitted much that should have been said, they may find less than they suppose in what he did say with which they will disagree. That the multitude is indefeasibly entitled to govern itself, even though better objective results might be got out of submission to a wise autocrat, was a doctrine

[21] *Ibid.*, i.

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which he could never abide. He believed with Pope in the government that is best administered. He was as emphatic as any Jacobite on the divine authentication of kingship, provided men fit for kingship could be found.[22] Thus in his *French Revolution*, whilst he approved of what the revolutionary leaders did, because the concrete situation demanded it, he has nothing but scorn for those abstract principles about "Rights of Man" by which philosophedom was wont to justify the overthrow of the Bourbons. And, although he holds that the Stuart dynasty in England had to be deposed, this is not because he had the least sympathy with elective Protectorates. It is because the Stuarts had ceased to be real kings, and because he saw in Cromwell all the substance without the name of royalty. Again, in his *Occasional Discourse on the Nigger Question* there is no reason to suspect the sincerity of his view that compulsory labour in the West Indies was best for the black man himself. We have there, indeed, what Mirabeau would have called a very thorough "swallowing of formulas." Abolitionists had spoken much about the abstract right to freedom, and of abstract rights Carlyle had as great a horror as Burke. He would have eagerly subscribed the doctrine of the *Reflections* that liberty means allowing people to do as they please, and that whether it is good or bad depends on what it will please them to do. He thought the negro in Demerara incorrigibly idle, unless compelled to labour; and as the highest blessedness of all men, black or white, was to work, whatever means could secure this was enjoined by the law of God. It was an actual frustrating of the purposes of the Most High that one man in a niggard soil should have to eat bread in the sweat of his brow, whilst another browsed in animal sloth where Nature had been most profusely bountiful.[23]

Another way of putting this is to say that Carlyle conceived the world as a place where the will of the Maker is to be done, that he looked on the sentimental and anarchic

[22] Cf. *F. R.*, chap. i.

[23] Cf. *Occasional Discourse on the Nigger Question*, passim.

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tendencies of his time as an effort to claim for the individual a capricious right of doing his duty or of refusing to do it, and that he believed the sole question—in disregard of all individual interests and 'rights'—to be that of making each person diligent and efficient in the work that is assigned to him. If democracy and abolition served this purpose they were good. But in his view they served the reverse.[24]

II.

In the three senses which I have enumerated, and, I believe, in no other sense, can the phrase 'gospel of force' be applied to Carlyle's social teaching. Let me now point out how different it is from the creed of *Weltmacht oder Untergang* with which German spokesmen, eager to make their own side respectable, have affected to identify it.

Clearly the ethic of militarism is as far removed as anything can be from a pious belief that in the struggles of mankind Right will eventually become Might. Such a statement implies that Right is one thing, Might another, whilst the Bernhardi message is that they are one and the same. What the apostles of the new morality have asked us to do is to rearrange both our words and our ideas so as to think and to call 'good' that which proves itself to be physically strong. It is plain that Carlyle's radiant faith in the triumph of ultimate justice over temporary oppression is one which should comfort not the Germans, but the Belgians, the Poles, the Serbs. Its truth, if it be true, can have nothing but terrors for William II, for Count Tisza, for Enver Pasha. Indeed no doctrine of more complete moral satisfactoriness could have been announced, and any misgiving we may feel towards it must arise not because we dislike it, but because we lack evidence for its validity.

Equally foreign to the mind of a German publicist is any such view as that great movements have always a sound basis somehow underlying them. The nerve of Prussian

[24] Cf. *Latter Day Pamphlets;* esp. articles entitled "The Present Time," "Parliaments," and "The New Downing St."

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administration, especially in subject countries, has been the confidence that mankind can be drilled into any mental attitude which a ruling caste may prescribe. To find out what the Poles and the Social Democrats 'intrinsically mean,' and to give effect in an enlightened way to what is reasonable in such demands, is no object of a Kaiser's Chancellor. The tradition of Bismarck is that by efficiency in education and in discipline it may be dictated to Poles and Social Democrats what they *shall* mean, and that sooner or later they will come to think reasonable that which is pronounced so at the headquarters of Reason in Berlin. If the sentiment of local patriotism is there placed on the moral Index Expurgatorius, it is expected that Imperial officers shall take steps to remove this from among the aspirations of Poland. The whole idea of the *Kulturkampf* implied that the minds and consciences of men are as plastic towards State control as their muscles are responsive to the exercises of the gymnasium. Faith in machinery seems to go beyond even this. For, after all, the trainer must work within the limits of anatomy and physiology. But the extent to which man's moral life is modifiable at will seems to be taken by many German writers as quite indefinite. Could any position be more precisely antithetical to that of Carlyle? "Is arithmetic, think you, a thing more fixed by the Eternal than the laws of justice are, and what the right is of man towards man?"

The only colourable resemblance between the Prussian and the Carlylean doctrine is to be found in their common antagonism to democracy. Yet here too the difference is far more significant. Our author believed in autocratic rule on grounds which we think mistaken—at least for western peoples,—but which we cannot think immoral. He disbelieved in self-government for reasons which in many a social situation of the past have been valid, and which, for aught we know, may become valid again. No intelligent advocate of democracy will take the position that it is a natural right of all mankind as such, or that it is desirable at every stage of human advancement, or that it is to be

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justified otherwise than by its fruits. And no one who understands the dark mid-Victorian epoch in which *Laissez Faire* was the watchword of a heartless commercialism, can forget the man who wrote *Past and Present*. The time of the Charter was a time for someone to speak the truth about Whig 'liberty,' to bid the State be paternal enough to save its children from starvation, and, in defiance of political economists, to call *Laissez Faire* a doctrine of devils. The extent to which State control should be pressed, and to which the old maxims of unfettered individualism should be revised, was of course a matter of great nicety, and we are not concerned to deny that Carlyle went to a dangerous extreme. He had no vision of that collective control by the people which has proved not less effective and far less objectionable than a benevolent despotism. But we can still meet him upon a common platform of humanity. Our social purpose is the same as his. We differ as to the means by which it may be reached.

It is needless to point out at any length how remote all this is from militaristic Prussianism. The latter rests upon a postulate which would have filled Carlyle with horror, a postulate which has not been antiquated by changing circumstance but which never was valid, and never can be so, a postulate which would mean an end of all social justice, a postulate to which the only reply that will be understood must be given otherwise than in words. An autocracy which is organised for social good differs *toto cælo* from an autocracy that is organised for war. The Bismarckian programme makes much of the rule of the most competent. But why? As we have seen it interpreted, this is not because a democratic system means trusting the unwise multitude with powers which they will use to their own undoing. It is because such a system, by emphasising personal good must obstruct that racial predominance which can only be reached where the individual is made a cog in the State wheel. Nietzsche was in many respects a rebel against the bureaucratic régime, but he was its faithful representative when he poured scorn upon "the

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happiness of the most,"[25] and when he declared that for the sake of evolving a higher caste millions of men must be turned into slaves and instruments.[26] What an Ernulphus curse would have been pronounced by him who wrote *Working Aristocracy* upon those to whom he is so freely quoted as a parallel!

We may attack Carlyle's Hero-Worship from many points of view, but this at least is not one of them. We may say with Mr. R. H. Hutton that he was for ever bidding us trust a wise autocrat, without giving us a hint of how to find him. We may point out that democracy has taken all the risks of which the Chelsea prophet spoke, and that his dire predictions of mob foolishness, of corruption, of demagogic deceit, have not been fulfilled to any extent which is comparable with the benefits it has brought us. We may urge that free institutions have wrought a spiritual development, that the masses have evolved a wisdom and a self-restraint for which he never gave them credit. We may mark with pride the extent to which the people are finding means to cure their own worst faults. As we do so, perhaps we shall conclude that Carlyle's fierce attack was not wholly without result as an awakener to the too sanguine Radicals of his day. We shall certainly conclude that his ideal of a benevolent despot is now less plausible than ever it was before. But let us not dishonour his memory by confusing him with those to whom his kinship was so superficial and so slight. There is all the contrast between kingship for public service and kingship for personal privilege. Carlyle's conception remains that of Milton:

> For therein stands the office of a king,
> His honour, virtue, merit, and chief praise,
> That for the public all this weight he bears.[27]

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[25] Cf. *Twilight of the Idols*, p. 87.
[26] Cf. *Beyond Good and Evil*, 258, 265.
[27] *Paradise Regained*, Bk. I.

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III.

The reader may perhaps object that this defence of our Scottish prophet has the defect of proving far too much. Whatever else he failed to do, he seldom failed to express himself with lucidity. If he was really so antithetical to Prussianism as we now know it, why, it may be asked, has he come under such general suspicion of being a sympathiser with it? The answer seems to be this. Carlyle had undertaken to prove from history an ethical doctrine about the triumph of good which history could not prove, but often seemed rather to refute. He strained the evidence to make it fit his thesis, and the inevitable result was to change the meaning of the thesis into something which the evidence he invoked was adequate to support. In trying to show from empirical facts that the way of the world is just, he gave the impression that by justice he meant no more than the way of the world.

Belief that the right always wins is an optimism of the most unbounded type, and its dangers were long ago pointed out by men whom Carlyle unduly despised, the French Encyclopædists of the eighteenth century. Our author reflected on this matter much more deeply than Voltaire, but he was too much given to dismissing an objection as shallow merely because it was obvious, and he might have learned from even the impious merriment of *Candide*. If the good always prevails, then that which prevails is necessarily good. When the University of Coimbra after the Lisbon earthquake decided to prevent such things in future by a more zealous execution of heretics, and when the Leibnizian Dr. Pangloss was strung to a gallows as the first step, Candide cries in amazement "If this is the best of all possible worlds, what are the others?"[28] Nor was he much relieved to remember that the victim himself had found a sufficing reason for the earthquake, and had shown both the fall of man and the consequent curse to belong of necessity to a perfect cosmic system. Even the

[28] *Candide*, chap. vi.

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view of Dr. Pangloss, however, is more defensible, or at least less capable of disproof, than some of the suggestions which have been hazarded by Carlyle. The good which it finds in apparent evil is, indeed, made exquisitely ridiculous in Voltaire's caricature. But the position that the disasters and even the immoralities of life are incidental to a scheme designed for human discipline, permitting human freedom, faintly appreciated when seen only in fragments, but furthering upon the whole the highest human values,—the position which is theologically expressed in the words "He maketh all things work together for good" and "even the wrath of man to praise Him," is, after all, more satisfying than any other "philosophic" reply to the eternal riddle. Carlyle makes a far larger draft upon our capacity for optimism. He is able to verify the justice of the world order here and now. For him God ceases to move in a mysterious way; the working of His hands may be somewhat minutely traced, and is seen invariably to vindicate the righteous and confound the wicked.

Now, if you are sure that good always triumphs in this world, then failure, especially prolonged failure, is apt to suggest that a cause cannot have been so good as you had supposed. *Vice versa* an uninterrupted run of success is evidence that an enterprise is worthy. You may warn yourself as much as you choose against premature decision. You may think that the inference was too hasty against those on whom the Tower of Siloam fell, and against those whose blood Pilate mingled with the sacrifices. But if, with Carlyle, your morality is of the Old Testament rather than of the New, judgment for an evil thing, or approval of a good thing may be so very long deferred as to shake your confidence in your own moral insight. You tend to think it more likely that this was in error than that the foot of justice should be so slow and so limping. The sanction of conduct becomes thus, in spite of yourself, an ultimate reward in victory for the good, and if the exigencies of proof require you to look forward, not to one of these years, but

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to one of these centuries, the appeal becomes somewhat visionary. Small wonder if such postponement makes the hearts of the sons of men wholly set in them to do evil. For your creed is in the end that of Bildad the Shuhite. "Nature" begins to dictate to conscience, rather than conscience to adjudicate upon Nature.

It is in this Puritan Theodicy, and not in anything like the Immoralism of German *Kriegsherren*, that we should find the root of Carlyle's extraordinary judgments upon the men and events of the past. It is sheer want of acquaintance with the text of his *Frederick* which makes many assume that he defended that royal brigand on the unblushing plea of the right of the stronger. On the contrary Carlyle enters into detailed and plausible proof that, for example, there was no substantial breach of faith towards Maria Theresa. His argument now appeals to few, and what I suggest is that it would not have appealed, as it certainly did, to himself, without the predisposing cause of an ethical theory which those events were to illustrate. And this case does not stand alone. We know that there are certain types of historical situation where, amid all the brilliance of the picture he gives us, we do well to suspect him as a guide. For he was writing with a thesis in his mind. We can never trust him when he deals with a triumphant despotism. Perhaps we should be on our guard when he is under the intoxication of *anything* that has triumphed. "Doth God pervert judgment? Or doth the Almighty pervert justice?" How easy it is to make these questions the basis for an immoral depicting of the past! The book of *Job* was always among Carlyle's favourites, and the line of thought of Job's friends was often not far from his own. A scheme has won its way; then let the light be cast upon its points of merit, or of colourable merit; exhibit little, and that little dexterously arranged, of the more sordid and selfish side. Thus the picture of a "Hero" is convincingly presented.

Sometimes the effect of this is merely grotesque, as when Frederick William is complimented for having swept off

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the street all applewomen who were not industrious enough to knit at their stalls,[29] or when Francia's reign of terror in Paraguay is drawn as a sort of earthly Providence, or when the benevolent bullying of the monks by Abbott Samson is made to serve as a pattern of the best age of the Church. At other times we are roused to an indignant outcry, for example by the justification of the Cromwellian massacre at Drogheda and Wexford, or by the scorn for sentimentalists who object to the efficient lash of a West Indian planter, or by the refusal to see perfidy in Frederick the Great. Carlyle indeed is far from singular in all this, and as we condemn him we should include the others as well. Our English historians who have panegyrised Cæsar's Gallic wars, and Alexander's aggressive Kultur in the East, should hesitate to cast a stone. Moreover they have not the excuse of a Hebrew theology which they were pledged to support. But the fault remains a grave one, however it arose. We cannot help asking how our author would have comported himself if certain issues had turned out differently. Suppose Frederick's attack upon Silesia had been defeated, and suppose Strafford's policy of Thorough had been successful, would his moral rhetoric have adapted itself? Should we have heard how a Prussian bandit had been broken upon the Eternal Verities? And how the sword of an iron Chancellor had "gleamed like a star, . . . shearing asunder the big balloons and letting out the diplomatic hydrogen" of an Hon. Mr. Pym, and a Right Hon Mr. Hampden?[30]

Such, however, are the embarrassments and the temptations of those who undertake to philosophise history, in particular when they aim to show not only that the finger of Providence is in it, but just where and just how that finger has moved. Despite its difficulties the attempt is one which none of us can, or perhaps should, wholly forbear. When men around us to-day are exclaiming in the churches that the Allied Powers must win "because their

[29] *Frederick*, Bk. IV, chap. 4.

[30] Cf. *ibid.*, Bk. XIII, chap. 2.

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cause is just," are they not still at Carlyle's standpoint, and exposed to his perils? The prosperity here and now of a cause that is just was the doctrine which he devoted himself to driving home. He did it with quite unexampled force. Again and again he made clear that the course of things is far more equitable than we tend to admit. Again and again he made us feel that the sense of right is an immense reinforcement to effort, and that it is not mere poetry to speak of him as thrice armed who hath his quarrel just. He was among the first to point out the real dynamic that gave strength to Cromwell, and to reveal the inner heart of morality in the French Revolution. But he was resolved to admit no contradictory cases, even though he had to venture the monstrous paradox that there is no injustice anywhere if we look far enough ahead. Alas! the exceptions are numerous, and such moralising of the cosmic process, however heroically it may be carried out, becomes its own refutation.

And even as we have no ground in experience, so we have no assurance in the Christian revelation, that any such unimpeachable fairness belongs to the development of world history. Those who have been telling us that faith in God could not survive a German victory if such should occur, must be singularly unaware of the roots of faith, and singularly insensible of the human tragedies by which in every mean street it is constantly being tried. The righteousness of good men is not *here and now* brought forth as the light and their judgment as the noonday. That the right is often overborne, and must wait for its vindication elsewhere, is both the lesson of our moral consciousness and the teaching of the New Testament. Perhaps Mr. R. H. Hutton was not far wrong when he said that Carlyle never rose beyond the Hebrew point of view. And Miss Julia Wedgwood, in her incomparable study of his work, has put the same criticism in a form which bears somewhat closely on the problem of this paper. She finds that Carlyle never escaped from the idea of the moral order as a thing ordained by the arbitrary will of a Divine Being, and as

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thus in the end a mere external law imposed by Power. If we call him an immoralist for this worship of force, we misuse words; for we might equally well say so of the men in the Westminster Assembly. But though the Calvinists will never see it, their way of expressing themselves lends colour to the comparison with the creed of Prussia, and the Prussian takes to Calvinistic phrases as germane to his own thought. That was a characteristic retort which Carlyle made to the lady who told him that she "accepted the universe"; "Gad, madam, you had better." Of what Kant meant by calling morality autonomous, he had probably little idea. To be ever in the great *Taskmaster's* eye was the formula by which he was moved, and he had the defects not less than the sublimities of that way of envisaging duty. Hence he was absolutely at home in the exposition of Islam; he could never have entered into the soul of Sakya Mouni. But if he thus lived on Sinai rather than at Nazareth, he at least lived there in singleness and honesty of heart, and his memory is not to be defiled by analogies with men whose spirit is equally apart from either though in language they parody both.

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THE GLORY OF DEMOCRACY—POETRY, COMEDY AND DUTY.

ALFRED H. LLOYD.

There can be no real life without vision. There can be no real vision that does not sometimes laugh. Life that sees and that can laugh is duty at its best. Without vision and without laughter duty is arid and small.

MAY I be just one more to begin with the great war? I may wish also to close with it.

Since the war opened our country has been in the various stages of a certain problem or conflict which while not exclusively ours has been, in view at once of our history and of our prominence as a neutral nation, peculiarly ours. On the one hand we had either a selfish and sordid neutrality tempting us, the physical incommodity of war and the lucrative advantage of peace both promising to be very great, or, under the promptings of a narrow nationalism and a quick resentment of offenses, resort to arms and to the traditional military alliance. Between these two, between such neutrality and such war, I myself could see little if any difference. One is hardly any better than the other. Action in mere anger, on jingo-nationalistic lines, is no better than action—or the lack of it?—from greed or, better to say, from the always *entente cordiale* of fear and greed. But, on the other hand, besides this Hobson's choice we had the opportunity of a progressive policy, involving some real advance for civilization, and of such eventual overt action as would be required to carry out a progressive policy. To the lasting credit and, as I have to believe, to the prompt and very general satisfaction of the country, the policy of progress prevailed and was vigorously acted upon. It was a policy, perhaps, that was not clear even to itself at first, that had to overcome strong counter-tendencies in one national party or the other, in this or that established interest, in the various accepted theories about nations and the community of nations,

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and about international law, and that in its manner was not even democratic, that is to say, not conventionally democratic, developing as it did under a somewhat arbitrary albeit quite timely leadership instead of in response to any clearly outspoken popular demand. Of course democracy must always lack vitality unless it can respond to just such leadership. Perhaps, again, in official papers and national enactments many mistakes were made, involving annoying delays, a troublesome suspense. But, after all, tendencies needing to be overcome and mistakes and delays are most natural and even most helpful incidents of anything which is worth while, and somehow they give substance to the outcome, making this not less but more significant; not weakening but strengthening the final decision. The policy of progress, I repeat, at last prevailed, committing this nation to action for something new and, as so clearly and convincingly stated in the address of April 2, sending a thrill of interest and determination over the whole country, as well as over all the neutral countries, and awakening new zeal and confidence among the warring peoples across the seas, at once bringing clearer purpose to those who were winning and, as events are likely to show, hope even to those who were losing.

The policy of progress, I have said, called for action that sought something new. It was, then, a policy that proceeded from some vision, that depended on imagination; the policy of no traditional and merely rational and prosaic calculation—not a dollar policy in either fact or spirit—seeking only results which traditional tests could approve; but, on the contrary, of a poetic, imaginative statesmanship, which was superior to mere precise figuring as well as to unworthy impulse, which had courage, the real courage of a new order, and a certain abandon, and which accordingly argued to its purpose by no literal likeness of what was to be to what had been but by bold and romantic analogy. Can progress argue by anything but analogy? Thus, we must organize the nations as democracies have

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already organized individuals. We must take from nations their weapons of offense and defense, so long too handy for impulsive and disastrous use, as we have taken daggers and pistols from individuals. We must have international institutions as we have had the various institutional instruments of democracies. Boldly we must force these things out of a new and unlike future; seeking not mere peace but something new and better than what we had before the war. Our national groups at least before the war in respect to the values that have long determined their individuality were still as of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, when among persons individuality was a matter of conspicuous dress, highly sensitive manners, emotional instability and temperament, a weapon always at hand, and hasty action for good or for ill, in love or in hate, and now we would lift these groups to the higher and more modern type of individuality that already prevails personally and that involves among other things so much more self-control. Perhaps, parenthetically, to lift the groups so would be to make possible still higher development in personal individuality, for in history the person seems to have had a habit of outrunning the group. But, this possibility aside, an international democracy is the policy of the day, as it has gradually but at last clearly been set forth, and nothing in all history has been more inspiring than the awakening of civilized peoples to the vision of it and the hope and labor of its execution. There can indeed be no real action without vision.

All real life, whether written large, as in the historic episode of the war, or written small, as in what any one of us may do personally, must involve adventure and romance —we have long had too little romance!—requiring the courage of something new and so dependence on the imagination. Let me not get lost in philosophical vagaries, but, were I asked in general terms to tell what real life, real activity, really does, I might answer in two ways, equally significant. For one, it always resolves some conflict. For the other, it always shows some part finding its

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place and so its value, its new and different value, in some whole. That the war, again, offers illustration of both of these answers needs hardly to be said. It is of course a conflict of tremendous forces wonderfully organized; but, more than this, as virtually said already, it is a conflict of ideas, one conservative and reactionary, the other prospective and progressive. It is, again, especially when one regards it from the standpoint of the United States's entrance and intervention, an example of a nation, long under a policy of protected nationalism and isolation, taking its part openly and deliberately in life of larger scope and greater meaning and responsibility and getting thereby a new outlook and new values of life. But what the war so well illustrates is true of all activity that really does something, that is no mere routine, that is more than just a domesticated caudal chase. All productive activity resolves some conflict and shows some partial life overcoming isolation and finding itself and so a new meaning in some whole. If further illustration is necessary, think of the great historic conflicts that are always challenging men, politically of government and people, law and freedom, morally of righteousness and unrighteousness, intellectually of knowledge and ignorance, and even biologically as well as theologically of life and death. Each of these familiar conflicts, as old as the hills and as new as to-morrow, is like the present war in involving at once a meeting of definite and manifest forces and a conflict of values or ideas, of different and incommensurable ways of living. To emphasize the latter implication, are there not—and quite without any mere juggling with words—two distinct values for each of those terms, law, wealth, knowledge, life, and the others? Law is written; but who can write the law? Wealth is so much of this or that; but who can calculate real wealth? Life begins at birth and ends at death; but death is only the way to larger life. And these incommensurable values are never absent from those conflicts. Shot through the conflict of mere forces, too, as they invariably are, they contribute their very important part to

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human life, to its interest and its reality. In each conflict, then, some solution and some enlargement of life, involving the issue of incommensurable values as well as that of forces, are what is constantly sought. Simply the larger law or righteousness or wealth or knowledge or life, even like the larger nationality in the war, by which some solution is attained, never depends on mere change in size but requires new and different valuation.

But, to come to my point, under either of the two accounts of real life poetic vision is very plainly essential; freedom of feeling and imagination is indispensable. The prosaic mind, the conservatively accurate and calculating mind, treating all things as commensurable, as like in kind, may help in organization and preparation and in a certain efficiency of mere attack and conquest, but can not suffice for final and progressive action. Thus, for the first account, no real difference, no real incommensurability, such as must always underlie any real conflict, can ever be settled on any basis of literal comformity of either side to the other. The prosaic, *equating* reason, however good as a fighter, is a poor mediator; it may effect formal agreement, but it can bring no guaranty of real sympathy. For mediation and sympathy, in short for real solution, the rigor of reason must give way to the freedom and feeling of imagination, literal conformity yielding to freer, more or less visionary analogy. Again, in the other instance, in regard to that other account of real life, no part can be like in kind and merely larger, as it really finds itself in some whole. Real wholeness, or enlargement, as indeed already said here, is not just more in kind; it is not just bigness.

At risk of tedious repetition I must emphasize this incommensurability of part and whole. Wholeness is real difference and here, as in the first instance, the prose and the logic of the common reason are not adequate. Neither can either side in any real difference ever merely reason itself to real unity with the other nor can a part ever logically calculate and accumulate its way to real enlargement.

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The organizing and calculating reason is quite too economic and domestic or stay-at-home, too commonplace, too unromantic, for either of those great journeys. In none of life's conquests or enlargements, I say, can sheer conquest bring real victory or mere expansion true unity; in none can "assimilation," however benevolent, bring peace or panism, pan-anything-ism, make a true whole. Even once more, then, only the imagination, with its license to argue by analogies, instead of by stay-at-home conformities, and its play of human feeling, can take either of those great journeys, the journey to peace or the journey to wholeness, successfully. There must be in all effective life, in all real travel, some generosity, some abandon, some candor towards difference; in short, some vision of the incommensurable. I dwell on this so much, because hereafter the disastrous tyranny of the organizing and calculating reason, which in essential treachery to democracy would bring all things under one measure, will come up for somewhat pointed comment.

To give now an illustration which will doubtless be quite unexpected, so far is it from what is most naturally in one's thoughts after mention of peace or of pan-anything-ism, is God, who whether in thought or in reality is at once the wholeness of personality and the impartial ruler over all human conflicts, making—as only a poet can understand—the rain to fall for good and for ill alike on the just and on the unjust, is God a person as any partisan and partial human creature—even a Kaiser!—is a person? Or, not less pertinently, is the natural world as a whole to be judged by any mere formal extension or generalization from what some partial and partisan experience, ordinary or highly scientific, has disclosed? For both questions, assuredly not. In journeying to God—or in God?—or in journeying in the world, while the formal reason may be a good courier, the speculative reason, the poetic imagination, must be the real traveller; and, as in these adventures, so in all the smaller ones, including the great war, which are but their more or less important episodes. It takes poets, then,

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men of some vision and of some abandon, to solve conflicts or to achieve real enlargement of life.

But real life has other dimensions besides this of poetry. "Poetry, Comedy and Duty" is a book-title that caught my fancy when I first ran across it some thirty years ago and it makes a stronger appeal to me now than it did then. I never more than just looked over the book,[1] but the title gives three of the important dimensions of real life. So, having spoken at some length of poetry, I would next speak of comedy. If there can indeed be no real life without vision, there can with equal truth be no real vision without laughter.

Vision is such a strange mixer. It is always upsetting one's calculations and bringing together what common understanding finds and would keep apart. "When you really know Tom," exclaims Dick to Harry, "he is not such a bad fellow after all." Really knowing any person may change him from foe to friend, from friend to foe. A strange mixer, then, or a strange transformer, real knowledge is constantly contributing to the humor of life, to the gaiety of nations; and any one, having insight, is in no need of visiting the comic theater, although frequenters even of vaudeville do not necessarily lack insight. Moreover, this that is so true in the intercourse of men is true also for the world of things at large. Under established habits of mind we have the things of our world fairly well placed, these in this pigeon-hole, those in that, and complacently we accept the nice order so established, and conduct our daily life accordingly, faithfully following the appropriate routine and being members of society, as it were, *ex officio;* until, fortunately or unfortunately, something comes along to make us really think. Quickly the thinking, if at all penetrating, disturbs the arrangement most surprisingly. Where there had been order, a laughable confusion sets in; or rather, with respect to our emotions, as we frequently express ourselves, we are quite at a loss whether to laugh or

[1] *Poetry, Comedy and Duty.* By Professor C. C. Everett. Houghton Mifflin and Company, Boston: 1890.

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cry. Normal, wholesome people usually end by laughing; yet not too hilariously. Certainly it is well that normally, when vision reveals confusion or events effect it, laughter and tears are so near together; that a humorous situation and a tragic situation are so alike; for then one's laughter, one's sense of humor, can act as a sort of "first aid" in time of trouble. Every one knows what is meant by a "saving sense of humor," and this always goes with insight. There always is humor even in tragic situations and, however wisely controlled, sensitiveness to it is a great help. When little man runs up against big nature, how tragic; how comic. When nature, however big, finds how much bigger man can be, how comic; how tragic. Sophocles and Euripides were contemporaries of the very important Aristophanes. Shakespeare was great in both comedy and tragedy. In short nature or Providence—choose which name you will—was certainly very considerate in making the tragic and the comic so intimate; the very twins of the drama.

Vision, once more, is such a strange mixer. It is almost Irish in point of fact; or, if not Irish, at least paradoxical without blarney or other picturesqueness. Not only before its gaze may foes turn friends, but the rich may become poor; even the living dead. The point now is that vision brings the new valuations to which allusion has been made here already; making up down and transporting one generally to the wonder land of up-side-down or wrong-side-out. Nor is this amusing land, so Hibernian in character or scenery, very far to seek at the present time. To those who will look it appears, written large, in the affairs of the time. A good Irishman, for example, might very well say, apropos of the present conditions of life, that the next time he goes to church he will go to a Y. M. C. A. prison-camp or the Salvation Army Barracks or a Social Settlement; or the next time he gets patriotic, he will fight for Belgium or at least for humanity. I mean, as regards present conditions, that, strangely enough, life's supposed values and life's real interests and effective activities are

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divorced; and in a way, too, not without much humor. Thus, moral sentiment and spirituality are ecclesiastical, but moral efficiency is on the whole non-ecclesiastical; patriotism is traditionally and assertively nationalistic often to the point of jingoism, while real life is internationalistic and humanitarian, and culture and general intelligence are at once leisured and academic, but vocational and professional skill very commonly is uncultured and non-academic or at least academically *res non grata*. In general the values of life are institutional—in church or state or school—but life's productive activities are at once very material and practical and non-institutional or extra-mural; the will of civilization having somehow, like a naughty child from its bath, escaped from the protecting and restraining institutions of civilization. A serious situation, surely, that with its separation of culture—if I may use this word to connote all positive human values—and real life and efficiency may well be given as one of the things that made the great war possible; but, serious as it is, it is also a fair mark for Hibernian wit: "Things being as they are, the next time I worship at any altar, I shall go where there are no altars." How discomfited civilization ought to feel; its great institutions so cast off; these long-honored repositories of human values having now to look out upon mankind living, as it were, indifferently to them, with little or no benefit of them. A situation, that even reminds one, if I may pile on at least one more metaphor, of the distressed hen that had nestled her eggs only to bring forth ducklings and in maternal agony to see them leave *terra firma*—the *terra firma* of institutional verities—and go out upon treacherous or at least unproved and unsanctified waters—the waters of really-getting-something-done. Man himself may lack the great gift of truth—although personally I do him more honor than to believe this—and be accordingly wholly unable to laugh at himself, at his life being in one place and the treasures of it in another, but at least the truth-seeing gods must be laughing at him; at the present predicament of his boasted

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civilization, at the strangely met brutality and ideality, efficiency and valuation, things worst and things best, in human nature; making what truly is a humorous vis-à-vis.

I recall from long ago a story of a boy who had done wrong and brought much trouble, as well as considerable loss of property, both to his immediate family and to others. His grandfather, however, so the narrative ran, was "pleased" or "entertained"—I am uncertain which word was used—at the boy's wrong-doing. For some time I could not understand the old gentleman's getting any pleasure out of the proceedings, but understanding came in time and also I can understand how the gods can be laughing—quietly and affectionately, in a grandfatherly way—over the errors and the foibles of men and even over the fearful discomfiture of the present time. "There is some hope for that boy," said the pleased grandfather. Also the gods, who always can laugh, might be imagined to say: "There is, after all, some hope for civilization." Are not brutality and ideality at last vis-à-vis?

Yet a third time, vision is a strange mixer, making laughter even midst appropriate tears. But, objects someone, only the laughter of the cynic. Yes, the laughter of the cynic always, but not only his laughter. Seeing strange things or persons brought together or seeing life's values and life's interests, its treasures and its activities, in different places, as if there were two worlds for human occupation, one pleasant and worthy and the other just busy, may indeed invite cynicism. Confusion and discomfiture are always the cynic's opportunity, reflecting doubtless his own internal disorder. If vision mixes good and bad, as it is sure to, judge the good by the company that it keeps and laugh cynically. If institutions appear to have fallen behind, effective living having become extra-mural, unprotected and without benefit of institutions, promptly conclude that civilization has failed and, once more, laugh cynically. But he laughs best who laughs last. Why not judge the bad by its company? Or the passing of the old order by the released possibility of a new?

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And, so inspired, laugh hopefully and wholesomely? The idealist, always enjoying the same vision with the cynic, has at least equal rights to the laughter that the presented comedy of strange unions or strange divisions always arouses. Conditions and rights equal, moreover, if I may speak quite informally, I will bet every time on the idealist as the one to laugh last.

But, now to consider the third dimension, a life that sees and that laughs, that can laugh hopefully and courageously, even through its tears, is duty at its best. Obviously—I say obviously, but must admit that only at this moment of writing has it occurred to me—obviously vision and laughter name intellectual and emotional aspects of human life, while duty refers to volition and action, to overt action. The active life, then, to which duty calls mankind, is a life guided by real vision and affected with courage and good cheer. The French, we have been told, at the very front of the great struggle have shown a cheerful courage midst their fearful hardships and in such courage others among the allies having the same vision and the same determination have not been wanting. May the vision and the cheer and the determination deepen as the days pass. May our own country, as it does its bit, with the munitions and the men and the material relief of all kinds that it contributes, send over also in large measure these things of the spirit without which nothing worth while, nothing truly great, can ever be accomplished.

There is, I know, another idea of duty than this which would mingle with it vision and laughter. Some would have duty blind and very sober. For them the term suggests only routine, conformity, rigorous and unswerving allegiance to some superimposed obligation. Duty, they insist, or imply, must be hard, very hard; the performance of something unpleasant, even an unnatural obedience to some command from higher up. To touch it, however slightly, with vision and cheerfulness and naturalness is to spoil it, bringing defeat to the very purposes that are to be accomplished. But, emphatically, I have to disagree with

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this notion. In the first place, I can not agree that duty begins and ends, as one of my friends is constantly putting it, with realization that there is "a God in Israel" or that a duty of real vision and cheer is easier than the blind and sober sort. Indeed, if the question is only of ease, the rigorist's duty strikes me as the easier of the two.

> "Their's not to reason why,
> Their's but to do and die!"

is, of course, a long accepted formula for both courage and duty; but the hidden pacifism of it should not be overlooked. Such implicit obedience, followed by death, holds its own type of hardship and courage and wins its own reward, the soldier's reward, before death achievement with freedom from personal initiative of thought or will and after death this world's quieting memories and tributes of monuments and flags and the other world's tearless joy and perfect peace; but, as I believe, in spite of the unfailing saving humor and laughter, a life that does reason why and that does see is really harder and positively more courageous, being so much more one's own and exacting so much more personal responsibility. It is so much harder that only the attending humor of it makes it possible at all. Then, in the second place, whatever may be true of former times, men are not today living so much with reference to a peaceful hereafter, earned only by submission to superior powers that are loyal to some purpose out of the past and concerned with maintaining intact the established order of the present, as with reference to interest and satisfaction now and here, earned by themselves conceiving things and doing things. Once the world was created for them; now they would at least contribute to the making of a world. So have the orthodox creationism and absolutism, religious or political, economic or moral, given way to a new creationism, stirring the life of the present, and democracy, dependent on general intelligence and present satisfactions and real initiative and responsibility. Modern democracy can not sanction duty apart from vision and laughter.

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And now, referring to the difference of the present time from the past, I have certainly touched on an important point if not on the important point. It is natural that duty mean one thing for one time, another thing for another. Duty to an establishing or established institutional order is one thing; to a creative life at a time, as we often say, of transition, quite another, making a different exaction, having a different quality. When a civilization is taking form, when it is building and settling, a certain rigorism of life can not but have ideal value as well as be also the line of least resistance. Discipline must then be devised and maintained. Pleasure must be only aside and for the most part in the future. Submission and death with eventual rewards must constitute man's normal career. But, when the time comes, as it must, a time of epochal transition, for creative living after the preparatory building and settling, then the ideally normal life has to change, the quality of duty becoming very different; submission giving place to liberty, groping to understanding, enjoyment only aside or hereafter to enjoyment of life itself now, the relative ease of obedience under orders, that proceed from hard necessity, to the severer ordeal of human, whether racial or personal, responsibility. Thus in the Middle Ages duty was one thing; in our own time it must at last be quite another. In our own time, as but just said, in our time of democracy, of mankind consciously and intelligently doing things, poetry and comedy and duty, vision and laughter—that plucky laughter of the defiant idealist—and effective living are not to be separated, each helping to define the others; the first two notably determining the quality of the last.

A time of epochal transition! Truly we are nearing something new in life. A time of creative living must be at hand. The veil has been lifted and we see confusion. Civilization has broken loose from its most proper restraints and church and school and state are dismayed and apparently discredited. Life seems to have forgotten its worth and to be neglecting if not destroying its most sacred treasures. Law and art, science and philosophy and relig-

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ion, as well as sex, are being debauched. That brutal necessity, defying law, should make right! That hate should be set to music! That science should take life instead of give it! That philosophy should support conceit and effrontery! That God should occupy a worldly throne! That sex, source of so much that is best in human life, should be so betrayed! In a word, that man, at a moment when civilization was getting confident and feeling so much at home, should seek supremacy by exploiting civilization in the interests of barbarism! Of course something new must be near. But how are these offenses to be understood? And how are they to be met? What of democracy, too, and of duty?

Strangely enough—and what comedy is there here!—these offenses are being met, so far as in self-defense civilization finds necessary, in kind. Brutal war is being waged against brutal war. But how understand them? Only by seeing beyond them. Are they, except in the issues of present partisanship, as certain peoples, ourselves among the others, have chosen for the moment to draw those issues, solely and exclusively Teutonic? Civilization through the centuries, however unwittingly, may only have trained a certain group to be the scapegoat for offenses quite general among all peoples. As to this the historians can tell better than I. But evident it is—to any vision that is honest and that is not blinded by formal reasoning and tradition or by partisan interest—not only that no people is now innocent but also that before the war no people had been wholly innocent of any of those hated offenses. Understand the present barbarism, then, by seeing in it more than just Teutonism or—more narrowly—Prussianism. What, if not civilization itself, has made even Prussianism possible? And Prussianism—what but an exposure, localized and very highly developed, an incarnation and revelation, not merely of evil possibilities, but of evil actualities to be found too often and too generally the *civilized* world over? Is it not commonly true that one life's public crime is only another life's private vice? To have sanctioned those

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offenses openly and officially may be Prussia's peculiar sin, flagrant and revolting, but other peoples can gain nothing by being blind either to their own unofficial brutality or to an unofficial ideality even in Prussia. Holy civilization! See it meeting hate with hate, war with war, as indeed it must in its fight against its own barbarism. But which of all the peoples may fairly claim the holiness? Wishing, as all of us do, but one outcome to the struggle, let us hope that the Teutonic forces will not be the only forces signally defeated and that, the world over, through its victory over itself civilization will become holier. There would be an almost divine comedy in such an outcome.

Always the war! One can not keep away from it. Yet here there has been no real digression. To be able to see the war in that way is, in the first place, to make it more than just big. It becomes wonderful, not merely frightful; an inspiration, not an overwhelming despair. The bitterness of it is lessened, for civilization can not hate itself quite as something else, and the opportunity and hope of it are made clear. As each day more positively a just war against unjust war, it is bound to win. Not that such reversion will never recur again, but that at least it will be made less likely to recur again. Then, in the second place, the war itself is seen to be teeming with the forces of democracy, each day more conscious, more confident and more insistent; teeming with the material forces and with the vision and the humor and the sense of responsibility. Not only is the world to be made "safe for democracy" hereafter, but also, as is so important to appreciate, democracy, bent on making the world suitable for it to live in, is now very manifestly doing the work. Democracy is now active as never before. As the nations are getting together in their already large league that will be still larger before the war is over; as patriotism gets more and more humanly fraternal; as war-relief becomes as general, as international, as war-maintenance; as an ever greater community of real feeling and interest comes to predominate over any attempted or any supposable community of or-

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ganization and method; as civilization is awakening to its own responsibility for the very barbarism which it is trying to put down, while the "barbarians," coming to themselves, are beginning to feel and even confess, through whatever intrigues of socialists and imperialists, their own real place in civilization; in short, as the peoples, allied or hostile, in their conduct or their consciousness, in reference to the right or in reference to the wrong of the war, are finding out the unity of their life, the great work of democracy in the war is more and more apparent. And, working in this way, so much greater than any partisanship, democracy is bound to be the victor.

But under democracy duty is inseparable from poetry and comedy, from vision and laughter. Lacking the quality that these impart, lacking adventure and responsibility, life can not be at its best, if worth the living at all. Can I, finally, make this clear? It is, of course, a commonplace, as well as here a repetition, that democracy fosters human initiative, that through it there moves a spirit of creative life. Its institutions primarily are means, not treasures or idols; public utilities, not just sanctuaries. It may often look like absolutism and monarchy, but the institutes of absolutism are become only instruments for democracy. All the machinery of its life is, so far as possible, devised without the abuses of militarism, without absolutism's exploitation of the human person and his feelings and powers, being labor-saving or rather all along the line human-nature-saving machinery. Democracy may often fall far short of its ideals, but rightly we should judge it for its ideals. Alive, then, with humanism, allowing all men "life and liberty and the pursuit of happiness" and bent on materially increasing the material advantages of these three rights or privileges, democracy would give into man's hand the work of the world, bidding him feel the worth and the zeal of it. Under democracy, too, do not kingship and even divinity dwell immediately in the efforts of men? Of all men, of course, not exclusively of any one? So that, doing the work of the world, may not mankind justly feel a certain royalty and divinity?

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A new era seems to be at hand. Democracy must soon come into new life. History can afford no parallel of the awakening which is coming. Yet from history we may possibly get some intimation of what to expect. From the time of the Crusades on through the sixteenth century the formal and constraining discipline of the then reigning institution came to be touched wonderfully with humanism. Witness the chivalry, the art, the literature, the wealth of adventure of that time. Christendom saw visions and dreamed dreams and, its medieval asceticism passing, human life claimed the right to natural laughter. But in our time a far more comprehensive discipline or régime than just that of an institution has prevailed. Thus we have come to be ruled by the formal, calculating reason, once called by a certain German philosopher the "pure reason," and our later rule has been to the earlier as the big to the little, as the general to the particular, as a principle to just one of its applications; as exact science, for example, to exact and dogmatic theology, rigorous mathematics to positive law, or a world-embracing rationalism or mechanicalism to a specific institutionalism. Did the medieval institution, although claiming to be God's appointed guardian over the souls of men, itself become soulless? Did it, in such times as those of the Borgias and Machiavelli, become, however "pure" and "holy," quite irresponsible, in outward deeds flagrantly betraying its spiritual purposes? Its successor, the formal reason of science and commerce, democracy's appointed guardian of the rights of men, has proved soulless and irresponsible also. Has not this formal reason, so rigorous and calculating, made possible a brutal industrialism and, most recently, politically a tyrannical efficiency that threatens the world with imperialism, a boastfully "pure" and "holy" imperialism, the imperialism of *Kultur?* Has not this formal reason, as the great genius of efficiency, caused just that divorce of human values and effective activities which already has been remarked here and which has contributed so largely to making the war materially possible and ideally necessary? In the earlier

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time the Holy Roman Empire, at once Roman and Teutonic, an enterprise independent of the Church, was the efficiency movement or at least a significant mark of such a movement; extra-ecclesiastical and yet—strange stroke of modernism!—boasting the full sanction of God. The earlier movement, however, failed; it failed just because of man's refusal to consent to such aloofness of the worldly from the worthy life. Can the would-be Holy Rational Empire of our time, with its dependence on pure, reason-organized efficiency, be more successful? In answer I find myself recalling Bryce's remark that the Holy Roman Empire was never holy nor Roman nor empire. In this remark there is interesting history and a most reassuring prophecy. The modern analogue must some day have its Bryce; being by no means holy, only soullessly rational, and impossibly imperial.

So, once more, what new life and new zeal of life are before us! In the wealth of its meaning and interest and achievement the new life must measure up to what it overcomes. Modern ingenuity and efficiency put to the service of a modern humanism, modern reason touched with feeling and imagination, must far surpass anything yet recorded in history, as the mere rational organization of modern life has surpassed anything that the medieval institution, for example, ever even dreamed. What new chivalry, what new art, what new literature, what new life and religion, what new great human adventures of all kinds must be in store! Culture and efficiency, so disastrously grown apart, must be reunited. Democracy so demands and so points the evidence of history. America may well be glad that she is taking her part. At whatever cost, the other nations of the western hemisphere joining the United States, she will support her announced policy of progress vigorously.

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THE BASES OF DEMOCRACY IN CHINA.

KIA-LOK YEN.

IF ANYTHING is unthinkable, unbelievable, and even ridiculous, it is China's becoming a republic, the Occidental often declares to his Oriental acquaintance. China, he is likely to add, ruled over for four thousand years by an absolute, despotic government, with her archaic families, each under an absolute patriarch, her fixed class system, which allows no one to rise above the class into which he is born, her people uneducated, void of individual character, and having no capacity for co-operative enterprises, her ruling class caring for nothing but bribery and graft, her superstitious ideas and her heathen philosophy—how could she be fit for a democratic form of government?

Yet a republic has come into existence in China. A fact is a fact, and there must be some reason for it, obscure though it may be. It is the purpose of this article to point out some of the social, industrial, economic, and political institutions which seem to have favored the organization of a democratic government. These may in part account not only for what China has accomplished up to the present, but also for what she may accomplish in the future.

(1) Social Institutions.

1. The Family.—The family in China is the fundamental social as well as political unit. It has often been described by Westerners as a patriarchal system, namely, having the father as the head and each family constituting an independent unit. This is undoubtedly true to a casual observer who does not see the inner workings of the family life. The father, though theoretically supreme, occupies himself only with the supporting of the family, while the mother is responsible for all the internal management of the home and for the social intercourse of the family with other families. Thus, the father and the mother demand equal respect from their children.

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We are not here concerned with the reason why Chinese are so inclined to live together. Suffice it to say that it is not uncommon to find sometimes four or five generations living in the same household. The support of such a family devolves almost entirely upon the men members of the family while the women do the household work. In some families even the women work towards the support of the home by engaging in the occupations suitable to them, such as embroidering and weaving. The family is a living organism possessing a spirit distinct from the individuals constituting it. Each member works for the family and not for himself alone. The earnings of all the members are to be turned in to support the whole family and every member has a claim on the earnings of every other.

It has often been asserted that in a Chinese family individuals are sacrificed for the whole group. This again is a case of superficial judgment. With us, the individual character is not only not sacrificed but its development is everlastingly encouraged by every possible means. For instance, the person who can earn the most is looked upon by every other with profound respect. A child, whether a boy or a girl, who can progress more rapidly in his or her schooling than any other is the favorite, and the pride of the household. Under the old system of examinations only the promising member was sent to participate as great expenses were involved which the family could not afford to lavish upon every member.

Each member of the family not only has a claim on the earnings of all the others but also is responsible for their conduct. The whole family is responsible for all the civil and criminal liabilities of each member. Hence it can be easily seen why brotherly love is considered one of the virtues. As each member is responsible for all the others it follows necessarily that every one must be loyal to every other. Should one be crippled or helpless he has all the rest to do his work as it would bring shame to the whole family to let the helpless struggle alone. This may be one of the reasons why we do not have any charitable institutions to speak of.

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Another family virtue which is most important to us but seems to Westerners to be despotic is filial piety. It is the duty of all children to see that their parents suffer neither sorrow nor want. In old age the parents are jealously taken care of and their wishes invariably carried out. It is the latter feature that seems so despotic to Westerners. But through experience we came to the conclusion long ago that only the experienced is the wise teacher. The parents, the first to struggle for the family, the only members that have tasted all the sweet and bitter fruits of family life, can invariably tell better than anyone else what is best for each of their offspring, regarding their duties to the family. This, however, does not mean that the parents lay down a set of do's and don't's for their children to follow. What it amounts to in practice is that anyone contemplating an act must first present it to the parents and in the final decision take their opinion into account.

It is this respect for parents and loyalty to kin which keep the family a co-operative and harmonious whole.

We have so far described only the internal functions of the family. Externally, in the intercourse with other families, the father is the head. He represents the family as a whole. All the properties, real estate or personal, are owned in his name, only he cannot dispose of any of them without the consent of the members of the family. After his death, if the family continues, his rights are exercised and duties discharged by his eldest son. If the eldest son is dead these rights and duties fall upon the eldest son of the eldest son.

As long as either of the parents is living the family remains intact except in some extraordinary cases. When both of them are dead the family is divided up according to the number of sons, and the unmarried daughters go and live with the eldest son. The property is divided equally among the sons and unmarried daughters. If some of the sons happen to be dead by this time, their shares go to their children. If one of them does not leave any child his share

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goes to the one who the family agrees should discharge the duties of the dead brother. After the division each son is the head of his own family; thus the division of an old family invariably brings into being a number of new families.

Thus we see that in a Chinese family there is a sort of socialism with the rights and duties of each member clearly defined. In it every member is directly responsible for the whole household, and every one labors for the common good without sacrificing his or her individuality.

2. The Greater Family.—Even after the division of the old family the new families, except on very rare occasions, generally live near each other. They occupy a certain part of the village or town and have an ancestral hall of their own where they carry on their inter-family intercourse and plan to expand, and to protect their interests in common. Even immigrant families will always choose to settle near those who bear the same name in their newly adopted village. Very often families of the same or presumably the same origin occupy a village of their own, in which case the village invariably bears the family-name. These groups of families are generally called clans by Westerners and oriental students who have acquired the western sociological terminology. While it is incontestable that the term is applicable in so far as the solidarity of the groups are concerned, it must be pointed out that these families have no official comparable with the common chief of a clan. To avoid confusion therefore, we shall speak of these groups as "greater families" rather than "clans."

The headquarters of such a group is the ancestral hall where the remote great historical personages of the same name are housed. These personages serve as perpetual inspiration to each member of the group. The ancestral hall has property of its own the interests of which are used for the upkeep of the hall and the worship of the ancestors. All members whether rich or poor have the same rights and privileges in the ancestral hall.

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The affairs of the group are administered by a board of elders—varying in number—chosen by popular vote. They hold their offices for a definite term. Every project, every phase of the intercourse with other groups, every acquisition or disposal of the common property, every loan and the interest on every loan, is strictly recorded and kept in the hall where any member may inspect it if he chooses. At the end of each year, whether it be the end of an administration or not, there is an annual meeting at which the records of all business, especially the financial transactions, are read. Every member is supposed to be present at this meeting. But, in practice, each family sends only one member as its representative, or sometimes it even gives the power of attorney to the representative of some other family to represent it. The office of treasurer invariably goes to the rich—and of course educated—member of the group, so that in case there be any fraud there may be enough private property to be confiscated.

The functions of the ancestral hall are numerous. Among the most important may be mentioned the social, economic, educational, and judicial functions. Certain days of the year are set off for worship. While admitting that in some degenerated cases there has slipped in an unanalysable compound of the secondary fears of God and ghosts and the primary fears of bad luck, it should be emphatically observed that this form of worship must not be confused with the primordial magic of the savage tribes, or the refined superstition of the Christian churches. This worship consists chiefly in paying reverence to the past and strengthening the bonds between the present generations. On the occasions of worship an extensive feast is prepared and every male member who is of age is supposed to be present at an appointed hour. The affair generally lasts a whole afternoon. There is just a little ceremony lasting only a few minutes and consisting in bowing before the tablets on which the names and titles of the various great ancestors are inscribed, and then each member goes to the seat provided for him. There he eats and drinks and en-

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joys the company of others. As they meet in this manner only a few times each year, each tells to the rest all his failures and successes and receives and in turn gives advice on the subject of the struggle for existence. Needless to say it is these occasions more than anything else which serve to bind them together in a co-operative whole.

The ancestral hall also serves as the link between the poor and rich members of the group. As the ancestral hall property consists chiefly of land and ready cash, the poor members are privileged to rent the land at a very low rental and borrow the money at a very low rate of interest. The rich members on the other hand continuously contribute towards the increase of the ancestral property. Thus the ancestral hall serves to eliminate all the problems arising from the relation between land-owners and tenants and between capital and labor in the West.

Schools are provided in the ancestral hall for the children of the whole group. In some rich groups elaborate systems of subsidy are designed to encourage all intellectual pursuits including the taking of the government education. To a great extent the children of the group are looked upon as the common offspring of the group, and the ancestral hall provides and enforces a strict rule of discipline for them.

The board of elders also serve as arbitrators of the group. When conflict occurs between the members it is referred to the ancestral hall where all the evidences and arguments are introduced. After the concluding arguments, the elders, together with the representatives of the disinterested families, vote upon a final settlement each accompanying his vote with his opinion. Legally the disputants do not have to abide by the decision, but morally they are invariably bound to do so, for to go outside of the group to effect a settlement would be to bring disgrace upon the group. Besides, no outsider except the government official will undertake to adjust the differences for them; and even at that he does so only with the advice and assistance of the elders of their group.

Keeping these facts in view one can easily see why an

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elaborate sermon is not required on every seventh day to keep even the illiterate and superstitious Chinese within the bounds of morality.

It may be mentioned in passing that the elected elders, together with some other experienced members of the group, represent the group in inter-group or village affairs.

Thus the greater family too is an organism having a spirit of its own distinctly apart from those of the individual families constituting it. Within it exists a representative and co-operative system where all the members enjoy the same rights and privileges and discharge the same duties and obligations. Here too, it should be strongly emphasized that harmony and co-operation are not attained at the expense of individuality.

3. The Village.—Where the village consists of a single group, one greater family, there is no village organization besides what has already been described. But where there are several distinct groups in the village a separate organization, similar to that of the greater family, is found. The headquarters of the village organization is, instead of the ancestral hall, a temple of some deified personage; sometimes a great literateur deified as the God of Literature, or a great warrior deified as the God of War—the deification of any great historical figure as the lord of his particular department generally serves the purpose.

The village temple also owns property as does the ancestral hall, and is administered by a board of elders elected by and from the representatives of the various groups. It also has festivals as the ancestral hall. It maintains schools for the children of the village. In a word, it exercises all the rights and discharges all the duties towards the inter-group life as does the ancestral hall towards the inter-family life. It represents the village in inter-village affairs and also in dealing with government officials. These we shall mention later on. In addition to the above it also provides public utilities for the village.

Here again we find another representative organization

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with a spirit apart from those of the constituent groups. Within it are a number of smaller organizations each having its sphere of activity properly defined and each being directly responsible for the larger organization. The relation between the village and the group organizations is precisely the same as that between the group and the families or between the family and the individuals.

4. *The Classes.*—Leaving the definite social organizations we shall now examine one of the characteristic social institutions—characteristic not only of Chinese life but of human life in general. No description of Chinese life is complete without devoting some space to the class-system. Traditional China admits of four classes; the scholar, the farmer, the artisan, and the merchant, the degree of honor being in the order named.

It may be remarked that the fact that the military class is not included is often taken as the indication of China's disinclination towards war. This may be true, but a more acceptable inference may be drawn from history and literature. It seems as though every person is considered a soldier in time of war. As the class-system is effective only in time of peace, and as there is no need for an armed force in peaceful life, it follows that there need be no military class in society. This, however, is merely a suggestion and we need not dwell upon it.

Formerly—and theoretically of course—these classes were conceived as fixed, and a person born in one could not lift himself over into another. Westerners have seized upon this point and compared the Chinese classes with Hindu castes. They have failed to grasp the fact that whatever intentions the exponents of the class-philosophy may have had, actual practice—the only thing that amounts to anything—has emptied it of all its old meanings and loaded it up in their stead with new significances. These classes have come to mean nothing besides the distinguishing labels for the several professions. Far from being fixed, individuals have since time immemorial entered into

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any occupation they chose. Although there prevails a general tendency on the part of the children to enter into the occupations of their fathers, different members of the same family are very frequently found to pursue different professions, and even the same individual is often found—especially in the south—engaged in several occupations at the same time.

As to honor, the only class that is looked upon with any special degree of respect by the other classes is that of the scholar—the other classes regarding each other as of the same rank. A merchant, or a farmer, or an artisan, feels an infinite pride when his son makes good in literary pursuit.

As our purpose of discussing the class-system is simply to correct the wrong conception of the fixity of the classes and to show that the different classes mean nothing more than different occupations in which any one may engage, we are content with the statement in passing that the class-system is not a peculiar characteristic of Chinese social life and consequently deserves no consideration under our special subject besides the statement of facts.

(2) Economic and Industrial Institutions.

As to the economic and industrial institutions the notable ones among them are the mutual loan associations and the various gilds.

1. The Mutual Loan Associations.—Besides the provision by which an individual may secure a loan from the ancestral hall or the village temple there is a very ingenious scheme by which an individual or an organization may secure loans. This scheme is designed to perform the function of an emergency organization and that of a savings club.

The scheme works in the following manner: If A needs some money and wants to obtain it through the mutual loan association, he goes to his friends B, C, etc., and puts the proposition before them. B and C then transmit A's proposal to their respective friends. When a sufficient number have approved of the proposition a mutual loan

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association is formed with A as the head. A book is then prepared to keep a record of all the agreements and the names of the members. The number of meetings and the amount to be paid by each member at every meeting, together with the rate of interest, are then agreed upon and the stipulations entered in the book. The meeting place is generally at the home of A unless he wishes it otherwise.

Now, suppose that it is decided that each member shall bring $5.00 to each meeting preceding the assignment of the loan—the amount will depend of course upon how much A needs—and that there shall be two meetings each month, and suppose that there are twenty-four members besides A; then A will get $120.00 at the first meeting and will have to pay it back in twenty-four instalments of $5.00 each at the subsequent meetings. The privilege of A's being the head consists in his receiving the loan first and paying it back in twenty-four instalments without any interest. In exchange for this privilege he has to keep a record of all the meetings without compensation.

The person to receive the loan at the next meeting is decided in two ways; either by auction or by lot. If by auction, as is done when several of the members need the loan badly, each member is entitled to one bid as to how much additional interest he wishes to pay besides what is stipulated in the original agreement. Each one writes his bid together with his name on a piece of paper and gives it to A. A then examines all the bids, and the loan goes to the highest bidder. Suppose that the interest stipulated is two percent for each meeting and the highest bidder bids two percent in addition to that; he will receive the loan of $120.00, and will have to pay $5.20 at each of the subsequent meetings. Before receiving the cash he must deposit with A a deed to some of his real estate properties as security for the loan.

If by lot, as is done when none of members needs the loan very badly, the person who draws the right lot gets it and then pays it back with the stipulated interest, that is, two percent,—$5.10 at each of the subsequent meetings.

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Each member gets the loan once, and there are as many meetings as there are members.

These mutual loan societies serve to help many to avoid financial difficulties on the one hand and to save up their earnings on the other; the utility of them will be more apparent the very moment it is pointed out that there are no banks in many of the villages. The thrifty members of the community generally join as many societies as their earning capacities allow. If they do not need the loans they leave them to be decided by lot and get them when they draw the right lot. If they do need them they go and bid for them.

Here we have an instance of co-operative economic institution in which a spirit of unity is manifested in the confidence of each member in every other and the ready assistance to each by every other when in need.

It may be remarked that there are no statutory laws concerning such organizations; the only law being that of common consent and mutual confidence.

2. The Gilds.—By far the most important embodiment of the co-operative spirit in Chinese industrial and economic life is the gild. There are two classes of gilds; the merchants' gild, and the artisans' gild. (Some authors include the various social societies in a third class.)

The merchants' gild is a local organization of the merchants of the same trade, for instance, the bankers' gild, the silk gild, the dry goods gild, etc. All the merchants of the same trade are eligible to the gild; the qualifications being good character and promptness in paying dues.

The artisans' gild is an organization of the men of the same profession, for instance, the carpenters' gild, the jewelers' gild, etc. The membership of the artisans' gild consists of both the masters and the apprentices.

Each gild has a president, a secretary, and an executive board. They are all elected yearly by popular vote. In the case of the merchants' gild the secretary is generally one who has a learned degree. The secretary virtually acts

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as the attorney of the gild. All gild matters are first brought up before the leaders, and if they think these matters worth while they will submit them to the whole body.

It is the function of the gilds to settle disputes arising between their own members, and controversies with other gilds. They also fix the rate of exchange, the rate of interest, and the date for the settlement of accounts. In addition to these services they provide public improvements and strive toward the internal development of their trade.

Their meeting place is generally some of the village or town temples. Some of the rich gilds have their own headquarters.

It is the collectivity and solidarity of these organizations which is responsible for the preservation of social peace in China. They serve to preserve the stability of the market and to check the tendencies toward extremes, and thus prevent the deepening of the chasm between the classes.

Bishop James W. Bashford, a resident in China, tells us in his thoroughly trustworthy book on China, that "the democratic management of industrial and economic affairs through the gilds, and the democratic origin of industrial and commercial law, furnish the historic and economic basis for the democratic character of Chinese civilization. Indeed, so firmly is the authority of the gild established in settling commercial and industrial disputes that the government recognizes gild rules in all trials, giving the rank of statute laws." This same author tells us that "in China the gilds or voluntary organizations, combined through their chief representatives, frequently discharge the functions of a Board of Trade, a City Council, a Board of Charities, and a Board of Arbitration—all with semiofficial powers." Interesting, too, is his suggestion that "the labor unions of the United States might profit greatly by sending a representative to China to gather the constitutions of the Chinese gilds, and to make on the ground a thorough study of their practical management for the

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larger and better organization of the industrial forces of the Western World."

Before leaving the social, economic, and industrial institutions, it should be observed that the collectivity and solidarity of these institutions have developed to such a degree that their rules, that is, the crystallized agreements, are most rigorously observed and their interests and dignity most jealously defended, against both internal violation and external encroachment, by each and every individual member. The individual conceives of his own interests as so intimately interwoven with those of the organization to which he belongs that it appears to him to be a matter of life and death to struggle in the defense of the latter. The driving force that obliges each individual to discharge his duties towards the organization is neither a religious belief nor an economic project—though either may figure in the process—but a definite common purpose inspired by reverence for the successful and strengthened by loyalty toward each other. This purpose is so settled in the minds of the individuals that it becomes established as a mental attitude, and is habitually regarded by them as a life distinct and yet inseparable from their own. Thus, honor and disgrace to the institution are identical with the honor and disgrace to the individual, and vice versa; and for this reason those individuals who are unable to pursue a certain line of activity with success consider it their duty and privilege to support others in it.

Bearing this in mind we can very easily understand the occasional tribal or village warfares which a Westerner does not hesitate at all to characterize as the remnants of primitive life.

(3) Political Institutions.

As there are numerous treatises on China where descriptions of Chinese government may be found we need not concern ourselves with it except to call attention to one of the most atrociously and maliciously neglected functions, namely, the connecting link between the local and the

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central government. No correct understanding of the Chinese government can be arrived at without a careful consideration of the agencies between the central government and the local self-governments of the villages and towns. And, by pointing out this fact we hope to be able to correct some wrong impressions made by the heretofore existing treatises.

1. The Central Government.—As we are concerned here only with discovering the connection between the social, industrial, and economic institutions on the one hand and the political institutions on the other, we need not go into the detailed organization and functions of the central government. A general scheme will serve well our purpose.

The old central government of China was generally accepted as a despotism pure and simple. It must be admitted that this idea is theoretically correct. Practice, however, proved the government anything but despotic. The emperor was the son of Heaven and had all the powers and rights over the life and property of every one of his people. But the method by which he ruled the country had necessarily curtailed his authority to such an extent that he had to do almost as the people pleased.

The country is divided into provinces, the provinces into districts or Fu's, and the districts into counties or Hsins, Chous, and Tins, each of which consists of a number of villages and towns. At the capital of the province was a governor, that of the district, a Taotai, and that of the county, a Chuchou or Chuhsin as the case might be. The emperor, or the court, used to appoint the governor, the governor in turn appointed the Taotai and Chuchou and Chuhsin. Any person, in order to be eligible for the appointment had to have a degree. Each official was responsible to his superior official for his territory. The rank of their positions were in the order named; the Chuchous or Chuhsins being the lowest and in closest contact with the people.

The duties of these officials consisted mainly in keeping

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order, and collecting the taxes from their respective territories.

As it has been already pointed out that the local institutions always settle their own differences, provide their own necessary means for mutual assistance, and maintain order in their own localities, it can be readily seen that the activities of these officials were reduced to minimum. It was only when there occured differences between individuals or organizations which could not be settled by the local organizations themselves that the affairs were referred to the county official by whose decision they had to abide. The decisions, however, depended upon the influence of the parties concerned; and this is where bribery came in. After the decision was pronounced, if the unfavored party did not wish to abide by it, he might appeal to the higher officials; whereupon the county official at once allied himself with the other party. This, together with the uncertainty of a favorable decision and the enormous expenses incurred, obliged the controversial parties always to try to effect a settlement either between themselves alone or with invited assistance of the representatives of some disinterested parties.

As the official, who, as a rule, was a stranger to the territory to which he was appointed, depended entirely upon the representatives of that territory in governing it, he had to make a formal call on each of the representatives residing at the capital when he entered his office, in order to receive advice from them.

The only obligation the people had toward the central government was the payment of taxes which were generally very small in comparison with those of the Western countries.

This brief sketch will serve to show the connection between the people and the central government, and the extent of the despotic authority of the emperor. We shall now proceed to one of the now obsolete and forgotten but nevertheless interesting political institutions.

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2. The Bau-Tsia.—One of the most remarkable and indigenous systems is the Bau-Tsia which means very nearly "one who is responsible for, or a protector of, a certain part of the population." This system has a long history with which we need not concern ourselves besides mentioning the fact that it died a gradual death in different parts of the country. In some places the remnants of the system persisted till the Revolution hastened it to its end.

Each Bau consisted of a village or part of a village—originally one hundred families—in which the families were divided into groups of tens or more. Each group elected one representative and the representatives for all the groups in the Bau elected from their midst one to represent the Bau. This representative was called Hsiang-chang (the elder of the village), or Bau-chang (the elder of the Bau), or Ti-bau (the protector of the locality).

The functions of the Bau-chang consisted in keeping the record of the registration of the families which he was responsible for, and reporting at the office of the county official regularly regarding the order of the locality.

The Bau-chang, although he was elected by and from the representatives of the families, was the representative of the county official, and hence of the central government, in his locality. Thus he was responsible to the government and not to the locality. Law suits must go through him to the county official. When an official visited his locality it was his duty to provide for and entertain his superior. The responsibility of locating offenders against the law rested with him as he could, through the registration he kept, find the fugitive easier than anyone else. He was often invited to sit in the village temple—but not the ancestral hall—when the controversies between the members in the village were being adjusted. In these cases he attended the tribunal in the capacity of a representative of the central government.

In spite of the fact that this system worked satisfactorily for centuries it has died out completely at present. This was evidently due to the efficiency of the local organizations

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on the one hand and the deterioration of officialdom on the other. In the first place the local institutions regarded the relations between themselves as so sacred that they were often prone to settle their differences and provide for their own safety themselves, and were disinclined to solicit any assistance from without. In the next place the presence of the Bau-chang at the meetings where the local affairs were being managed seldom had any effect whatsoever upon the plans finally adopted. He was an outsider and was treated accordingly. Again, as his position was not a paid one and as he had to depend upon fees for his services he had the same tendencies as other government officials toward graft,—towards Tsan-ti-pi (scraping the crust off the land) as we call it. In many instances the system had so degenerated that no respectable person would accept the position and it devolved upon the county official to give it to anybody he pleased; and this sounded the death knell of the system.

The above instances are sufficient to show the connection between the local and the central government and to justify our assertion that the ultimate government of China has been popular and not despotic. Indeed, the local self-governments have proved so efficient in managing their own affairs that the common uneducated people to-day often declare that they fail to see anything that is considered important by the republicans which they have not had before.

(4) Popular Aspects of the Chinese Philosophy of Government

In order to appreciate the impetus of the institutions thus far described it is necessary for one to glance at the philosophy which reflects them or, perhaps, produced them. Although there are several conflicting trends of philosophic thought in China, the Confucian school as a whole remains the most prominent throughout. At least the moral, economic, and political theories propounded by its exponents seem to have a stronger hold than any other theo-

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ries upon the popular as well as the speculative mind. We shall therefore concern ourselves only with the Confucian theories which we consider the most representative reflection of Chinese life.

The doctrine that government is for the people and by the people is as old as legendary China itself. "Of all who are to be feared are not the people the most important?" so declared the legendary ruler Shun. His successor Yu put this into a positive statement by declaring that "the people are the root of the country."

It is true that the king is generally called the Son of Heaven, and that in latter times this has been taken to mean appointed by Heaven; but then, Heaven does not see nor does it hear. "Heaven sees when the people see; Heaven hears when the people hear." For instance, "Ki and Chew lost their empire through the loss of the people; they lost the people through the loss of the people's hearts. There is only one way to obtain the throng and that is to win the people. There is but one way to win the people and that is to win their hearts. Procure for them what they like and force not upon them what they dislike is the only method by which their hearts may be won." The watch-word of the Confucian school regarding government is "Win the people and the kingdom is won; lose the people and the kingdom is lost." "If the people have no confidence in their ruler there can be no peace in the nation."

Thus the popular idea of government frankly accepts the divine right of the king. But it turns right around and robs him of this right and vests it in the people by identifying the will of Heaven with that of the people themselves;—a logical defect in Chinese philosophy which seemingly proves in this case to be a blessing and not a curse.

Mencius, the most prominent of the Confucians, carries this theory to its logical consequences. From what has been said it can be easily seen that "the people are the most important element in the state. The altars of the spirits of land and grains are next. The king is the slightest."

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Thus in making an appointment, "if the ministers all say that a man is able it is insufficient; if all officials say so, do not yet act accordingly; if all the people say so, then examine him and give him the appointment." And to punish an offender against the laws, "if the ministers all say that a man should be executed, listen not; if all the officials say so, still listen not; but if all the people say so, then examine him and see if he should be executed and execute him." It takes but a glance to see the principles of popular election and jury trial in the above passages, and it requires still less ado to point out the principle of recall in the following: "If a king is false the ministers should admonish him. If being repeatedly warned and he heeds not, depose him." Even "the killing of a bad ruler is not murder."

That the expression "all people" does not mean the impossible is seen in this; "If a ruler will please everyone he will find the days too short."

The principle of specialization is clearly recognized by Mencius: "Some labor with intellect and some with muscles. He who labors with intellect governs others; he who labors with muscles is governed by others." "If there be no exchange of products of labor and no interchange of service, so that too much there will make good too little here, the farmer will have a superfluity of grains and the women of cloth. If there be such interchange, carpenters and carriage-manufacturers may exchange their products." The mutual respect of each other's professions is urged in this: "Being unable to command and at the same time refusing to receive commands virtually isolates one from all intercourses with men."

This, however, does not imply that there is a class born to rule and another born to be ruled, for, "there was nowhere such a thing as being born noble; there was no rank in birth." Neither does it mean that men are born fit for the various occupations, for the words of Confucius that "I am not born wise but acquired my wisdom through my appreciation of the past and my diligence in the pursuit of knowledge," and that "even in a village of ten

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families there are some who are as loyal and as confident only not so diligent as I am," are invariably pointed out to every adolescent as inspiration and encouragement towards a wide and promising outlook for the future.

If we are allowed to indulge in a little digression here it may be said that this is why universal education is so energetically urged. The old system of education may seem to the Westerner to be inadequate, but it was designed to bring out what is best in each individual on the one hand and to cultivate a mutual appreciation on the other. The old system, as may be recalled, had no class at all until it reached the seminary or the academy stage. Before that each pupil was a class himself, although he was given the same kind of materials as the others. And by a careful method of selection he was allowed to develop in the line of the least resistance.

Returning to our subject,—it should be added that since the function of government, as has been pointed out, is to satisfy the wants of the governed, it necessarily follows that adaptability is the most important; as the wants of the people change continuously as time goes on. Laws and standards, therefore, must be constantly modified to conform to the common consciousness. "There is no invariable standard of virtue, only a supreme regard for what is good makes a criterion of it. There is no invariable characteristic of what is good that is to be supremely regarded; it is found where there is a conformity with the common consciousness as to what is good."

As to the ruler, "he must first himself possess of the qualities which he requires of the people, and must be free from the qualities which he requires the people to avoid." "What is most potent is to be a man and one's influence will be felt throughout the state." "He that exercises government by means of his virtue may be compared with the north polar star which keeps its place while all the other stars turn about it." "The superior man offers not rewards, yet the people are stimulated to virtue. Nor

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shows he wrath, yet the people are more awed than by hatchets and axes."

Force is inadequate for government, for "when one subdues by force, people submit not because they are willing but because they are not strong enough to resist. When one subdues by virtue, people are pleased and submit to him heartily."

Confucius himself described what he conceived as a model ruler in these words: "By his generosity he won all; by his sincerity he made people trust in him; by his earnest activity his achievements were great; and by his justice all were delighted."

Further citations might be given but would not serve to make it any clearer that the popular idea of government is: (1) Government should be by the consent of the governed; (2) Moral agencies rather than physical forces should be employed; (3) The ablest, wisest, most experienced, and most virtuous are indispensable for a good government; and (4) It rests with the people the right to depose any ruler whose conduct they do not approve.

These principles not only pervade Chinese literature of every period but are also embodied in all elementary readers in the schools. It is not surprising, therefore, to find their influences among all classes and institutions throughout the country.

Our discussion of the democratic tendencies and institutions in China has only touched the surface. Yet even a mere general survey suggests that this archaic people, which is generally supposed to be misgoverned, oppressed, and thus miserable, bound by customs and traditions instead of laws, and dominated by superstitions and heathen ideas, may, after all, have something in common with its contemporaries of the West.

In considering the prospects for democracy in China it is necessary to take into account not only these already existing bases of native ideals and institutions but also the new factor of Western influences.

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(5) The Influence of Western Civilization.

This subject alone requires a separate treatise. It suffices, however, to mention that as China is coming into closer and closer contact every day with the West, she cannot keep her own ideas and refuse to assimilate those of the West—leaving out of account entirely the question of superiority and inferiority. Assimilations are going on both consciously and unconsciously, and are destined to go on until a certain degree of equilibrium is at least temperarily reached.

In the first place the influx of Christianity has awakened and strengthened in the minds of part of the population the new meaning of worship and meditation originally introduced into Chinese life by Buddhism, and has replaced some of the cruder superstitious elements. The propagandist character of Christianity itself has given the people another example of co-operative pursuit.

In the next place Western philosophy has brought with it an individualism which has modified the family life and social relationship of some of us. Some are now inclined to seek to express individuality even at the expense of the family and society—whether the individuality so expressed be desirable or not. This, coupled with the introduction of a larger scale of industry, the more efficient means of communication, and the highly specialized natural and social sciences, has complicated our social problems to such an extent that the old institutions, taken unprepared, seem to be unable to offer any solution in their separate capacities, and thus necessitate a co-operation of a larger scale.

Last and most important of all, contact with the West has induced a feeling of nationality which is more intense than it has ever been before. This, more than anything else, has brought about the realization of the need of a higher co-operation and closer co-ordination with the central government in order to effect a stronger organization for self-defense. Thus local feeling and local loyalty are extended and converted into a national feeling and a

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national loyalty. Provincial barriers are torn down and there is in sight a greater co-operation whose accomplishment time only can tell. In the meantime, by a careful and intelligent direction of the various forces, who can say that the goal may not be reached before it is too late?

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TOLSTOY AND THE RUSSIAN SPHINX.

WILBUR M. URBAN.

I.

IN THE midst of the amazing revelations of the Russia of to-day, many of us have doubtless been rereading our Tolstoy. For most of us Russia and this "greatest of all the Russians," as Mr. Howells calls him, have been identified in a quite exceptional way. Of all the Russians we have known him best. He more than any other has seemed to reveal Russia to us.

There have always been two opinions of Tolstoy as there have always been two ideas of Russia. Is it true that if you scratch a Russian you will always find a Tartar? Is Russia really the "bear that walks like a man," or a simple, appealing child of nature masquerading for a time in the head and pelt of a bear? In the last two years I have been rereading my Tolstoy, but I have also been reading his biographers and critics. Is he the simple peasant, the "Grand Moujik" of popular fame, or the intellectual *Tartar*, the bitter and sinister old man of some of his critics? Is his an evangel of love or a mission of spiritual anarchy? For me the mystery of Russia and the mystery of Tolstoy have always been one and the same. Haunted by these questions, I am reminded of the curious words of another great Russian who certainly knew his Russia. Tourgeniev tells us that he had before him constantly "her vast simple countenance, motionless and veiled like a sphinx of Oedipus." As though fascinated by an inner vision, he cries: "She will swallow me up later on. I seem to see her large inert gaze fixed upon me with its dreamy scrutinizing appropriate to eyes of stone. Never mind, Sphinx, I shall return to thee; and thou mayest devour me at the last if I do not guess thy riddle!"

The sphinx-like character of the Russian soul is not a mere figure of speech. As it appears on the pages of Rus-

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sian literature, it is one gigantic and threatening question-mark. The why and the wherefore, the wherefrom and whereto of life are everywhere present. They haunt the face of every peasant; the cool and silent hours of every more articulate mind mean their return. They obtrude themselves in the feastings and social functions, in the every-day business of life, in a way that is distinctly disconcerting to the western mind.

This eternal questioning has its source, no doubt, partly in external conditions, social and political. Yet deeper than all this we feel a peculiar quality of temperament that yokes a pitiless self-analysis with utter naivete of impulse; that mixes intellect and crass emotion in strange proportions. We are told that the Russian will alternate between oriental cruelty and feminine softness; that he will tear out his heart for his friends to look at and will lie outrageously immediately afterward; that he will get drunk and beat his servants only to grovel before them in abject contrition; that he will break the moral law completely and take his life for an empty scruple. Instinctive religion he has, but while it may rise to the highest levels of trust and prayer, it is always ready in the next moment to revert to the crudest of superstition. He will labor with a brute tenacity that is almost meaningless, but will turn with a destructive fury against the products of his own labor. We are told all this, but we do not understand it. Nevertheless, when we once catch this outrageous Russian rhythm, an almost perfect rendering of which is to be found in Strindberg's picture of *Peter the Great*—in whom indeed there is scarcely one of these contradictions which does not appear in imperial potency—then we begin to comprehend how in this fatal facility for revulsions and revenges of feeling, the Russian must indeed become an eternal question to himself.

The fabulous monster of Greek mythology was a hybrid, represented generally as having the winged body of a lion and the head and breast of a woman. Those who know the Russian at first hand explain his mixed psychology in terms

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of racial origins and tragedies. We are told that this instability of temperament, these contrasts of strength and weakness, of insensibility and kindness, all this genius for reaction and revulsion, is the result of a tremendous mixture of races and ideals. Western culture, moreover, developed almost wholly independently of the Sclav; and, though grafted upon the byzantine stock, has remained in many respects a foreign good. Ideals, classical and romantic, the Russian "intellectual" has been able to appropriate with surprising rapidity, in so far as they have appealed to his variegated instincts and emotions, but he has always shown a supreme distaste for the disciplining of intellect which alone gives these ideals their stability and their worth. These are indeed old explanations, but in such secrets of racial and cultural alchemy we must still look for an understanding of that fascinating but forbidding temperament which, despite the changes of the moment, is none the less written indelibly into Russian literature and art. To such sources we must look for an understanding of the gigantic and threatening question-mark that stares at us from every page. In them also we must seek the clue to those strange revulsions of feeling, the "temperamental nihilism" which so often constitutes the Russian's answer to the riddle of life. *Enfant terrible* of the nations, hybrid of east and of west,—all the irrationality of his double nature comes to the surface in this return wave of crass and instinctive emotion that swallows up question and questioner alike.

Such, at least, is the Russia that fixed her large inert gaze upon Tourgeniev. That he saw all this in her dreamy and scrutinizing eyes, is evident on every page of his works. It was this, he knew, that would swallow him up also in the end.

II.

For many Tolstoy has always been more of a symbol than a man. The large, flat, stump-like nose, thick lips, bushy eyebrows, small gray eyes, and somewhat unkempt beard—that total ugliness which caused him so much pain in his

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earlier years, but which was later heightened by the constant presence in his portraits of the shapeless peasant costume—these were for most of us but the outward and visible signs of an inward and spiritual grace. To look upon that face, become so familiar, was to yield almost insensibly to the collective illusion of a fond world that cried, the Grand Moujik, and thought that in that cry the last word had been said.

The Tolstoy cult was indeed inevitable, as inevitable perhaps as the detachment of any mediæval saint from his dark and irrational background. With a pathetic readiness for types of personality that suggest salvation, we seized upon Tolstoy as a symbol of the simple human, abstracted from all that was Russian and racial. By one of those effects of *chiaroscuro*, which are the very conditions of hero-worship, his central figure stood out from the dark background of primitive, savage, and byzantine Russia. He was "the light that shineth in the darkness"; and, as in some of the great masterpieces of light and shade, the light seemed to emanate from the central figure, while in that light the formless Russian background took on a darkness as great as his own light.

Yet there were always those who did not yield to the illusion, those who did not bow to the symbol. I have been rereading my Tolstoy, but I have also been recalling the emotions with which some of his later books and more daring ideas were received. Certainly a very real process of disillusionment was in progress before his death. The old man of Poliana seemed to live up to our ideals neither of peasant nor of saint. Saints do indeed sometimes ask disconcerting questions, but in their answers they do not usually reveal the forbidding philosophy that underlies the *Kreutzer Sonata*. We did not expect the simple peasant to raise the raucous cries of *What is Art?* So it was that, as one by one these rigid, cruel and bitter—shall we not also say splendidly barbaric and anarchical?—lines appeared on his face, many asked themselves the question, is he not, after all, more Russian than human? Fascinated, we looked

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again at what had so long appeared familiar. All at once it was discovered that "the eyes of the old man were rigid and glassy and full of bitter thought." The cry was actually heard: "will not some one at last unmask the villain?"

Of Tolstoy more than anyone else, perhaps, it may be said that everything he wrote was autobiographical. His *Confession* was no more a confession than any one of his novels. It was an epitome of them all. His turning to art in his early manhood was as much the result of a crisis in his experience, as his later turning from it. The profligate young officer who threw up his commission and fled to the Caucasus, there to seek the natural and the primitive, is the same passionate and disillusioned old man who later fled from home and family to seek peace in the supernatural and in death. One is as much a part of his life's pilgrimage as the other.

This autobiographical note is struck at the very beginning, and in a way, one may well believe, that gave the keynote to all that followed. *The Cossacks* is the first fruit of his flight to the mountains. In it we learn how he was pursued by the questions of life. We learn also how, in the company of primitive man and woman, he found "how good it was to forget the questions of life." "Ah," he cries, "if I could become a cossack like Lukashka, could steal horses, could get tipsy on thick red wine, shout ribald songs, shoot men down, creep in through her window at night when drunk, without any thought of what I was doing or why I did it, that would be another matter. Then we might understand each other, then I might be happy. What is the most terrible and delightful thing with me is that I understand Marianka, while she will never understand me. It is not because she is inferior to me; on the contrary she ought not to understand me. She is happy; she is like nature itself, is beautiful, calm and absolutely self-contained."

This is undoubtedly boyish *Weltschmerz*. The youthful ideals of the tipsy cossack and the unattainable peasant

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girl passed away. But the eternal questions remained, as also the longing for oneness with nature and the unconscious.

The characters of Tolstoy's novels are all in fact but so many trembling mortals standing before the Russian sphinx. The Russian in each of them asks the eternal question of the meaning of life and love; and the Russian in them has for each the same answer. We have only to recall that group of characters, Levine, Anna, Vronski, Koutousov, Pierre, in whom for most of us so much of Russia is supremely embodied, to realize that they are all variants on the one theme. Whether man or woman, prince or pauper, peasant or intellectual, it is always the same Russian soul, with its large inert gaze that we see. Russian they all are, but they are also their author's *alter egos*. The tyrannical ideas that make their fate are also his own intellectual and moral preoccupations.

In view of the later developments of Tolstoy's thought, it may seem an exaggeration to say that the problem of sex has always constituted one of his two or three great preoccupations. Nevertheless, there is scarcely one of his larger works which does not, side by side with other motifs, contain a complete study of love. *War and Peace* contains several minor episodic studies, *Anna Karenina*, two complete contrasting developments, and *Family Happiness*, for instance, is written entirely around this theme.

To many this is the most forbidding element in all Tolstoy's works. The peculiar Russian frankness with which the primal passion is assented to, is equalled only by the passion with which it is followed up and interrogated. It is here that the penetrative imagination of the Sclav has let itself loose most brutally upon the romantic wrappings of the cosmic seed. The instinct of the west is altogether in the direction of the removal and detachment of the object through the medium of lyrical and dramatic objectification. These inborn habits of envisaging love, a protection against the disillusionment of sated passion and of penetrative thought alike, seem to have been largely denied the Sclav. The simplification of love, its reduction to the

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lowest terms, with consequent mystical ecstacy or brutal revenges,—all this seems inherent in the Russian temperament.

It is mainly in the hearts of women, such as Anna and Katioucha, that Tolstoy reads, and with an awful ease, the marks of these revenges. But his men are by no means exempt. Such love he describes as "like opium or hashish; the sensation is overpowering and delightful but it passes. It is not in human nature not to wish to renew the experience, and for this novelty is indispensable." Each repetition of the ecstacy serves but to hasten the disclosure of the cold and brutal egoism that underlies it, the inevitable satiety and the revulsions of feeling that are its predestined goal. In *Family Happiness*, on the other hand, we find a study of that gentler, though no less inevitable disillusionment, the gradual succumbing to the universal and the usual, with its dulling of sensibility and ennui. "Let all be again as it used to be. It can be, can it not?" the woman asks, gazing into his eyes. "Let us not try to repeat the experiment of life," the man replies. "Let us not deceive each other. There will be none of the old anxieties and agitations—thank God for it. Sufficient happiness has fallen to our lot. Now it is necessary for us to step aside and give room for some one to pass," he said, pointing to the nurse who with Vanya came and stood at the terrace door. . . . This might be said to be almost normal and indeed to have a beauty of a certain kind. But in later treatments of the same theme—the marriage of Levine and Kitty in *Anna Karenina* and of Pierre and Natacha in *War and Peace*, there is no longer any element of beauty. His mordant realism leaves nothing unsaid. One feels indeed—even more intensely perhaps, the same racial shame as before the ravages of bodily death. For Tolstoy the dilemma of passion has no middle ground. In *Anna Karenina* it is absolute. Over against the long drawn out death of marital passion of Levine and Kitty is set the violent death of love in Anna and Vronski. Death by inches or death by a blow is the logic of passion.

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This is Tolstoy's answer to the question, "where shall love be found?" It may be taken as typical of his answer to the other fundamental questions of life. To the "will to power" he presents a similar dilemma, the answer to which is no less forbidding than the philosophy of the *Kreutzer Sonata*. Here also the presence of ascetic christian elements does not save it from displaying the diabolism of a Schopenhauer.

Tolstoy's conversion to the cult of the non-resisting Doukhobor is dramatic and picturesque. But its dramatic character should not obscure the long line of characters throughout his novels in whom the "will to power" embodies itself in varying forms. In the crude force of the cossack his idealizing imagination had found the germ of many heroes, but it was only to see them vanish before his penetrative intellect, confounded all by a fundamental contradiction in the will to power itself, appearing as soon as that will becomes self-conscious.

In *Sebastopol Sketches* the illusion of the hero is laid, but it is in *War and Peace* that the philosophy which underlies the criticism appears. Of the former it has been truly said that the acuteness of his observation of the moral instincts on the field of battle has never been equalled, before or after. He shows us how the very men who behaved like heroes under fire, a moment after betray the meanest selfishness. Meanness and confusion of aims are the rule in the camp and on the march. Galvanized by the emotions or accidents of the fight into a momentary singleness of purpose, with the stimulus removed, this fictitious heroism of battle disappears as quickly as it came. War itself is a huge blunder, a chapter of accidents; and the only hero of the Crimean War is the private soldier, "who knows not how great a thing it is to die for one's country!" In *War and Peace*, on the other hand, the characters all fall easily into two groups: those who represent the assertion of the will to life, who consciously pursue some aim—the two emperors, Prince Bolkonski and his old father, the Kouraguine family, and the heroine of the story, Natacha Rostov—and those

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who allow the current of life to sweep them along, such as Peter Bezoukhov, old Rostov, the Princess Marie, Platon Karataiev and Koutousov. Here then, in peace as well as in war, the two alternatives of life are allowed to play themselves out. One is at a loss to decide which is the worst horn of the dilemma, the futility of individual self-assertion, or the irrationality of social passions and forces. Before these two paradoxical forces of life, the quietism of the ass between the two bundles of hay seems to be the only middle ground.

At the close of this period of his life, Tolstoy said of life and art alike: "I saw only one thing at this time, Death. All else was a lie." Death had become his third great preoccupation. With the indescribable singularity of the Russian temperament, he shrank as little from naked mortality as from naked vitality. With bodily death he had always been familiar; had in fact, sought it out with predilection on the battlefields and in the hospitals of the Crimean and Russian campaigns. No less persistently had he haunted the death-beds of peace, seemingly with the desire and hope of finding an inner and spiritual grace for the outer and bodily signs. The death of Nicholas Levine in *Anna Karenina* and of the old Count Bezoukhov in *War and Peace* are masterpieces of that realism which creates an intolerable meaning from an interminable addition of particulars. In *The Three Deaths*, with its pictures of the agonizing death of a nobly-born woman, the easy death of a man of humble birth, and the happy unconscious death of a felled tree, it becomes a symbol of his growing "philosophy of the unconscious." In his book *The Meaning of Life*, in which he seems to identify himself with the attitude of the *Kreutzer Sonata*—and which was indeed later appended to that work—this philosophy is finally clearly stated. He points out the contradiction between our individual life with its sense of immortality, and our outer and material surroundings which all speak to us of death. From this paradox of life he deduces renunciation of the will to life itself.

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III.

Of all human documents that profess to follow the instinct of life to its source, Tolstoy's confession is the most marvelous in its brute sincerity. Whether it be due to sober classical ideals of expression, or to I know not what ineradicable instinct of belief, all the other great monuments of the search for God—the confessions or meditations of an Augustine, an Anselm, a Pascal, or a Descartes—fail to produce completely the illusion of reality. In all of them there are hidden reserves, even make-believes, that make them nearer akin to art than to reality. One feels that the issue never was really in doubt, that there is an element of artistic convention in every *dubito omnium*, and that the raising of difficulties is merely a device for the intensification of a faith innate, for the greater glory of a God who has never really withdrawn himself. Saint Augustine always has on his priestly robes, Anselm his doctor's gown, and Descartes his doublet and hose. But with Tolstoy the case is different. For him there are no conventions, no reserves. He gives us himself in the interval between the casting off of the conventional frock coat and the donning of the moujik's tunic. We are face to face with a naked soul.

The first impression is undoubtedly that of a miracle of conversion, of a turning from death unto life, a complete reversal of all that had gone before. The effect of *chiaroscuro*, of the detachment of the peasant saint from his dark and irrational background, is indeed inevitable. To Tolstoy himself, doubtless, it marked, as he said, an "illumination of reason," which passed all understanding and answered all questions. To the observer who dogs his steps, it is a revelation of quite another character. For one thing, the very abandon with which he strips himself appears, on second thought, to be but a continuation of his past temper. We no longer merely feel the Russian atmosphere of his novels, created by the medium of art and enveloping characters more or less external to the author himself. This Russian temper has now become the very blood and marrow of his naked style.

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Closer study of the contents of the *Confession* serves but to deepen this sense of continuity, to show indeed why, in the very moment of illumination, of revelation of the simple, the universal, and wholly human, we receive the impression of something singular and racial. In his novels, the characters are so many trembling mortals standing before the Russian sphinx. The *Confession* is but the epitome of the novels. One after the other, the same characters reappear, now as types, as disembodied souls, stripped of the trappings and circumstance of life, facing the naked alternatives of their being: either satiety, disillusion and death; or illusion and meaningless life that is worse than death. But here Tolstoy goes to the root of the matter. In the very exigency of his own personal passion for truth, which at last tears away all the veils of art and lifts the individual fate to the region of the universal and inevitable, is disclosed the one great and original sin common to them all. This one unforgivable sin is simply and briefly, to think. Intellect is the mother of all illusion and the destroyer of life.

A consuming hate of intellect is the deepest note of the *Confession*. In it, as well as in all his writings which followed, is to be found the bitterest arraignment of the intellectualism and civilization of our time, the deepest and most disconcerting expression of the hatred of thought and its complexities which sleeps in the instinctive soul of the mob. This impatience of all reasoned solutions of the problems of life, so characteristic of the Russian temper, was always present in Tolstoy. One recalls the studied irony with which, as for instance in *War and Peace*, beside the futility of intellect is placed the sufficiency of the simple mind. But in the *Confession* mere impatience and disdain develop into a philosophical passion. The passionate generalization, "all is a lie," acquires the dignity of a philosophical axiom. Science and philosophy are both essentially self-defeating. Science, in seeking the infinitely little of analysis, leads but to a meaningless infinite regress. Philosophy with all its super-human efforts at synthesis,

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leaves moods of disillusionment, satiety and pessimism. The last word of philosophy is pessimism, that of science, nonsense. All this some have found amusing. And indeed one may smile at the childish eagerness with which he heard and repeated the good news that some Russian scientist had demolished Darwin; one may rail with Nordau when he cries that this great Russian "speaks of science as a blind man might speak of colors"; or again one may be partly amused and partly scandalized at the way in which this same great Russian goes tilting among the great philosophies, in *What is Art?* The really significant thing in all this fierce and fanatical attack upon intellect and science is the source of the destructive fury. To Tolstoy it seems an "illumination of reason." To the thoughtful observer there is in it rather something of the curious malice with which the mystic is ever ready to turn upon the products of his own labor. To Tolstoy it appears some universal and inevitable metaphysic of the human will. To the psychologist who dogs his steps, it is a logic of quite another kind, that barbaric logic with which we are already familiar, naive, feminine, cruel—that sphinx-like quality of the Russian soul, the return wave of mystic crass emotion, swallowing up question and questioner alike.

Thus to emphasize the negative and destructive side of the *Confession* may seem to betray a singular lack of perspective. To minimize the positive, christian element in Tolstoy would indeed be as great a blunder as to fail to understand the fundamentally religious character of Russia itself. But one can scarcely deny that even Tolstoy's christianity holds for the western mind something disturbing if not positively forbidding. Indeed the simple American christian who remarked with a puzzled air, that "he either liked what Tolstoy said and disliked his way of saying it, or disliked what he said and liked his way of saying it," stumbled unwittingly upon a real criticism. He was at least partly conscious of that "malicious criticism" of life and thought that underlies Tolstoy's return to mystical religion.

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Neither the genuineness nor the wonder of Tolstoy's christianity should be questioned, but its *primitiveness* should be emphasized. To me at least it has always seemed that the secret of Tolstoy's conversion is to be found, not so much in the arguments of the *Confession* or in the meditation upon the Gospels, as in an emotional experience recorded in *Anna Karenina* and to which indirect reference is made in the *Confession* itself. It is his famous description of the reapers, with its intangible yet vivid and altogether wonderful reality, the autobiographical character of which is indubitable. Filled with heart-burning questions, not only of an intellectual kind, but of a more intimate and personal sort, Levine is driven from the house into the field, where he puts on a peasant's tunic and, working by their side, becomes for the moment one of them. In the pure abandon of labor intellect comes to rest. "All was swallowed up in this sea of joyous, universal labor" and it was felt that "God gave the day, God gave the strength, and the day and the strength consecrated the labor and yielded their own reward. No one dreamed of asking why this work and who enjoyed the fruits of it? These questions were secondary and of no account."

It seems like a gross exaggeration to rest the whole of Tolstoy's later development upon this slender thread of sensation and feeling; to say that this was not only the fateful moment in which he put on the moujik's tunic, and with it the gospel of instinctive labor and faith, but that also in which was born all his later critique of civilization, religion and art. Yet is it not to just such moments that the psychologist always looks for the miracle of conversion? Is it not also to the mysterious kinship of just such moments with instinctive and sub-conscious forces, that he looks for the explanation of the "miracle"? This spiritual kinship is here unmistakable. Between the youthful Tolstoy of the *Cossacks* who learned "how good it was to forget the questions of life," and Tolstoy of the *Confession* for whom all questions "were swallowed up in the sea of joyous and universal labor," there is undoubtedly a difference, but a

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difference only of years and experience. The lust for the unconscious, for oneness without a difference, is the same.

In such moments as these, then, were engendered alike the hatred of the intellect that distinguishes and divides and the worship of instinctive labor and faith. In Tolstoy's case it is not difficult to see what images were waiting to symbolize this new feeling of reality. It would be a curious misreading of his novels to overlook the minor figures, the peasant, the common soldier, the nurse, the night-watchman, forever lurking in the shadow,—now as more or less clearly defined individuals, now as an indistinguishable rabble. Patiently they waited until his soul was swept and garnished; and the same tide of feeling that swept away the questions of life swept their monotonous visages into the center of his vision. Then, as he says in the *Confession*, it seemed that "these had always known the meaning of life; and had carried on this life so that it reached him. . . . Everything in me and around me" he finds, "corporeal and incorporeal, is the fruit of their experiences of life, even the means by which I judge and condemn life; all this is not mine but brought forth by them. I myself have been born, bred and have grown up, thanks to them. They have dug out the iron, have tamed cattle and horses, have taught how to till the ground, and how to live together and order life; they have taught me to think and to reason. And I, their production, receiving meat and drink from them, instructed by their thought and words, have proved to them that they are an absurdity! It is clear that I have called absurd only what I do not understand."

IV.

There have always, I said at the beginning, been two ideas about Tolstoy, just as there have always been two wholly different opinions about Russia. This is especially true of all that follows the period of his "conversion." There are those who are unable to see in his later philosophy anything but a mass of jostling contradictions and in-

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coherences. There are those, on the other hand, who see in him one of but two or three completely consistent and logical minds of the nineteenth century. Yet in this there is nothing strange. Anarchy is internally the most consistent and logical of all conceptions. It is in its external relations that it develops contradictions. If this is true of political and social anarchy, it is still more so of the spiritual type of Tolstoy's.

The world's quarrel with Tolstoy is a very old one. Its fear of simplicity and literalness is deep-seated. It knows, or thinks it knows, that "ideas must be kept in the abstract." Tolstoy's logic is undoubted, but the world distrusts logic. Granted his initial assumption of the absurdity and futility of intellect, his ideal of the complete simplification of life, and his entire criticism of civilization, religion and art follows. If one demands "all or nothing," he is not likely to have much sense for the middle ground. Tolstoy found salvation in the brute insensibility of questionless labor. With perfect consistency, therefore, he would cry out against "the astute and diabolical invention of the division of labor," against all the economies in which the mind of society embodies itself. His Russian temperament could find relief from the eternal questionings of a morbid egoism only in a wholesale weltering in the emotions of pity and love. He naturally found equally diabolical any of those partial reconciliations of egoism and altruism which characterize the ordered progress of society, and taught in his *Acts of Self Sacrifice*, paradoxes no less destructive than those of Nietzsche himself. There is after all nothing like the logic of a saint, even when he is most paradoxical. For inhumanity there is nothing to equal the temper of those who would be most humane. The astounding picture of one who was of the spiritual kin of a Beethoven, and who felt that kinship to the extent of acknowledging a passion for his music, denying to that music the character of art, prepares us for that crowning inhumanity which, while finding the secret of life in the simple faith and prayer of the peasant, yet turns with a destructive fury upon all

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those symbols in which this faith is embodied and to which the prayer is raised.

V.

It has often been said, and in the main with justice, that it is after all as the man and still more as the artist, that Tolstoy is finally to be judged. The barbarisms and ineptitudes of his philosophy are but the by-products of a life which is mainly significant for its contributions to art, if indeed that life itself is not his greatest work of art. From this point of view the most significant result of his conversion is the later simplification of his art. The sufficient answer to his intellectual attack on art is, it is said, his own quite wonderful contributions to a new and simplified art in his last period.

If there is one thing enigmatical to the western mind, it is that "this greatest of all the men who have written since Shakespeare should come at last to hold the literary art in light esteem." Yet it is at this point that Tolstoy's inhuman and sphinx-like answer to life's riddle is most naked and complete. Art was his medium for questioning life and, though itself the last thing to be reduced to illusion, its denial was involved in all the preceding negations. If the successive embodiments of the irrationality of the Russian soul which appear on the pages of his works are so many Frankensteins of his own soul which he wipes out with a brutal "no" to all their questions, we are not surprised at a growing hate of his generative powers. It is not without meaning that the cry, "all is a lie" came at the end of his greatest novel, and that it marked the beginning of his revulsion against art.

A superficial reading of his arraignment of art lends color to the belief that it was a deduction from his later social and religious views. But that is to fail entirely to see how wholly the art was the man and how completely his ultimate "artlessness" was a reflex of his later sophisticated selflessness. In the *Confession* Tolstoy recognized that it was his imagination that made it impossible to accept any of the

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conventional solutions of the problem of life. It was this same imagination that made it impossible for him to find any satisfaction in the personal embodiments of life which his art created.

Tolstoy's revulsion from an art which had become for him sophisticated illusion was followed by the desire to inaugurate a form which should be simple and universal, the medium for the expression of the inexpressible. That he almost accomplishes his desire at times, who would care to deny? Take for instance, *The Power of Darkness*—that new form of the popular drama, intended for the public who frequent the open-air theatres and fairs, and of which it is said that eighty thousand copies were sold during the first week. Where has the simple and awful grandeur of that picture of peasant avarice, lust and murder ever been equalled? Or again, that popular tract, *Does a Man Need Much Land?*—the tale of a peasant who gained permission to possess as much land as he could walk around from sunrise to sunset. In that picture—of his constantly growing desires, his efforts to reach the goal, until at sunset it is gained and the man drops down dead—filling in all but a half dozen pages, is, pressed together, as Havelock Ellis has said, all the tragedy of the nineteenth century. Or, finally, that idyl of self-sacrifice and death, *Master and Man.* Here we get so near to ultimate reality as to have almost a feeling of pain. The author has almost found the one incommunicable word, and we hold our breath with fear that he may dare to say it.

But what is this last word? What is it that this great magician, by the wizardry of his words, has taken me across the wind-swept weeds and snow of the desolate steppes to whisper into my ears? What is the secret this haunter of death-beds has hidden in his masterpiece of vicarious death? Ah, if I only knew! Of one thing I cannot be in doubt. It is still death and death only that he sees. With him I have been led to that ultimate bourne to which the undertow of the soul, the longing for the instinctive and unconscious inevitably goes. Is it Heaven or

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Nirvana? If I knew I should probably read the riddle of Tolstoy and of the Russian sphinx.

VI.

I once had the privilege of attending a presentation of Tolstoy's unfinished posthumous play, *The Light that Shineth in the Darkness.* It was shortly after Tolstoy had himself emulated the hero of the play, and fled from wife and home into the night. The autobiographical character of the drama is undoubted, and the actor who created the part, one of the foremost continental players, recognized the fact in costume and make up. One seemed to have the great Russian before him in the life.

The well-to-do Russian land owner, Sarynew, who wishes to live according to the gospel, to give his possessions to the poor and to love his neighbor as himself, who recognizes in christianity not a beautiful dream, but the very word of life, is none other than Tolstoy himself. In this play, of which no member of his family had any knowledge, Tolstoy portrays the struggles he had with his family, the doubts that overcame him as he saw the consequences of his teachings in his own circle, the oppositions his thoughts met with on every hand, and the evil consequences which everywhere followed the application of his ideal efforts to real life. The only solution is flight. Sarynew attempts it, but in the face of the tears of his wife, both "ununderstanding child and cunning woman," his will breaks. Here the play stops abruptly, the remaining notes indicating that the author was at a loss how to finish it.

That which the hero of the play had not the strength to do the creator of the hero afterward accomplished. The dramatic departure of Tolstoy from his home, and later from life, this double freeing of a completed personality, caused the world to hold its breath. The vast simple countenance of Russia, motionless and veiled like the sphinx of Egypt, had indeed, at last, drawn him to mystery, darkness and death. He had not solved the riddle. So I

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had said to myself as I came away from the play. But perhaps he had solved it after all. Like Cadmus of old he had, perhaps, spoken the word that should set his country free. May not that dramatic flight to the wilderness yet be reckoned as one of the "supreme moments" to which millions of hearts answer with a reverential *Amen?* A moment in which one may hear—in more than human language, the "well done, good and faithful servant"?

To these questions vast and mysterious Russia alone has the answer. One thing seems certain. The mystery of Tolstoy and the mystery of Russia are one. As we found the Tolstoy cult with its symbol of the Grand Moujik far too simple, so the ideal of the simple peasant himself, of Holy Russia, with its simple democracy and religion, its brotherhood and love, is greatly overdrawn. Both pictures leave out the "temperamental nihilism" which so often constitutes the Russian answer to the riddle of life. The spiritual anarchy of the great "intellectual" is but the sublimation, not only of a political anarchy, but of a deeper nihilism of which the American people are so largely unaware,—that strange fanaticism of which the Princess Radziwill tells, of the sects of the baby killers, the stranglers, and above all, of the Philipowtski, who preach salvation through suicide, and for whom the voluntary death of a number of people constitutes a meritorious action. On the other hand the simple christianity of the "great literalist" is only the intellectual sublimation of the cult of the non-resisting Doukhobor. The Russia of Kerensky has still the Russia of Lenine and Artzibashef to reckon with.[1]

"In our days what is most useful?" asks a character in Tourgeniev's *Fathers and Sons.* "Negation. We deny," is the answer. The spirit that always denies, one may well believe, must for a long time still be the dominant force in Russia—negation, not only of the traditional forms of moral and social life, but even of the meaning, if not the will to life itself. Already observers tell of ominous signs

[1] It is interesting to note that this paragraph, with its prediction, was written a month or more before Lenine came into power.—EDITOR.

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of reaction. An era of free constructive thought will doubtless come, but the spirit of destruction has still its work to do. When that era does come, it will bring with it, we may well hope, a new world of which we had not dreamed—a world in which old forms and words have lost their meaning and many things, at least, have become new. All that Russia is and does is vast. If affirmation follows negation, if the will to life succeeds the will to death, it may well mean the resurrection, not only of a nation but of a world. Tolstoy is already the hero of a people. He may well become the symbol of an age.

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THE TYRANNY OF THE AVERAGE MAN.

JOHN M. MECKLIN.

THE tyrant, it appears, is an ever recurrent phenomenon in human society. The bearded figures of the Euphrates valley, holding in leash the necks of kneeling captives, are grim witnesses to the conditions in the beginnings of civilisation. The archaic group of Harmodius and Aristogeiton that adorned the winding approach to the Athenian Acropolis was the plastic embodiment of ancient democracy's protest against tyranny. Capri's romantic spell suffices even without the aid of Tacitus' biting phrases to remind the traveller of the unhappy despot who there passed his later years in misanthropic seclusion. Machiavelli's "Prince," the hand-book from which Louis XIV learned the gentle art of statecraft, long remained the classic description of the modern tyrant. But with the growth of democracy men became aware of another form of tyranny, more powerful, more insidious perhaps than any other. Our modern tyrant is hydra-headed, myriad-handed, and we call him Demos, borrowing the term from that ancient disgruntled aristocrat, Aristophanes.

I.

In a remarkable passage, DeTocqueville portrays this new form of despotism which he thought he saw illustrated in American democracy. It is a despotism, he tells us, not of the body but of the mind. The instruments of ancient tyrants were the thumbscrew and the faggot, fetters and headsmen. But they attacked the body only and were not able to subdue the spirit. Demos, the modern tyrant, extends to his victim physical freedom while seeking to enslave his soul. Death was the penalty for revolt against ancient forms of tyranny. To the modern rebel Demos says, "You are free to think differently from me and retain your life, your property and all that you possess.

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But if such be your course you must be content to live the life of an alien and outcast among your own people. Civil rights to be sure are yours, in name at least, but they will lack that sympathy and sanction of your fellows without which they are otiose privileges. Honors and emoluments you may indeed seek at the hands of your fellow-citizens but they will most assuredly be denied you since you have dared to set your feeble will in opposition to theirs. Physical life is yours but it is not incompatible with spiritual annihilation at the hands of the community." The social, political or religious assassinations daily witnessed under free democratic rule are none the less tragic because they are bloodless.

DeTocqueville's observations were based upon the American democracy of the third decade of the last century. At best it was but a shadow democracy, "the substance of things hoped for," for it still tolerated slavery. Yet with all its crudeness and inconsistency American democracy had already become self-conscious, intolerant and even tyrannical. "The smallest reproach," writes DeTocqueville, "irritates its sensibility, and the slightest joke that has any foundation in truth renders it indignant; from the style of its language to the more solid virtues of its character everything must be made the subject of encomium. No writer, whatever be his eminence, can escape from this tribute of adulation to his fellow-citizens. The majority lives in the perpetual practice of self-applause, and there are certain truths which the Americans can only learn from strangers or from experience."

The implications of DeTocqueville's criticisms will be clearer if we analyse the situation a little more in detail. There is a general principle of distribution of social strata, according to which we have at the higher levels a small group composed of genius and talent, the elements which make for leadership in every community. At the lower levels are found the unskilled, the illiterate, the proletariat, and lowest of all the defective and the criminal. Midway between these lie the masses which compose the rank and

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file of society. In a democracy it is this numerically dominant mediocrity that controls the situation. The typical representative of this group is the "average man," who is in reality a mythical personage. But in the actual working out of democratic institutions the countless temperamental, social, economic, intellectual and even class differences are ignored or eliminated so that the "average man" becomes tremendously real. He becomes real because of the steam-roller effect of the unwritten law of democracy, namely, uniformity. It is this democratic abstraction which utters the last word in the eternal argument and gives us our measure of values from which there is no appeal. Like the golden calf of apostate Israel he is but the creation of our own hands and yet we worship him as our god.

The characteristics of the "average man" are thoroughly familiar to us. He is dominated by routine and tradition. His philosophy of life consists for the most part of conventional principles that are provided by pulpit, party or counting-house. On the whole he is suspicious of ideas, especially if they be new; thinking is irksome and largely unnecessary since he finds that a judicious regard for what "they say" will solve most of his problems. The political "spell-binder" and the professional reformer, to whose interest it is to study his idiosyncrasies, find that a skillful appeal to his prejudices or his fixed ideas never fails to bring a favorable response. On the whole he prefers orthodoxy to scholarship in his minister, loyalty to party rather than political wisdom in his statesmen, the preservation of the profitable *status quo* in his business rather than the social or economic betterment of the community. Being our political over-lord he is unfortunately, in Mr. H. G. Wells' phrase, "state-blind." On the other hand the "average man" is not without redeeming qualities. If it be true that he is shallow and prejudiced these failings are more than offset perhaps by the homely but socially valuable virtues of honesty, patriotism, and sympathy. If he can not be depended upon to start a reform, still less is he inclined to

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become a criminal. His simple and unsophisticated existence places at the disposal of the nation a mass of thoroughly sane and human sentiments to which we can safely appeal in great crises.

It is for the "average man" that our democractic institutions exist; they are supposed to be most ideal in fact when they best reflect his view of life. In literature, art, morals and religion he is the final arbiter; hence the questionable exploitation of elemental human instincts in the photo-play, the glorification of obscurantism in the pulpit, the tawdry and commonplace sentimentality of the cheap novel, the impossible wit of the pink Sunday supplement, the utterly inane songs of the popular vaudeville. No Oriental despot ever exercised a tithe of his sway for he rules the minds, not the bodies, of men, and there is no appeal from his arbitrament. The choicest products of literary or plastic art await his sovereign decision for the right to live. Preacher, politician, advertiser, teacher, philosopher, study to know and do his will. He is the incarnation of modern humanity. The salvation of society is ultimately the salvation of the "average man."

> "Deep in the breast of the Average Man,
> The passions of ages are swirled,
> And the loves and the hates of the Average Man
> Are old as the heart of the world—
> For the thought of the race as we live and we die
> Is in keeping the Man and the Average high."

II.

As a nation we have hardly freed ourselves from the obsession that liberty and equality, the connotations of democracy, are pre-existent, ready-made endowments of human nature. We have fondly imagined that when those hindrances which have weighed down the free spirit of man are swept away there will be a triumphant march to the goal. We have lost sight of the fact that democracy is but one of many solutions of the world-old problem of living together in a social order that will ensure the least amount

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of friction and the richest development of human values. It has come as a bitter disillusionment to many that an honest and enlightened despotism may set standards of scientific achievement and social efficiency which democracies have never yet equalled. Many have asked whether a benevolent and farsighted German bureaucracy is not preferable to industrial feudalism and the ignorant though well-meaning tyranny of the "average man." We have yet to learn the truth of Sir Henry Maine's dictum, "Of all forms of government democracy is the most difficult."

It can hardly be said, therefore, that the tyranny of the "average man," in so far as it is a reality, is due to malice aforethought. The rather are we to seek its explanation in the difficulties inseparable from democracy itself. That which constitutes the power of democracy, the secret of its hold upon the hearts of men, is also its greatest stumbling block in the effort for efficiency. Democracy is in its last analysis a *state of mind.* It consists of certain ideals, for the most part exceedingly vague and intangible, which must be intelligently appreciated by all and made the basis of communal action. But strange as it may seem, this very *likemindedness* so essential to an efficient democracy may defeat itself. For as the sense of this likemindedness grows upon the individual through education, social institutions and the immeasurable suggestive power of millions of his fellow-citizens the tendency is to destroy personal initiative. Uniformity in language, social customs, political institutions, education and art combine with the sheer geographical expanse of his native land to coerce the individual American, to put him in the strait-jacket of uniformity. "On all sides," says Bryce, "there stretches round him an illimitable horizon; and beneath the blue vault which meets that horizon there is everywhere the same busy multitude with its clamor of mingled voices which he hears close by. In this multitude his own being seems lost. He has the sense of insignificance which overwhelms us when at night we survey the host of heaven, and know that from even the nearest fixed star this planet of ours is invisible." Thus

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there arises the fatalistic attitude born of the overmastering sense of the multitude. The legitimate and necessary democratic conviction that the majority must rule comes in time to mean that its decisions are eternally right and any revolt against them is therefore morally reprehensible.

The psychological effects of this regard for the opinions of the multitude on American thought and life are simply incalculable in their subtlety and power. Respect for public opinion has become so thoroughly ingrained into our national life that it is little short of a fetish. The deliverances of the majority have gradually taken on for us much of the indefectible character of the laws of nature. To challenge the intelligence or the finality of the will of the majority is as futile as to get into an argument with gravitation or to dispute the precession of the equinoxes. This is unquestionably the most powerful because the most subtle form of the tyranny of the "average man." Through this fatalistic regard for the will of the multitude the "average man" becomes for all practical purposes our democratic apotheosis of wisdom. His power lies in his very intangibleness. We never meet him face to face; we can never corner him in an argument. He is a spiritual entity and dwells only in the souls of men, and yet his omnipotent ubiquitous hand shapes our individual destinies. The sheer massiveness and pervasiveness of his influence school us into a belief in his infallibility. No moral alternatives can possibly transcend the scope of his consciousness. His inclusiveness is our guarantee of the ultimate triumph of the right. Because of his naive religious trust in the wisdom of the "average man" the American citizen goes to the polls, casts his vote and then takes a "moral holiday." His peace of soul is seldom disturbed by the fact that he may have been hopelessly in the minority. His mental attitude is aptly parallelled by that of the mediæval theologian who was willing to be damned for the glory of God.

In his loyal allegiance to the will of the majority the American is merely giving expression to a deeply human characteristic. For the vast majority of men it is far more

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natural to obey than to rebel. Furthermore, it is well in a great community still earnestly seeking to understand itself and distraught by the strident voices of conflicting interests to have a final court of appeal. Men can not live by controversy and argument alone. The danger, however, lies not in the repudiation of all authority but in too much acquiescence. Bryce remarks that Americans take the lateness of a railroad train or the delay of a street car by a dray in front of a ware-house door far more complacently than the Englishman. This is but one illustration of the countless ways in which the habit of constant acquiescence to the will of the majority tends to discourage personal initiative and to place the average American at the mercy of the *status quo*. Theoretically we have a free press, dedicated to the untrammelled expression of the opinions of a free people. But in industrial centers where the controlling forces are largely economic our great dailies either voice the mind of the prevailing economic interests or are content for the most part to play the rôle of simple purveyors of the news. If we wish critical enlightenment upon these questions we must seek it in scientific journals or in the columns of the independent weekly and monthly periodicals. In strongly Protestant communities objection is often raised to the appointment of Catholics as instructors in high schools and state institutions. The popular revivalist in a community mainly Protestant and Roman Catholic pours out his religious billingsgate upon the higher critic on the one hand and the outcast Unitarian on the other, knowing full well that both are *personæ non gratæ* to the majority of his hearers. Educators are familiar with the protest against the teaching of evolution and similar "heretical" doctrines in state institutions of learning on the ground that they are contrary to the prevailing religious convictions of the community. Respect for the belief of the majority is thus allowed to tyrannize over the thought of the minority, violating our most precious traditions of spiritual freedom.

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III.

Though ostensibly the stalwart champion of intellectual freedom the "average man" is at heart intolerant of new ideas. Free speech is to be sure a conventional part of democratic traditions. One is free, for example, to criticise the private life of a political candidate, even to the extent of circulating downright scandals. The average minister in orthodox Protestantism is not free to tell his congregation the bare facts of Old Testament history as they have been established by the critics. The "average man" may perhaps be able to stretch his conception of tolerance to the extent of listening to arguments against immortality or woman's rights but the like free speech in regard to the monogamous family, birth-control, the rights of private property, protective tariff, trade unions, or the "color line," depending upon the section concerned, may precipitate a torrent of disapproval and intolerant abuse. Intellectual freedom seems to suffer from certain disabilities which are inseparable from democracy itself. DeTocqueville contends that a democracy encourages superficial thinking in that the individual citizen must constantly pronounce upon the profoundest social, economic or political questions in the exercise of his sovereign right as a member of a democracy. He inevitably falls into the habit of thinking in ready-made generalities. This amounts to a surrender of intellectual independence. Furthermore the "average man" is made uneasy by new ideas. They suggest possible disconcerting changes in the social order; he has neither the time nor the ability perhaps to think things through for himself and prefers rather to bear those ills he has than fly to others he knows not of. Hence, it may be seriously doubted whether on the great national issues the "average man" ever earnestly seeks an intelligent comprehension of the principles concerned. For this reason his judgment on questions involving technical knowledge is often a hindrance to social efficiency, but on a plain moral issue his opinion is invaluable. Again the "average man" is hampered by the narrow margin that is always found between thought and

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action in the shifting uncertain conditions of American democracy. We have few or no social habits or traditions that encourage the life of reflection. The average American, especially in the great industrial centers, is catapulted from the cradle to the grave in the mad hurly burly of a headlong civilization that never pauses to get its bearings or to ask the meaning of life. Having neither the time nor the inclination to think, the "average man" is repelled by reflection. To him every thinker is a potential rebel, a possible disturber of the peace. Since reflection alone gives to men a grasp of values and the sense of perspective it is not surprising that the "average man" who possesses neither is lacking in poise. He is the unhappy puppet of an imperious and eternal *now*. Imagination alone can emancipate us from the tyranny of the present, from the crushing, maddening immediacy of brute facts.

Perhaps the most discouraging characteristic of the "average man" in American democracy is what has been called his "state-blindness." Tyrannies are rarely intelligent but the most intolerable of all tyrannies is that based upon ignorance and callous indifference. "State-blindness" is congenital in American democracy. From the days of the revolutionary fathers to the present the average American has accepted state authority only under protest. He began by throwing off the yoke of despotism and unfortunately has always associated political authority with that memorable struggle. Politics for the average American to-day is merely a necessary evil. The actual machinery of the state, political leaders, parties, platforms, party slogans, interest him very little; more often they arouse feelings of disgust or ridicule. True he is patriotic. But the state that elicits his patriotism is a hazy idealistic entity that bears about the same relation to actual politics that the ethics of the Sermon on the Mount does to the "rules of the game" in business. These shadowy ideals find expression at Fourth of July celebrations or are evoked by the name of Lincoln or the sight of the flag. Seldom or

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never do they provide moral dynamic in dealing with the problems of the immediate political situation.

The average American prides himself upon his energy, his business astuteness, his industrial efficiency, but in many ways his civic stupidity makes the world stand aghast. He can not see that the corrupt party leader whom year after year he returns to office is not only a bad investment from the standpoint of political efficiency but through his influence degrades the moral sense of the entire community. He can not see that by supinely submitting while unscrupulous individuals exploit the city's franchises he is cheapening the moral self-respect of the citizenship and rendering the economic struggle more difficult for all, including himself. He can not see that an indispensable background for a noble and worthy citizenship is clean streets, efficient public service, honest officials and a sensitive community conscience. For without these there can be no such thing as civic pride and without civic pride no man can do his best work, whether he be an artist or a hod-carrier. A Michael Angelo without Florence or a Phidias without Athens would have been unthinkable. The hard and cruel alternative, "work or starve," which our militant industrialism offers the toiler, is tragic in its short-sighted selfishness. It forgets that the best worker must love his work and that this is impossible without a sense of social worth.

IV.

This analysis of the characteristics of the "average man" brings us face to face with a paradox which has puzzled more than one student of democracy. In the light of the evident prejudices and intellectual limitations of the average citizen how are we to justify the appeal democracy is constantly making to his judgment in the settlement of fundamental issues? Writers such as Macaulay, Lecky, and Peel have asserted that since the masses are confessedly ignorant of statecraft or of moral philosophy their rule is necessarily a rule of ignorance and incompetency. On the

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other hand, Bryce states that "where the humbler classes have differed in opinion from the higher, they have often been proved by the event to have been right and their so-called betters wrong" (*American Commonwealth*, Vol. II, p. 251). An American writer goes so far as to say, "There has never been a period in our history, since the American nation was independent, when it would not have been a calamity to have it controlled by its highly educated men alone" (Higginson, "Cowardice of Culture," *Atlantic Monthly*, October, 1905). It would be unfair perhaps to infer from this that learning or culture *per se* unfit a man for pronouncing upon moral issues. But it is doubtless true that the specialization of work and the concentration of energies in the case of the markedly successful business man, lawyer, physician or scientist inevitably induce a narrowing of interests. The price paid for success in a chosen profession is too often an institutionalizing of habits of thought or of feeling. Every social reformer must know from experience the truth of Mr. Lloyd's statement in his *Man the Social Creator* (p. 101), "Seldom does the new conscience when it seeks a teacher to declare to men what is wrong, find him in the dignitaries of the church, the state, the culture that is. The higher the rank, the closer the tie that binds those to what is but ought not to be." The unsophisticated sanity of the "average man," therefore, gives to his pronouncements on moral questions a validity not possessed by the opinion of the scholar or of the successful business man, hopelessly committed to powerful interests.

For this reason we have made the "average man" the keeper of the conscience of the community. Moral valuations are not merely a matter of the intellectual appreciation of the situation. The old Socratic dictum that insight will always bring right action has long since been discarded as an ethical principle. At best, insight merely puts one in the position to do the right thing. We must have in addition the driving power of the affections. The springs of moral action are ever in intimate association with

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the homely but sane and powerful sentiments that find expression in the marriage tie, love of offspring, normal and healthful occupations and community interests. The secret of moral sanity is found, therefore, in living a well balanced and thoroughly human existence through which these fundamental interests may best find expression. Our tense industrial centers with their selfish profitism, their ruthless exploitation of man and of nature, doubtless militate against the healthful functioning of the basal human impulses. In the mad pursuit of economic gains, social preferment, or the tawdry pleasures of our highly artificial city life, the sober persistent values are often utterly lost from view. Doubtless this explains why we find the unbiased moral judgment of our village and agricultural communities most trustworthy on great national issues. If there the current of life is more monotonous it is also more normal. It is hard not to see some connection between the freedom, the vigor, and the sanity of western democracy and the more healthful environment of its citizenship. No individual or group of individuals whose broad human sympathies have been warped or vitiated through abnormal social or economic conditions can be trusted to decide aright great moral issues.

For good or for ill we have committed our destinies to the keeping of the "average man." Often we grow restless at his blunders; we despair over his stupidity. It is easy to criticise him for his faults are writ large in the chronicles of passing events; he has nothing to conceal. At best, however, he is more deserving of sympathy than of censure. For he lives in an age unlike any other in its desperate need of an understanding of the real meaning of life. The increment of human experience has far outrun our ability to give it rational interpretation and evaluation. We are overmastered, bewildered, even appalled at life's increasing complexity, its tragic revelations of the ape and tiger. We need as never before a philosophy of values. Not a philosophy that moons over the eternal puzzles of metaphysics, that tries to catch the drift of the cosmic weather,

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but a philosophy that will give us a trustworthy evaluation of the immediate and insistent facts of experience. Perhaps we may adapt to the "average man" and his problems Bernard Shaw's somewhat irreverent remark as to the deity and say "Don't pity him. Help him."

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ETHICAL CHRISTIANITY IN EUROPE.

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IN THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS for July, 1916, Mr. Bertrand Russell began an article by stating that "the influence of the Christian religion on daily life has decayed very rapidly throughout Europe during the last hundred years." He added that not only had "the proportion of nominal believers declined," but "the intensity and dogmatism of belief is enormously diminished." I am too sceptical of any merely statistical aspect of such a matter to care to take any account of it. Aside from that, however, we have the assertion of "very rapid" century "decay," and the suggestion of a roseate ethical condition in Europe from which this decline took place. Both of these I disbelieve, and though it would not, of course, be worth while because of Mr. Russell's statements, it yet may, on wider grounds, be desirable to point out some reasons for rejecting his views. When he remarks the lessened "dogmatism" of Christian believers, that may be thankfully admitted, but the fact is not favourable to his contention of the lessened influence of Christianity on "daily life," for the diminished stress on dogma has been replaced precisely by an augmented hold on Christianity as an ethic—a life. It will be time enough to admit lessened "intensity" when some sort of proof is offered. The rectification of utterances like those quoted lies in a more internal study of European countries a hundred years ago, with their imaginary flourishing influence of Christianity on "daily life" as base of a "very rapid" decay.

Royce has some remarks which are very much in point here. He says "assertions are indeed sometimes made to the effect that the Church, in all its various forms and divisions, or in very many of them, is already very rapidly losing touch, or has already hopelessly lost touch, with the

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modern world; and that here the process of estrangement between the Church and modern life is constantly accelerated. Some observers even venture to predict a rapid dwindling of all or most of the ecclesiastical institutions of Christendom in the near future. I suppose all such extreme assertions to be hasty and unwarranted."[1] He proceeds to shew that this is because of the deep human strength resident in the religious ideas themselves, by whose light European civilization has been transformed. These Christian ideas still guide its life, and alone satisfy certain deep and universal needs of the human soul or mind, apart from any creedal forms or institutional embodiments. It was for this reason that thinkers like Rousseau, Kant, Schopenhauer, and Lotze, to name no others, held firmly to the ethical aspect or portion of Christianity. Rousseau held the ideas to be Christian before they were philosophical. But this must not suggest that Christian Ethics can be an independent science, dissociate from our original moral faculties and their moral perceptions or apprehensions of duty. It only means that there is, in an ethical sense, an "*anima naturaliter Christiana,*" that ethical process, though Christian, has not ceased to be philosophical. Morality in general does not spring into being through thought, but rather is recognised by reason in virtue of a necessity which antedates all subjective activity. And the Christian ethical standing ground could only be reached, as a German ethicist has remarked, "by an act of moral caprice," if our natural moral knowledge were denied free play.

But what of Mr. Russell's implied height of Christianity as an ethical force or factor in Europe a hundred years ago, from which there has been "very rapid" decline? We may glance at some of the great European nations at that time. Speaking of Germany about the year 1814, the German Church historian Hase says, "at the commencement of the new century, the pious morals and manners of the preceding times had become seriously impaired in consequence of the

[1] J. Royce, *The Problem of Christianity*, Vol. I, p. 395.

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sudden relaxation of the former system of faith, the unrestrained mode of life which the Revolution had produced, and the universal tendency to material or political interests." "The educated and the half-educated classes turned silently away from God, or at least from Christ," and more of the same sort. There does not seem to be much of a summit here for the past century to decline from, and the supposed summit is itself lamented as a decline. And of the ethical influence of the Christian ideas in Germany in our time, Paulsen says: "Christianity is older than the creeds and is most likely destined to outlive them; it has become a reality in the historical life of the European nations, and can never again become unreal; it can only perish with these nations themselves. It has helped to fashion the will and the heart of these nations into what they are, and has left its mark indelibly impressed upon their character. Even those who feel decidedly opposed to Christianity cannot escape its influence; it continues to determine their thoughts, feelings, and volitions."[2] Paulsen is no doubt right, and is far from peculiar, in this suggestion that *non sua poma* applies to much that is best in non-Christian writers. I shall give but one more reference relative to the ethical force of Christianity in Germany, which does not bear out the "very rapid" decay of Mr. Russell's representation. In *The Constructive Quarterly* for September, 1915, Prof. A. Deissmann, of the University of Berlin, quotes a statement by a prominent German theologian and authority on interdenominational life, which he endorses. In it occurs the following: "Everywhere, however, with the soldiers at the front as well as with the non-combatants at home, religion as an inner experience in *daily life* (italics mine) takes an important place. Nevertheless, we must take heed in drawing rash conclusions from this state of affairs and not speak of a religious regeneration of the entire German nation. Our religious life will settle down to a constant normal state as soon as the bitter struggle comes to a close. Not until then will we

[2] *System of Ethics*, tr. by F. Thilly, p. 156.

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know how much we have grown in true Christian faith and in the quiet but lasting virtues of Christian morality." Not even in Germany does the case for ethical Christianity seem so hopeless as Mr. Russell would have us believe.

Nor is the case improved for Mr. Russell's implication when we turn to France a hundred years ago. Heine, at the close of his writing on "The Romantic School," says that in the provinces "the women, doubtless, seek consolation in the Christian religion because they can not live in Paris. In Paris, since the Revolution, Christianity has ceased to exist, and even before then it had lost all real significance." Again, writing in 1832 to his friend Lewald, he says,—"There are no atheists here. They have not preserved enough respect for *le bon Dieu* to be at the pains of denying Him. The old religion is dead down to the roots; more, it has fallen into dissolution. The old morality is not less dead." Elsewhere he writes, "this poor and pitiful morality, without religious roots, and resting only on reason, obtains no decent measure of respect here." It does not look as if there was much of a height here, whence ethical Christianity could make a rapid century decline. No, alike in moral theory and in moral life France has advanced, not declined, in the past century. It was in 1842 that M. Troplong said to the Institute of France,—"The Christian philosophy is the foundation of our social life. It lies at the root of our principles of right; and, though the fact is not universally recognised, we live much more by it than by the ideas which have survived from the ruin of the Greek and Roman world." It is obviously undesirable to indulge in merely personal judgments in discussing a matter of this sort, and so I present what Dr. Merz has said on the theoretic advance, which is never dissociate from the progress of moral life. "In France, moral philosophy as such had practically no independent existence during the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century, and it is only within the last quarter that its problems have been taken up afresh; but since then, that country can claim to have produced some of the most remarkable and original works

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on the subject."[3] The various and complex difficulties attending ethical advance in France, with its Voltaireism and its Rousseauism I can not, of course, here discuss, but rapid decay is not obvious in the period concerned, either on the theoretic or the practical side.

It was not a promising beginning for Italy when, in 1817, the Pope, Pius VII, pronounced the Bible Society a pestilence, and, in 1814, restored the order of the Jesuits throughout the world, who were soon to set themselves against freedom in Church and State, and against liberal institutions. To regard the then condition of things as such that a centurial decline of an ethical sort has taken place would be too absurd. The country of Rosmini, Gioberti, and Mamiani, has known no such decline, but an advance in free and ethical enlightenment. No one who knows anything of the work of her ethical writers will despair of Italy to-day. Very much the same thing is true of Spain. I am well aware how much these countries leave to be desired on the religio-ethical side, but we may easily come short of justice by basing our judgments too entirely on mere appearances or a surface view of things, and, at any rate, there has not been much to decline from. The unfavourable sides were faithfully enough set down by G. Diercks in his work *Das moderne Geistesleben Spaniens*, for Spain has her indifferents, hypocrites, and atheists. But the Spain of the past century was far from untouched by the liberating effects of the French Revolution, as her own action in 1808, and again in 1869, shewed. Nor has Spain in the past century lacked active ethical influences such as the teachings of Balmez and others, with whom I have critically dealt in the chapter devoted to "the philosophy of Spain" in my volume of *Studies in European Philosophy* (Blackwood, 1909).

When we turn to England a hundred years ago and thereby, we have to do with the ethical conditions associated with the two great movements known as the Evangelical Revival and the Oxford Movement. But there, too, we can

[3] *History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century*, Vol. IV, p. 129.

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admit no ethical summit for a centurial decline. Writing in the British *Quarterly Review* for 1879, Mr. Gladstone declared that "the preaching of the Gospel a hundred years ago had disappeared not by denial, but by lapse, from the majority of Anglican pulpits"; and it was to improve upon this condition of things that the Evangelical Revival aimed. But, aside from the religious virtues of that movement, it had a great defect on the ethical side. This is frankly admitted by writers like Dr. Dale, who says that while "it accomplished a great moral transformation," its "moral aims and achievements" were unquestionably "seriously defective." The defect lay in its failure to provide "a lofty ideal of practical righteousness, and a healthy, vigorous moral training." The other movement, the Oxford Movement, even if it had been more highly charged with ethical forces, was not a sufficiently broad and popular movement, and was not sufficiently modern in its modes of thought, although it had its beneficial effects, in some quarters and respects. From the century old condition of things in England, I can find nothing to justify the idea of ethical decline, and still less of "very rapid" decline. As for Scotland, the country from which I write, the past century has registered an enormous ethical advance, which is not to say that no further improvement is possible or needful. But it would be a grievous mistake to overlook the fact that the ethical Christianity of Britain is by no means restricted to ecclesiastical Christianity. To take only a single instance, the daily ethical influences of the Y. M. C. A movement in connection with the vast and devastating war have been so outstanding as not to be lost on any man who is not smitten with judicial blindness, and I am as purely spectatorial in these matters as I take Mr. Russell to be.

It does not seem to me needful to pursue the review of European nations further: a glance may, however, be given to Holland as a country marked by some striking developments of distinctively ethical character in the last century. At the beginning of that century, Holland was marked by

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teaching too narrowly religious to be anything but defective in ethical force. Politically, of course, the country was swept by the influence of the French Revolution, but its religious thought was affected but little. For Holland—like Spain—has maintained a deep subjective or national consciousness. But both in Church and State much confusion existed, and there was certainly no high plane of ethical elevation, from which decline should take place. The country of Schotten and De La Saussaye has been the scene of too many conflicts of Dutch ethical idealism to be other than in a much healthier ethical condition than it was before. The influence of Bavinck has helped not a little in this direction.

Even if this or that community or nation had ethically declined, it would be highly illogical and absurd to conclude that Christianity in its inherent potentialities had therefore declined as an ethical force or factor. Their default could not impair its vitality. But wheresoever in the world a community or a nation turns to seek the religious-ethical influence that shall prove most harmonious, complete, universal, and satisfying, there it turns to Christianity, for in these respects no other international ethic has proved comparable to it. Unlike certain other ethics, ethical Christianity, rightly apprehended, calls to no mere passivity, no negativity or vacuousness, no suppression of life, but to the fuller manifestation of personality, to life more intensely conscious, because suffused with the light and grace of Deity. What is of import, from the ethical point of view, is the formation of character or spiritual type, and in this connection ethical Christianity is, of course, concerned with the typically or essentially Christian. There may be much ethical Christianity where form and appearance have little of the ostentatiously religious: the ethical kingdom does not so readily come by observation. The real question is one of moral force, of ethical dynamic, and it is there that Christian conception excels, it may be affirmed, without impugning the virtue-making power of other modes of ethical conception. The question of power is, in the ethical

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context, one whose importance it is impossible to overrate, and it is in its inexhaustible resources for the creation and supply of motive power for daily life, in its heights and its depressions, that ethical Christianity has historically triumphed, wherever these resources have been duly drawn upon. Its moral ideal is not one of tenuous and unattainable beauty, for in it the Ideal has been made real; hence the Christian ideal can become effective. It can make men sure of themselves, and it can afford them light and leading in the problems of life. The appeal of the world is never far from man or nation—the appeal to choose the lower rather than the higher, the material before the spiritual, might rather than right, and time in preference to eternity. That is why Christianity is here, charged with ethical power. Its kingdom is a realm of ends: its final end is the love of God, but without the idea of absorption, sometimes, but wrongly mixed with it. What seems to me far too much overlooked in such discussions is, that the ethical correspondence established between man and God is always the result of voluntary response—a response that has become habitual; but if the result of ethical Christianity is so conditioned by our voluntary response, our failure to respond is obviously no legitimate ground of reflection on the worth and efficacy of Christianity. It is not wise to neglect the needful stress on ethical activity and achievement, because, forsooth, Christianity is supposed to be a revelation; if it is a revelation, it is one that awaits our ethical discovery. No beatitude falls on the morally sluggish: no ethical kingdom is theirs. They turn not vision into fact, nor dream into reality, nor idea into truth. But man's unconquerable soul is keyed to ethical struggle with evil and the world, and only therein does he discover the inherent worth of Christianity, as the power by which he lives and triumphs. Paulsen has pointed out the radical lack of insight on the part of Schopenhauer in not perceiving how greatly superior is Christianity to Buddhism from the purely human standpoint, and it is from that standpoint that Royce has mainly apprehended the worth of

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Christianity. But, emphasize the human element or aspect as we may, the power of Christianity is, nevertheless, always seen in its appeal to man's longing for the transcendent, and in its capability of inspiring men to work, to suffer, and to die, on its account. So severe is Christian ethical demand, and so serious is the need of man, that divine power must come to his aid. It is in this aim to link man with God that ethical Christianity, in its more excellent way, meets the need of ethics.

The Christian ethical ideal has, in many forms and modes of manifestation, impressed itself upon European civilization in the past century. I have already adverted to the religious-ethical movements of that time in Holland. The great Ritschlian movement in Germany, whatever its defects—and they were real and deep enough—did certainly not lack ethical passion. The most illustrious figure in Swiss Protestantism in the late century, Alexandre Vinet, was a significant religious-ethical force for France as well as for Switzerland. In Italy, Mazzini has, as Myers remarks in his "Essays Modern," for "his passionate impulse to 'incarnate in humanity,' as he said, 'that portion of eternal truth which it is granted to us to perceive—to convert into an earthly reality so much of the kingdom of heaven, the Divine conception permeating life, as it is given us to comprehend.'" To informed minds, the ethicising of religious thought, feeling, and experience, was the most potent and valuable influence exerted in Britain throughout the second half of the last century. Rightly so, for religion, whatever else it may or may not be, must be thoroughly ethical. In Denmark, Martensen and Kierkegaard were in the last century among the decided sources of Christianly ethical influence, as Tolstoi was in Russia. But to what purpose these sporadic manifestations, if you will, of ethical Christianity, which might be almost indefinitely multiplied? The truth is, the Christian ethical spirit cast its spell far too completely, all contrary appearances notwithstanding, over European civilization during the century in question, for its presence and effects

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to be easily traceable in full. It was the all-controlling ideal, the secret moulding energy of what was then best in the European fabric. Whether the influences and forces that so converged on the ethical Christ, or the ethical forms of Christianity, had always an adequate and satisfactory metaphysical basis and support, is another matter, which I am not now called to discuss. But at least the fact must be remembered that every ethical system rests upon, or is affiliated to, a metaphysic, a fact often very inadequately realised. The law of doing is not dissociate from its basis in being. Ethical Christianity may be practical, and concerned with daily life, but there are, for all that, theories of existence and of knowledge involved in its religious system. And where the metaphysical support is inadequate, there, however unconsciously, the ethical working is deprived of sustenance and shorn of vitality. The inwardness of ethical Christianity is its characteristic excellence: it has none of the hardness of a mere ethical code. But the ethical values are not attained without a severe internal warfare, in which our subjective striving and ethical aspiration are met and aided by the stimuli and strength which Christianity, objectively regarded, can effectively supply. "We do need for our encouragement and support the assurance that what justifies itself to the moral reason as good must in the end prevail. It is the good that is eternal; and that which is devoid of ethical character is but transitory."[4] In the light of what has already been advanced, we see that nothing could have been more erroneous than Mill's conception of the Christian ethic as in ideal negative rather than positive, passive rather than active, innocence rather than nobleness, abstinence from evil rather than energetic pursuit of good. Ethical Christianity is precisely an overwhelming refutation of all this display of philosophic ignorance and misconception. Positive and energising enough, surely, is the requirement of love to God with all our hearts, and the love of our neighbour as ourselves. In such moralisation of life, from the distinc-

[4] *Cambridge Theol. Essays*, p. 203.

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tively Christian point of view, there is surely no lack of scope for self-affirmation and self-impartation. There is involved in it an awakening of conscience which, as said Amiel, drives us "into contact with the terrible wheels within wheels of human suffering and responsibility; it is the bugle call, the cock-crow, which puts phantoms to flight; it is the armed archangel who chases men from an artificial Paradise." Yes, but that is not all; for it shews us the pathway to a real Paradise—one of calm and fidelity, of self-discipline and trust, of freedom from irresolution and inward perplexity, for that is the very meaning of the Christian ethical ideal. No man, in times like these, is so little to be envied as the man who is only a "half-believer in a casual creed," for if we refuse to grapple with those mysterious problems of life which form the background of all experience, if we fail to cast upon them the fullest light we can command, and to come under the spell of their ethical grandeur or ennobling magnificence, we leave an all-important side of our nature undisciplined, our character stunted, and our entire existence impoverished. No wonder Emerson said of "ethical truth," "what divination or insight belongs to it!" We need to realise, with Pascal, that "the first of Christian truths is that truth shall be loved above all," and to hold fast the confidence that *Veritas fortior omnibus*. This need not keep one from deploring that the hold of the Christianity of the Churches upon the peoples of Europe is not stronger than it is, nor from admitting that, in organized Christianity, "they are not all Israel who are of Israel." But I think one may also recognise how superficial is the modern craze for treating everything, Christianity and morality equally with public-houses and crime, in a merely statistical manner. We have known and thought but little of the soul, in its secret stirrings, its subtle movements, and its silent convictions, when we have given ourselves over to statistical tendency. Do we delude ourselves into the notion that the soul has meanwhile given up its craving or desire to live by some Power or Life higher than its own? No, the soul is not confined to organised Christianity, nor to statistical schemes

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of comfort and improvement. But it need not be denied that the soul has at times enough to do to breathe the free air of religion, when we find a somewhat notable religious figure in France saying, not many years ago, that "the Jesuits are masters of the Church, the atheists are masters of the republic." In so far as such an estimate was true, it shows what unfavourable environment the soul has sometimes had to contend with, and little opportunity Christianity has sometimes been afforded for its working. But is not heroic France regaining her soul, largely through the influence of her host of priest-soldiers on the scene of the European conflict? A recent French writer says their patriotic and Christian influence has been such that "between two battles the soldiers, formerly so indifferent to the things of religion, went to church in a multitude." Freedom of conscience will not always droop in France to freedom from conscience, nor the fact be permanently obscured that man, as said Sabatier, is "incurably religious." The innermost kernel of Christianity has in history again and again broken the fetters of existing forms, and created new forms of deed and proof, corresponding to new needs. I am speaking of the universal essence of Christianity, which knows how to descend into the deeps of subjectivity, and leave no lack of intensity. I regard the religious ideal and the moral ideal as perfectly distinct, but I view them both as ideals of reason; and I do not think the highest result is gained until, in the striving of reason after unity, they become blended in us into an harmonious and inseparable unity. That is the ideal I have had in view in speaking of ethical Christianity. The more the ethical element in us deepens, as a source of action, it corresponds the more with the ethico-practical aspects of religion; and there is an ideal of religion which is not unaccordant with the ethical ideal. That is why the inmost harmony of individual being is realised, in my view, only in their final and living unity. But I am not, in saying that, to be understood as undervaluing scientific ethics, to which, in its independence, I attach great value; I am only speaking from a more practical and general standpoint.

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If Christianity were the declining ethical force or factor in Europe, which Mr. Russell represents it to be, the ethical outlook would be gloomy indeed. I am far from alone in thinking that "there is among the religious-ethical systems of the world no possible rival to Christianity. Nor does it seem likely that any fresh synthesis of moral ideas will arise from the closer intercourse of men of different faiths. The possibilities in this direction seem long since to have been exhausted."[5] What Christianity has done for the civilizations that have welcomed its working in begetting freedom of spirit, and in interpreting the meaning and values of life, can not but lead us to have faith in its future power and working. New and varying forms of thought and life and organization there may and will be, in the different countries of Europe, but the essential spirit of Christianity is the one thing needful, not a mechanical outward unity. Already it is manifest enough that "the Austrians and Hungarians, or the Spanish and Italians, are scarcely made more friendly one to the other as nations because they alike regard the Pope as head of their religion." And "it is impossible in this age to subject the spirit of England, Sweden, and Germany, to the Roman domination, unless one first destroyed the religious life of those countries."[6] But it is true that for every estrangement that may appear within the time order, there will be found the reconciling spiritual element or event, and that above the distractions and distortions, or even tragedies, of particular religious communities, there will remain the serene and unified character of universal Christianity. What is needed, from the human side, is that there should be desire as well as obedience, ethical aspiration as well as loyal self-surrender to divine impulses, for, without these, the charm and effectiveness, the reality and resources, of ethical Christianity, must remain impotent and unavailing.

JAMES LINDSAY.

IRVINE, AYRSHIRE, SCOTLAND.

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[5] H. H. Scullard, *Hibbert Journal*, 1917.

[6] P. Gardner, *Modernity and the Churches*, pp. 266–267.

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A NEW PSYCHOLOGICAL SOCIETY.

The British Society for the Study of Sex Psychology is now completing its third year of existence. It has survived the first shock of the great war; its membership has grown slowly but steadily, and its activities have developed. Some brief account of the aims and work of the Society may be of interest to readers of THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

On the occasion of the International Medical Congress in London, during the summer of 1913, the need for unprejudiced and thorough investigation of sexual divergences from average habits and standards was brought forcibly to the notice of a small group of men of letters, and workers for various humanitarian and democratic causes. In the previous year, 1912, the Report of the Royal Commission on the Laws of Separation and Divorce, and the Proceedings of the Eugenic Congress had revealed publicly the need for reorganising the laws and conditions of family life in this country. The Royal Commission on Venereal Diseases was appointed in October, 1913 at the urgent request of leading doctors and largely owing to statements made in the course of the International Medical Congress. However grudgingly and imperfectly, light was being at last let into some of the dark places where life still agonised and decayed, and the initiators of the British Society for the Study of Sex Psychology felt the need for "more light"; and particularly in the case of members of the specially privileged and responsible medical, legal and educational professions. In all these three professions, in spite of treasures of goodwill and knowledge, experience and devotion, there still exists a tragic ignorance of certain profound and ineradicable human tendencies. And even those persons who see and admit the importance of these tabooed subjects and who help generously in individual cases of hardship, are, too often, unable or unwilling to demand a revision—or, at least, a suspension pending enquiries—of social judgment. It is significant that the President of the Medico-Psychological Society recently admitted in a letter to the *British Medical Journal* that "British medicine has erred in the past in totally ignoring the very considerable influence of the sex instinct."

The founders of the B. S. S. S. P. soon realised that their investigations could not be confined to one type of abnormal

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sexuality, but must cover a wide and diverse field of psychology, and must take into consideration the influence of atavistic superstitions, and economic conditions. Among the pioneers and pillars of the Society certain names must receive special mention. The formal institution of the Society, which occurred in April, 1914, and its establishment on a workable basis are very largely due to the prestige and inspiration of Edward Carpenter and the indefatigable activity and versatile talents of Laurence Housman. The position of these two pioneers in the intellectual world, and their close connection with the democratic and feminist movements, have been invaluable assets. Both are still active members of the Executive Committee of the Society and Laurence Housman has contributed largely to its literature. Associated with them in the foundation of the B. S. S. S. P. and also at present members of its Executive, are George Ives, an authority on the reform of our criminal law, and author of that psychological and historical classic "A History of Penal Methods"; and Bertram Lloyd, one of the ablest and most active of the younger Socialists and humanitarians. These four men were certainly the cornerstones of the Society. Other members of the Society now include the chief exponents of the psycho-analytic doctrine in England; the leaders of the birth-control movement and the founder of the movement for Divorce Law Reform; several eminent eugenists and educational specialists; and an increasing number of medical men and women. It is interesting to note that the first medical members of the Society were women.

The Inaugural Meeting of the Society was held on July 8, 1914, at the rooms of The Medical Society in Chandos Street, and with a distinguished magistrate in the Chair. Since then, it has held eleven quarterly meetings, and its membership has nearly trebled. The special difficulties with which the Society has had to contend may be imagined, in the peculiarly strained financial and general conditions of the great war. It has been, and still is, dependent on the generous kindness of individual members for premises to hold its quarterly meetings; and its literary output has been limited to four publications, three of which were delivered as lectures followed by discussions at meetings. Nevertheless it grows and works.

The Society takes the view that "Sex questions are in general of an extraordinarily complex character, and we cannot expect to find a simple solution for them as we can for such questions as

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slavery or torture, which can be solved in a simple word: 'suppression.' On the contrary, sexual instinct and sentiment have their deepest roots in life itself. Intimately bound up as it is with the very foundations of humanity, the sexual instinct demands an entirely different treatment." It has been established "for the consideration of problems and questions connected with sexual psychology, from their medical, juridical, and sociological aspects"; and it endeavours to subject these problems to investigation and discussion.

The publications issued, up to the present date by the Society, include the following:

I. "Policy and Principles, and General Aims." (One of the addresses delivered at the Inaugural Meeting; by L. Housman.)

II. "The Social Problem of Sexual Inversion." (A translation, and supplied to members only.)

III. "Sexual Variety and Variability among Women and their Bearing upon Social Reconstruction"; by Stella Browne.

IV. "Fellow-Feeling in Relation to Sex"; by L. Housman.

These publications can only be obtained by adult students of social questions; membership of the Society is confined to persons over twenty-five years of age, who must be proposed and seconded by members who have some personal acquaintance with them.

The Society recognising the vastness of the field of their studies, roughly divides it into the following branches: Inversion, prostitution, aberration, sexual ignorance, disease ("not necessarily venereal"). It has been suggested that study-groups or sub-committees be formed, to collect data, and suggest questions, and pursue investigations on these various topics. It is to be hoped that this scheme will materialise, as a greater degree of specialisation in detail would undoubtedly enhance the value of the Society's work, though the general attitude and point of view should remain broadly human, and free from the distressing dogmatism and absorption in one aspect of their subject, so typical of the scientific pundits.

Meanwhile the Society is arranging a Conference to be held in July, on the "Pros and Cons of Sex Education"; and it is to be hoped that this crucial point will be discussed thoroughly, and more illuminatingly than is generally the case.

We are also collecting and making lists of books bearing on sexual psychology, in English, French and German,—*exclusive of poetry and fiction, at least for the present.* We hope to form a useful bibliography and later a library on the subject.

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Finally a few words on the Society's attitude on two points. It is not purely representative of any *one* school of thought or method of research in sexual psychology, nor, in fact of any one point of view on social or economic questions. This is fundamental; the founders and most active members of the Society have been and are keen propagandists on various subjects, but the Society itself exists for *investigation;* and for the advocacy of that attitude of mind, individual and social, which makes investigation possible. In the happy phrase of Laurence Housman: "Here within our Society, we are only social analysts. . . . And if we are to collect the human documents which will be required for supplying the necessary material, and the necessary impulse for sound and expert treatment, to doctors, lawyers, and teachers, we must not ourselves adopt the condemnatory attitude, nor pronounce moral judgments."

The second fundamental principle of the Society is that membership and eligibility for office are open on precisely the same terms to women as to men. On this, I cannot do better than quote E. B. Lloyd: "A steadily increasing number of normally constituted men and women are beginning to understand better, the feelings and emotions of the opposite sex: which understanding is obviously bound to result in a larger measure of sympathy, even if it does not directly proceed from it. That this increasing sympathy, clarity and equality in the relations between the sexes, though still far from widely diffused, is at any rate a consummation devoutly to be wished, most fair-minded people will now be inclined to admit. . . . For although it is probably true that those two vast upheavals of the old social order, the Women's movement, and the Socialist movement—have contributed far more than anything else towards the growing sympathy and intellectual merging of the sexes to-day, yet it is undeniable that free and open discussion of sex questions would be a very potent factor in the same direction. Especially does this apply to the question of sexual inversion; for the intermediates, sundered as they are from both sexes on the psycho-physical side, may yet give very valuable help, as a kind of mediators between them on the intellectual and emotional side." (Article on "Intermediate Sexual Types" in *The New Freewoman: October, 1913.*)

F. W. Stella Browne.

London, England.

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RECENT BRITISH PERIODICAL LITERATURE IN ETHICS.

As representative of recent periodical literature of ethical interest, two articles, or rather two series of articles, may be selected for exceptional importance. Philosophical speculation (in the pages of *Mind*) has taken the form chiefly of historical studies; practical investigation (in the pages of the *Hibbert Journal*, the *Eugenics Review*, and the *Shield*) has centred around problems of depopulation and birth-control. Mr. P. S. Burrell's "Plot of Plato's Republic" (*Mind*, Nos. 97–99), and Professor McBride's "Study of Heredity" (*Eugenics Review*, Vol. VIII, Nos. 1–4) are the most valuable contributions to their respective fields.

Mr. Burrell takes the view which is maintained by so eminent a Hellenist as Paul Shorey in his *Unity of Plato's Thought* and which is now pretty generally accepted: the view that Plato's philosophy, and the *Republic* in particular, forms a consistent whole. In the course of his article he refutes certain distinguished critics (notably Jowett, Gomperz, and Mr. A. D. Lindsay) who discriminate the "Socratic" from the "post-Socratic" books, or who find various inexplicable transitions in the work. Mr. Burrell demolishes the Box and Cox bogey of the "historical" and the "Platonic" Socrates. Taking up each section of the *Republic* in order, he shows how it contributes to the whole work. To refute Thrasymachus it is necessary to discuss the nature of reality, to raise the question whether there is a moral world. And in order to study the morality of the individual we must first study the "larger letters" of society. Among noteworthy theories opposed are: 1. Gomperz' complete misunderstanding in his statement that the connection of moral, political and historical philosophy was slight. For Plato the connection was vital. Furthermore, the "first city" is no more a description of real society than the second or third city: Socrates' state is ideal from end to end. 2. The three virtues in the state do not as Jowett supposed correspond to the three parts of the soul. Nor is there any confusion between justice and temperance. Temperance consists in harmony between the rulers and the ruled, justice in the doing by each of his own work. 3. Justice does not as Pater

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thought "supervene" upon the other virtues; it is what makes them possible.

In the April number of *Mind*, an article by E. W. Hirst, "Moral Sense, Moral Reason, and Moral Sentiment," has for its foundation a criticism of Dr. Rashdall's theories, especially as set forth in his last book (*Is Conscience an Emotion?*). Dr. Rashdall fails to do justice to Shaftesbury and Hutcheson. Their Moral Sense is not simply a "particular sort of feeling or emotion" but involves reflection on action. Dr. Rashdall thinks that in reducing the Moral Sense to a kind of Moral Taste these writers abandon all objective criteria. But in matters of art, and even in matters of food, there is always *some* objective criterion, and furthermore the moralists in question do recognise the objectivity of the Moral Sense. (When Mr. Hirst says that "the obligation to cultivate correct views on art essentially differs from the duty of manifesting right conduct" he perhaps means or should mean "different from the duty of cultivating correct views on conduct," which is not quite what he says.) Mr. Hirst objects that Shaftesbury and Hutcheson do not sufficiently recognise the difference between the moral and the æsthetic sense: æsthetic judgment depends on a certain "involuntary factor." (So, however, does the understanding of right and wrong, as distinguished from mere correct behaviour.)

Dr. Rashdall maintains that only as moral judgments are the work of Reason can their objectivity and authority be assured. Reason gives us the axioms of Equity and Rational Benevolence —but these, says Mr. Hirst, depend for application upon a quantitive estimate. Though Dr. Rashdall says that goods are commensurable "only for the purposes of choice," this restriction does not seem to prevent a sufficient amount of one good from being equivalent to another amount of another good. Choice would then depend upon "taste." Dr. Rashdall, however, in his recent work, erects a hierarchy of goods. Mr. Hirst denies that ethical quality attaches to the form of activity (*e.g.* he denies that intellectual activity is more 'moral' than eating) but not to the motive. The so-called higher activities are higher only because they are less immediately selfish. Dr. Rashdall holds feelings to be an object rather than an essential constituent of the value judgment. We judge *about* feeling. Mr. Hirst suspects that Canon Rashdall does not discriminate between the value-judgment and the judgment of fact. Mr. Hirst's own view of

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Conscience is based upon the development of society. Conscience is a regard for the Tribe. It is extended not by the admission that "one man's good is of equal value with the like good of another" but by a wider notion of "unity."

Recent numbers of the *Hibbert* show the absorbing interest of educational reform and international ethics. Mr. Harold Begbie animadverts rather vaguely upon the direction which educational reconstruction in England ought to take. Mr. Chapman deprecates extreme pacifism and outlines the platform of the American League to Enforce Peace. Mr. J. A. Hobson replies to a review of Armstrong's *Our Ultimate Aim in the War* by Dr. Jacks. Dr. Jacks questioned two assumptions: (1) that a common will of mankind really exists, (2) that such a common will would be in favour of perpetual peace. Both of these assumptions Mr. Hobson undertakes to make plausible (deleting the word "perpetual"). He asserts that the "great majority of the more developed minds desire, will and plan many of the same objects and in conscious co-operation": in commerce, science, philosophy, religion, art, hygiene, education, social reform and society. He believes also that a will for peace at almost any price will be strengthened by the present war. Dr. Jacks criticised the League to Enforce Peace because it seems to assume that only one state at a time would rebel from its decisions. He, in turn, according to Mr. Hobson, assumes that there would exist strong fixed parties in the Parliament of Nations, and that their sympathies would be strong enough to detach a powerful minority from the decisions of the Parliament. Mr. Hobson does not claim for the Federation (at least as an immediate ideal) the right of interference in the affairs of the several states; the Federation would not, for example, be empowered to accord independence to India. He further suggests that the Federation need not, in its inception, include more than the seven great powers, and remarks justly that their conduct toward lesser nations in the capacity of a corporate body, would probably be juster than the separate Imperialisms of each. Mr. Hobson hardly meets Dr. Jacks's objection that we shall not find working toward Internationalism the same federative forces which have produced the several states, but he has a strong argument in the contention that whatever the defects of international government, no better means of avoiding the ruin of civilization has yet been devised.

In the April number Dr. Jacks makes a number of shrewd

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observations on the future after the war, though with a tantalizing vagueness in conclusion. He remarks that all the schemes for reconstruction put forward depend for their execution upon the war's ending favourably for England, and goes on to point out that a Europe divided into victors and vanquished would not be a very promising ground for the new crop of reforms—no matter which side was the victor. On the other hand, Dr. Jacks is strongly opposed to "peace without victory." His solution is to dispense punishment to the "small group of exceptionally dangerous men" to whom the war and wars are due. He does not enter upon details as to the torture to be applied to these culprits, and he mentions no names; and he does not state whether any of the persons are to be found outside of Germany.

Mr. A. D. Maclaren, late a prisoner of war at Ruhleben, analyses the feelings of national hate in various countries. Mr. Barbour and Miss Maynard both discuss the place of Force in Christian ethics, and arrive at somewhat similar conclusions. Miss Maynard cuts the knot as follows:

"John xviii, 36: 'If my kingdom were of this world, then would my servants fight.' Is Britain a kingdom of this world? Most decidedly she is. She is a kingdom that above all others stands for the three great foundation-stones of the State—Justice, Liberty, and Benevolence."

Professor McBride's article in the *Eugenics Review*, referred to above, occupies a large part of four issues. It is in large part highly technical, although well written, and made as intelligible as possible to the uninitiated. We can here only quote Professor McBride's main conclusions, without attempting to outline the experiments upon which they are based:

> In all cases where large numbers of a given species of animals are raised under somewhat artificial conditions a certain number of monsters will be produced, apparently owing to a disturbance of the germ-cells in their growing and ripening. This is true both of insects raised on banana peel and of human beings raised in a large city. These monsters in most, but not in all cases, differ from the normal type, in the loss of some feature which the normal type possesses, and hence are to be looked on as defectives. . . .
>
> Exercise of the functions tends to enlarge the organs by which these functions are carried out, and this exercise continued through generations slowly modifies the structure of the stock, till eventually the resulting change can show itself in the young before the exercise has been begun. Conversely persistent disuse of function tends slowly to atrophy the organs by which they are carried on, till eventually these organs are only developed in a reduced form.

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Professor McBride draws two conclusions of social importance: 1. That in former times the struggle for existence was enough to keep down the defective element in the population; but under present conditions these people are protected and multiply. He advocates therefore segregation and sterilization for the benefit of society. 2. The transmissibility of acquired characters makes the problem of education of the highest importance: we must adopt such a system of education that "the next generation may start at a very slightly higher level of capacity than their fathers."

In replying to a writer in the *New Statesman* who had written in praise of this article, Professor McBride points out (*New Statesman*, March 17, 1917) that the inheritance of acquired characters is not taken as proved, but only as rendered highly probable. And in reference to the two conclusions mentioned above, he says that while racial improvement by any means must be a very slow process, the harm done by the propagation of the defective is very quickly felt. Furthermore, he insists upon the importance of the responsibility of parents: "there is no system of state subventions," he says very justly, "which will not break down if parental responsibility be removed and reckless reproduction encouraged."

In the January number (1917) Major Darwin, whose articles always deserve attention, discusses methods for encouraging reproduction on the part of the best classes in the community, and for discouraging reproduction on the part of the incompetent, thriftless and pauper element. Mr. A. K. Chalmers also has an able article on the report of the National Birth-Rate Commission.

In the April number Havelock Ellis ("Birth-Control and Eugenics") argues that birth-control is a continuation of the same process as the gradual diminution in number of offspring in the higher animals. There are various points of view from which birth-control may be advocated: the evolutionary, the economic, the humanitarian and the medical (as in cases when a woman lacks the physical strength for child-birth). The eugenic standpoint is still another. Birth-control is an essential part of eugenic propaganda. We must (1) increase and promote the knowledge of the laws of heredity, (2) popularise a knowledge of the methods of birth-control, (3) act in accordance with our knowledge. Our action must be inspired by a high sense of personal responsibility. Mr. Ellis deprecates hasty eugenic legislation and legal regulation of marriage.

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The birth-rate problem also receives attention in the *Shield* (a "Review of Moral and Social Hygiene"), which has done a useful service in reprinting the report of the Birth-rate Commission in England in its October issue. Its activities intersect with those of the *Eugenics Review*, but it is occupied with the social aspect of eugenics exclusively. Eugenics is in fact only one of its interests, and it devotes much of its space to the subject of prostitution. In printing statistics, notes, reports, and in its reviews this quarterly performs excellent work; and its editorials are usually written in a sensible and moderate tone. For the opinions expressed in the articles the editors disclaim responsibility; and as might be expected, the articles are of various merit and from various points of view. One confusion which exists in the campaign for public health is the differences of standpoint with which different reformers attack the same problems. There is the religious, the sentimental, the hygienic-practical; with all possible hybrids of religious-sentimental, hygienic-sentimental, et cetera. One reformer will look forward to more freedom between the sexes, another to less. The weakness of many of the articles is that they "get you nowhere."

The March number contains a full discussion, with citation of the pertinent documents, of Sir George Cave's Criminal Law Amendment Bill (1917). The Association for Moral and Social Hygiene objects to clauses 2 and 6 of this bill. We reprint sections 2 and 3 of clause 2, and section 6 of clause 6.

2. If a person acts in contravention of this section (section 1, forbidding persons suffering from venereal disease to have intercourse or to solicit to intercourse) that person shall be liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment with or without hard labour for a term not exceeding two years, or on summary conviction to imprisonment with or without hard labour for a term not exceeding six months.

Provided that a person shall not be convicted under this section if that person proves that he or she had reasonable grounds to believe that he or she was free from venereal disease at the time the alleged offence was committed.

3. Where any person is convicted of any of the offences mentioned in the schedule to this Act, the court may, if they think fit, for the purpose of ascertaining whether that person is suffering from veneral disease in a communicable form order that person to submit to such medical examination and tests as may be requisite for that purpose.

If the person is a female, the examination and tests shall be conducted, if she so desires, by a female doctor.

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CLAUSE 6.

6. The power to impose a penalty on a person convicted of an offence under No. 11 of section fifty-four of the Metropolitan Police Act, 1839, 2 & 3 Vict. c. 57 (which relates to loitering for the purpose of prostitution or solicitation), or convicted under section twenty-eight of the Towns Police Clauses Act 1847, 10 & 11 Vict. c. 89, as a common prostitute or night-walker for loitering and importuning passengers for the purpose of prostitution or convicted of any similar offence under any Act, by-law, or regulation is hereby (where necessary) extended so as to include power, on the conviction of a person after a previous conviction for any such offence, to impose imprisonment with or without hard labour for a term not exceeding one month.

The Association remarks: "The particular injustice of sub-sections 3 and 4 (dealing with presumption for disease) lies in the fact that this heavy sentence and forced medical examination can be imposed upon women without any evidence, other than police evidence, being given at any stage, that any person was infected, solicited, or molested by the women accused."

Miss Macmillan points out that "prostitutes" (in the legal definition of the term) are not accorded a full and equal protection of the law with other "women." The Editor (Miss Nielson) rightly deprecates the agitation for the protection of soldiers from "harpies," and points out that much of the "protection" is merely weakening the soldier's sense of personal responsibility and self-control, besides unfairly penalizing the women in cases where the initiative may have been on the part of the man. The article is followed by official correspondence and memoranda on the subject. The "Campaign for Compulsory Notification" is discussed, and the conclusion arrived at that compulsion is highly undesirable. It is a doubtful point whether the following suggestion of the Local Government Board manifests the highest moral tone:

The moral inducements to chastity should be supported by the fear which every right-minded lad and man and every woman ought to entertain of the terrible consequences of these diseases.

Prudence and morals are both good things, and can be brought to support each other, but they should not be confused. The Bhikku Silacara writes interestingly of sexual morality among the Burmese (except when contaminated by contact with other races, as in Rangoon). As reasons for the absence of prostitution and irregularity he adduces the lack of a pastoral clergy (marriages are civil and can easily be dissolved on reasonable grounds, even on the ground of incompatibility), the example of the Bhikkus, or monks

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(who apparently practice without preaching), and the simplicity and low cost of living, which render early marriages possible. If the Bhikku Silacara's information is quite unbiased, the primitive Shan tribes are undoubtedly more civilized than ourselves.

T. STEARNS ELIOT.

LONDON, ENGLAND.

BOOK REVIEWS.

'I APPEAL UNTO CAESAR.' The Case of the Conscientious Objector. By Mrs. Henry Hobhouse. With Introduction by Professor Gilbert Murray, and Notes by the Earl of Selborne, Lord Parmoor, Lord Hugh Cecil, M.P., and Lord Henry Bentinck, M.P. London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1917. Pp. xxii, 84. Price, 1s. net.

Existing conditions in respect of the treatment of conscientious objectors are hardly known in their details in England, and probably not at all in America, except to those who happen to be personally interested in the unhappy individuals concerned. The most influential part of the English press has succeeded by the simple process of saying nothing about it, in drawing a veil of obscurity over a most unsatisfactory business, and the purpose of this little book is to drag the facts to the light of day. Mrs. Hobhouse, the author, is in a position to deal with the subject, which is probably unique. She has three sons in the combatant services and a fourth undergoing a second term of imprisonment as a conscientious objector, and no one can fail to perceive that she feels that the cause all of them have at heart is in the end the same.

It must not be imagined that the book is a plea for pacifism; it is not even a defence of the position of the conscientious objector; but only a statement of facts and an appeal to England to consider whether the line of treatment adopted is producing anything whatever except suffering and resentment and disaffection. Pretty full accounts are given of the personal histories of some of the leading conscientious objectors, with a view to showing what manner of men they are, and extracts are quoted from their letters and reports as to prison experiences. It is impossible to summarise such an account, but two things specially emerge.

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The first is that a considerable number of men who are undoubtedly conscientious objectors in the sense contemplated by the Military Service Acts have been refused the absolute exemption to which the law entitles them, and that they have been tried and punished repeatedly for an offence which is really though not technically only one. The second is that so long as a conscientious objector of this rather extreme type is imprisoned, even under civilian control, it is inevitable that he should continue to commit breaches of discipline, involving punishments the cumulative effect of which is indistinguishable from a subtle form of torture and may sooner or later threaten the prisoner's sanity. There is no way out except unconditional release, and no argument against it. The whole problem is considered in an incisive but admirably restrained preface by Professor Gilbert Murray, and short statements in support of the case he makes follow from a number of prominent men who certainly can not be suspected of pacifism.

Apart from the practical issue raised, the book throws a startlingly vivid light on the consequences of some familiar political ideas, and on the confusion which exists about others. What, for example, ought to be meant by the term 'conscientious objector'? No attempt was made to provide a definition in the Act, and its determination was left to perfectly incompetent tribunals. The government wisely refused to confine it (as the American government has apparently done) to members of organised religious bodies, though there is a good deal of evidence that the tribunals did not follow them in this. The real difficulty is that popular ideas about the term are greatly colored by obsolete ethical theories. A man's conscience tells him what to do or avoid. No reasons are required, nothing indeed but the act of God. On the other hand, to come by a process of reasoning to the conclusion that war is wrong may be usual and defensible enough, but (in the popular view) it is not a "conscientious" objection. This sort of thing was the basis of the decisions of many of the tribunals. If it be abandoned, the notion of conscientious objection is transformed. It only exists when fully thought out. But if it is then to be recognised, the only possible course is to grant exemption to any man who publicly and solemnly declares that he has a conscientious objection to military service, and leave public opinion to deal with him. That would be a sufficiently exacting test of the genuineness of any man. If public opinion

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is not strong enough for that, it is not sufficiently united to have compulsory service. And it prevents that strange perversion of the law which victimises instead of protecting an unpopular minority in a period of strong public feeling.

Admitting, however, that certain conscientious objectors have on technical or other grounds incurred the pains of law, the extremity of their sufferings requires some explanation. This is partly to be found in a recrudescence of the old and vicious retributive view of punishment. Such an idea has always been congenial to the popular mind, and it seems to have an exceedingly strong emotional basis. As Mrs. Hobhouse indicates, there is no evidence that the brutality with which some objectors were treated was deliberately intended by the higher military authorities: the real source of the whole thing is a comparatively small body of very influential and authoritarian opinion prominently represented in the press. It makes great play with the suggestion that the men concerned are bad citizens who will do nothing for their country and that even genuine conscientious objectors are permitting other people to undergo the horrors of the trenches in behalf of their liberties. To this it may be replied in the first place that the real alternative, which these men have refused, is work under the Home Office Scheme; secondly that no unprejudiced man would question their earnest desire to serve their country in any way but this which they think utterly wrong, or call a man a bad citizen who sacrifices himself as they have done for what is in his eyes the cause of civil liberty; and in the third place that in any case since further imprisonment will *at the best* only make them more resentful without altering their opinions in the least, continuance of it is merely stupid cruelty.

The violence of public opinion, is, however, only part of the explanation. The most significant and painful thing in the book is the evidence it gives us as to the real effect of the prison system as a means of punishment, and this is much wider than the problem of the conscientious objector—which is after all only temporary and affects, in its acute form, less than a thousand men. It is not relevant to urge that the objectors were educated men of a sort not usually found in prisons and were besides probably mostly of a neurotic type. Separate confinement for in practice two-thirds at least of his total sentence, the deprivation of decent literature and the complete lack of writing material,

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together with indifferent hygienic conditions, have no reformative effect on any man, however uneducated. Nor is there any reason to suppose them deterrent to any appreciable extent. They are forms of social vengeance, and those who like that defence of them may develop it.

M. W. ROBIESON.

Belfast, Ireland.

THE LIFE AND WORK OF GEORGE SYLVESTER MORRIS. By R. M. Wenley. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1917. Pp. 332.

An academic generation has nearly passed since the subject of this memoir was cut off in his prime. Largely as the result of his remarkably strong and fine personality, thorough scholarship, high ideals of the teacher's opportunity, and profound conviction of the reality of the problems of philosophy, the study of philosophy at the University of Michigan in 1889 had become a leading influence. The strong students were likely to be found taking as much work in the department as possible. Perhaps at no other state university, unless it be the University of California, where one of Professor Morris' former associates established a similar tradition, has this been paralleled. So notable an achievement deserves to be brought before students of philosophy and of higher education, and Professor Wenley's admirable account has therefore a value not only for the alumni of Michigan but for a wider circulation.

Born of a New England stock, growing to manhood in a family and social atmosphere of high seriousness, planning to enter the ministry as the occupation of greatest usefulness, following the path of duty into the Civil War for a year, studying at Dartmouth and Union Seminary, Morris combined, as Professor Wenley happily suggests, the best traits of Puritan and Pilgrim, of strict conscientiousness with genial sensibility. His study in Germany confirmed a shift in his orientation from that of a theologian to that of a philosophic inquirer, but was accompanied by no lessening of his moral earnestness. His scholarly translation of Ueberweg's History of Philosophy gained him general recognition, although no academic chair was available for some time. His brilliant *Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, A Critical Exposition* and his exposition of Hegel's philosophy of the State in the same series showed a Hegelian point of view. His Ely

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Lectures on Philosophy and Christianity gave opportunity for more of an original contribution; but to those who knew him did not represent adequately the powers which were just awakening to full activity when he died.

Like Hopkins of Williams and Garman of Amherst, Morris represented great spiritual meanings and values of life which had found previous formulation in theological terms, but which in his thinking changed their formulation without losing their power. At the present it cannot be said that scientific interests supply an equally vital material for philosophy, and the social interests are as yet too confused, too imperfectly organized and interpreted, to evoke similar depth of response in teacher and student. It is good for the teacher of philosophy to consider how he can succeed under present conditions in giving to his subject the reality and vitality which it had in the work of Morris.

In his task of giving Morris his personal and intellectual setting the author has been unusually successful in reproducing the spirit and motives of New England thought and life in the middle of the nineteenth century. Professor Dewey has contributed an appreciation from the twofold point of view of pupil and colleague. The author, the many former students of Professor Morris, the University of Michigan, and teachers of philosophy are to be congratulated upon Professor Wenley's painstaking research and sympathetic interpretation.

J. H. Tufts.

The Town Labourer (1760–1832): The New Civilisation. By J. L. Hammond and Barbara Hammond. London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1917. Pp. xii, 346. Price, 10s. 6d. net.

This volume, by the authors of *The Village Labourer*, is the first part of a close and valuable study of the industrial revolution, which has drawn largely upon new material from the Home Office papers. It is a book to be read by all who are concerned with present labour problems, and conditions of industrial life; for a full understanding of the purgatorial experiences of the working class in the critical years of this great social change is a key to its attitude to-day. The working class, like an oppressed nationality, has its memories. The authors have dealt with the social aspect of the revolution, and have given the first part of the book to the material conditions in workshops, mines, and

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mills, and their surroundings; while the second part deals with the psychological conditions of the rich and the poor. Insensibility, unconscious cruelty and stupidity was the mark of the classes that possessed authority in the state and had acquired the new wealth; and one and all understood by government the protection of society from the fate that had overtaken the privileged classes in France. Property was the great civilising force for the sake of which, in Macaulay's words, "all other institutions exist, that great institution to which we owe all knowledge, all commerce, all industry, all civilisation, all that makes us to differ from the tattooed savages of the Pacific Ocean." This attitude, as of the governor of a beleaguered city, accounts for the temper and reasoning of a society that tolerated the horrors inflicted upon children in mines, and as 'climbing boys,' and accepted the constant misery of the poor as a recognised and indispensable plinth of national welfare. "The poor man," said a working-class paper, "is esteemed only as an instrument of wealth." To educate him was undesirable, for education, according to Mr. Giddy, the President of the Royal Society, would render him "factious and refractory."

He became the cannon-fodder of industry. Criticism, liberty, free thought were, to men like Wilberforce, allied to the principles of the French Revolution. Wilberforce came forward to express his approval of Peterloo, and prosecuted a small bookseller for selling Paine's *Age of Reason*. "The wretched culprit was found starving in a garret, his children all ill with small-pox, and Erskins, the prosecuting counsel, made a strong appeal for mercy. But Wilberforce boasts in his Diary that he and his fellow-Christians stood firm, and insisted on the ruin of the man and his home."

In the chapter on the 'Conscience of the Rich' those passages could not be approached in humour, by the most skilful parody, in which clergymen and men of property, Paley, the saintly Hannah More, Wilberforce, emphasise the shocking results that would accompany the lightening of the poor man's load.

The religion of the working classes, Methodism, was also in spirit unfavourable to the democratic movement, and it is not surprising that some of the leading working-class reformers regarded the Methodists quite definitely as enemies. Cobbett said that "the bitterest foes of freedom in England have been and are the Methodists," and his general view does not differ from the

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accounts of his contemporaries. The mission of Methodism was not favourable to the growth of the Trade Union spirit, and the movement "was a call not for citizens but for saints." A copy of the *Leeds Independent* of 1819 contains side by side announcements of a great Reform meeting on Hunslet Moor and of a Methodist meeting at Skipton that passed the following resolution: "This meeting deeply deplores the religious and moral state of the world, but especially of the Pagans, Mahommedans and Jews." Their kingdom was not of this world: as far as their religion touched upon this world, it taught patience, a virtue very desirable in the poor from the point of view of the governing classes; but not the seed-plot of progress. The valuable and vigorous presentment of this phase of history loses nothing from the absence of rhetoric, and it is some measure of a century's progress that an indictment of a system which found so many supporters then, can find so few to-day.

M. J.

THE ORGANIZABILITY OF LABOR. By William O. Weyforth. Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1917. Pp. ix, 277. Price, $1.50.

The numerical strength of organized labor is not necessarily the most significant index of its importance in American life. Its support in the class-consciousness of the mass of manual wage-earners, its control of fundamental industries and its political influence are a few other criteria. In matters of immediate working class betterment, however, where the power of the union to compel acceptance of its program counts, numbers and all they mean in matters of finances, morale, etc., constitute the chief basis of success. The question of the organizability of labor is of particular interest to the student of ethics, in passing, because of the light it throws on such fundamental controversies as group self-help versus community action, individualism versus collectivism, direct versus political action.

The comprehensive and detailed data of the volume may be thrown under four heads: (1) the methods and character of the unions themselves which make possible the organization and holding of the workers. The familiar policies of the strike, the boycott, the union label, the closed shop, organizers, education, as well as the immediate and individual advantages in the form of

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higher wages and better conditions of employment, mutual insurance, protection against arbitrary discipline, and increased facility in securing employment, are mentioned. (2) The characteristics of the workers play an important rôle. The unskilled cannot or will not pay dues, consider the future or produce the requisite leadership. Women, negroes and immigrants offer their own difficulties, to make no mention of office workers. (3) The powerful trust or employers' association may or may not be a hindrance to unionism. It depends on the willingness or ability to use its great force. Unfortunately economic self-interest and the rule of the stronger have been given almost free play. The small business and the nature of the trade offer problems also. Finally, (4) general economic conditions and public opinion play their part. The business cycle makes itself felt, the concentration of population is a factor, and the sympathy of the so-called public helps or retards.

The merit of the work consists in its inclusiveness, its definiteness and most of all in its intelligent and detailed consideration of the significant factors in this vital topic. One may criticize it in general, however, for lacking a very intimate, and most personal understanding of the situation, the study is the result of a weighing of factors by one who is on the outside; interviews and a bibliography supply what years of first hand contact alone can truly give. The difficulties of organizing the workers in trustified plants are somewhat glossed over at the end, for example, by a plea to the unions to conduct themselves more properly and win the approval of the public. Until the shoe pinches the so-called public hardly bothers in such matters. Furthermore, attention is confined to the work of the American Federation of Labor and hardly any mention is made of the heroic if somewhat unsuccessful efforts of the Industrial Workers of the World to arouse the "lumpen—proletariat," however doubtful the expediency of some of the devices used. The study, it should be said before closing, is one of the best in the splendid series.

NATHAN FINE.

FATE AND FREE WILL. By Ardaser Sorabjee N. Wadia. London and Toronto: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1915. Pp. xii, 190.

Gifted with a clear mind and clear style, Mr. Wadia stands in the first rank of those Indians who have expressed themselves in English. Last year he published some remarkable political and

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social studies about India; now he has written out an account of his private faith. He is a Determinist and he prefaces his confession by a survey of Determinists and believers in Free Will through the centuries, a survey that evinces knowledge and power of arrangement, though it is a little out of place in so short and so personal a book. More valuable are the scraps he tells us about his own development—his discovery (some of us cannot make it) of Harmony and Eternity in the stars, his irritation (all of us have shared it) when his father said to him as a boy, "You would not have failed if you had only tried a little harder." The parent *qua* parent is apt to uphold Free Will, *qua* politician or *qua* employee he may acquiesce in Fate, and one may remark in passing that most of us do in practice vacillate between these two beliefs, just as we vacillate between belief and disbelief in immortality. Mr. Wadia, whose own mind is of a scholarly quality, scarcely realizes our vacillation and expects us to reply "Yes" or "No" to his powers when we can only stammer "It depends upon what I am doing." Like most psychologists he lacks insight into human nature, and this is perhaps the chief flaw in his equipment.

When he dicussses which of the two beliefs we *ought* to hold—and it is of course his main theme—he stands on firmer ground. His words are impressive and passionately represent his convictions. He believes with Saint Augustine that the will is an executive not an originative force, and that it is as absurd to speak of "Free-will" as of "Free-emotion," or "Free-memory," all being alike faculties of the mind; that all our actions were foreordained, not indeed by God, in whom he disbelieves, but by the iron laws of Nature, and that they generate not in our consciousness, but in the vast and unexplored world of the subconscious. When that world is explored and its laws understood we shall be able to foretell the future, and already are better equipped to face the present than is the Voluntarist, because we realize that we are being used by a power greater than our own. But Mr. Wadia does not dwell on the rewards of Determinism—rewards which most Determinists have indeed been unable to grasp. He is satisfied with his creed, as men of vigorous temperament are apt to be, yet he holds it not for the satisfaction, but because it is the only creed that facts, as he apprehends them, permit. Sincerely desirous of truth, he is not to be silenced by any considerations of expediency.

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"I know the danger of the doctrine I am discussing, but I know the greater danger of the other doctrine that would stifle enquiry on the pretense of its dangerous consequences to religion and morality. But Philosophy can no more accept the unreasonable demands of religion and morality than she can reject the just demands of atheism and immorality."

Welcome at all times, such an assertion is most valuable now, when men are tempted by the external crisis to establish an auto censorship over their own thoughts. Mr. Wadia has produced a stimulating and valuable book. His philosophy can only be criticised by the professional philosopher. But he also addresses the general public, and, as a member of it, the present reviewer would applaud the sincerity and the courage with which he writes and would indicate the robust and slightly imperceptive temperment from which that courage springs.

E. M. FORSTER.

Weybridge, England.

SHORTER NOTICES.

THE FREE MAN AND THE SOLDIER. By Ralph Barton Perry. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1916. Pp. ix, 237. Price, $1.40 net.

"The Free Man and the Soldier" is a collection of twelve essays, ten of them reprinted from the periodical press, all bearing more or less upon the war. The divergencies in content and in treatment are enormous, however; indeed they provide a series of shocks for any reader unprepared by foreknowledge of the great versatility of Professor Perry's mind. Thus a couple of magazine articles pleading for military preparedness (in 1916) written in brilliant journalese are followed by an essay—the solidest in the book—in which Professor Perry digs deep into philosophy for the sources of German cultural intolerance. This is succeeded by an amusing skit on the life of the Plattsburg "Rookie"—written from actual experience. There follows a quartet of war essays, including Professor Perry's much discussed answers to Bertrand Russell's still more famous articles in *The Atlantic* and THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS. The book is concluded with a group of papers with comparatively little bearing on the problems of the war in which the author philosophizes about "Harvard individualism," liberal education, the "useless virtue" of rationality, and the feminist movement.

The only unfortunate essay in the collection is the preface. There Professor Perry imputes to the book as a whole a seriousness of purpose and a regard for "the whole truth" which are conspicuously lacking in the more ardently pro-preparedness and pro-Entente articles. In this regard the contrast between Bertrand Russell and Professor Perry is by no means favorable to Professor Perry. Bertrand Russell's position is based on a profound distrust not of the ideas behind the slogans of the Allies but of the sincerity with which those slogans are uttered by the men who control

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affairs of state. He has substantiated that distrust with a scholarly analysis of the military and diplomatic past of the nations involved—a past which we all prefer not to examine too critically, and which Professor Perry adroitly eliminates from the discussion. Instead of ploughing deep into the foundations of Russell's argument Professor Perry shows a tendency to attribute to his antagonist a "belief that when a man has struck an attitude, and has braved it out in the midst of a rough and vulgar world, he has somehow solved the problem and done his duty" (p. 97).

But waiving this dispute, one can hardly accept such dicta as the following as expressing "the whole truth": "Military preparedness in itself means nothing more than foresight and organization applied to the contingency of war" (p. 12); "Compulsory military service is in principle contrary to no ideal save that of reaping without toil and sacrifice" (p. 33); "What he (the conscientious objector) needs is a new conscience which will teach him to keep the faith with his fellows until such time as their common understanding and their controlling policy shall have been modified" (p. 37).

C. E. A.

THE WILL TO FREEDOM: OR THE GOSPEL OF NIETZSCHE AND THE GOSPEL OF CHRIST. By J. N. Figgis, D.D., Litt.D. London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1917. Pp. xx, 320. Price, 6s. net.

Dr. Figgis's study of Nietzsche in six lectures is not the summary condemnation universal at one time in the English press. He is in love with his subject, and under the charm of a writer who spoke of Christianity as "the one great curse, the one great intrinsic depravity." But to Dr. Figgis, pessimism is "ten thousand times more wicked than all the variegated blasphemies of Nietzsche."

His study of Nietzsche is able, fresh and sympathetic; he lays stress on the fact that Nietzsche's influence on modern Germany was by no means lessened by his anti-Prussian views of later years. Perhaps because he is under Nietzsche's charm, he does not quite come to grips with his subject. He gives four pages to a quotation of purely literary interest, and does not put up a reply to the Nietzschean assault upon Christian ethics.

It is somewhat difficult to reconcile Dr. Figgis's attitude to Nietzsche as "a friend in many ways to Christianity"; and at the same time as "one of the many influences that will deepen the cleavage between the church and the world in the future," a dangerous influence, whose doctrine of the superman, is "the spirit of pride in mere power, which believes that for powerful individuals or classes and for these alone, nothing is true, all things are permitted." Nietzsche's dissent from Christian ethics is so pronounced; the points in common with the Christian view of life so few, that it is misleading to style the "John the Baptist of the new kingdom" in any way the friend of Christianity.

M. J.

THE CHOICE BEFORE US. By G. Lowes Dickinson. London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1917. Pp. ix, 274. Price, 6s. net.

Mr. Lowes Dickinson paints the future of a world given over to militarism, and to wars of terrific intensity, such as are sketched by the Russian general Skugarewski; and in the latter part of the book discusses the alternative, manifold problems of international control, covering very much the same ground as other recent internationalist literature.

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The first part of the book, which was written before M. Séch'és *Les Guerres d'Enfer*, is very well worth reading from the intensity, vigour and directness of its attack upon the reality underlying the militaristic ideal. His thesis is well supported by documents. Militarism is to a great extent an European phenomenon, for the far East (with the exception of Japan) is untouched by it. "For that reason," writes the author, "those parts of the world are the hope of the world." Within a few pages he quotes a very interesting letter from a Chinese Confucian (p. 22) which shows militarism spreading like an epidemic even in China, and China looking forward to defending her vast empire and "claiming the voice and place to which she is entitled in the family of nations." With regard to militarism in England, Mr. Lowes Dickinson lays undue stress on an entirely uninfluential and forgotten book by Captain Ross in his attempt to find evidences of militarism in countries other than Germany.

With all his justifiable indignation at the conscription that needs persecution, he goes too far in his forecast that "it will not be long if conscription is continued after the war, before these men (*i. e.* conscientious objectors) will be shot with the full approval of the Press, the universities, and the Churches." The value of the book lies in its appeal to realities; its criticism of unreal standards and ideals, of the flat assertion that the "State is a personality different in kind from the individuals it controls; the weakness of any foreign policy which behaves in abstraction from the concrete interests of the people."

M. J.

THE COMING POLITY: A STUDY IN RECONSTRUCTION. By Patrick Geddes and Victor Branford (The Making of the Future Series). London: Williams and Norgate, 1917. Pp. xviii, 264. Price, 5s. net.

This interesting and optimistic opening volume of the Making of the Future Series is another sign of the reaction against the tendency to hypostatize the State in the political theory, that was inspired by Germany. Instead, the authors look to France and the French sociological ideals as expressed by Comte and Le Play, and particularly to the latter's conception of regionalism, and tend to re-express the problems of statecraft, and nationalism in the concrete terms of civic and regional life. As in *Ideals at War*, the great new figure on education is, of course, Baden Powell, and the authors require for boys "in place of the existing elementary school, an elemental school, with picked craftsmen for schoolmasters."

M. J.

PROPOSALS FOR THE PREVENTION OF FUTURE WARS. By Viscount Bryce and others. London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1917. Pp. 54. Price, 1s. net.

The proposals include in a convenient form Lord Bryce's draft scheme, the programme of the League of Nations Society and of the American League to Enforce Peace, together with an appendix giving quotations from leading statesmen on the subject of international relationships after the war, and an Introduction in which the project of the authors is stated as not "a world state or even an European Federation" (which they do not believe to be practicable at any near date), but an association of independent and sovereign states which could be realised immediately at the conclusion of the war. This avoids the crux of various proposals, entailing the inevitable surrender of sovereignty.

M. J.

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HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE WAR. By John Burnet. London: Macmillan and Company, Ltd., 1917. Pp. x, 238. Price, 4s. 6d. net.

This is a most thorough, sane, and scientific piece of work. Most of the criticisms on the German educational system were published in an address delivered in 1913, and they are not therefore unduly influenced by the war (p. vii). Thus the conclusion (p. 214) that "it is impracticable for us to throw the whole burden of giving a complete liberal education on the secondary schools, and that it would be most undesirable even if it were practicable," has a quite special value. Americans will read pp. 40–48 and 223–238 with particular interest. This is the best work on education we have seen for a long time.

P. J.

PROBLEMS OF THE WAR. Papers read before the Grotius Society in the year 1916. Vol. II. London: Sweet and Maxwell, Ltd., 1917. Pp. xxvi, 178. Price, 6s. net.

The second volume of the proceedings of the Grotius Society carries on the policy of the earlier volumes, a policy of the full discussion of problems of international law from the juridical standpoint. As claimed in the editorial note "not one of the writers has consciously departed from that attitude of impartiality which should distinguish an international jurist." Among the valuable contributions are papers on 'International Leagues,' on 'The Enforcement of the Hague Conventions,' and on the effect of the war on international law, which lays special stress on the fact that the freedom of the seas is seriously compromised by the creation by belligerents of what are called war zones. There are also papers of ethical interest on questions directly arising out of the war, such as the punishment of war crimes, the treatment of civilians in occupied territories; and 'war-treason'; the latter the result, according to Professor J. H. Morgan, of a "forced and illegitimate union between Constitutional Law and National Law," and of German origin. According to the German military code, supplemented by an Imperial ordinance, in time of war, a foreigner who in Germany in the field, or in occupied country whether in the field or not, commits any of the offenses which, if committed by a German soldier would be war-treason, is guilty of the same offence; which is an intolerably harsh conception.

M. J.

RATIONAL SEX ETHICS. By W. F. Robie. Boston: Richard G. Badger, 1916. Pp. 356.

The word "rational" in the title of this book is relevant, in the first place, to the method employed. The discussion is based upon an inductive study of material obtained in part through the author's medical experience and in part through questionnaires filled out by "what is considered the better part of the middle class." The questionnaires seem to have been in many cases supplemented by personal interviews. The outcome of the inquiry indicates a far greater frequency in this class of auto-erotism and a less amount of promiscuous relations than has ordinarily been supposed. The author is convinced also that the evil consequences of auto-erotism have been greatly exaggerated and that the fear of evil consequences has frequently been the worst factor.

In the second place the term "rational" might be applied to the recom-

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mendations of the author, if we understand by rational what is removed from extreme. While opposing utterly promiscuous sex relations, the author emphasizes the positive values of vigorous sex life. His clinical advice to many persons both normal and neurotic, in which he has employed methods similar to those of Freudian analysis, seems to have yielded highly beneficial results.

J. H. T.

MOTHERHOOD AND THE RELATIONSHIPS OF THE SEXES. By C. Gasquoine Hartley. London: Eveleigh Nash and Company, Ltd., 1917. Pp. 396. Price, 7s. 6d. net.

This book makes some excellent points: for instance "There are still too many births for our civilization to look after: we are still unfit to be trusted with a rising birth-rate"; yet the author subsequently quotes, without protest or criticism, from Dr. Mary Scharlieb's bigoted and dishonest statements! The whole chapter on "The Unmarried Mother" is very timely and useful: so is the plea for honourable recognition of individual sexual diversity, and the insistence on the harm which is being done by the systematic ignoring of women's special physiology, both in industry and education.

It is a pity that the wisdom and justice of many of C. G. Hartley's contentions should be stifled in a rhetoric which resembles masses of pink cotton wool, and interspersed with bits of pure reaction, *e. g.* "Woman belongs not to herself, but to posterity"! Moreover the habit of unacknowledged quotation has grown upon her, sentences are lifted bodily from the work of Ellen Key, Patrick Geddes, from Sylvia Pankhurst's excellent essay on The Birth-Rate Commission's Report—without any indication of their source.

The author's exhortations to her sex sometimes degenerate into sheer nagging; it is absurd to blame women primarily for the social chaos of the present or the immediate past.

The book compares unfavorably both with C. G. Hartley's first work "The Truth about Women," and with the straightforward and exhaustive study, "The Sexual Crisis" by Grete Meisel Hess, which is accessible to Americans in the Pauls' valuable translation.

F. W. STELLA BROWNE.

THE MAGDALEN HOSPITAL: THE STORY OF A GREAT CHARITY. By the Rev. H. F. B. Compston. With Foreword by the Archbishop of Canterbury. London: Society For Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1917. Pp. 237. Price, 7s. 6d. net.

The eighteenth century in England was an era of charitable enterprise and social reform, and among many other charitable undertakings of the utmost importance it saw the foundation of the first English Penitentiary by Robert Dingley. It was in 1758 and as a result of a letter in the *Rambler* and an article in the *Gentleman's Magazine*, both of 1751, that Robert Dingley published his *Proposals for establishing a public place of reception for Penitent Prostitutes*, and the foundation of the Magdalen Hospital took place almost immediately after this. The origin and history of the Hospital is given in Part I of the book under notice, and Part II is biographical and descriptive and deals with both the past and the present. An Appendix deals with accounts of past and present officers and staff and so on. There are twenty excellent illustrations, the book is written well

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and with great care and detail, it is magnificently printed, and it is altogether of very great interest and value.

P. J.

POVERTY AND ITS VICIOUS CIRCLES. By Jamieson B. Hurry, M.A., M.D. London: J. and A. Churchill, 1917. Pp. xiv, 180. Price, 5s. net.

The problem of poverty is illustrated diagramatically by woodcuts which help in the visualisation of ideas. No detailed discussions of measures for dealing with poverty are included, as the author restricts himself to the analysis of certain of its causes and concomitants, as far as they can be shown in the "Vicious Circle."

M. J.

SOCIAL AND INTERNATIONAL IDEALS. By Bernard Bosanquet. London: Macmillan and Company, Ltd., 1917. Pp. 325. Price, 6s. net.

Most of the papers, written in a strain of reasoned optimism, are reprinted from *The Charity Organisation Review* and discuss the principles which should underlie our handling of social problems, and certain aspects of social psychology. The essay on "the function of the state in promoting the unity of mankind" contains a restatement of his theory of the Super-Personality of the State, and a defence against the charge that implies "Prussian militarism." Dr. Bosanquet argues that a community cannot be responsible for crimes committed by its agents, but finally confesses that "recent events have done something to show that the responsibility of a community for a single wicked action may be more intimate than I had thought possible,"—a very candid admission. Most of the papers were written before the war, and a finely-written chapter on true pacifism and patriotism is perhaps the most generally interesting to-day. Throughout the book stress is laid on a noble conception of life as the only road to peace, and "to increase the number of persons who value things in this way and to adapt political forms to the expression of their will, is the only infallible road, however long, to the immense diminution, if not to the abolition, of war."

M. J.

FIRST PRINCIPLES OF MATERIAL WELL-BEING. By Benjamin Davies. London: Headley Brothers, Ltd., 1917. Pp. 64. Price, 1s. 6d. net.

A criticism of monopoly, usury and unproductive labour, in lieu of which the author holds up the principle of association.

M. J.

GUILD PRINCIPLES IN WAR AND PEACE. By S. G. Hobson. With an Introductory Essay by A. R. Orage. London: G. Bell and Sons, Ltd., 1917. Pp. viii, 176. Price, 2s. 6d. net.

This book is a development of the thesis of *National Guilds*, and the attack on the wage-system is admirably continued. The book is worthy of more attention than its small size would seem to indicate: for Mr. Hobson is not only a clear thinker but also an attractive writer. The analysis of the evils in modern social structure seems to me to be correct, although many details have necessarily to be omitted in a small summary. The central idea is that labour is not a commodity as the economists have pretended: and it is shown that labour is not really treated as a commodity

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by the managers of labour except when they are making up their accounts. It is argued that there is no reason why capital should not bear the support of labour during periods of unemployment: for the maintenance of a reserve of surplus is a distinct advantage to capital. The solution of the difficulty and the cure of the evils of the wage-system are said to be National Guilds. But in the constructive part of his thesis the author is not so persuasive as in the analysis. That is not to say that he is wrong: the solution he proposes appears to be on the right lines, but it is undeveloped. The obstacles are not really faced. It is too easily supposed that a complete and autonomous industry could be so organised as not to oppress either those belonging to it or the general public. But we may wish National Guilds "God-speed." There are too few good ideas in the world of political and social theory, and as for the practice of politics—that is unspeakably obsolete in its methods.

C. D. B.

COMMUNITY: a sociological study, being an attempt to set out the nature and fundamental laws of social life. By R. M. Maciver, D.Phil. London: Macmillan and Company, Ltd., 1917. Pp. xvi, 467. Price, 12s. net.

In this remarkable book—remarkable for the vigour, originality and precision of the views presented—Dr. Maciver sets out the nature and fundamental laws of social life or community. He sets aside certain unreal distinctions between individual and social, as a main source of sociological error, for, as he writes in the chapter on "False Perspectives of Community":

"There are no individuals who are not social individuals, and society is nothing more than individuals associated and organised. Society has no life but the life of its members, no ends that are not their ends and no fulfilment beyond theirs. There is no conflict between society and *the* individual, between the welfare of the society and the welfare of *the* individual. The quality of the society is the quality of its members."

As community is the common life, an association is "an organisation of social life definitely established for the pursuit of one or more interests. The association is partial, a community is integral." He is averse from using expressions such as "collected wills," "tribal wills" and "spirit of the crowd" without due reservations, for they conceal the interaction of many individual minds, not a collective unit. "Because community is a union of minds, it is not therefore itself a mind. . . . Why are we to call the interrelation of mental forces a mind? Does the system so created think and feel and act? Does it perform a single one of those operations which we recognize as the work of . . . a mind?" (p. 76).

Of the two appendices, A is a very masterly criticism of neo-Hegelian identification of the State with society, in which the author examines the doctrine held by Rousseau, Hegel and Professor Bosanquet, showing that "in every case they are vitiated by a too narrow Hellenism." It is, perhaps, in this illuminating criticism of authorities such as Professor Bosanquet in this appendix and of M. Durkheim (p. 87), Mr. William McDougall (p. 79) that Dr. Maciver is at his best.

M. J.

AN INDUCTIVE STUDY OF RIGHT AND WRONG. By Mathew Hale Wilson. Boston: Richard G. Badger, 1916. Pp. 321. Price, $1.50 net.

Although modern society is doubtless not so highly stereotyped as the earlier social orders out of which it has developed, it is very much more

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complex, and the very redundancy of the moral conventions of our civilization is therefore rather more likely to baffle the young people who are under the necessity of learning them than was the greater fixity of the taboos of the simpler social organization. And hence there is much to be said for the book which attempts, as "An Inductive Study" does, to bring together as many as possible of the moral conventions which have come to be our accepted guides as children and as parents, as pupils and as teachers, as members of the professions and in the different walks of business life, in our conduct of our political and social affairs as well as in our regulation of our own private lives. But "An Inductive Study" has accomplished this task somewhat too well. There are in it rather too few hints of the magnitude and importance of the unsolved moral problems which will beset the paths of its youthful readers almost before they have got a start in the world of affairs.

C. E. A.

ETUDES DE PHILOSOPHIE MORALE. By Charles Werner. Paris et Geneva: 1917. Pp. vii, 249.

Not the least of the evil products of the great war is the flood of impoverished writings which is making its appearance in all branches of literature. This volume which we hope can refer to the war as an extenuating circumstance is a fair example of what should not be encouraged in the domain of philosophy. It consists of a series of essays of which all but two have appeared before, and presents a theologico-philosophical viewpoint. The book is sufficiently characterized by its support of the idea that reality is not found in the world of perception, and the constant reiteration of the fallacy of the contradictory nature of science.

J. R. K.

ORGANIC TO HUMAN: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL. By Henry Maudsley, M.D. London: Macmillan and Company, 1916. Pp. 402. Price, 12s. 6d. net.

The candour with which Dr. Maudsley admits that this book was written to "occupy the time," should perhaps disarm criticism: yet it is difficult not to feel that the author might have found better occupation. There is a stupefying amount of repetition, there is no absolutely new detailed scientific research and there is a singular deadness to the creative and constructive impulses of our time; and all this is set forth in an excruciating style, heavily pedestrian, yet tortuous, culminating in a sentence twenty lines long, which concludes aptly enough with the phrase "ventosities of inflated verbiage!" (p. 313). The criticism of Socialist theory is particularly shallow. The best things in the book are the occasional footnotes which contain some curious facts.

F. W. S. B.

GREEK IDEALS: A STUDY OF SOCIAL LIFE. By C. Delisle Burns. London: G. Bell and Sons, Ltd., 1917. Pp. xii, 276. Price, 5s. net.

Mr. Delisle Burns has written this little book for the ordinary man of intelligence wishing to know what we owe to Greece; but this is not to say that the scholar will not find it very fresh and arresting reading, even though "it contains no reference which will be new to scholars, and no subversively new conclusions drawn from the old evidence." It is a

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popularisation, in the best sense of the word; a discussion of Greek ideals that he who runs may read. Emphasis is laid on the Greek idea of sociability, and the main argument of the book is that the Greeks desired a life in society and a character completely social; and society was conceived primarily as a religious union. In so far as society was organised politically their social life shows a desire for flexibility in law and free local development. Later developments of Greek ideals are expressed in literature; the 'old school' stood for traditional excellence, and the philosophers made Greek ideals more consistent and more exalted. Plato "expresses the desire for a perfect society, in which every man capable of a high development shall have an opportunity of doing what he is best fitted to do."

The best passages in the book deal, as is natural from Mr. Delisle Burns' earlier work, with political ideals, and his criticism of Plato's Republic is of great interest.

M. J.

THE CONTINGENCY OF THE LAWS OF NATURE. By Emile Boutroux. Chicago: Open Court Publishing Company, 1916. Pp. ix, 196.

This volume, which was originally presented to the Sorbonne as a dissertation (1874), revived in 1895 and now translated, is a brilliant presentation of some ideas now long current.

M. Boutroux treats the problem of contingency with that delightful dialectic of which the French are masters. The fundamental thesis of the book is that phenomena are not subject to the laws of nature. The laws "express only the relations that are due to their previously realized nature" (p. 155). The contingency of the laws of nature is indicated, among other things, by the mutability of species and the impossibility of accounting for living and conscious beings by the operation of physical and physiological laws.

The positive result which M. Boutroux reaches is the fact of human freedom. He considers that the Beings of nature have a further task than merely to continue in existence. They must realize an ideal. In order to realize this ideal, which is highly developed in man, we find him endowed with free will, which is the power to choose between good and evil. The appearance of necessity in the world is caused by the fact that the ideal of the world is attempting to realize itself.

The ultimate support of this entire scheme of nature and freedom is God, who not only creates beings but is the ideal which guides their development. As long as M. Boutroux criticizes the assumption of an ultimate mechanical explanation of phenomena he is contributing to our understanding of experience. When he substitutes rather arbitrarily another ultimate he makes his argument lose most of its point. In general the tone of the book is that which characterized much of the reaction to Darwinism in its early career. A possible reason for the revival of the volume now is to be found in the stimulating challenge of current events for final explanations of human conditions.

J. R. K.

A SCALE OF PERFORMANCE TESTS. By Pintner and Paterson. New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1917. Pp. ix, 218.

Students of social ethics are watching with serious expectancy the contributions which psychology is making toward the solution of their

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problems. Of particular interest to them is the work being done which has for its object the determination of the mental and moral status of individuals. They hope to receive much aid from the researches made in these fields. Although, as yet, nothing very definite has resulted from these researches, their development is not without instruction. The present book is a description of a scale of performance tests which is designed to grade individuals as to their mental ability. The performance tests obviate verbal instructions and responses, and are serviceable with foreign and deaf children and also those who have speech defects. The tests consist mainly in putting together figures and pictures.

J. R. K.

THE PASSING OF THE GREAT RACE, OR THE RACIAL BASIS OF EUROPEAN HISTORY. By Madison Grant, with a preface by H. F. Osborn. London: G. Bell and Sons, Ltd., 1917. Pp. xx, 232. Illustrated with numerous maps and plans. Price, 8s. 6d. net.

Mr. Grant's book is a popular statement of the racial problems of European history, illustrated by many very generalized maps; and emphasizing heredity rather than environment. The European problems are, as is natural in an American author, of serious import to Americans, especially in relation to immigration and the consequent racial degeneration. We confess ourselves puzzled by a chronological table, which dates the finding of iron in the second city of Hissarlik at 2000 B.C. and the discovery of its use in Crete eight hundred years later. It is, moreover, not obvious why Cnossos should be mentioned as if it flourished in the last Minoan age alone. In the present war he sees a demonstration of the truth that "the basis of the government of man is now and always will be force, not sentiment," and he looks on the war as "the modern edition of the old Berserker blood rage, class suicide on a gigantic scale," in which the Northern or Teutonic race is "passing." The book, which is written by a well-known American zoölogist, has some interesting features.

J. M. E.

THE EXPANSION OF EUROPE. By Ramsay Muir. London: Constable and Company, Ltd., 1917. Pp. xii, 244. Price, 6s. net.

The book, originally designed as one of a set of four to be included under the general title "The Culmination of Modern History," is a continuation of the author's *Nationalism and Internationalism*, in which he pointed out that the principle of autocracy, which the central empires stand for, is in the final stages of a struggle with "the rule of liberty and the rule of law." The first part of the book is a well-arranged survey of the process by which the whole world has, during the past four centuries, been subjugated by the civilisation of Europe. A fine contribution to imperialism is given in Professor Muir's quotation from an early nineteenth century official report laid before the British Parliament, containing the words: "It is recognised as an indisputable principle that the interests of the Native subjects are to be consulted in preference to those of Europeans, whenever the two come into competition." It would be hard to find, as he truly says, a parallel to this formal statement of policy by the supreme government of a ruling race.

Professor Muir's historical survey is sound and full, yet without any unnecessary multiplicity of detail; but in the last stages, where the great challenge to the greatest of the new composite world states, the British

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Empire, is dealt with there is a polemical note, and his references to America throughout are acid and grudging.

M. J.

THE ATHENÆUM SUBJECT INDEX TO PERIODICALS. 1916. Issued at the Request of the Council of the Library Association. Theology and Philosophy. London: The Athenæum, 1917. Pp. 48. Price, 2s. 6d. net.

This useful class list contains entries of a number of articles from 187 periodicals distributed under subject headings. Also an alphabetical index of authors is given at the end of the class list. As compared with that for the previous year, this subject list has increased in bulk by 43 per cent and the journals quoted by 33⅓ per cent. It is perhaps only to be expected that German periodicals should not be quoted, but it is rather difficult to account for the neglect of such periodicals as the *Revue de Metaphysiqué et de Morale*, the *Journal of Psychology, Philosophy and Scientific Methods*, and for the fact that only the London address of the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS and only the Chicago address of the *Monist* are given. In this list, "religion" comprises, besides Christian and non-Christian religions, primitive religion and consequently witchcraft, magic, and the occult. In the same way, philosophy, including ethics and psychology, carries with it some headings verging on social, medical, and pathological psychology. It has been found convenient to include the articles relating to Jew[illegible], though these may not be all of a religious interest.

P. J.

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A LEAGUE OF NATIONS: CONTRIBUTIONS BY VARIOUS WRITERS ON THE PROJECT OF. London: The League of Nations Society, 1917. Pp. 30. Price, 6d.

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ETHICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.[1]

JAMES H. TUFTS.

IS THERE, can there be, any ethics of international relations? Or must we recognize that as regards actual conditions, ethical theories are as hopelessly in conflict as warring nations, and that as regards the future, the best that ethics can offer is a choice between radically different views of human responsibilities, standards, and values?

Such conflict seems to deny the basal presuppositions of ethics. If there can be no genuine moral principle that does not hold good for all rational beings, if consequences of happiness or well being for all rationals must be reckoned with, if good and bad are properties of things independent of opinion, or if good is the transcendent and eternal—on any of these ethical theories right and good should not be determined by national frontiers. Yet apart from recriminations as to specific acts which seem to one antagonist either intrinsically good or else entirely justifiable as means, whereas to the other they appear so utterly abhorrent as to condemn any end which incorporates them, there are no doubt fundamental differences in moral attitude. As in the historic battles between national religions, or as with such issues as split Loyalist and Puritan in England, North

[1] This and the two following papers by Professors Hocking and Overstreet opened the Discussion on Ethics and International Relations before the American Philosophical Association at its Princeton meeting December 27-28, 1917. They are published together in accordance with the vote of the Association.

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and South in our Civil War, great causes are more or less masked under particular occasions; the names under which men fight do not by any means always show what are the real principles which contend for victory.

I propose to outline certain of the more typical of the issues, combining to some extent the two methods of approach: psychological explanation of what is, and consideration of what ought to be. The questions may be conveniently grouped under the heads of responsibility, justice, and ultimate values.

I.

Can Nations be Regarded as Moral Agents?

"International conflicts are not so much moral events as they are the clashing of social forces."[2]

"The author seems to be quite unaware that he is being guilty of an unpardonable confusion of thought. All ethical considerations are completely alien to the state, and the state must therefore resolutely keep them at arm's length."[3]

The first of these quotations would suspend ethical prosecutions in war time in view of the disagreements of juries, and substitute the activity of sociology which raises no question of responsibility, but merely traces forces at work.

The second would demur absolutely to any ethical judgments upon states. The private citizen cannot try the government. The state knows neither right nor wrong, justice nor mercy. Whether one view the state as above morality, as *ex-lex*, like the God of certain scholastics, or place it in a distinct compartment—"politics is politics," just as "business is business"—the practical outcome is the same. All ethicists are hereby solemnly suspended from their occupations so far as states are concerned. Let them consider private morals, or the absolute good. But when the state kills or makes alive, covenants or breaks cove-

[2] Professor H. C. Warren, International Journal of Ethics, March, 1917.

[3] Review by Professor Eulenberg of Leipsic, of Jerusalem's, *Der Krieg im Licht der Socialtheorie*, in *Archiv für Socialwissenschaft u. Socialpolitik*, July, 1916, p. 317.

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nants, seizes or defends, the proper attitude for philosophy is "*nicht sich ärgern, nur bewundern.*"

Professor Warren's attention was challenged by the disagreement of moral judgments pronounced not only by the warring nations of Europe, but also by psychologists and philosophers of this country before we entered the war. One of Professor Warren's inferences may be provisionally accepted: "The nations which are brought into conflict by clashing ideals are not governed by the same ethical standards." But are we thereby forced to conclude that there is "no alternative open but to judge it from a wholly non-ethical standpoint"? True enough that most, if not all, civilized nations in the past, and even in the not very remote past, have broken agreements and invaded smaller states, and in this country we know how radically sincere men in North and South differed on the ethics of slavery. All this is in point against certain ethical attitudes which presuppose universal intuitions or inevitable logic, or an absolutely unquestionable scale of values with its possibility for conclusive weighing of consequences. But the important question is, Will the world gain, or shall we as thinkers gain, by abdicating all moral jurisdiction?

The half truth in the contention is that as yet social forces are imperfectly understood and imperfectly controlled. As Professor Dewey said in substance at the twenty-fifth anniversary exercise of the American Psychological Association, one great reason for the ills under which politics and society suffer is that our social sciences have not kept pace with our physical sciences. We have tools of production and weapons of destruction, but not the means for their control in the interest of human welfare.

But two things ought to be said further: First, the forces which issue in individual action are likewise imperfectly understood, and with some men and women, very imperfectly controlled. Yet we pursue a steady policy of holding the individual responsible for acts which cause injury to his fellows. To "shoot up" a continent is an act for which the plea of "social forces" cannot be accepted as a

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bar to ethical judgments. If the philosophers hold their peace, the dead must cry out. The jury may stay out long for the evidence; it may find various degrees of murder; but the old verdict of death by the act of God will not satisfy. And in the second place, control over social forces is not entirely lacking. Bismarck did not think so. He informed Crispi as to the methods of guiding public opinion. He himself gave a brilliant example of ability to make public opinion in two countries demand war. Is it to be presumed that both instruction and example have been forgotten or neglected? There is much to indicate that no such logical inconsistency or practical *non sequitur* as praise of his methods and failure to follow them has been committed.

What can we say to the more absolute demurrer of Eulenberg? In its extreme form it refutes itself. For if there is anything essential to the existence of a modern state, it is the loyalty of its citizens; and loyalty in its highest, most enduring form demands ethical approval. When the state consisted of an absolute monarch, or an absolute few, governed solely by greed for power and gain, secure by its resources of armor, or cavalry, or castles, as against the great mass of subject peoples or individuals, no ethical pretense was needed for conquest or plunder. But now the state finds that even for such wars, moral justification is necessary strategy. It must make its wars appear wars of self defense, as Bismarck taught. It still uses the political maxims cited by Kant in his *Essay on Perpetual Peace*, "*fac et excusa*," "*si fecisti, nega*"; but it does make excuses, it does make denials; it may even prepare the way for outrages by fictitious reports of similar outrages on the part of the enemy; it finds it wise to disguise annexation under the camouflage of "self-determination." Now the militarist or Macchiavellian may for a time succeed in playing the shrewd game of gaining ethical support for a non-ethical state; but the philosopher, at least, ought not to be privy to such a logical sleight-of-hand, and the common people are likely to be increasingly suspicious.

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It is in a modified form that the theory of no jurisdiction is more plausible. Ethics has a relation to international relations, the theory asserts, but the ethics which applies is not the ethics of individual life; the clash in ethical judgments is due to confusion between standards for the individual and standards for nation or state.[4] If the state is a supreme and transcendent entity; if in it all individual good culminates and all obligation is fulfilled; if it is the embodiment of reason, God on earth, then obviously the safety of the state *is* the supreme law. How shall mortal man be more just than his maker? So runs the thought of Hegel and essentially of Rümelin. Supplemented by the doctrines that history is the march of God and that the superiority of a given state proves it the representative of reason, the incarnation of the *Idee*, it sufficiently explains why those who hold such a doctrine must clash in judgments with those who do not. The infallible state denies the right of private judgment. Morally, as legally, the state can do no wrong. Englishmen and Americans, Münsterberg explains, are too hedonistic and egoistic in their ethics to apprehend such a superindividual object of loyalty.

It would doubtless be futile for the American to discuss this view if he is incapable of understanding it, but the query must be raised, whether at any rate any concrete particular state as yet fills the specifications of absolute reason. Granting that mankind — when mankind shall have progressed in wisdom, sympathy, and good will — organized for living nobly and well, may claim the loyalty of all men, does this give any particular state the right to trample on human life, pervert truth, poison good faith, and practice ruthless frightfulness under the plea of necessity? I may pass over further discussion of the dangers to human values in an abstract idealistic deification of the state, as they have been so admirably set forth in Professor Dewey's *German Philosophy and Politics*.

But a more downright and plausible form of removing

[4] Lord Lytton's Glasgow address, 1888.

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nations from moral control while seeming to maintain an ethical standard is that of Treitschke. Starting plausibly with a maxim of Kant, it ends with complete justification for *Machtpolitik*—the politics of Power. The state is a collective personality. Every personality must be treated as an end, not as a means only. Man and every personality "attains the highest perfection possible when he has developed the most essential part of himself. When we apply this standard to the state and remember that its very personality is power, we see its highest moral duty is to uphold that power . . . the injunction to assert itself remains always absolute. Weakness must always be condemned as the most disastrous and despicable of crimes, the unforgivable sin of politics."[5]

If we admit this absolute right of self assertion, no other justification for any act by the state is pertinent. The measure of ruthlessness is solely its success in increasing or maintaining power. The only refutation it can admit is failure. If other persons are not in sympathy with this idea, then their resentment may turn strength into weakness and thus prove the immorality of a specific act of ruthlessness. Likewise for a state to conquer what it cannot assimilate is immoral, for it displays weakness.

International law faces the doctrine in the following form: Aside from those provisions based upon treaties, there are other provisions which are in the nature of usages initiated or practiced by certain states, and accepted or at least tolerated by others. Such was the doctrine of "continuous voyage" put forth by the United States government during the Civil War. The German government desires to introduce a doctrine of "war zones." If we say that international law is anything that a power can carry through with the acquiescence of other powers, the question recurs: Shall other powers allow the power in question to "get away with it" or shall they resist? If it is an absolute duty of power *A* to assert itself, and an equally absolute

[5] *Politics*, Vol. 1, p. 94 ff.

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duty of power *B* to assert itself, are we not confronted with a contradiction which must at least awaken a doubt as to the absolute morality of power?

On this basis we might have an internal limit of power set by the ability to assimilate diverse elements into one national whole. Just as there is a point at which the superior efficiency of great corporations becomes doubtful, so a world-capturing policy in an empire may develop weakness.

If now proceeding from this absolute duty of self assertion we should attempt to forecast the ethics of international relations, we might at first sight suppose world domination the logical expression of any power strong enough to carry through such an aim—but too complete dominance would mean peace and this would be fatal to another militarist value—war. For Treitschke the logical outcome is, first, pluralism: "The state is power, precisely in order to assert itself against other equally independent powers"—and then war: "The grandeur of history lies in the perpetual conflict of nations." The same view of war as the "best and noblest form of the struggle for existence," in the words of Schmidt, "the main factor in true, genuine *Kultur*" according to Nippold; "A holy thing," "The holiest thing on earth" according to Sombart; is apparently shared by many besides Bernhardi.

It cannot be said that this scheme of power and conflict is absolutely non-ethical. Its scale of values places the heroic at the head, or it considers struggle as nature's, and therefore as man's, highest law.[6] As to the first point of view, I do not see how one can demonstrate by argument the values of other virtues to be superior to those of war. I can only wonder whether those who have actually been close enough to the trenches and the empty homes to take in the full experience of such a war as this, will still regard it as the best life. If so, I fear no arguments from pure reason will have consideration. I can only say in the words

[6] Compare Professor Vernon Kellogg's account of his conversations with the biologist in "Headquarters Nights," *Atlantic Monthly*, August, 1917.

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of Lincoln, "I should think that any one who likes this sort of thing would be very much pleased with it."

As for the second point, that since conflict is nature's law, it should also be man's, I reply that the very essence of ethical life according to pragmatist, idealist and at least one realist, is the possibility of at least partial control by intelligence instead of by trial and error, partial freedom from blind necessity, partial massing of forces against a reluctant cosmos.

One great task of ethics in relation to international relations, is to discover and point out how far intelligent methods of co-operation may supersede conflict as an international process. Münsterberg draws the analogy between war and prevalent methods of industrial competition, and uses it to justify war. But we have learned in the economic world to discriminate between a competition directed toward the conquest of nature which stimulates invention and thereby improves the condition of all, and a competition toward conquest of competitors, which substitutes brutality for ideas and profits only the winner.

Power is indeed by tradition the essence of the state. It was in military operations that the enormous power of human association and organization on a large scale first emerged. Political organizations followed military lines. The cruder processes of violence were at first largely met and controlled by blood and iron. And as a whole, Europe has never been able to co-operate. The colonies in this country nearly fell into the same slough of despond. Fortunately, they decided to co-operate, by trade, canals, railways, migrations, postal service, instead of competing by tariffs and maintaining armies. Economic power, only in the last century exercised on a scale comparable to political power, has been likewise proceeding wastefully, but we are now facing the elemental problem of economic supply of human needs more directly. Shall we go back to the older wasteful process?

I conclude that the doctrine of the state as naked power issues in an ethics of power which doubtless has claimed

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admiration, but which when universalized, so to speak, becomes too horrible a thing for most men to tolerate, and which even in its own test of power ignores the greater power of co-operation and good will as compared with conflict. For co-operation and good will never are evoked by power as power.

True it is that state and nation have peculiar tasks, peculiar responsibilities. They have been defenders of liberty and order, arbiters of justice, bonds of unity, preservers of culture, and agencies for common welfare of large groupings of men, though also agencies for strife and tyranny. True likewise that it is difficult for the individual, especially if he be of a different nation, to judge these adequately and fairly. Yet if the world is to remain tolerable for man no single group or organization, whether it call itself "state" or by less pretentious name, can claim exemption from moral responsibility. It is by international responsibility, ecumenical conscience and international guarantees that the great interests, of which nations have in the past been the necessary trustees and defenders, must be increasingly maintained.

II.

Conflicting Standards of Justice.

A second issue, more or less clearly emerging between the warring groups, is, What is the standard for justice? Stationary nations, or those which have already obtained what they want, are naturally insistent on the rights of the existing status. Those which are in process of rapid growth, or which have not reached territory adequate for their wants, would use for their measure of justice their need of expansion.

Several aspects of this issue have emerged in the present war. (a) Treaties versus needs of the situation when conditions change. (b) The right to areas of the earth, based on occupancy, or past conquest, as versus claims based on the need of a growing population, or the merits of superior civilization. (c) Established rules for land and

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sea warfare, designed to mitigate injury to non-combatants, as versus the changes necessary if a new invention such as the submarine is to be used with a maximun of result.

The question of treaties was well discussed by Mill, who took the ground that no government had the right to bind a people indefinitely. Treaties, he urged, should be for limited periods. It is noteworthy that the principle of the Dartmouth College case has been more and more strictly construed and limited by our courts in the interest of preserving freedom of action on the part of the public. Ethics must, however, distinguish between needs that commend themselves internationally, and needs that are egoistic. If the purpose is aggression, a nation can hardly command international sanction until this aggression is able to prove its claim.

The question of the right to occupy or control areas now sparsely occupied, or unimproved, is one that Americans decided in their own case on one basis when dealing with Indians, and on another when dealing with individual land ownership. Broadly speaking, the right of the whites to the territory controlled by the United States rests less on any treaties with the Indians than on the fact that under the civilization of the whites the land supports a hundred millions and may support many more, whereas under the Indian, and even Spanish control, it was far less fruitful. On the one hand, individual Indians ought to have been treated with consideration and humanity; on the other, it can not be said that the collective units, the tribes, ought to be preserved forever in their original status of exclusive occupancy of the whole continent. The case is analogous in part to the introduction of machinery. Individual workers ought not to bear the burden of readjustment, but society cannot refuse to accept inventions on the ground that some men will lose their employment in tasks for which they have acquired special skill.

Applying this principle to international affairs, and beginning with an extreme case, no small group of men can equitably possess or control indefinitely a great area, if it

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is thereby kept from contributing to human well being. But as civilization advances attachment to the soil increases, and the web of human relations grows stronger and more intricate. The case of actual occupants becomes stronger before the test of satisfying human needs, as well as in sentiment and legal title. Just here exchange of goods without surrender of soil has provided a solution. Just as it is no longer necessary to own an Epictetus in order to read his book, or to be lord over a villein in order to get the aid of the tiller of the soil, so it is increasingly unnecessary for a nation to own mines or forests or soil in order to obtain heat and metal, wool and wheat. This principle, however, must be carried farther. We have heard chiefly of an international court. My colleague, Dean Hall, urges that it is equally important and probably more important to set up an international legislature which shall have power to provide on the one hand for access to raw materials or such exchange as may secure them, and on the other, for suitable markets. Servia ought to have had more than one market. Germany makes splendid uses of iron; she ought to have iron without going about to get it by conquest. It is easy to see difficulties. Shall France be required by an international legislature to furnish iron wherewith Essen may forge weapons for the conquest of France? On the other hand, can such an international legislature prevent Germany from using the iron as it pleases when once it is in possession of it? Yet who can doubt that the path of progress must lie along the direction of providing for all legitimate needs by other than the crude method of ownership of men or dominion over the earth?

The most difficult obstacle in the way of a non-political method of providing for needs is the seeming diminution of political prestige. Will it answer to let England govern a district while Germany has the trade, or vice versa? Such was often the situation before the war. We get on harmoniously with Canada on this basis, yet the appeal to political interests when the reciprocity treaty was under consideration and the overturn of the Canadian govern-

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ment on this issue shows how easily such a question becomes delicate.

III.

Ultimate Values—Aristocracy vs. Democracy.

The third great issue which divides the contending groups is that of aristocracy versus democracy as a political and social order. Not that all the inhabitants of the Central Powers are Junkers, not that all British, French, and Americans are democratic in ideals and sympathies. But the dominating agencies in the first group, from the Hohenzollerns who have refused power offered by popular voice in order to hold it more securely when achieved by blood and iron, to their ecclesiastical and academic supporters, believe in direction by the few, discipline for the many. They maintain or accept the militarist scheme of subordination of civil to military power. The dominating forces in the opposing group are increasingly democratic and have no disposition to allow military forces the decisive word in national policy.

The psychology of Germany has been acutely analyzed by Veblen in his "Nature of Peace," as that of a feudal state. The religious ideas which come to us in such phrases as "the German God," or in the recent language of the emperor, "The year 1917 with its great battles has proved that the German people has in the Lord of Creation above an unconditional and avowed ally on whom it can absolutely rely," belong naturally with the feudal stage of society. A feudal morality finds in loyalty to a superior complete satisfaction and sufficient ethical sanction for any act. Bismarck's morals seem to have been of this sort, although sometimes in Prussia's interest he might resist the monarch. And on its other side, feudal morality is the *Herrenmoral* of a ruling class. It is not necessary to charge Nietzsche with bringing on the war, but he certainly thought he was advocating (1) a *Herrenmoral*, and (2) a morality the reverse of the general morality of Christendom. A class which believes in its divine right to govern will naturally find such a morality of masters convenient. And if a people believes

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its own culture so superior to that of other peoples as to make international law impossible,[7] it will easily accept so much of superior class morality as to make explicable collisions with codes of inferior cultures.

But let us look away from historic reasons why men are so, and consider in barest outline some of the values claimed for aristocracy and democracy respectively.

If we are to have increasing unity, increasing organization, shall it be along the line of superior-inferior class rule, that is, of empire, or along the line of self direction and equality? When I call this a question of ultimate values, I do not mean that none of the values have any common denominator, but that although some have, others apparently have not. Let us notice some of the issues which are arguable. They turn largely on whether we stake our case on what is, or on what may be, on nature or on intelligence, on mechanism or on consciousness.

(1) There is first the question of efficiency. This is based in part on specialization of function. If men are in fact different in both kind and degree of ability, is it not obvious that some should rule and others be ruled? From Plato and Aristotle to the present day, this has seemed to many axiomatic. A second closely related argument is, that democracy will refuse to use experts. It is a "cult of incompetence," as Faguet puts it. A representative of a group is chosen by the group, and therefore is below the level of the group who choose him; he sits in a group and therefore when in parliament sinks below his own level—such is the social psychology of Christensen.

The democrat replies: Admitting there are differences between men, the great question is, do we propose to *crystalize* these or to encourage the emergence of new powers? A class system takes the first course. Its machinery, social, political, educational, is all based on the theory that nature has said the last word. Democracy believes in experimenting with human nature, in taking chances, that

[7] Kohler declares English, French, Russians, Italians, and Americans as impossible members of any international law association. They have no "living conscience."

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new powers may unfold. While it relies mainly on bringing on the whole mass, it sometimes finds genius coming out of Nazareth. It admits a good deal of lost motion, but it is willing to pay the price.

And as to the cult of incompetence, democracy urges that this is a relic of the time when office meant dominance. No one objects to the expert surgeon or the competent musician. Undoubtedly the legislator or judge or executive must have authority as well as expertness, but with a genuinely democratic conception of government it is at least plausible that suspicion of the expert as official may decrease. Early democracy in America, fresh from the recollection of old world governments, was actuated by fear of governmental usurpation of power. Its system of checks and balances was intended as Professor McLaughlin has put it, to provide a government that could not "do things." Now that we demand increasingly for our complex conditions a government that *can* do things, the need of the expert is increasingly apparent. There is likely to be less suspicion of his ability.

(2) Aristocracy claims that specialization of function not only means efficiency, but also individual liberty and culture. It asserts that liberty and democracy are inherently contradictory. It will have naught of the herd, of the mish-mash and its control. There is undoubtedly an individuality of the aristocratic type. It seeks intellectual, æsthetic, or economic distinction. And in past ages with inadequate production very likely culture could flourish only by building upon the submerged foundations of slaves, villeins, artisans, or some other exploited class. In the language of Nietzsche, "we children of the future . . . ponder over the need of a new order of things, even of a new slavery—for every strengthening and elevation of the type 'man' also involves a new form of slavery."

But is not this merely another illustration of the disposition of the aristocratic theory to fall back upon what has been, upon nature as versus creative intelligence? It is by no means certain that individuality requires class aris-

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tocracy. There is certainly in intellectual development as such, no necessary dependence upon comparative superiority. If there is an aristocratic art which expresses rare and unique experiences of a few gifted souls, there is certainly also a democratic art which sounds chords of common emotion. If there is a type of individuality which increases its values by being different from others, there is another which seeks them through contacts, and defines its own ideals by comparison with those of equals, as Professor Fite has well pointed out.

(3) We come finally to a comparison in which there is no apparent common denominator. The final issue between aristocracy and democracy is the relative value of power over another, as compared with free association among equals. I do not see that the partisan of aristocracy can demonstrate his case to the advocate of democracy, or vice versa. There can be no question of the reality and urge of the will to power. There is little doubt that to many natures the consciousness of power over other human beings is more satisfying even than that of power over nature. This consciousness of power is enormously increased by membership in a military or other ruling class. A *Herrenmoral* will seem to such a class the expression of the eternal fitness of things. "To demand of strength that it should *not* manifest itself as strength,—that it should *not* be a will for overcoming, for overthrowing, for mastery, a thirst for enemies, for struggles and triumphs, is as absurd as to demand of weakness that it should manifest itself as strength."

The democrat, however, on his side urges that equality is satisfying to those who live it. Friendship is good, and friendship rests on equality. The religious ideal of equality before God, the implication of equality before the law, the give and take of scholarship in pursuit of truth bespeak a democratic value that is real. It is the appeal of the finer institutions which man is building; it is more and more gaining ground.

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SOVEREIGNTY AND MORAL OBLIGATION.

W. E. HOCKING.

THEORIES in politics are originally the defences men make for their conduct toward other men. One can saw wood without a theory of sawmanship; one can deal with his friends without a theory of friendship; but one can hardly conduct an elaborate business operation without what is called a "policy." The increase of what we call mere physical quantities in any practical undertaking will eventually conscript thought, general principles, for its mastery and for expounding it to both co-operators and critics. It is partly for this reason that while politics is the most practical branch of philosophy, it is also the most philosophical branch of practice, the branch in which men have been most governed—sometimes ridden—by their theories. And for the same reason, this will always be the case.

The theory of sovereignty has done more than its share of practical damage; but the fault has rarely been that of the thinker. For if the sovereign is the most logical entity that political theory has created, it is unquestionably the most illogically used,—by the politicians. It was Bismarck, presumably a practical statesman, who fought and lost his *Kulturkampf* in pursuit of an ideal of state sovereignty, which certainly he himself did little to create. And critics of sovereignty at the present moment are prone to take such extracts of historical experience as this Bismarckian episode as pertinent comment on the fallacy of the conception.[1] What such an episode might show—as nearly as history can show anything—would be that Bismarck's conception did not work in Bismarck's hands; and quite possibly (among other inviting hypotheses) because it did not correspond to fact. This procedure is

[1] See, for example, the notable series of essays in Harold J. Laski's The Problem of Sovereignty, 1917.

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instructive; but it promises fewer positive results than to ask *what it is in human relations that has given this concept a foothold.* For the notion of sovereignty was not drawn gratuitously from the clouds; it was designed to clarify some fact found at work within political experience.

In the present paper, I propose to follow this second and more empirical method; but it may tend to clear the air, and to bring about theoretical co-operation (nowhere so needful as in political theory), if we begin by excluding certain historical conceptions of sovereignty as neither actual nor expressive of any working ideal.

I.

First, the sovereign foreshadowed rather than defined in Aristotle's political theory, the subject which, prior to the human individual, pursues the *all-inclusive end,* neatly embracing and superseding the purposes of all personal and family and village life,—this sovereign does not exist in human society. Already in Aristotle's time the simple hierarchy of existing purposes in the ideally self-sufficient community had been visibly ruptured by widespread commercial, and incipient religious, groupings.

Second, the sovereign of Hobbes, whose prior will creates the conditions under which alone morality is possible, does not exist. The conditions under which moral obligation exists are not made by any human institution. If I refrain on moral grounds from breaking the furniture of a person whose taste in furniture I disapprove, it is not primarily because I have set over myself a power which renders it imprudent to act in this way; it is rather because he and I alike prefer to live in a world where freedom of choice in certain matters is respected, and because he and I are capable of recognizing in one another *that* preference, though not the choice of furniture, as a common good and a common bond. It requires no institution to create this situation, and the obligation that goes with it; and further, no institution could create it,—though it might easily precipitate itself in the shape of an institution.

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Third, the sovereign commonly though erroneously, attributed to Hegel, the quasi-absolute, subject or spirit in whom all individuals together with their rights are mere momenta, does not exist in human society. Indeed, this sovereign, as a sort of synthesis of the sovereigns of Hobbes and Aristotle, may be said to be doubly non-existent. But the particular feature of his non-existence which I should like to emphasize is his individual personality. And this point is so vital to the whole matter that I ask leave to give it more than a passing comment.

II.

First, as to its implications: It might reasonably be supposed that only a person could be a subject of moral obligation; and that, accordingly, if one judges that states are fictitious, rather than real persons, he thereby resigns the notion that states can have any but fictitious moral duties. Only a being with a soul can sin or repent of sin; and while we hardly expect states to be moved by the fear of future punishment, inasmuch as it is the avowed intention of states to live on earth forever, we might well wish them to be accessible to the more immediate sentiments of interpersonal regard and interest in the general human future. But these are, to our observation, the sentiments (now and then) of statesmen, not of states; and the difficulty which the statesman has in making his own individual conscience the guide of his political action is chiefly the difficulty of knowing what precisely the character of that being may be in whose name he acts. A doubt of real identity between the being which under one administration makes promises, signs treaties, incurs debts, etc., and the being which under another administration has to fulfil these undertakings, can hardly fail to perplex the problem of obligation.

In the case of the individual, there is always an empirical difference between the person who promises and the person who has to fulfil, a difference which may or may not be relevant to the subject matter of the promise; but his interest in being, and being taken for, a morally responsible

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entity is enough to override in most cases such differences. In the case of the state there are similar obvious motives for a wish, on the part of the statesmen, that the state be considered responsible; and this major expediency may likewise override not alone the fact of change of administration with whatever psychological discontinuity that may imply, or even of revolution, but also a strong feeling that the original promise was iniquitous, or that history has so far altered the circumstances as to reverse the original meaning of the engagement. But if the state is a fictitious or pragmatic entity to be treated *as if* responsible, for certain abstract purposes, it would seem the duty of the statesman to recognize that the limit of those abstract purposes is also the limit of possible obligation. He would have to subordinate his conscience to his deductive faculty, not because his conscience is in error, but because it fails to apply. The state can do no wrong; not because the will of the state defines what is right, but because there is here no moral subject.

If, in spite of these considerations, critics attack the idea of the real, over-individual, personality of the state on the ground that politics must come within the domain of moral judgment, one would be inclined at first to say that the force of the argument—if it has any force—is in the opposite direction. The postulate of responsibility would apparently lead us to regard the state as a real subject in the sense, at least of Gierke's *Genossenschaft* or of Royce's Community.

But however powerful our conviction that states must have duties, I doubt whether an argument regarding the nature of the state can be built on that postulate. If a view of the state can be built of objective material, by the aid of psychological conceptions empirically valid, I should judge that nearly all would prefer it. And it seems to me that such a view is attainable.

III.

Suppose we think of an instinct as a course of behavior inseparable from a group of environing objects with which

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that behavior deals,—as the food-getting activities are inseparable from the food-objects and their habitat. The food-getting creature tends to regard this entire group of objects as *his own* in only a somewhat more attenuated sense than that in which he regards his tools or weapons as his own, because they form part of one of his *vital circuits*. Similarly the "self" of an author extends itself over the materials of his writing and the characters of his book; they are part of his life in the very literal sense that if he is deprived of them his functions are interrupted, much as they are interrupted if you deprive him of an eye or a finger. Through their relations to him these objects may be said, in more than a purely fictitious sense, to be alive, and to acquire at times a sort of personality.



Individual vital circuit and coincident vital circuits, showing tendency to quasi-individuality of the circuit.

But a vital circuit of this sort need not necessarily be exclusive to one individual and his wish. A group with the same hunting ground, a gang of workmen on the same job, stockholders in the same business, have vital circuits partly coincident. In such cases the common portion tends to assume an autonomy of its own; and the life of such a quasi-individual entity, I repeat, is not a pure fiction: if you cut this circuit, it bleeds.

If two individuals have the same need, they need not on

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that account have any vital circuit in common. But if in a school of nine boys there is a unanimous wish to form a baseball nine; and if there is in the aggregation one bat, one ball, one mask, one mit, etc., the prophetic eye may see nine vital circuits falling into a coincidence shaped by fate, each of which includes beside the common material property the persons of the other eight. In similar fashion, a wholly universal need may bring men together in apparently fortuitous groupings determined by the accidental presence of a *set of objects* available and necessary for a common vital circuit. In this way the theory of "vital circuits" will differ from that of "social groups" in general.

And it is in this way, I believe, that we may conceive the universal need for an ordered and reliable social existence calling into being—no universal state—but those curiously irregular and curiously tenacious entities called national states. Let it be granted that among the deeper needs of human nature, call them instinctive or not, are the needs for self-knowledge, for cumulative experience and experimentation, for making long plans, for a calculable to-morrow and a calculable permanence, for a set of traditions to cherish and test in application, and for that kind of power which consists in the possibility, by persuading one's neighbors, of putting one's ideas into lasting effect. And let it be granted that the *material conditions* for satisfying these needs are peculiar, not to be made or unmade by any social contract entered into by any group you please of men-in-general or by the group of all-men. If, then, a vital circuit satisfying this composite "political" need is once formed, it will tend to persist; it will include present, past, and future members, and not the present only; its identity will not essentially alter with the shifting of personnel; it will have a real and verifiable life, a character, a reputation; and it will have problems of relations to other such circuits determined by its own character. But the veritable consciences concerned in these transactions will always be the consciences of the individuals whose vital circuit the state is. These consciences will be able to act

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under the postulate of identity because the needs concerned and their data, the vital circuits, coincide.

IV.

We may now put the question, In such an entity, what are the facts which would evoke, and so give meaning to, such a notion as that of sovereignty?

First, *finality of decision.* If men are to act together at all, there must be some way, formal or informal, of arriving at a decision; there is a definite office, whether or not a definite officer, determining what shall be done, and how it shall be done. This circumstance has nothing to say about how much consultation with everybody shall have preceded the decision; nor how much the decider will defer to the judgment of the more important, more thoughtful, more powerful or authoritative members or interests—it being taken as an axiom that such differences of power will always exist. He who leads must always to this extent follow; but this does not destroy the office of leadership. The function itself is as inevitable, and hence as unanimously willed, as the existence of the common undertaking; it occupies the same place in the physiology of the vital circuit as the function of decision after deliberation in the individual mind,—a simple corollary of the will to exist as an identifiable subject. It is the existence of a supreme court, a chief executive, an authoritative foreign office, which marks the "sovereign" state; and the function retains its meaning no matter what interest, at any time, may be the most powerful within the community.

Second, *the psychological priority of the political interest.* If the will to act together politically were as easily abandonable as the will to take a summer trip together, leadership in the state would have the same limited finality as leadership in any other social enterprise. A genuine "general will" to take such a trip might conceivably be reduced to zero in the course of a discussion of ways and means which failed to develop any acceptable concrete plan, and hence any leader. If the political enterprise were of this nature,

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the state would be in precarious competition for our loyalty with the interests represented by recreation, industry, religion, professional fraternity, etc. It is some such picture of the position of the state that the guild socialists of England and their followers in this country are framing. Every wave has its own crest, but there is no crest of the ocean: the political interest, as one interest among many, must take its chances with the rest.

But while the old concentric picture of social structure has become visibly obsolete with the dominance of world-wide "liberty of association," it remains true that the state is on a different psychological plane than other groups; and the crux of the contemporary problem of sovereignty lies in defining this difference.

The state does not *include* the end of religion, commerce, industry. It is not quite the case that it *provides the conditions* which make them possible. But if we regard all shifting social groupings, and all variation of power between groups, as experimental,—not shifting for its own sake, but shifting for the sake of finding a right adjustment,—this *interest in the meaning of the process* would presuppose a mind surveying the whole story, formulating and preserving its results, making the competing ingredients gradually self-conscious and skilful in the guidance of their own efforts. One type of experiment would be more inevitable than any effort at summer trips, or trades unions, or chambers of commerce, namely the experiment of adjusting all these special experiments to one another. This supervisory mind, of long memory, with its adjusting or law-making functions, is the state; and the interest in wholeness and proportion which it expresses is psychologically inevitable, whatever the careers of the interests reflected upon, and whether or not the vital circuits of those interests lie wholly within its own borders.

After all it is the *man* who is distributed abroad among his various competing vital circuits, and his unique interest in the state is among other things his unique interest in not being torn asunder by their conflict. It is his interest in

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being *himself* that makes the will of the state imperative upon him, as no interests therein reflected upon are imperative. In this sense also, the state is sovereign.

V.

The political sovereign is now defined as the will which finally decides that a particular experiment shall exist (together with all deeds involved in carrying it out),—an indispensable experiment in co-ordinating all other social experiments. It is an identical, and irrevocable, element in the will of every member of the state, treated as a single and independent person.

We have not said, however, that there is nothing left over in the individual citizen's will beside this particular experiment, and what it surveys. For any one who makes a decision has something left over; at least, the knowledge that other experiments were possible, and in our case, the knowledge that other experiments exist.

His relation to these other experiments would be a moral relation, in precisely the sense defined in section I, above. The mutual respect for freedom of choice in experiment-making would be the common good that creates the common bond and the mutual obligation. And so far, the moral relations of sovereign states would be precisely analogous to those of sovereign persons. We do not, as a fact, wholly respect the freedom of choice of children and other wards; we wholly respect that freedom only in mature persons. And so the world naturally divides itself into sovereign and part-sovereign states *on the basis of maturity*. States are recognized as sovereign precisely because they are morally responsible,—the very reverse of supposing them sovereign because they are above moral obligation.

VI.

But there is still a third empirical element in our conception of sovereignty which threatens to spoil the simple purity of this picture.

The attempt to apply principles of personal justice and

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the "rights of man" to national states always meets resistance and, I believe, a justified resistance. There are two types of justice in vogue in the world, each of which promises highly unsatisfactory results as applied to inter-state relations. The justice of *legality* naturally tends to perpetuate the *status quo:* a juridical decision would have kept Austria in control of Italy, and these colonies under the control of Britain. The justice of *equity*, however, would not preserve the *status quo:* on the contrary, it would work miracles,—such miracles as none would wish to see performed. It would argue as follows. Britain has an empire; I also should have an empire. Thus Germany has argued, with great plausibility. But let the argument run its course. Let Sweden and Switzerland and Montenegro also have empires; for what is fair for one is fair for another in terms of the "equal rights of states." Or obversely, that which does not work all around is not true anywhere, and we ask Britain to surrender her claims to empire and redistribute the world among all nations in such wise as to give all an equal share in every good thing. The absurdity of these proposals creates a presumption that these two types of justice do not fit the international situation, and that the morality appropriate to persons cannot be translated forthwith into a code for nation states.

I believe, in fact, that the morality of *comparison* based on the presupposition of equality, has a very restricted application to states; and that states are frequently right in refusing to defer to a plea based on this kind of justice. If so, there enters into the notion of their sovereignty an element of self-determination based on the *uniqueness of states*, as opposed to their comparableness. For while human nature that needs the state is the same everywhere, the geographical and other objects that enter into these vital circuits are surprisingly various, crooked, and dissimilar. The entire ordering of life, about which theme the political experiment plays, must be different in the Soudan and in Siberia; in empty America and in crowded Holland; in portless Switzerland, and in sea-girt Britain. The

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important thing would be that states should get rid of the supposed necessity of imitating in everything the states they regard as big and prosperous, and find rather the specific conditions for their own peculiar life. They would then speak, not of their "rights," but of their "vital interests"; and they would have grave doubts about the arbitrability of these interests, precisely because they are—and of right ought to be—unique.

VII.

In falling again into the language of "right" while rejecting it, we come to the final point of our argument. This third empirical element of sovereignty, the incomparableness and hence apparent non-arguableness of vital interests, is not opposed to the application of moral concepts to states,—it merely demands *another kind* of moral concept. And the hope for the future peace of the world seems to me to lie in recognizing this fact.

We are naturally inclined, at times, to fall back, as does Professor Philip Marshall Brown, in his book on International Realities, from the idea of "right" to that of "interest" as applied to states, because of the visible inadequacies above noted. We are inclined to judge, as he judges,—that the security of the people must still be the supreme law; that (as he declares with Lorimer) "no state puts its conscience or judgment in the keeping of any other," inasmuch as there is no competent common superior, no competent public opinion of the world, no extant "family of nations composed of peoples possessing common standards of right and wrong, common conceptions of rights and obligations," no available world court of arbitrators "free from all national and racial prejudices, detached from the atmosphere of world politics, and blessed with transcendent wisdom" such that they should be allowed "to judge the acts of England in Egypt, France in Morocco, Russia in Persia, and the United States in Mexico and Colombia."[2] It is surely better to face these conditions, as Professor

[2] International Realities, pp. 52, etc.

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Brown faces them, recognizing the limited application of the ethical factor while demanding for it its due place, than to bring the entire plea for international compunction into disrepute, perpetuating the kind of contempt felt for it in the German high command and elsewhere, by insisting on applying it where only culpable blindness to fact could suppose it capable of being applied.

In view of all this, it is still noteworthy that when Professor Brown quotes Lorimer, he finds himself speaking of a *conscience* which every state holds at least over itself in these matters; and while it is doubtless true that no state dare put its conscience in the keeping of any other one state, any more than any person dare put his conscience in the keeping of any other person, it is still an open question whether any state can prevent its actions, so far as they actually affect the interests of other states, and come increasingly to the knowledge of the world, from being judged by the consciences of *all other states*, or can insulate its own judgment from that outer judgment in proportion as that outer judgment approaches a *free consensus*. The point is, as I see it, that the conscience of the world does not necessarily limit itself to the lines of either legality or equity; that it is *capable of making the valid distinction* between the comparable and the incomparable concerns of different states. This is what we are likely to despair of, but, as I believe, without sufficient ground.

For after all, the third kind of justice we need is no other than the familiar justice of the family, which in giving gifts to children does not feel obliged to make the gift to A identical with the gift to B for equity's sake; or the familiar state of mind of the traveler, who travels only because he finds interest and beauty, not in the similarities, but in the peculiarities of every land. It exists, to some extent, in the mind of everyone who, confronted with the question, Do you wish the annihilation of Germany, or of any other enemy state, answers with a distinct No.

The state of mind required to bring a public conscience into these awkward, non-justiciable, individual problems,

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is thus neither unknown nor inaccessible.[3] But it is very doubtful whether it yet exists *in sufficient volume* to justify any state in entrusting its interests to the keeping of international conscience.

But this, indeed, is a question of condition, not of theory, and can only be solved by making the test, and running thereby the risk of loss, even of martyrdom. And a martyrdom which might be the evidence of a mistaken faith in this conscience, hence of folly, and indeed of criminal negligence on the part of a government responsible for its people, might conceivably be the opposite of folly and crime, if it were a necessary sacrifice to arouse a slumbering world-conscience into competent action. Some two thousand years ago an obscure Jew ventured to make the supreme wager, in the faith that mankind was sufficiently near a perception of brotherhood, so that his act would be caught up, as it were, by the conscience of mankind, and kept from falling to the ground as an act of madness,—preserved rather as a symbol of divine wisdom. And what this Jew ventured for the conscience of individual men; that, in our day, one small state seems to have ventured for the conscience of the states of the world. The deliberate self-sacrifice of Belgium may well be the test case,—either an act of profound political guilt, or an act big with a powerful future.

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[3] Cf. Josef Kohler, Moderne Rechtsprobleme, 2d Ed., 1913, §41. "Allein auch hier (speaking of exactly these problems) ist die Möglichkeit nicht ausgeschlossen, dass sich allmählich gewisse Grundsätze der Ausgleichung entwickeln, und dass die Lösung solcher völkerschaftlichen Probleme von den Nationen leidenschaftslos übernommen wird. Heutzutage ist nur das eine wesentlich, dieses Problem scharf ins Auge zu fassen, und unter Berücksichtigung der geschichtlichen Erfahrung, über die Grundsätze solcher Ausgleichung nachzusinnen: tun wir dies, dann wird der Gedanke uns nie verlassen, dass der Friedensengel einst auch hier erscheinen wird."

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ETHICAL CLARIFICATIONS THROUGH THE WAR.

HARRY ALLEN OVERSTREET.

THE war has wrought important changes in many regions of our life. Has it effected any clarification, modification or extension of our ethical attitudes? It is doubtless too early to expect the radical moral revaluing which, as it has come with every wide-reaching human crisis, must inevitably come as a result of this most unprecedented of wars. We are still too partisan in the conflict, still too quivering with our indignations and hates to be either creative or receptive of a moral insight which is completely "above the battle." In default of that greater achievement—which may indeed mean for our particular age what the revolutionary insight of the Nazarene meant for his—we can to-day only trace out, haltingly at best, certain directions of new moral conviction which seem to converge upon some more adequate view of our common human life.

I.

If we attempt to analyze out those factors in the ante-bellum situation which lent themselves peculiarly to the fomenting of war, we find them, I think, to have lain chiefly in four points of stress—economic, cultural, political and "temperamental." Of these points of stress little need be said in elucidation, as the three years and a half of war have instructed us more than sufficiently. Let me describe them simply for the purpose of indicating with precision what I mean.

By the economic point of stress I mean, in the first place, to refer to a typical situation which had developed strikingly in the few decades preceding the war. Economic enterprise, which, during the early nineteenth century, had been confined mainly within national limits, had, in the latter half of the century, grown to such dimensions that it overleaped national boundaries. In all the strongly

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developed countries—creditor nations, as they came to be called—surplus capital sought fields of investment in foreign lands, and particularly in those backward lands where rich natural resources were undeveloped and where labor was cheap. A peculiar form of economic competition developed out of this situation. One might have supposed, for example, especially in view of the *laissez faire* economics of the nineteenth century, that a land like Morocco or Mesopotamia or Syria would have been considered an investment field open to all comers—a free field and no favor. As a matter of fact, it was quite otherwise. A new factor, of signal importance for the peace of the world, was introduced into the competitive situation. Following Lord Palmerston's historic speech of 1850, the principle came into rapid acceptance that investments made by the citizens of any nation outside that nation were to be backed by the diplomacy and, if need be, by the military force of that nation.

The result was that during the decades immediately preceding the war, Europe presented the spectacle of a number of capitalistic groups in the several states eagerly competing for investment privileges in the backward countries and dying empires and supported in each case by their respective Foreign Offices. It was the spectacle, in short, of economic or capitalistic competition operating in the guise of political or national competition.

Here was the crux of the situation. The competition of capitalists for franchise privileges within a city or a state, for example, involves no possibility of warlike conflict. The situation is wholly economic. Were it, on the other hand, the custom for each city to back its citizens in their investment ventures in other cities, it is obvious that armed conflicts might easily develop. Thus suppose, for example, a group of Albany citizens to organize for the purpose of capturing the trolley franchises in Hackensack; and a group of Boston citizens to organize for the same purpose. It is quite clear that if the mayor and council of Albany felt it patriotically incumbent upon them to back Albany capitalists,

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and with force of arms if need be, war might easily develop between the two cities. As a matter of fact, war has been completely eliminated from the list of possibilities by the simple device of keeping an economic situation wholly free of admixture with political powers and ambitions.

What, however, was peculiarly unfortunate about this situation as it developed in the years preceding the war was that the several nations were engaged in the very questionable business of securing special or monopolistic privileges for their capitalist citizens. Thus France was intent upon monopolizing Morocco for her own capitalist group. Germany was bent likewise upon monopolizing Morocco for her own capitalist group. There was no thought that investment fields should be open to the free competition of capital from all over the world. Each nation, in brief, sought to "corner" certain rich markets for her own investors.

What was curious about the moral attitude of the past decades was that this economic-political situation was accepted almost, if not wholly, without question. Most of us who were busy dreaming about Hague Conferences and disarmament—"*Die Waffen Nieder*"—knew practically nothing about the matter; or if we knew of it, we accepted it—as we accept land-rent and interest nowadays—as part of the necessary mechanism of world development. Within our home lands indeed, we had begun to be peculiarly sensitive to the immorality of economic monopoly and economic special privilege. We had begun to see them for what they were—factors making for the diminution of life possibilities. But of these wider and nationally supported forms of monopolistic special privilege, we saw nothing save that they were ways in which surplus capital was put productively to use in lands beyond our ken. Now and then came tales of the misuse of life—Congo atrocities, Mexican peonage, Putomayo murders, and so on. We roused ourselves for a moment to the human appeal of the situation; but when the human values were recognized, or were said to have been recog-

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nized, we lapsed again into our indifference. For the most part, we saw nothing more deeply in need of correction.

I suppose that that day is nearly over. An increasing number of us know that Morocco, Kiaou Chiou, Turkey, Mesopotamia, Syria, Korea, and so on, stand for the attempt of capitalistic groups, supported by the diplomacy of their nations, to monopolize special portions of the earth. And we know particularly that because of such nationally supported monopolization and the competition for it, whole peoples are hypnotized, on various "patriotic" pretexts, into war. We are learning, then, nowadays, to be triply indignant; first, at the principle and the fact of the monopolization itself; second, at its masquerading in patriotic guise; third, at its outcome in wars between whole peoples.[1]

What our awakened moral understanding will demand will be the Open Door so far as all investment enterprise is concerned. Such an Open Door will be secured in the first place by clearly affirming the principle that economic competition of any and all sorts is to be recognized as economic solely, and not political; that the governmental backing of special groups of capitalists is hereafter to be regarded as an intolerable menace to the peace of the world.

And yet we shall not go far if we mean by this simply that the foreign investor is to bear the risks of his investment. The development of backward countries by capitalistic investment is, at the present stage of our economic life, of signal value for the advance of the world. It would be unfair to ask that, in performing this service, the investor bear all the risks that are present in uncivilized or only partly civilized countries.

The solution, unquestionably, lies in the direction of internationalizing the foreign investment situation. We have already developed the type of machinery which is requisite for such an accomplishment. The International

[1] *Cf.* H. N. Brailsford, *The War of Steel and Gold* (London); F. C. Howe, *Why War* (New York); Walter Lippman, *The Stakes of Diplomacy* (New York).

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Postal Union organizes the interests of postal communication from an international point of view. The International Sanitation Commission organizes the interests of sanitation from an international point of view. It is not in the least utopian to look forward to the creation of an International Trade Commission whose especial function it will be to guarantee three things: (1) that all investment fields are kept freely open to investors all over the world (investment-free-trade, so to speak); (2) that investors are protected against unscrupulous or violent actions on the part of the natives of the countries in which the investments are made; (3) that the natives of these same countries are protected against unscrupulous exploitation on the part of investors.

Such internationalization of the foreign-investment situation would remove the chief and captain of the causes of war. It is important that we realize that the quarrels over the Moroccos and the Algerias, the Mesopotamias and the Turkestans are fundamentally quarrels over economic opportunities. Once the economic opportunities are thoroughly internationalized, the quarrels cease as effectually as they long since have ceased between cities or states within a nation.

We have dwelt at length upon this particular phase of the economic situation because, while perhaps most crucial of all, it is least understood. Of the other phases we may speak more briefly. The principle of "free ports" is becoming so widely accepted and has on the face of it so much in its favor that little argument need be spent in its support. It is perhaps sufficient to point out that the monopolization by any particular group (nation) of so priceless a natural advantage as a harbor is of a piece with all other monopolizations of natural resources, and must sooner or later go the way that they must go. In the case of the monopolization of ports the situation is all the more serious because, by the mere accident of geographical position, certain groups are able effectively to inhibit the life of other groups not so fortunately situated. The ob-

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vious solution is the neutralization of all ports access to which is essential to inland peoples.

Finally, the whole logic of recent events points us away from the entire system of nationalistic tariff barriers and discriminations to a system in which, as far as possible, trade shall move freely and uninterruptedly from land to land. There will of course remain the problem of adjusting to each other the different standards of living and occupation in the several countries of the world. Such problems, however, are to be solved internationally, in terms of the real human situation, not, as in the past, in terms of financial greeds masquerading in the garb of "national welfare."

From the point of view of an international ethics, the economic situation, then, would seem to be clear. If the end of life is the fullness of life, a fullness to be attained in large measure by bringing into human use—through production, manufacture and commerce—the potentialities of nature, all devices which in any wise hinder the process of mastering and utilizing nature—tariff walls, monopolies of investments, monopolies of ports, monopolies of raw materials, special privileges of one sort and another, favored nation treaties, etc., are in direct contravention of the fundamental end of life. The principle of the economic Open Door must then be a decisive and continuing moral insight of the future.

II.

The second point of stress was the cultural. Living in a world of plural cultures, the peoples of the world had not adequately known how to adjust themselves to such a situation. The pressure towards a monistic intolerance was constant. In the earlier centuries, this monistic fervor had displayed itself in the overmastering desire to compel all persons upon whom a group could lay its hands to believe in that group's particular god in that group's particular way. In the years preceding the war, it had displayed itself in the overmastering desire to compel all persons

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upon whom a national group could lay its hands to speak that nation's language and to wear that nation's particular garb of social and political institutions. The various national groups were all, in a measure, alike in this. We in America, for example, had felt ourselves ordained of history to bring trousers and baseball and the American school text-book to the natives of the Philippine Islands. The Russian autocracy had felt equally called upon, in the name of Christian civilization, to induce the wretched Jew to leave his wretched ways. The Turk had looked pityingly upon the unmohammedanized Armenian; the Englishman upon the unsanitary Hindoo. The German had set himself, with all the conscientious pedantry and bureaucratic inflexibility of a professor in uniform, to woo the Pole and the Alsatian to the supposedly more civilized ways of the Fatherland.

It is a question, of course, just how unpolluted, in all these cases, the motives were. One suspects that the "cleaning up" of the Hindoo was more than an object of æsthetic rapture to the Englishman; that the trousering of the Filipino was not unconnected with thoughts of American world trade; precisely as the introduction of teutonic gutturals into the schools of Alsace and Lorraine was not altogether distantly related to iron ore and coal deposits. Indeed, the economic we have with us always, even while we are most piously unburdening ourselves at the shrine of civilization!

And yet there is no doubt that there was in the motives a sincere desire to grant to civilizations that were really (or were supposed to be) less mature a measure of culture and scientific mastery that were actually beneficial. Unfortunately, however, this true quality in the motives was overlain with other qualities less admirable, and in particular with the invincible egotism which seems to infect all strong political groups, the group egotism, I mean, which believes its own way of life to be the truly superior one. The Britisher is fully as strong in his persuasion that he is the authentic bearer of the white man's burden as is

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the German in his conviction that *Deutschtum* is to be the salvation of the world. Nor is the American distinguished in this respect by a large sense of modesty. If it is suggested to the American that the Filipino civilization, being ethnologically nearer the Japanese than the American, should be developed by the energetic and resourceful Nipponese, he flames up with outraged patriotism.

Apparently the truth of the situation lies not in the *laissez faire* extreme of permitting each group to live its life in what manner, good or bad, it will. Undoubtedly there are backward civilizations that need the helping hand of more mature civilizations. But with equal certainty the truth does not lie in the other extreme of permitting each group, strong in its own conceit, and strong enough to impose its egotistic will upon other groups, to play the self-imposed part of civilizer of the world. The truth of the situation lies rather in the recognition that civilization standards must somehow be internationalized standards. England has much to offer to backward countries; so have France, Germany, America. And doubtless—perhaps even more so—so have the militarily weak nations, Belgium, Switzerland, Holland, Sweden, Norway, and others.

Here, doubtless, will be the fundamental task and the really novel opportunity of a world league of nations. Where an international Council of Conciliation, say, sitting in permanent session, is composed of Frenchmen, Englishmen, Germans, Belgians, Chinese, Japanese, Swiss, Dutch, Brazilians, Mexicans, and so on, there will be hope at last that the problem of backward civilizations will be approached from a point of view that is international. There will be hope that the imposition of civilization standards will be the imposition not of standards—like language, clothing, social customs, and so on, that are particularistic and localistic, but of standards, like sanitation, security, justice, education, that are universal in their scope and validity. The task of an international league of states, in short, will be to see to it that in each backward country there is such social and technical organization that orderly

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opportunity is given for the development of the group's inherent genius.

This more generous attitude has already found its expression in the widely repeated slogan: the free development of all nationalities. One may venture to believe that the slogan is too exclusively political in its expression, implying, as it does, that free development may properly obtain only where there is a separate and independent political life. It should rather read: the free or autonomous development of all groups. It should not be necessary that the Russian Jew construct for himself a new Zion in order that freedom of development for his group be realized; or that the Finns be a separate nation, or the Irish, or the Alsatians. In fact, the tendency is doubtless away from independent, sovereign nationalities. It should be enough that throughout the world there is no group existing which, for any reason whatever, suffers political, civil, educational, social, or religious disabilities; no group which is compelled, in despite of its immanent genius, to adapt itself to ways of life and standards other than its own.[2]

Doubtless our still partly civilized world has far to go before such a generous pluralism of life is realized; but it has already gone a far distance in reaching, as in large measure it has, the conviction of free development above expressed. This, again, is an expression of the Open Door principle—the open door to all group possibilities, to the intimate genius of the group, its insights and loyalties. It is the repudiation of our group conceits, our moral monopolies, our cultural interlocking directorates, our fervid convictions of missions to make the world over according to our own particular *Kultur*. It is a free scope for all authentic life.[3]

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[2] *Cf.* Hobson, J. *A.*, *Towards International Government*, pp. 123 *seq.*

[3] Brailsford has summed the matter up concisely in one of the articles which he proposes for his League of Nations: "The signatory powers, convinced that the interests of peace require the free cultural development, irrespective of political allegiance, of all the races of Europe, hereby declare that they will not, in their European territories, impose any political or civil disabilities,

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A further expression of this attitude is the conviction which, among us in America at least, has assumed the character of a social axiom, the conviction, namely, that the conquest of any people or land is fundamentally unjustified. Defense—that we can still tolerate. But forcible aggression, for the sake of taking lands or peoples to a nation's self, that is henceforth to have no place within the world of decent human relations.

All this of which we have been speaking as the outcome of the three and a half years of war is indeed but part of a large, typical movement of modern times, the movement to liberate life. It is of a piece with the earlier, more quietly conducted movements for free education, for the liberation of the child worker, for the removal of occupational and political disabilities of women, for the elimination of commercial prostitution, for the protection of the laborer and the enhancement of his status, for the self government of dependencies. It marks but another stage, in short, in the emergence of a generous, democratic belief in all life and a willingness to guard it against the oppressions and suppressions of the still lingering despotisms of the world.

III.

So much for the economic and the cultural points of stress. The third point of stress which we indicated was the political. Perhaps the most striking characteristic

on the ground of race or religion; and farther, that in their European territories they will accord to every race reasonable facilities and rights for the use of its language, for the development of schools in which the language is the chief medium of instruction, for every form of association consistent with the order of the State, and for free exercise of its religion." (*League of Nations*, p. 130.)

Brailsford speaks here only of European peoples; but obviously, however difficult the actual administration may be, the principle must be applied to all groups throughout the world. If, for example, there is to be an economic development of the backward places of the world, such development must not spell tragedy for the inhabitants thereof; if, as is doubtless true, peoples are still to be held in tutelage, the tutelage must not mean the superposition of an alien culture, but simply the organization of an orderly opportunity for the development of the inherent group traits.

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of nineteenth and early twentieth century states was the claim which each made to a finality of rights and powers. Each was a sovereign state, a kingly power, as it were, indivisible and imprescriptible. Now it is obvious that where the life of each state is a completely enclosed whole, where there are no influences and interests passing from state to state, such a plurality of sovereignties is wholly conceivable. Where, on the other hand, states interpenetrate, where vital social factors—commercial, industrial, scientific, artistic—overleap national boundaries, such a plurality of sovereignties not only goes counter to the truth of the situation but involves an endless clash of jurisdictions.

As a matter of fact, the theory of the sovereign state had its inception in the days when, with practically no intercommunication and intertransportation, states were to all intents and purposes, selfcontained wholes. But as we are well aware, the period of such strictly national economy is long since past. We live to-day in a period of international economy. States are, in literal fact, and in all kinds of ways, dependent upon each other. For a state to presume to live an isolated life and to manage its affairs in terms of its internal powers, would be for that state to eliminate itself from the course of civilized advance. Certain factors in the life of peoples, indeed, have shown themselves to be so typically international, that states, despite their jealously maintained theory, have been compelled to depart from their independence of sovereignty and to unite in a supernational community of jurisdiction.

Postal service is a case in point. A person in England wishes to communicate with a person in Rumania. His letter must pass through a half dozen sovereign territories before it reaches its destination. How intolerable the situation was when, in each country, the postal service was a separate independency, operating as to rules, rates, etc., in entire indifference to all other postal independencies, is easily conceivable. It was not a utopian dream then that established the International Postal Union. It was

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the recognition of a sheer fact, the fact, namely, that communication is a function which, in its nature, is inevitably international. Sooner or later this fact would have had to be recognized. Sooner or later the independent sovereign states would have had to realize that here was a function in the life of all of them which required a jurisdiction above their separate jurisdictions, the jurisdiction, namely, of all of them, in federated union.

The same is true of health and sanitation. A ship from Hong Kong lands at San Francisco with bubonic rats in its hold. Not all the elaborated theories of the political scientists as to the sovereign independence of the United States will prevent those same rats from escaping to land and infecting sovereign Americans with their disease. That diseases are communicable is, in short, a fact which overleaps all artificial or natural boundaries of states and demands an administration supernational in power and comprehension. The International Sanitary Union is such a supernational administration, and in so far, is, like the Postal Union, a living witness to the fact that national states can in nowise be regarded as final in their jurisdictions.

One might run through the list of the international jurisdictions that have grown up out of the very necessities of the case: the International Telegraphic Union; the International Radiographic Union; the International Union of Railway Freight Transportation; the International Automobile Conference; the International Association of Navigation Congresses; the International Metric Union; the Union for the Publication of Customs Tariffs; the International Opium Commission; the International Fisheries Police; the International Conference for the Repression of the White Slave Trade, and so on. The list is too long to set down here in its completeness.[4] What one realizes as one glances over such a list is that the matters in concern are each and all matters that, by the very necessity of the

[4] *Cf.* Reinsch, P. S., *Public International Unions* (Boston); Woolf, L. S., *International Government* (New York); La Fontaine, Henri, *The Great Solution*, chap. v. (Boston).

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situation, require an international administration. And as one realizes that the above international unions and others are, or before the war were, successfully operating, one realizes how utterly antiquated and barren is the political theory of the "sovereign" state.

To-day a further extension of the development above indicated is in process. Each of the above international unions or commissions, it will be noted, deals with a specific matter that is international in character. Each matter is of a kind that involves conflicts of interest—often very serious conflicts of interest—between states. In each case there is provided, very specifically, the permanent body whose function it is to adjust conflicts of interest. Now there are types of matters which are clearly international in character and which frequently involve serious conflicts of interest between states which nevertheless have not yet been provided with an adjusting body, permanent in character and with specifically defined powers of decision and administration. One such matter, for example, is the interpretation of treaties. A treaty is a bilateral or multilateral affair. Obviously the interpretation of a treaty can no more be left to each of the states in question than the interpretation of a contract can, in civil law, be left to each party to the contract. The function of treaty interpretation must, by its very nature, be supernational. In a timid way, such a supernational interpretative body had been developed before the war in the Hague Court. But, effective as this tribunal was in a great many cases, it failed in the crucial events, because its function was not recognized as one which states were under solemn obligation to recognize and employ.

Doubtless the great advance which will be made after this war will be the frank recognition on all hands that such matters as the following: the interpretation of treaties; the responsibility for acts occasioning loss to other states; boundary rights; reparation for injuries done by the citizens of one state upon the citizens of another; recovery of contract claims by one state from another—justiciable

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matters, in short—require a supernational body for adjudication and that reference to such a body shall be compulsory on the part of every state in the world.

Again, there are non-justiciable matters that are essentially international in character, issues, for example, that affect the territorial integrity of nations; that affect their "honor," welfare, growth, expansion,—issues, in short, like that of Alsace and Lorraine, Italy and the Trentino, Serbia and the Adriatic, and so on. They are the type of issues that are continually arising in this changing world of ours and that are the most constant source of the irritations that eventuate in war. Obviously again they are issues which by their very nature demand a supernational body of inquiry and adjustment—not, in this case, a Court, but rather a Council of Inquiry and Conciliation, an international body, in short, whose permanent function it shall be, first, to be alive to all conditions and controversies which threaten to endanger the friendly relations between states; and second, by all amicable methods, to bring about their adjustment. Here, too, as in the case of the International Court, the submission, to say the least, of all matters in dispute will be an obligation upon the nations of the world. Should such a Council be established and also such a Court as above mentioned, there will then be two new international administrative bodies to take their place by the side of the Postal Union, the Sanitary Commission, and so on; and the states, in their turn, will just in so far recognize and give effect to a specific limitation upon their sovereign independence of action.

In view of all this, then, we are enabled nowadays to take a bit less seriously the doctrine of "sovereignty." Mankind will not much longer suffer itself to be checked and hindered in its international growth by this antiquated theory of the "repellent individualism"[5] of states. A state is not, Hegelianwise, the last word of the spirit. It is but a member of the larger human community, and as

[5] Brailsford's phrase. See also Burns, C. D., *The Morality of Nations*, p. 111 (London).

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such has co-operative obligations and obediences as truly as rights and powers.[6]

Perhaps I speak too precipitately. There are still diplomatists and near-statesmen among us, who, like the gibbering sprites of Homer, talk of ancient things forgotten. They will indeed hinder in some measure the formation of a collective or federated will of the nations; but they will be as helpless as old King Canute to stem the tide of new moral realization which is sweeping in upon our older individualistic political thought.[7]

With the doctrine of sovereignty there was bound up, in moral logic, the doctrine of neutrality. If nations are "repellent individuals," they have a perfect right to pronounce whether they will or will not suffer themselves to be their brother's keeper. They have a perfect right, in short, to agree with Lucretius: "It is sweet, when on the great sea the winds trouble the waters, to behold from land another's distress; not that it is a pleasure and delight that any should be afflicted, but because it is sweet to see from what evils you yourself are exempt." With the coming into its own of the doctrine that all nations are fundamentally interrelated, no such attitude of neutrality is longer possible. The doctrine of neutrality, then, goes into the discard, making room for the ethically more tolerable doctrine of a common responsibility.

In all this, it is again the philosophy of the Open Door which is the animating spirit. There must be no barriers set up by this group and that which hinder the free circulation and the free development of life. There must be no exclusive group rights and prerogatives; no irresponsibilities unique and unreachable. The state is to be

[6] *Cf.* McIver, R. M., *Community, A Sociological Study*, p. 28 (Macmillan). It is not true, in other words, as Alpheus Snow has recently expressed it, that "the only limitation that can be placed upon a State is self-limitation" (*International Legislation and Administration* in *The Foreign Relations of the United States:* Academy of Political Science). That is but the shadow of the old fetish falling darkly upon our reason. The state is subject to the limitations placed upon it by the will of a collective humanity.

[7] *Cf.* Duguit, L., *Les transformations du lois publique; passim.*

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the servant, not the master of life; and the states in their co-operative fellowship are to be ministers to a common welfare. At last, in short, after ages of experimentation, the idea begins to dawn in politics, that the fundamental welfare of each state is indisseverably bound up with the free co-operative fellowship of all.

IV.

We have reviewed three points of stress between nations —the economic, the cultural and the political. The fourth point of stress I have called, for want of a better term, the temperamental. The word of condemnation to-day is for Prussianism. By Prussianism we understand a temper, an attitude, a way of regarding things and of getting things accomplished. It is the temper which is the opposite of the urbane, the conciliative, the generous. It is the attitude of arrogant superiority, which accomplishes its ends drastically, with a brutal frankness, with an unconcealed scorn of the weak and the supposedly inferior. It is the temper which scoffs at kindliness and consideration as emotions that belong to a degenerate humanitarianism. It is all for *Macht und Tüchtigkeit*, for the "iron" virtues, the virtues of the "unbending soul." It believes in the refreshing, soul strengthening joy of hatred (*Schadenfreude*).

I am not sure that Boutroux is correct when he reports[8] that the German language has no equivalent for *générosité*, as the French has no equivalent for *Schadenfreude*. None the less, it is true that among the Prussian people (and Prussia has directed the character education of Germany) group generosity, the spirit of mutual give and take, of sympathetic live and let live among the nations is far less in evidence than the spirit of arrogant national self-assertion, of blustering self-commendation, of threats and suspicions and hatred. Above all, in its national ideals, Prussianism is the attitude bred of the belief that a nation, to gain for itself, must take it out of other nations or groups. It has no conception of that finer, and, in the long run, more

[8] Emile Boutroux, *Philosophy and War* (New York).

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successful way of national life, which gains for itself in and through the gain of others. Prussianism, therefore, is the rule of drastic might; the rule of "blood and iron." It develops the military skills as the skills which, in highest measure, are meet for a virile nation.

It is true indeed that not all Prussianism is in Prussia. We are growing the habit of detecting Prussianism in all sorts of places—in the business office, in the school, in the college, in the family, on public boards, in the seats of various authority. We are learning to detect the temperament that compels, that forces, that "lays down the law," that is regardless of personal consequences, that holds to its own superior wisdom, that suffers no criticism, that allows for no free development in others, that is drastic and *schnarrend*. We are learning to contrast with it the temperament that attracts, that persuades, that enlists co-operation, that gives large freedom, that believes itself fallible, that encourages independence of judgment and action.

Our ethical systems since the Reformation have laid large stress upon duty as the cornerstone of the ethical life. It is a question whether the war will not once and for all have changed the point of emphasis, taking us back at once to a more pagan point of view, and forward to a point of view more really Christian. We have the astounding spectacle of a whole people profoundly and indeed heroically actuated by a sense of duty and yet making itself intolerable in the society of nations. It is a question whether our future ethics will not lay far more stress than ever before upon the qualities which enable persons to "get across" to each other, the "clubbable," the "sportsmanlike" qualities. Our moral principles, in short, have had altogether too much of the dull gray and the forbidding black of the Puritan scheme of life. It may be that the war will have brought us to value more nearly at their real worth the qualities which have their root not so much in duty as in creative joy; not so much in a literal justice as in generosity; not so much in self-sacrifice as in the give and take of sympathetic co-operation. For the latter are the democratic

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qualities. The world that is fighting for democracy must in the end be fighting for the livable and the lovable qualities that make a democratic community of life possible.

But our insight goes even farther. It is beginning slowly to dawn upon us that Prussianism is but the more spectacular, more dramatically terrible expression of an evil that has long been with us. Both—Prussianism and "profiteering"—are ways of life that are ruthless in their suppressions, ruthless in their seeking of their own ends at the expense of victims. Both work with the instruments of force. Both are antagonistic to free and generous co-operation. Both strive for monopolization of privilege by the pitiless elimination of rivals. *Spurlos versenkt* is a phrase that has its sinister reality in the field of competitive business as truly as in the murderous field of Prussian diplomacy.

Apparently the fight to-day is not only a fight between nations. It is already beginning visibly to cut across national boundaries. The Russian Revolution, which, from its beginning, was economic in its character—and particularly the Bolshevist development of the Revolution; the rise to clear and even threatening expression of the British Labor Party; the rumblings of labor discontent in Italy; the increasingly serious labor crises in Germany and Austria, seem to point to the fact that a new type of cleavage is being established. It is the cleavage between owners and productive workers. Apparently the time is approaching—the war, in a measure, still operates to confuse this issue—when a new type of rulership is to be established. Social rulership in the past and the present, has, in the main, been based upon property. The social rulership of the future, apparently, is to be based upon productivity.[9]

This, one may readily believe, is to be the next real advance in the world. The economics of the nineteenth

[9] Note the significant statements to this effect recently made by Mr. Schwab and President Eliot. See also the striking book by Charles Ferguson, *The Great News* (Kennerley)—published in England under the more informing title *Creative Finance*.

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century was indeed an economics of enterprise, but it was also an economics of parasitism. For all that it glorified and encouraged new productive activity, for all that it brought to the front energetic and resourceful captains of industry, it permitted, in the first place, the landholder to remain; it permitted him—non-productive in his land-holding capacity—to take toll of productive industry; it permitted him, so that he might secure for himself an even greater toll, to keep his lands out of productive use. Again, it permitted the capitalist speculator to flourish, the man who, non-productive in that capacity, made a generous livelihood out of the manipulation of the symbols of other men's production. Again, it developed the monopolizer, the interlocking director, the secret rebater, the wage slaver, the sweatshop driver, the hirer of children—one and all men who gained their financial rewards not by the productive energy which they put into life but by the productive energy which they were clever enough to take out of the lives of others.

Feudalism passed out not only because it was inhuman, but because it was economically a failure. The capitalism of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, one may readily believe, is itself on the point of passing out, not simply because it is, in large measure, inhuman, but because, in a very real sense, it too is an economic failure. It is too heavily loaded with the non-productive taker of toll to live vigorously into a successful future. The economics of the future, when it comes to its own, will doubtless be an economics of the workers solely, the workers with brain and with brawn. Such, at any rate, would seem to be the pointing of these ominous stirrings in the ranks of labor all over the world.[10]

[10] "The Labor Party refuses absolutely to believe that the British people will permanently tolerate any reconstruction or perpetuation of the disorganization, waste and inefficiency involved in the abandonment of British industry to a jostling crowd of separate private employers, with their minds bent, not on the service of the community, but—by the very law of their being—only on the utmost possible profiteering." A Report on Reconstruction by the Sub Committee of the British Labor Party. Published in the *New Republic*, Feb. 16, 1918.

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V.

Let us now draw the threads together. The ethics of a truly reconstructed world of nations must, if we judge aright, be the ethics of the Open Door—the ethics, first, of the economic Open Door as between nations, of free trade, free markets, free investment opportunities; it must, in the second place, be the ethics of the cultural Open Door as between nations and groups within nations, the ethics, in short, of free development of all authentic life in the light of standards increasingly internationalized; in the third place, it must be the ethics of the political Open Door, the recognition, in short, that there is a jurisdiction above that of the separate states, that jealous independence is to give way to a generous and effective leaguing of nations in co-operative rights and obligations; finally, it must be the ethics of the Open Door so far as all use and abuse of life is concerned. It must be the ethics of a frank willingness to let all life, big and little, have its full opportunity of productive satisfaction.

Something of all this, one may firmly believe, will be realized as the immediate outcome of the war. However far removed and difficult the fuller accomplishment may be, it is certain that that way lies the hope of a sanely reconstructed world.

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ETHICAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONALISM.[1]

WILLIAM KELLEY WRIGHT.

THE air continues to be full of projects for the prevention of future wars. All advocates of such plans are convinced that some closer union of nations is requisite, for the future, than in the past has been effected through the imperfect co-operation of the "concert of Europe" under the leadership of the "great powers," for the maintenance of the "balance of power." President Wilson insists that within the program of the world's peace must be included "a general association of nations . . . for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike";[2] while Mr. Lloyd-George seems to go somewhat further in saying that one of the "three conditions of a just and lasting peace" for which the British are fighting is "the creation of an international organization to limit armaments and diminish the probability of war."[3] It seems now to be generally assumed, with the Hague court as a precedent, that some sort of court or tribunal will adjudicate disputes between nations, and that a league of national governments will enforce its decisions through military and naval power. What President Eliot said of Europe three years ago perhaps most of us to-day would agree is true of the world as a whole, now that a general European war had been seen to involve all the continents of the earth: "There can be no secure peace in Europe until a federation of the European states is established, capable of making public contracts intended to be kept, and backed by an overwhelming international force subject to the order

[1] An earlier draft of this paper was read at a session of the American Philosophical Association at Princeton last December. In revision the writer has tried to make his main thesis clearer by adapting his exposition to the general drift of thought that prevailed there, as well as to the course of current events.

[2] Address to Congress, January 8, 1918.

[3] Address delivered on January 5, 1918.

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of an international tribunal."[4] Some proposals go further yet, and include boards of conciliation for the settlement of misunderstandings and non-justiciable disputes, while sometimes an international legislature is also proposed. All would probably agree that the ultimate ideal would be a complete international government, with full executive, legislative, and judicial functions, that would include within its scope the furtherance of all common interests that could not so well be conserved by national governments. Proposals for the immediate future go as far in the direction of this ultimate goal as is now thought to be practicable. However modest or however radical, all such proposals contemplate some kind of league or federation of nations that will afford a larger international justice; and it is usually recognized that this justice may at times, at least at first, have to be enforced upon a recalcitrant nation by military and naval power. To recognize this last implies that the federation must stand for lofty moral ideals that will so completely win the devotion of individual human citizens of all nations within the league that they will joyfully support it in times of peril, and even be willing to lay down their lives in its defence if necessary. In other words, the federation, no matter how limited or how extensive its scope, will require for its support sanctions similar to those now possessed by national governments.

It will be the chief business of this paper to consider what moral values must be included within the conception of such a federation, or association, or organization, or league, or alliance,—call it what one will—in order to induce men first to bring it into existence and afterwards to give it their loyal support. Other ethical and psychological considerations bearing on this problem will also be noticed.

One of the favorite arguments used to show the feasibility of an international justice enforced by a federation is to point out the manner in which local group morality has gradually given place to national law and justice. All disputes of any moment have passed within the jurisdiction

[4] C. W. Eliot, "*The Road Toward Peace*," p. 160.

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of law courts, and no place has been left for private vengeance, blood feuds and duels. While law and justice have thus developed intensively, they have also developed extensively. Small local communities have united with one another into large nations, so that the individual citizens of each local community have justice assured to them throughout the entire land, while the rights of local governments are similarly made secure. It is merely necessary, it is urged, to carry this evolution a single step further in order to form an international federation. The argument, as thus far stated, appears to be sound. But those who advance it often seem to labor under the delusions of the "social contract" theory. For they go on to assume that to bring an international federation or league into existence and to assure its permanence, all that would be needful would be for representatives from the present national governments to assemble, and to draw up a set of treaties as a result of mutual bargaining, much in the manner that consolidations and gentlemen's agreements are formed in the modern business world. Past social evolution has gone on in no such simple and rationalistic fashion as this.

In the past, durable peace has been effected through the union of previously conflicting groups in one of two ways. (1) In the majority of cases, a union has first been achieved through forcible conquest, and later a sentiment favorable to the established order has come to the permanent support of the union. (2) In other instances, a strong sentiment was originally common to separate groups, and later led them voluntarily to seek organic union. In any event the permanent psychological support of union was a sentiment. The difference is one of priority: either force came first, and, wisely used, was successful in evoking a sentiment; or the sentiment came first, and later embodied itself in institutions.

The first type of union mentioned, the outcome of wars and conquests, has been very common. One group or nation conquered its neighbors and made them subject to its law. Later, this force became transmuted into moral

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authority. This has happened again and again in the savage world and among historical civilizations. The Romans began by forcing the nations of the ancient world to submit to them, and, as their rule became more just, it gained universal respect, and the subjugated nations learned to appreciate the blessings of the *pax Romana*. Ultimately they were permitted to share in what remained of Roman citizenship. In a similar way large portions of the human race, including even the recently conquered Boers, have come to respect a *pax Brittanica*, and to be loyal to British rule. Our own government of the Philippines is another instance. Beginning with force, it has been considerate and just, and we hope that it has won the respect, if not yet the affection, of the native population. In a more brutal manner, and with less though considerable success (as German solidity in the present war testifies), Bismarck effected through blood and iron the federal union of the present German empire under Prussian domination.

An international federation effected through force of this character could at the present time be brought about only though a complete German victory in this, and perhaps several future wars. A frank pan-German might urge upon us the desirability of such an outcome in words like these: "You really ought to allow the marvellously organized Prussian military power to conquer the world and impart to all nations the blessings of a *pax Germanica*. With Prussians and their allies in mastery of the world, all other nations of course would be disarmed, and there could be no more wars. The Kaiser's law and the Kaiser's peace would then bring happiness to all nations, and the hymn of the angels, the *Gloria in Excelsis*, would become a reality. German physical might would be exercised as a just moral authority. The Imperial Supreme Court at Leipzig would render justice to the entire earth; and, as Roman jurists made real in actual law the conception of a universal Logos of which Stoic philosophers had been dreaming, so would German judges interpret and the Kaiser would put into actual force the international law

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of the future. If not you, at least your descendants, properly educated in Prussianized schools, would learn to recognize and to revere the divine Idea manifest in the Teutonic government of the world."

It is hardly necessary to reply to our pan-Germanist. Like his compatriots who tried to win our sympathy for Germany three years ago and only succeeded in relieving us of our last doubts as to the complete justice of the Entente cause, he would fail to comprehend our point of view, and he would marvel at our perverse stupidity in not being convinced by his arguments.

Since, therefore, we should not desire an international federation effected in the first instance by force, only the second alternative lies open to us. A strong sentiment for an international federation must be developed among the existing nations of the world that will lead them into a voluntary union. Federations of this kind, though rarer, have come into existence in stages of development as diverse as those represented by the League of the Iroquois and our own United States of America. The prerequisite to such a federation, if it is to be more durable than a temporary coalition, is, that some deep tie must bind together the federated groups or states. On one plane of development the connecting tie might be totemism, with all its sacred meaning and mystery to the savage mind; and on a higher plane it might be a common language and traditions, and the fresh memory of a heroic struggle for liberty against a tyrannical mother country. Perhaps we may hope that after the present war the memory of a united struggle to make the world safe for democracy will furnish the basis for the ultimate development of such a sentiment.

In order to convince every one of its desirability, the common good to be achieved through internationalism would need to be comprehensive, and to embody a wealth of human values. It is doubtful whether it would suffice, even for a beginning, to make the bond of union between nations consist merely of a sort of international law court to settle disputes and so to prevent wars. The de-

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cisions of such a court would have to be enforced by a league of nations. It would be hard to induce citizens of democratic states to lay down their lives to enforce the decisions of a bench of black-gowned judges upon abstract points of international law. The league would be surer of the loyal support of citizens if it were known to be affirming the rights of every nation, and of every individual in every nation, to larger and fuller lives of freedom and opportunity in a variety of directions. It would need to be clear, as a minimum, that through its membership in the league or federation every mature nation would be assured autonomy, the inviolability of its territory, and the respect of every other nation for its rights according to international law. The federation would then be clearly seen not to be usurping but to be making secure the rights now enjoyed by each individual nation. As an ultimate ideal, though not completely attainable in the immediate future, the federation would affirm the rights of the citizens of every nation to travel, to reside, and to transact business in every other country upon the same terms as the native citizens. Foreign capitalists would not be permitted to exploit a backward country while pretending to develop it; and, on the other hand, their legitimate investments would obtain international protection. An internationalism that would thus render honest development of backward countries attractive to reputable capitalists, who seek fair but not speculative returns, would confer a boon upon creditor and debtor nations alike. Internationalism should prevent all banking and transportation companies from showing the least favor to citizens of one country in preference to those of another. It should render impossible such things as "commercial wars" between countries, tariffs showing preferences for "most favored nations," and special privileges of any kind for citizens of a particular country in the territory of another country. Ultimately all national tariff barriers should be wiped out altogether, though it may be long before this can be achieved. The principle of the "open door," which our government has

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claimed for China, should at once apply to all countries, both those that are independent and those that are colonies.

In numerous other ways, such as the promotion of scientific research, of the fine arts and humanities, and the diffusion of education, the international federation could carry on valuable projects too vast for individual nations to undertake. The conception of the international federation as formulated by its advocates should be made to include so many goods that every citizen of every country may be led to perceive its desirability, and to realize that if it were in existence the benefits that he would personally receive from it would be as numerous and as tangible as those that he now enjoys from his local and national governments. If possible, everyone should be brought to understand these possibilities during our lifetime. The sooner everyone comes to desire such an international federation, the more quickly its advent will be hastened.

It is to be emphasized that the federation as here conceived in no way would supplant or diminish the importance of existing national governments. On the contrary, it would be an effective instrument for assuring the well being and dignity of them. Through internationalism the legitimate aspirations of nationalism would be more fully achieved and fulfilled. Such a federation, once formed, would do much to raise the plane of national ethics. Each nation would have to respect the rights of other nations. National egotism and jingoism would appear absurd. Each nation would desire the esteem of other nations and be ashamed to break its plighted word, or to engage in a predatory imperialism at the expense of other nations.

On the other hand, no nation could selfishly refuse to assume its share of the white man's burden. For one serious obstacle to the full realization of an internationalism in which each nation would have equal rights with all others, in regard to freedom of trade, travel, emigration and immigration, is that at the present time not all nations are upon an equal level of intelligence and culture. For instance,

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a coolie immigration to our Pacific coast in unrestricted numbers at the present time, or in the near future, would be a disaster to the progress of civilization in this hemisphere. To make practicable the incorporation of principles of equality in international law, like equality in intellectual and moral development must first have become an approximate fact. It is therefore the duty of the great nations to assume responsibility for the educational and economic development of backward portions of the earth, in order that the world can become prepared for an internationalism based upon the principle of equal political, social, and economic opportunities for all men. In choosing to live to itself, and selfishly refusing to accept its responsibilities, an anti-imperialistic nation might be guilty of a sin of omission only less culpable than the overt acts of an unscrupulously imperialistic nation that misused its opportunities for service in the advancement of humanity.[5]

In order to bring such a federation into existence and to assure its success and permanence it would not be enough for national governments and individual citizens to become intellectually convinced of its desirability for such reasons as have been mentioned. Still more would be necessary. The federation would require the support of a *sentiment* comparable to the patriotism now felt by the citizens for their respective nations. In the sense here intended, a "sentiment" is a permanent organization of instincts, emotions and other impulses about a definite

[5] Separate nations, in time no doubt, would be relieved of some duties that could better be performed by an international government, once the latter had achieved sufficient strength, stability, experience and general competence. *E.g.*, the international federation, if it were now in existence and had won general confidence, might be able to relieve us of the risks and expense involved in maintaining the security of the Philippines, and a stable government in Cuba. It could, with less offence than we, intervene in Mexico, if it should ever become necessary, and perhaps without intervention it might be able to assist the Mexicans to develop their natural resources and to achieve a government that would be just alike to foreigners and to the various classes of the native population. Until the advent of such a time, however, each of the "great powers," including our own, must do what it can in an honorable way to promote the advance of civilization among its more backward neighbors.

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object. Love is such a sentiment. Its core, I believe, consists in tenderness habitually felt for some definite object —a wife, a child, a parent are the instances that first occur to one. Love may also be felt for truth, liberty, justice, science, God. These last objects may appear to be abstractions to the outsider, but they are vivid and concrete realities to the holder of the sentiment, and he may be ready to sacrifice his life for one of them. Not only does he habitually feel tenderness toward them, but he is angry when they are attacked, fearful when they are endangered, joyful when they prosper, self-satisfied when they are praised, ashamed when they deserve condemnation, and so on. The objects to which his stronger sentiments are attached are the greatest values in a person's life. Patriotism is such a sentiment; its core is a union of love and respect for one's nation and country. One loves and reveres his country—its people and its soil, its history and its ideals, its great heroes and its achievements, its songs and its flag.

Can a sentiment analogous to patriotism be developed for an international federation not yet in existence so strong that the common will of mankind will bring it into being? Can men be taught to feel toward humanity emotions similar to those which they now feel to those of their own kin and nation, so that they will desire some sort of organic union of the entire human race? A man upon whom I once urged the desirability of such consummation replied: "But you can't expect people to develop any particular affection for the solar system!" Well, perhaps many people to-day find it as difficult, almost, to feel emotion for the human race as for the solar system, and it will undoubtedly take a long time to foster and develop a sentimental love of humanity. But it is by no means impossible.

To be sure we are still a long way from it. As yet we do not even possess an international flag (if we except the wholly undesirable red flag of anarchists and socialists), nor have we any really suitable international songs. We should choose an international flag, and accustom ourselves to display it together with our national flag upon all

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public occasions. There should be international songs dedicated to humanity, and every child should be taught to sing them. A holiday once a year should be celebrated in honor of humanity, for the fostering of international sentiment. All nations should celebrate this holiday simultaneously. One side of every coin should bear a design of Humanity. The reverse side would be sufficient for the emblem of the particular nation. Statues of Humanity should be familiar objects in all our large cities and public parks. Auguste Comte devised a calendar with each day in the year dedicated to the memory of some hero who has notably served humanity. It would be well to familiarize ourselves with such a calendar, and for the newpapers every morning to remind us whom the day commemorates. In every way possible concrete imagery must become associated with internationalism, if the latter is to become the object of a deep sentiment.[6]

Two influences in the direction of internationalism and the recognition of humanity are familiar to all of us. What progress has thus far been made in the recognition of humanity has been largely due to them. I refer to religion and to socialism.

All of the great spiritual religions have expanded beyond national and racial boundaries and have acknowledged a mission to all human beings. Christianity is a noteworthy instance. Its enthusiasm as a missionary religion and its emphasis upon the brotherhood of man are in evidence. So far as Christianity has failed in its attempted universalism, this has been due to several reasons, none of which is essential to its fundamental nature. In the case of Protestant and Eastern churches Christianity has been broken up into segments, none of which has stretched beyond national boundaries. It has therefore been easy for these confessions in times of national conflict to lapse into heno-

[6] International athletic and literary contests, like the ancient Olympic games, should come in time to attract general attention, and to make a universal appeal. They would thus help to promote mutual respect and good will, and to provide "a moral equivalent for war" as a means for the expression of national rivalries.

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theism. The Church of Rome has remained international in its scope, but it has lost prestige through anti-clerical movements and for other reasons. In all of its forms organized Christianity has been too closely identified with the interests of certain classes of society, either the middle classes or the aristocracy, and so it has failed to appreciate the struggles of the humbler classes for an economic justice fundamental in their case to afford social and moral freedom and opportunity. Besides all this an "otherworldliness" still persists to some extent, and there is too much absorption in church activities of little ethical worth, and not enough attention to social and moral values of greater moment for the world in which we are living. The remedy for this "otherworldliness" would be found, if Christian workers would study sympathetically the "religion of humanity" of Auguste Comte, and adopt his enthusiasm for humanity, as it is and may become in *this* world. And for organized Christianity to eliminate all the defects I have mentioned it would merely need to concern itself with the problems of our time in the spirit of complete devotion to humanity shown by Jesus Christ in his time. And, notwithstanding all its limitations in the past, Christianity in all of its branches seems to me to deserve the credit for having done more than any other single agency to inculcate in men a sentiment for humanity. We may expect this to continue to be true of it in the future.

The other noteworthy influence in the direction of internationalism that requires to be noticed is socialism. It, too, has spread beyond national boundaries and linked men of different countries with common aspirations. It has even had an international flag and international songs. Its failures seem to me to have been chiefly two. First, it has identified itself too exclusively with a single class, the proletariat. It has often preached a "class war" against the rest of humanity. Its ideal has not been concrete and inclusive. In the second place, and as a consequence, socialistic internationalism has been thought to be antagonistic to national patriotism. It is to the credit of

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the socialists that in the present war (with the deplorable exception of those in Russia) they have been patriotic, and have realized that, despite class conflicts, their fundamental loyalty is to a common good which they share with the other classes of their respective nations.[7] Socialists in the future will surely come to realize that the object of national socialism must be a synthesis of the goods of *all* classes within a nation, and that a genuine international socialism must in like manner be a synthesis of all national goods in a larger whole. Socialists will then find that their national and international ideals are in complete agreement. They will then be able to be of substantial service in the promotion of the cause of internationalism as here conceived.

The first step to the cultivation of international ideals and sentiments is to win the present war. During the progress of the war the consciousness of a common humanity is developing in our minds and in those of our allies. In entering the conflict, as we have done, not to secure an advantage for our nation at the expense of other nations, but for the sake of a common good in which all nations will share, including our present enemies, we have been actuated by the type of motives that will ultimately bring a federation of nations into existence.

Possibly I have not employed enough ethical terminology to make clear the relationship of the "humanity" and "internationalism" I have been preaching to systems of moral philosophy. In the spirit of Kant's maxim it has been claimed that humanity, whether embodied in nations or in individual citizens, is always to be treated as an end in itself. The international federation would be an attempt to make Kant's "kingdom of ends" in some measure an actuality in the affairs of nations. The point of view sets forth what Hegelians call a "concrete universal" in that

[7] In the case of the Germans, a more enlightened socialism would have perceived that the national interest is opposed to the circle about the Kaiser that has misled the nation and precipitated the war. If they only could have seen this, German socialists could have remained true patriots and yet opposed the war. But, as it is, they deserve credit for patriotism as they have understood it.

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it insists that the sentiment for humanity must be a synthesis of national patriotisms, and not an abstraction from them. In this respect it is in direct antithesis to the thin-blooded cosmopolitanism (common in the eighteenth century and still extant) that deprecates national loyalties, and fails to realize that only true patriots are capable of acquiring the larger patriotism implied in deep devotion to a federated humanity. The adaptations from Hobhouse, McDougall, and Shand, are, I trust, obvious.[8] It will also be apparent that an attempt has been made to view the moral consciousness of "humanity" as a union of reason and emotion in a sentiment,[9] so that the doctrine mediates between a rationalistic ethics and an ethics based upon impulse and emotion.

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[8] L. T. Hobhouse, "Morals in Evolution"; William McDougall, "An Introduction to Social Psychology"; Alexander F. Shand, "Foundations of Character."

[9] In opposition to writers of the type of Canon Rashdall. Cf. the author's paper "Conscience as Reason and as Emotion," *Philosophical Review*, vol. xxv, pp. 676–691.

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THE SOUL OF THE SLAV.

MOMČILO T. SELESCOVIĆ.

WHAT is it that distinguishes man from man? Everything; for no two things in the world are alike. That is the basis of the historical understanding. And yet nothing; for all men obey the same laws, mechanical, physiological, mental. That is the basis of the scientific understanding.

Between these answers the conception of nationality becomes obscure. The question opens out before us: What are the causes that determine a certain group of people to unite together, and fix a gulf between them and other men? What, in short, is the ultimate principle of the process, seeing that nature appears to us in the guise either of infinite irregularity or of sameness? The principle is the law of the human reason; to apprehend is to dispose in order, and divide into parts. That is the basis of the philosophical understanding.

The peculiarity of the Slavs lies in their relation to world-history—the history, that is, of the universal values which we call "culture," not the record of passing occurrences. The Westerner is the bearer of world-history and its latest expression; it is only in our own day that the Slavs are gradually entering within its sphere. And this fact necessarily leads them to conceive of world-history in a special way.

The position may be thus defined: World-history means for the Westerner his own history, for his own history is nothing else but the latest bloom or fruit of world-history.

World-history means for the Slav a foreign property which he has to make his own. The characteristic of the Slav in contrast to the Westerner is that the history of the Slav is only an affair of the past, only a preparatory history,

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only a series of self-preservative acts;—if you like, not a history at all in respect of human progress or culture.

The history of a Western people, however, has value; it has grown organically out of world-history and involves it in itself. Like every organism it is the continuation of a previous development, and therefore the clue to the culture of the Westerner, the root of that culture, is to be found in his national life. Outside his own history there are no values, that is to say, no culture.

It is otherwise with the Slav. The consciousness of himself, of his distinctive character, of his membership in a nation or a race he can acquire only by culture; otherwise he would remain unreflecting, or in other words insignificant for history. If he were to commit the impossible, and surround himself with a Chinese wall, all that he could do would be to gather or create afresh the experience or the values that he has already at hand in the achievements of other peoples. His distinction would consist in having none at all, and his rôle would be that of repeating stale truths. In order, therefore, to get a self of his own, he must traverse the path already made by others. Culture, that is to say, comes first, and national character derives from it; or in other words, culture is experienced as pure culture, and not as a national trait; and the order of development, as we find it in the West, is revived.

It is only by keeping this fact before our eyes that we shall be able to understand the meaning of the word "Slav" and the new value that the Slav brings with him.

For what is meant when the Slav professes: I am a Slav?

He is assuredly honest in his profession, and speaks from genuine conviction: but be it remembered that there are two kinds of honesty, two kinds of conviction—the spontaneous and the reflective, faith and the deliberate judgement. Must they always coincide?

He is honest in calling himself a Slav because his father did the same, and he proves his honesty by staking his life

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for the name's sake, and killing for the name's sake, or being killed by, the man who does not own to it.

But he is also honest, when he asks himself by what right he calls himself a Slav because his father also did. Is it because he was born in a Slavic country? because his mother tongue was Slavic? But in that case what is "Slavic" but a mere word? For that he had left behind him the state of the natural man, and become conscious of himself, and been able to reflect on the meaning of the name "Slav," he owes to civilisation, or, as we have called it, "culture," the product of foreign peoples. Its results were perhaps set before him in the schools of his own country; of their existence and their acquisition he learned, perhaps, in his own language, but those who acquired them were not of his own people.

Thus the deliberate judgement is, as it were, a light that brings into perfect clearness the faith that underlies it: it shows that the word "Slav," if referred to the past, is an empty sound, or, in other words, that the value that the Slav brings with him in contrast to the Westerner, is not historical and must not be looked for in the past.

And this is the characteristic of the Slavs as against the peoples which are also in the preliminary stage of history,—that they are conscious that theirs is only a preliminary history.

It is through the necessity of following up the course of the world's culture in order to arrive at self-consciousness and national consciousness (if his faith is not to remain merely a blind inkling), that the Slav comes to recognise that culture is the content and essence of nationhood, and that, vice versa, nationhood is nothing but a form of culture.

This is the great experience, the foundational value that the Slav brings with him. This is his release from the opposition between humanity and nationhood—a release for which the Westerner struggled in vain. For the cosmopolitanism of the Italian Renaissance, the French Revolu-

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tion, and German Classicism, was morbid; it was theoretic and not related to the given circumstances in their mould of time and space; it set itself above these circumstances and remained always in the clouds, until the international romanticism all but killed it outright by glorifying the opposite extreme—nationalism.

For the Westerner culture and nationhood are originally one and the same, and on that account he always sees the character of a foreign nation as a contrast to himself.

But the Slav is enabled by his experience to transcend the opposition of culture and nationhood, of man and nation; he recognises that the relation between them is the relation of the content to the form.

And this determines the Slavic conception of national character, not as the element which separates peoples, but as the basis on which alone their intercommunion is possible. The peculiarity of the conception consists, therefore, in the idea that national characteristics are not contrasts between peoples, but conditions of internationalism.

In the West, that is to say, internationalism means the very opposite to nationalism. It appears either as a matter of the individual consciousness or as a social ideal. In the former case it takes the form of eclecticism, dilettantism, æstheticism, by which I mean that sort of moral impotence which is implied in a lack of any specific quality—in short, anti-individualism; in the latter case its shape is a vision of a future society, a social purpose, taste, or programme,—in other words a theory. In either case it is abstractive, only it moves in two opposite directions: either the individual takes up into himself the character of other people than himself, which means, if I may use the expression, the incarnation of an abstraction; or the theory is projected outward as a form of society. In the one case the internationlist will have nothing that is his own; in the other, nothing that is foreign to his own.

The historical rôle of the Slavs consists in this:—that they do not advance to manhood, in the full sense of the

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word, over the ruins of individuality, but on the contrary through its development. Nationalism and internationalism cease to be opposites.

For the national character in this case does not derive from a history—there is none at hand—but merely and only from the relation of individuals to each other. It is not identical, therefore, with what is common to these individuals; on the contrary, it arises from their differences. It is only through the recognition of foreign characteristics that the Slav arrives at a recognition of his own, and only the self-consciousness of each of its members is the cause and the condition of the harmony of the whole society. Not in spite of the fact, but thanks to the fact that Slavic nationalism does not imply a tradition, but is rooted in the independence of the individual, does it lead to the social organisation, the motive of that organization being the natural need of each individual to co-operate with others; for through the very fact of being an individual, that is, a part, each has need of other parts to form a whole.

That is the character of the Slav in one aspect. Negatively, both his individualism and his morality are distinct from those of the West, in that he makes a synthesis of both. For in the West individualism and morality are opposites; the individualist being either the superman or the man with no moral principle at all.

The positive characteristic of the Slav consists in this: that on the one hand, in contrast to Western individualism, he conceives the individual not as a self-contained unity which is its own end (in which case it would deserve rather to be called universal) but as a means to society. On the other hand, however, in contrast to Western morality, he conceives society not as legalised individualism (in the legal abstract of individualism, as we should then have to call it), but as a consequence of individuality, as a mutual supplementation of each by each.

National character, then, is in this case not identical with any historical product. The mission, the meaning, and the nature of Slavic nationhood is to be a mediator.

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To point out how this peculiarity of the Slavic mind is manifested in practise and theory, in the state, in art, and in philosophy is a task which may be reserved for another paper. I shall speak here of how that mind has been crystallised, and not of the manner of its operation.

The Slavic character has often been conceived by the Slavs themselves as an historical result, and attempts have been made to discover it from the past. On the analogy of Western examples the roots of Slavic national character were sought not in the mediating synthesis, but in opposition to other nationalities. Such a procedure is, of course, uninformed and merely literary; it lacks any sort of foundation, for it contradicts the facts. The whole method consists in arbitrarily transferring the principles and standards of the West to the Slavic world. The natural consequence is not only that the Slavic character is not recognized, but that it is positively effaced. By applying the same standards to both the Slavic and the Western world, you identify them, you eliminate the whole difference between them, which consists in their different relations to world-history. In this way the main fact, the postulate, the necessary starting-point is left out of mind, and the results can only be forced and arbitrary constructions.

But these constructions usually end in confusing the conception "national" with "popular," in substituting for the ideal and universal value which a people represents concrete and ephemeral phenomena from its history, in speaking of a "people" in the small and narrow sense of the contrary of the conscious individual, in understanding the people as the more or less unconsciously vegetating mass and bringing it under the category of quantity and not of quality.

That is the inevitable consequence, if you look for the character of the Slav in his past. The only characteristics you may infer from it are popular—the characteristics of the mass: popular costumes, dances, customs, sagas, and so on.

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Thereby, however, you arrive at exactly the opposite of the goal you proposed: instead of some achievement of human culture, you have a raw material that is only of importance in so far as it is, or might be, stuff to work upon; for it is only in working upon it that the national element, the universal value of the nation, is reflected; and herein lies the significance of the form it is given. The raw material is known to no one but the native: for the stranger it has only the values and charm of its strangeness: that is to say, it represents no universal value and is in so far the very opposite of national. To these half-way phenomena I apply the term "popular."

In fact, nationhood does not express with the Slavs a contrast to other people. So far as the word Slav, that is to say, denotes a contrast to other peoples, it is a misleading word, a title without a meaning, for the name covers an element of quite a different nature; it means, not the conscious characteristics of the people in question, not its national traits, but its faith.

We can now understand why it is among the Slavs that nationalism assumes so passionate a rôle: it is because it is not nationalism. I mean: we understand that the contrast between the Slavs and other peoples, though it goes under the name of nationalism, is not, and cannot be, rooted in it; that the reverse is rather the case—this so-called nationalism grows out of the opposition in which other peoples put themselves to the Slavs, out of the oppression in which the Slavs found themselves for many centuries, and in fact find themselves still. We understand, therefore, that this nationalism has its roots not in the conscious judgement, but is simply that which enables a down-trodden people to preserve itself—faith.

Its character is conditioned by its origin. The Slav had no leisure to think about life in general, he had to defend his own. His faith, therefore, is not a theory of existence, but a means to its realisation. And that makes him pic-

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ture the world in quite different forms and colours than the Westerner.

The Westerner sought not only the key to the solution of the cosmic riddle, but the solution itself in reason. Is it a wonder that, thus mistaking reason, he was obliged either to find the world unreasonable, or to find reason not a means, but only a hindrance to the solution? Whether he denied this world for the sake of the world beyond, or affirmed the present for the sake of the future, he has always been in a mediate relation to the world; a dream it is for him, and nothing but a dream, be it fair, or be it distressing.

The faith of the Slav is an immediate apprehension of existence. It is not a theoretical explanation of the universe, for only one explanation is possible for him, the realisation of the life-impulse. In that realisation the world here and now ceases to be a means and a preliminary, and becomes an end. The world is not denied for the sake of eternity, but affirmed. For eternity in this case is not the opposite of the present, but identical with it; it is only the present that is; the future has to be, and the past has been already.

The Westerner conceives of the present as a timeless point at which the future passes into the past. To be, on this view, is merely to seem. Reality can only be outside; that is God as the Western mind conceives Him. And the faith of the Westerner is that the world would be meaningless without that supplement.

For the Slav the world becomes meaningless as soon as he asks himself whether it has a meaning or not. For him its nature is nothing if not holy: it is the manifestation of God in time and space. That is his faith. And what is God? As God He is nowhere manifested. We only infer Him from the world: infer Him, that is, as a something that transcends our apprehension and may, therefore, just as well be called a nothing. It is only the self-contradiction of our intelligence when we ascribe a quality to this unknown, whether as explicable or inexplicable. Something and nothing in this case are only empty words, which

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describe nothing but the impotence of our understanding. The word God designates either the insufficiency of man's understanding, or (which is the same thing) an object that surpasses his understanding, and of which, therefore, nothing more can be said than that it is holy, which means simply that it passes the intelligence of man.

Faith, to the Westerner, is turning from the world, denying the world he has experienced for the sake of that whose existence he has argued. And so it is either speculation,—a conceiving, not of God, but of the thinker's own self, for God is in this case nothing but a projection of his own person in eternity and infinity; or it is not a faith at all, but atheism, the most artificial, the most contradictory, the shallowest of all philosophies, believing itself to be a philosophy, but being really the lack of one, solving the eternal questions by not solving, by simply eliminating them.

The faith of the Slav does not remove the world to a pale distance, but on the contrary bestows on it colour and intensity. It is a mysticism that necessarily manifests itself —to use a word than which I can find no better—as a realism. Faith means in his case faith in himself and God, faith in mankind.

He is thus in opposition not only to speculation but to atheism. For at bottom atheism is nothing else but speculation, only in reverse; it is not thinking, but the absence of thinking; not the content of the ego, but its very void is projected in eternity and infinity. Speculation defines God in positive terms, atheism in negative. The faith of the Slav does not define Him at all. Therein consists what is called his mysticism, and what, if we have regard not to its inner nature but to its outward expression, we must call his realism. For the Slav does not deny God by not defining Him; he recognises Him only, as unintelligible, undefinable. To explain the world, therefore, he does not set up a spiritual principle instead of a mechanical; he does not see the world through principles at all, but through the phases of his own personality. What is called his mysticism,

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therefore, is simply the root of his realism; it is the very opposite of abstraction.

This is the whole secret of the soul of the Slav—that it does not go beyond itself. Within itself it seeks for an explanation of itself; not outside itself.

It is backwards that the eyes of the Westerner are turned; he seeks the significance of his being in its cause. He is not his own answer, and this is for him the fundamental idea of his personality. He is not a unitary being, but divided in two, a double or a half. The mood to which he is set is discord and a longing for peace. It is from outward and not from inward opposition that the faith of the Slav is born. The world and I are conditions of one another; but the measure of man comes from man; this is the great experience that the Slav has made at his own expense. His faith, therefore, aims not at explaining the world; this problem is for him identical with that of explaining his own life. And so it is that he asks not after the cause of life, but after its end. He does not sail under the banner of metaphysic. Where metaphysic is found among the Slavs it is only childish and child-like phantasy, or else a ruthlessly logical development of western metaphysic, lifeless verbalism. The faith of the Slav issues entirely in ethics, for that only can give him an answer to the question of the end of his existence. His life is a restless dissolving of himself in the relations of man to man, and there-with the conception of the transcendental becomes converted in his mind into that of the necessary, or what is simply given. In face of this necessity his only attitude is passive and contemplative. Thus the faith of the Slav is devotion, not enquiry into ultimate things, and least of all garrulous demonstration.

The mood, therefore, to which his being is set is inward quiet, peace of mind, the deep silence of the heart; where God is there is God only, and to ask why is to utter a contradiction. The Westerner draws his conclusions the other way: he argues from the conception of the transcendental to his behaviour in this present life. The trans-

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cendental becomes the active regulator of here and now: the only question is whether the transcendental be conceived as a reality outside the man, or as a fiction of the man's mind. In the one case the Westerner's motive in living is the immortality of his soul; in the other the immortality of his name. Faith, in this case, is simply a man's battle with himself, and morality is simply the opposite of egoism. For the deepest wisdom is here contradictory: the overcoming of self for the self's sake.

The faith of the Slav is not an anticipating of the transcendental, but the reaffirmation of the given reality. His actions are not determined by the consciousness of being in possession of eternal truth, but by the humility which we feel towards that which we regard as inevitable, that is to say, by furious revolt against that which we regard as arbitrary. This attitude, so contrary to the attitude of the West, includes a contrary conception of the personality. Personality is conceived as a means, not as an end. The importance of the ego lies not in its immortality, in its preservation, in its eternity, but, on the contrary, in its mortality, in its development, in its manifestation: to live and to die are only two words for one and the same thing, namely, for the restless dissolution of the self in its fruits. This view of death cancels all the import of a future life. Life and death cease to be opposites.

In short, we may put it thus: the faith of the Westerner manifests itself either as pessimism or as optimism, according as we regard its source or its tendency; it is either a contempt of earthly life or a hope of the life beyond. The faith of the Slav is something different in principle: not the valuation but the fulfilment of life. Activity is not only its expression, but also the complete gift of itself, and its ultimate import.

This puts him in opposition, firstly, to Mohammedan fatalism and Buddhist scepticism, which like two polar extremes lead to the same thing, to passivity. Secondly, it puts him in opposition to the activity of the Westerner:

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for the activity of the Slav is rooted not in abstract theory, but in the concrete; it is not metaphysical or anti-metaphysical, like that of the Anglo-Saxons, but ethical; it is not an aggressive affirmation of certain values, but a judicial recognition of the given truth and critical towards itself.

All this is given, of course, in rough outlines. And since both Westerners and Slavs—at least the overwhelming majority—have the same Christian religion, they use the same words: God, Immortality of the Soul, the Beyond. But whoever can look behind the words will see that the same sound covers different meanings: the names are the same, but the foundations of the structure are different. This is clearly shown in the position and significance which the church has in the West and among the Slavs.

If you look at the church of the Slavs with western eyes, you see only that it did not grow from the home soil, but was brought over ready grown from strangers. That is true not only of the Orthodox Church but of the Catholic too, though perhaps it is more conspicuously the case with the Orthodox. It is a borrowing from Rome or from Byzantium. Not being adjusted to the new circumstances the church ceased to be a living organism, degenerated into stark and lifeless selfishness, characterlessness, empty formalism, and became a mannerism without a manner. The very opposite, that is to say, to the church of the West.

For the church of the West grew organically out of the circumstances, and is, in fact, nothing other than the necessary counterpart or counterpoise to nationality. History, culture, as we saw, are conceived by the Westerner as his national heritage. Being national, they failed to satisfy what was universal and purely human in him. This gap is filled by the church; that is her position in the West. In fact she represents the non-national, international, not to say the anti-national element. Church and nationality, therefore, according to their fundamental ideas, are, in the West, opposites.

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The very reverse is the case with the Slav. His church is not a church in the Western sense. She stands not for the universally human element, not as a counterpoise to nationalism, but, on the contrary, for the affirmation of personality in face of the oppressor, for reaction and opposition to the foreign foe. (The original Christian church stood for both at once.)

This being so, we can understand that the inexpansiveness of the Slavic church, its rigidity, its petrifaction was not its deficiency, but the condition under which alone it could play its part. Its deep significance consists in the fact that it was always only an organ of national self-preservation. The formularies under which this happened were borrowed from strangers. If the church would remain true to herself, the foreign formularies must perforce remain formularies, petrify, ossify to a symbol, and shrink to a name.

We have, therefore, a twofold opposition; one between Western and Slavic conceptions of culture and of the church, and a second between Western and Slavic relations to culture and to the church. Culture in the West means the national quality, and the church means the international element. With the Slav, on the contrary, it is the church that harbours the national element and culture the international. Culture and the church supplement each other in the West, completely; with the Slav the one grows out of the other, the national being in his case, as we saw, not the opposite to the international, but its fruit.

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THE NEW ERA OF FRUITFULNESS IN ETHICAL THINKING.

C. E. AYRES.

I.

IF THE content of the science of ethics is assumed to be determined by the treatises of ethicists, then the history of ethics is the history of a dualism. For practically all the work which has been done in ethics up to the present time has been done simultaneously in two fields and upon two problems. From the very first ethics has attempted on the one hand to give a causal explanation of moral phenomena, and on the other hand to propound a theory of what things are good, and what acts right.

Doubtless these two problems are indistinguishable from one another in the minds of many students of ethics. But the difficulty of distinguishing between them does not lie in an external identity. So far as their external aspects are concerned, the analysis of the moral consciousness, the examination of the moral judgment, the determination of the nature of conscience and of duty—these problems, or rather, this problem is clearly enough a different thing from the formulation of rules of conduct and the definition of a moral ideal. Formally speaking, the analysis of the moral judgment is a description of what is, while the formulation of the goal of right living is a description of what ought to be.

The reason for the assumed indistinguishability of these two problems lies beneath the surface differences in the relation which has always been supposed to exist between their answers. The fundamental postulate of ethical thinking from earliest times to the twentieth century has been the proposition that the only source of moral guidance and moral progress is the study of the phenomena of the moral judgment. The major undeclared assumption of practically all ethicists up to modern times has been the belief

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that the answer to the question: "What ought I to do?" is to be found only in a theological, or metaphysical, or psychological analysis of the process to which the word "ought" refers.

As a result, however, of the gradual realization, to which ethics came at the end of the last century, of the cosmic extent and complexity of the moral problem, a grave crisis has overtaken the science. We are to-day in the process of bringing the tacit assumption of the dependence of moral doctrine upon metaphysico-psychological speculation into the light of ruthless criticism.

The magnitude of the issues of this crisis can be appreciated properly only in a historical study of ethical methodology; but such a study can only be indicated in this paper, since, if it were not limited to a mere sketch of a single period, its proportions and importance would entirely subordinate the purpose for which this interpretation of the recent history of ethics has been made. For that purpose is determined by the future rather than by the past methodology of ethics. If our suspicions of the practical efficacy of the analysis of moral consciousness should appear to be well founded, and if, during the next decade they should be heightened and justified, then that field will have to be definitely abandoned by students of morals. The attempt to reduce the life of the individual and of society to some sort of moral order,—to make life more worth living,—will begin not with a brief for the rationality of conscience or for the instinctiveness of moral reactions, but rather with a survey of the conditions of social life. To put more meaning into human existence, —to make of it a more orderly and less futile thing than it has ever been,—we shall try first to understand the meaning of the life we are now leading.

II.

The three great ethical treatises of the later nineteenth century contained little augury of the approaching crisis in ethical theory. But in so far as they carried the tra-

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ditional types of ethical speculation to a higher degree of refinement than had ever been reached before, they constituted one of the important causes of the revulsion against the traditional ethics. The very barrenness of work so monumental in scope as that of Sidgwick, Green, and Martineau contributed largely to the formulation of a new ethical methodology.

Sidgwick recognizes the dual nature of ethical inquiry at the very outset of his book. "I prefer to consider Ethics as the science or study of what ought to be," he says. This is a clear statement of the problem of human welfare; if this is true, it is the business of ethics to construct a system of moral precepts which shall define the good and the right. One cannot restrain a smile on finding that the sentence following the one quoted above is the author's apology for the fact that ethics—and his book—"consist, to a great extent, of a psychological discussion as to the 'nature of the moral faculty.'"

The answer to this paradox seems to lie in Sidgwick's belief that since right conduct must consist in rigid adherence to the principles of the one true theory of morality, the discovery of which of the current "methods of ethics" is the "true" one must necessarily contribute greatly to the establishment of the precepts of moral action. The criterion of the validity of the "methods of ethics" is to be the pragmatic test of the applicability of each theory to actual practice. Thus the method of the whole book coincides with the author's belief in the efficacy of moral philosophy. Sidgwick is able to show pretty conclusive evidence that the incommensurability of pleasures is an insuperable obstacle to the application of hedonistic theories to moral practice, and that the hopeless deficiency in clearness and precision, in self-evidence, in mutual consistency, and in universality of acceptance, of "intuitive" principles of morality makes the acceptance of intuitionism impossible.

When he came to the consideration of utilitarianism, however, Sidgwick unfortunately relented and refrained

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from applying his pragmatic test with unmoved scepticism. Consequently he allowed himself to be convinced that in utilitarianism, reinforced by an intuitional principle of rational benevolence, he had found the really fruitful ethical doctrine. And still Sidgwick recognized in the end the impossibility of constructing a complete system of morality, even upon the utilitarian plan. Consequences must be considered, he says. But what sort of consequences? And how should the consequences be calculated—since pleasures are incommensurable? There is no answer to these questions—nothing but the bare conviction that the thing can be done. "No doubt a thoughtful and well-instructed Utilitarian may see dimly a certain way ahead."

And so the study of "Methods of Ethics" ends as it began with the unsupported assumption that in some inexplicable way the guidance of human conduct toward the good and the right has been advanced by the decision that the moral consciousness of man works thus, and not so. The task is begun by virtue of an alleged "general agreement" that conduct is determined by principles in terms of which moral behavior is explained, and it is finished with "no doubt" that a man well-instructed in the "rational benevolence" variant of utilitarianism may somehow make some progress.

When the introduction to Green's "Prolegomena to Ethics" is examined for vestiges of the assumption of the fruitfulness of a dual methodology in ethics, its similarity to the first chapter of "Methods of Ethics" is very striking. Green, like Sidgwick, explicitly recognizes the dual task which has been traditionally assigned to ethics. "It has generally been expected of a moralist that he should explain not only how men do act (*i.e.*, in making moral judgments) but how they should act." But moral philosophy has fallen into disrepute because it has had "no interest for the imagination and no power over the heart." It has become a natural science, seeking to explain causally the facts of moral life. But in so far as ethical speculation

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has been reduced to a natural science, the "practical or preceptive" part of ethics has become obsolete.[1] Thus the utilitarian, "instead of telling men of a greatest sum of pleasures which they ought to seek, and which by acting in the light of a true insight they may attain . . . will rather set himself to show how the phraseology of 'ought' and 'ought not,' the belief in a good attainable by all, the consciousness of something that should be though it is not, may according to his philosophy be accounted for." Yet with such a clear insight into the futility of one analysis of moral consciousness, Green announces his intention of embarking upon the same voyage, though in a different ship. The "Prolegomena" is to be a metaphysical analysis of the fundamental nature of the cosmos, for the purpose of determining whether there is in man's being a principle which "consists in the consciousness of a moral ideal and the determination of human action thereby."

As a matter of fact, however, the metaphysician in Green completely overtops the moralist. For he not only gives over the bulk of his book to establishing the existence of "the consciousness of a moral ideal," but when in the fourth book he brings himself down to the specifically ethical job of showing how "human action is determined thereby" his habit is too strong upon him, and his achievement turns out to be a further elaboration of his metaphysic of morals rather than the justification of that speculation by the deduction from it of precepts for right conduct. "It remains to be asked," he says at the end of the book, "By what rule effort is to be guided, which we suppose the idea of a possible human perfection thus to initiate." Unless this problem can be solved "it would seem that our theory of the basis of morality, though its adoption might save some speculative persons from that distrust of their own conscience to which Hedonism would naturally lead them, can be of no further practical value."

[1] Green saw clearly enough that to resolve this methodological paradox by abandoning "practical ethics" is essentially to abandon ethics for sociology. See p. 382 of this article.

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And in the end Green gave the game away, saving himself as best he could by the reiteration of his still unjustified assumption in the form of the assertion that "we all recognize virtues which carry in themselves unfulfilled possibilities," and by the distinction, which served him in tight places several times, between motives and effects. "No theory whatever of the 'Summum Bonum,' Hedonistic or other, can avail for the settlement of (the question of what law or usage or cause of action contributes to the better-being of society), which requires analysis of facts and circumstances, not consideration of ends. But it (a theory such as this) will sufficiently direct us in regard to the kind of effects we should look for in our analysis, and so to the value we should put upon them when ascertained." How this is to be done forms no part of the theory; yet that it occurs is the justification of the whole philosophy. Thus the "Prolegomena," like the "Methods of Ethics," ends as it began with the basic assertion that moral philosophy is the source of moral wisdom still unsubstantiated by any evidence beyond that of traditional acquiescence in convenient dogma.

It would seem as though a thinker like Martineau who believed morality to consist in "a feeling that *this* is worthier than *that*," and that the exercise of this feeling "demands no reflective introspection, no ability to lay the finger on what it is in the action which excites the feeling, or even to ask the question whether it be the motive or the effect," would naturally feel little necessity for providing the world with a book on ethics, except as a piece of scientific description. One does not have to listen long to the tone of the book, however, to realize that Martineau also labored under the universal ethical misapprehension that from his exposition of the facts of the moral choice he could deduce some positive contribution to morality. Martineau did indeed actually set about the task of stabilizing the work of conscience by providing it with a set of principles (through a hundred and thirty-six pages) with reference to which the rightness and wrongness of an act may

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surely be determined—after first chiding Sidgwick, Spencer and Stephen for not having had the mental stamina to precede him in this necessary work.

Martineau's achievement, however, is hardly enough to justify the conclusion that from a theory of the nature of morality, a morality may be inferred. Waiving all consideration of the compatibility of the authority of Martineau's conscience and Martineau's principles, a glance at the nature of the principles themselves is sufficient to show that they are as far as the principle of self-realization from the needs of any actual moral situation. Martineau did not realize this, as Green and Sidgwick did of their generalizations. He produces situation after situation, solving each one in imagination without the least difficulty. His conception of a moral problem, however, does more credit to his character than to his mind; there is very little reality either in the difficulties or in their solution, to the modern way of thinking.

III.

In spite of the inadequacy of the types of ethical theory which have just been criticized, the fair historian cannot pass lightly over the positive contributions of Sidgwick, Green, and Martineau. It can hardly be expected that any philosopher will solve all the problems of the cosmos, though his failure to do so must be painstakingly noted in the interest of future progress. Moreover, the unexamined postulate which has been shown to underlie this ethical work was inherited from many generations of scholars, and perhaps it was not to be expected that it would be noted and its fallacy exposed in a period such as the Victorian; for while Darwin's work was already having large effects in all fields of thought in the seventies and eighties, still the evolutionary attitude had not become habitual in the sense in which it is now. Furthermore, though the great social reconstructions which are now going on were implicitly present at that time, the traditional "common sense" morality of the race was very much less in question

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then than now. These two changes—the recognition of the wide variations through various evolutionary epochs of the social background of morality, and the demands made by modern industrial society for a reconstruction of conventional morality—are largely responsible for the growing recognition of the inadequacy of the older type of ethical theory.

That moral conduct is social conduct is no new idea. It is specifically enunciated by Aristotle, who defines ethics as a "study of man in his relations to Society." In a certain sense Aristotle may be said to have been in possession of an idea of which Baldwin's principle that "all rules of action for the guidance of life must be of possible social application, even though in their origin they are announced and urged by individuals" is simply one expression. The significant thing, however, is not that Baldwin thus restated the Kantian categorical imperative in the language of sociology, but rather that the importance of recognizing the social nature of moral problems was very much emphasized in the nineties, notably in the six hundred pages of Baldwin's "Interpretations."

Furthermore it is one thing to acknowledge the existence of society as the home of the individual; it is quite another thing to maintain as Sumner was doing[2] that society constructs the individual. The serious exposition of the theory that "right" means only "compatible with the existing order of things," and that "philosophy and ethics are the products of the folkways" really represented a new attitude towards the development of society if not a wholly new conception.

The new recognition of the facts of social life, particularly of the significance of the wide discrepancies between the moral conduct of different peoples in different periods of social evolution, was perhaps a less potent awakener of ethicists from their dogmatic slumber than the growth of

[2] For though "Folkways" was not published until 1907, Sumner was teaching the doctrines which it contained very much earlier. See "Folkways," Preface.

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the modern urban-industrial society. Professor Tufts considers this the chief cause of the reconstruction of ethical concepts. "If we ask what has affected most intensely the ethical thought of the period we must find an answer, not in science, but in the economic, political, and family life. The changing conditions of business and industry, the shift to urban life, the consequent changes in the family, the demands for new legislation, the controversies over judicial interpretations, the search for more effective dealing with poverty, vice and crime, last of all the issues of nationalism and internationalism, war and peace—these and others of like sort have stirred men from easy reflection."

IV.

In the face of problems such as these it would seem that the old subconscious dogma of ethics,—the supposition that what men need is a clearer exposition of moral phenomena,—must atrophy from very disuse. As a matter of fact, however, while certain men resolved the premise of the older ethics by advocating the abandonment of metaphysico-psychological speculation for the more fruitful study of actual affairs, others seized the opposite horn of the dilemma, and proceeded to make ethics a "natural science." The form which this "natural" ethics typically took was that of an attempt to account for the phenomena of social life in terms of a moral instinct. In 1887 Höffding had made a careful descriptive analysis of the moral organization of the family, the state, and "die freie Kulturgesellschaft," using as his principles of explanation "a feeling of pleasure or pain" (Lust=oder Unlustgefühl) which "when it has developed from its basis in sympathy into a consciousness of duty and justice, finally becomes the criterion of ethical judgments of pleasure and pain," and a conception of welfare (Wohlfahrt) as "the principle for the determination of the contents of ethics and for the evaluation of human conduct."

Höffding, however, wrote before the extension of the evolutionary principle to the field of morals had been con-

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summated, and he therefore did not attempt to make his explanation include the development of modern out of primitive morality. This task was very boldly attacked a decade later in Sutherland's "Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct." Sutherland attempted to trace the origin of an instinct which, emerging from the parental instinct of the lower animals in the form of sympathy, had "deepened and expanded" into "the moral instinct with all its accompanying accessories, the sense of duty, the feeling of self-respect, the enthusiasm of both the tender and the manly ideal of ethic beauty." With Westermarck this moral emotion is broadened into a mere emotion of approval and disapproval, which, acting spontaneously though apparently along relatively fixed lines, determines the forms which moral and immoral practices assume in different civilizations.

While the work which has been accomplished by this type of "scientific ethics" has been of the very highest value for the sympathetic understanding of moralities foreign to our own, yet, as Green pointed out, it does not afford any basis whatever for the formulation of a positive contribution to the morality of our own day. Höffding saw this clearly enough. "There are two problems of scientific ethics to be distinguished from one another," he said. "Ethics is partly a historical, partly a philosophical science. Historical or comparative ethics seeks to set forth positive morality as it appeared at each given time among each given people. Philosophical ethics has as its problem not the description and explanation of given ethical phenomena, but evaluation itself."

Westermarck was more consistent and denied that this evaluation of current moral practices can be the business of a science. But this escape is purely verbal; it serves to make a clear distinction between the "natural science" of ethics and the practical problems of morality, but it does not explain away those problems.

Another effort to develop an expository ethics without even an attempt at a contribution to morality is that of

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the rationalists. In spite of Taylor's cogent and vital demonstration that "it is an insufficient explanation of the nature and origin of moral ideals to say that they spring from the rational character of human agency," since "in order to know what kind of conduct will in the case of any individual or species conform to our principle (of economy, *i.e.*, "rationality") by securing the beneficial reaction at the least cost, it is clearly all-important to know what are the general conditions of existence which have to be met by the action of the individual or species in question," the rationalist type of ethical speculation has persisted.

Why it persists, it is hard to say. The rationalists cannot claim to have made any such contribution to knowledge as that of the moral instinct evolutionists, nor do they devote themselves to the solution of practical moral problems. Moore admits that "in order to show that any action is a duty, it is necessary to know both what are the other conditions, which will, conjointly with it, determine its effects; to know exactly what will be the effects of these conditions; and to know all the events which will be in any way affected by our action throughout an infinite future," and that failing of this perfect achievement ethics may nevertheless marshal the alternatives likely to occur to anyone and study their probable effects. Yet he does not take any steps in the direction of this type of ethical study, contenting himself with dogmatizing about the varieties of experience which are "intrinsically" good and evil. And Rashdall seems to confess that "if a Moral Philosopher be a good guide in practical difficulties, it will be rather his qualities as a man (the fact that "he must at least have accustomed himself to consider the relation of means to ends," etc.), than his scientific training that will make his opinion valuable." This amounts to a withdrawal of ethics from the sciences and its establishment as a discipline contributory to the mental development of moralists. Thus the rationalists as well as the evolutionists resolve the methodological paradox by the complete sacrifice of the practical phase of ethical thinking.

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V.

The only solution of the difficulties involved in the dualism of metaphysico-psychological speculation and practical morality alternate to the abandonment of the latter lay in the direction of the complete subordination of the speculative phase of ethics to the problems involved in the quest for moral guidance. If the axiom that from the analysis of moral judgment there naturally flows a stream of moral precepts had failed in practice, that failure could hardly be said to involve more than the particular types of moral analysis which had thus far found expression. It by no means followed that no explanation of the facts of moral life could be made which would give the slightest impulse to the solution of the practical moral problems of society.

It was quite natural, therefore, that there should develop out of this methodological crisis a new conception of the problems of ethics and the duties of the ethicist, which should involve the complete abandonment of the attempt to explain moral life as due to some one factor of the human personality, and should adopt instead the notion that the phenomenon of the moral regulation of life is a function of x variables,—in which all the faculties of the individual mind and all the relationships which constitute society have a part.

This conception of the problems of ethics was forecast in 1889 by Paulsen. Accepting the view that it is the function of ethics "to show how human life as such must be fashioned to realize its purpose or end," and that the end is not pleasure, but an "objective content of life, or, since life consists solely of action, definite concrete activities," Paulsen maintained that the difference between good and bad is the difference between "the effects which modes of conduct and acts of will naturally produce upon the life of the agent and his surroundings," and that morality consists not in the discovery of some great moral principle around which conduct can be organized, but rather in "the rational organization of life." In the same year Alexander

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published "The Moral Order and Progress" in which he set forth a variant of the same theory, describing the moral order as an equilibrium of the moral impulses of an individual, and of the conduct of the individual in society.

These formulations, however, have the disadvantage of being transitional; they do not cut themselves clearly away from ethical tradition, and consequently they do not fully achieve the reconstruction of ethical methodology. That reconstruction has come with the development of a new and freshly vital mode of thinking. It has been announced most clearly by the Chicago pragmatists, whose statements will for that reason be adopted in this exposition.

In 1891 Dewey definitely set out to expose the undeclared assumption which underlay the ethical speculation of the past, the axiom "which is not indeed marshalled in open array upon the battle field, but about whose presence there can be no doubt,—the idea that moral theory is something other than, or something beyond, an analysis of conduct,—the idea that it is not simply and wholly 'the theory of practise.' Moral theory, for example, is often regarded as an attempt to find a philosophic basis or foundation for moral activity in something beyond that activity itself." There can be no doubt, Dewey went on to say, that there is no "intrinsic connection" between moral theory of this sort and moral conduct. "The Golden Rule gives me absolutely no knowledge, of itself, what I should do." Of what use, then, is this type of theory? Of great use, since it supplies the instruments of analysis. Philosophical theories play the part of instrument makers, supplying us with new instruments of thought whenever the old become worn out. But "it is a piece of scholasticism to suppose that a moral rule has its own self-defining and self-applying content. What truth-telling, what honesty, what patience, what self-respect are change with every change of intelligence, with every added insight into the relations of men and of things. It is only the breath of intelligence blowing through such rules that keeps them from the putrefaction which awaits all barren idealities."

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Moral theory, as Dewey conceives it, is just this breath of intelligence. "What, then, is moral theory? It is all one with moral insight, and moral insight is the recognition of the relationships in hand. . . . It is the analytic perception of the conditions and relations in hand in a given act,—it is the action in the idea. It is the construction of the act in thought against its outward construction. It is, therefore, the doing—the act itself, in its emerging. So far are we from any divorce of moral theory and practise that theory is the ideal act, and conduct is the executed insight."

As early as 1891, then, the definition of the problems of speculative ethics was being based upon the demands of the practical moral situation. It still remained, however, to make more explicit the conceptions of ethical methodology which had been thus enunciated. A decade after the writing of the paper to which reference has just been made, Dewey recast the problems of ethics in terms of the historical method. After showing that "the historical method brings under intellectual and practical control facts which utterly resist general speculation or mere introspective observation," he went on to explain that the historical method demonstrates the continuity of moral experience, and provides the means for controlling that experience. "Its assumptions are that norms and ideals, as well as unreflective customs, arose out of certain situations, in response to the demands of those situations; and that once in existence they operated with a less or greater need of success (to be determined by the study of the concrete case). We are still enaged in forming norms, in setting up ends, in conceiving obligations." "To help us see the present situation comprehensively, analytically, to put in our hands a grasp of the factors that have counted, this way or that, in the moralizing of man, that is what the historical method does for us. Moral judgments are judgments of ways to act, of deeds to do, of habits to form, of ends to cultivate. Whatever modifies the judgment, the conviction, the interpretation, the criterion, modifies conduct.

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To control our judgments of conduct, our estimates of habit, deed, and purpose, is in so far forth to direct conduct itself."

The historical method, however, does not define the field of ethical inquiry. That field cannot be accurately defined in terms of any method of ethics; or rather it cannot be bounded by any special method which hypostatizes itself into an "ethical principle" and proceeds to define ethics as the exercise of that principle. It is the very essence of this interpretation of the problems of ethics that this is not such a special principle of explanation, but is a theory that the facts of moral conduct can only be understood when all the aspects of every moral situation enter into the explanation as equally relevant. The field of ethics, then, is the whole moral situation. If we are to construct an ethics which shall cover that field,

> we need to know what the social situation is in which we find ourselves required to act, so that we may know what it is right to do. We need to know what is the effect of some psychical disposition upon our way of looking at life and thereby upon our conduct. Through clearing up the social situation, through making objective to ourselves our own motives and their consequences, we build up generic propositions: statements of experience as a connection of conditions, that is, in the form of objects. Such statements are used and applied in dealing with further problems. Gradually their use becomes more and more habitual. The "theory" becomes a part of our psychical apparatus. The social situation takes on a certain form of organization. It is pre-classified as of a certain sort, as of a certain genus, and even species of this sort; the only question which remains is discrimination of the peculiar variety. Again, we get into the habit of taking into account certain sources of error in our own disposition as these affect our judgments of behavior, and thereby bring them sufficiently under control so that the need of conscious reference to their intellectual formulation diminishes. As physical science has brought about an organization of the physical world along with an organization of the practical habits of dealing with that world, so ethical science will effect an organization of the social world and a corresponding organization of the psychical habits through which the individual relates himself to it. With this clearing up of the field and organs of moral action, conscious recourse to theory will, as in physical cases, limit itself to problems of unusual perplexity and to constructions of a large degree of novelty.

This statement of Dewey's practically identifies the field of ethical speculation with that of the specific moral prob-

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lem. According to this view ethics is not an abstract speculative science, engaged in establishing "laws" definitive of moral judgment. It is rather the scientific treatment of moral problems. Ethics attempts to carry out on a larger, scientific scale just those thought processes which precede a moral decision in the mind of a wise man, —a man who would understand what he is doing before he does it. It seeks to understand the significance of the forces of social convention and of individual character—impulse and habit which sway the judgment this way and that, and the larger meaning of the issues at stake in the social situation. And the goal of such a scientific study of all the discoverable phases of a moral problem is not the creation of psychological generalizations, but rather the wiser and more scientific solution of the specific moral problem by the clear exposition of its innermost meaning.

This exposition, as Dewey has demonstrated, is greatly facilitated by the employment of the historical method. One can hardly understand the full significance of the social conventions which play so large a part in every moral situation without some knowledge of the manner in which those conventions have come to be what they are. This particular historical task has been undertaken by the sociologists, who, nevertheless, have shown some tendency to content themselves with giving descriptions of the different codes which have obtained at different periods among different peoples without correlating them and exposing the continuity of their development, or if they have attempted to see the continuity of social forms they have done so at the sacrifice of a clear vision of the unity of development of all the various institutions which together constitute the social order. The former criticism is, perhaps, premature, as the research into specific civilizations must necessarily precede the attempt to construct the results of such studies into the genetic form, and the recognition of the continuity of their development. Hobhouse, for example, has done as much as anyone along the line of tracing "the evolution of the ethical consciousness

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as displayed in the habits and customs, rules and principles, which have arisen in the course of human history for the regulation of human conduct." But though Hobhouse has organized a mass of material in such a way as to indicate that moral codes do grow from one another in a continuous progression, he has done little more than allege the unity of the developmental process, even in the third edition. Furthermore his characterization of that process is rather too external to suggest very clearly what the impelling forces behind the process are. On the other hand, Professor Tufts, although he has made no such extended research into the actual history of morality but has centered his attention upon the attempt to understand the nature of the evolutionary process in the field of morals, has made an extremely important suggestion for the interpretation of moral development.

Assuming the notion, of which he had been an early exponent, that mind is something which is developed in the course of societal evolution, he has gone further and described moral evolution as a process in which the moral faculty is sharpened by a growing social order, while at the same time the social structure is built up by the exercise of a developing moral consciousness. The most significant feature of Professor Tufts' statement of the nature of the development of morality is his full recognition that the gradual moralization of society through the evolution of social conventions is but one aspect of a process which includes as its other phase the development of the moral character of the individuals who compose society. Ethics deals with both of these aspects of life and conduct. "It has to study the inner process as determined by the outer conditions or as changing these outer conditions, and the outward behavior or institution as determined by the inner purpose, or as affecting the inner life."

When, therefore, Professor Tufts describes the evolution of morality as a rationalizing and socializing process he refers to the development both of social institutions and of individual character. Thus the "rationalizing process"

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means the greater use of intelligence, caused by the exigencies of the satisfaction of primitive wants. At the same time this rationalization is reflected back upon the objective situation in the creation of new institutions and the attendant higher organization of group life. So with socialization: Associations formed originally as a result of fundamental instinctive needs have their effects upon the human animal, making him more dependent on a group and more fond of social life. These changes in the character of the individual find equivalent expression in the growing complexity of the social structure. The building up of a socially self-conscious individual and the building up of a complex social group are phases of the same process.

VI.

This conception of the function of ethical theory is more than a mere eclecticism. If it were no more than that—if it only substituted for the moral theories which lay particular stress upon various features of the moral life a sort of theoretical compromise in which all those features were included without any selective emphasis—then the charge might be justly made that it is as barren of practical consequences as any of the systems which it seeks to supplant. But such a charge could be brought only if it could be shown clearly that the ethical theory, relying upon the old assumption that principles for moral guidance spring naturally from the correct understanding of the moral judgment, rests its oars as soon as it has formulated its conception of moral life and evolution.

But it would be difficult to make such a demonstration; for such a cessation of effort would be in flat contradiction to this notion of the function and problems of ethical theory. The principal point of difference between this and the traditional metaphysical and psychological theories is found just at this point. The traditional ethical doctrines essayed the analysis of the moral judgment in the vague hope of discovering the "true" principle of moral conduct, assuming that a knowledge of that princi-

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ple could somehow be applied to the solution of practical moral problems. This doctrine, on the contrary, maintains that the analysis of moral consciousness yields no such principle, by the mechanical application of which one can determine off hand what is right and good. It rests upon the conviction that any moral ideal which is deduced as an *a priori* formula from such metaphysical or psychological speculation is no ideal at all but only a conglomeration of words, until it has been given specific meaning in a long series of actual moral decisions each of which determines whether some particular act or policy is contained in that ideal or not. It asserts that if ethical speculation is to establish any really vital connection with the problems of living which are universally admitted to be after all the fundamental ethical problems it must take up into itself that specific and particular sort of moral speculation which precedes such actual moral decisions. For it is those decisions which determine what we think right, when all is said, and not our belief in greatest happiness principles or categorical imperatives.

Ethics can never hope to supplant the individual decision; its one claim to scientific standing must therefore depend upon its ability to contribute to moral progress by making individual moral problems its business. It must study the moral consciousness and moral evolution not as ends in themselves but only that as a result of such studies it may say with somewhat more widsom than is the mead of the common man whether particular immediately contemplated acts and policies are right or not. Consequently it must take into consideration not only motives and impulses, the good will, the moral sense, and the balanced reason, but also the whole objective setting and significance of the facts themselves. Its business is not only with faculties, but with institutions; it deals not only with men, but with events. It must achieve its results not by some metaphysical legerdemain, but by the plain hard work of mastering the essential facts.

It is clear that such work involves the concentration

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upon the solution of moral difficulties of the results of all the other sciences. Physics and chemistry and geology must contribute to an understanding of the alternatives presented in the moral situation and to a comprehension of the physical results of choices that have been made. The biological sciences contribute to a clear apprehension of the implications involved in the preference and accomplishment of "life as a biological process." And the social sciences should illuminate the social structure so that the ethicist may see the influence of the social order in the individual moral process, and the incidence of the effects of the individual moral choice upon other men through the medium of social readjustment.

Out of this concrete study of as many of the aspects of human life as can be brought under scientific observation the ethicist draws his conclusion with regard to a host of disputed moral problems. And from those conclusions he creates, if he can, a practical and personal ideal—not deduced by some transcendental logic from the psychology or the metaphysics of the moral judgment, but constructed out of the materials of the accumulated moral experience of the race.

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PRODUCTIVITY AND RECONSTRUCTION.

C. DELISLE BURNS.

THE productivity of a man of a group of men or of the whole human race is as much an ethical and psychological as it is an economic fact. Indeed the social problem which we shall have to face when the war is over—unless war is a permanent institution—will depend on the resilience or revival of spirit and energy much more truly than on the recovery of the exchange or the opening markets. The "spiritual" forces available for reconstruction are of the first importance. We may, therefore, attempt to estimate the amount and quality of what we have called, for want of a better word, "productivity." In this we mean to include all the material or mental force which goes to produce or create the resources of civilised life. The term productivity is not susceptible of exact definition: for we mean by using it to connect the artist's energy or inspiration with the growth of corn and cotton. We must, however, exclude for our present purpose the storage of force in capital without neglecting to consider the material which can be worked up immediately into usable goods for the promotion of life. Undoubtedly the whole of social life will ultimately depend not only on immediate production but upon the stores which we are able to leave to our descendants. But we are considering here the immediate and urgent problem of social reconstruction with which humanity will be faced when the war is over.

The importance of the question as to the amount of productivity available is due to the confusion or deterioration of civilised life which has resulted from the war: and this can only be appreciated if we look beyond the frontiers of our own state. In the British Empire we shall have on our shoulders the payment of war-loan interest to the amount of about £200,000,000 a year. At the opposite extreme of financial stability, Turkey will have to pay in

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interest to Germany and Austria as much as £20,000,000 (Turkish) a year, whereas before the war she had only an annual expenditure of £9,000,000 (Turkish). In Russia an Economic Committee has been appointed by the Revolutionary Government for developing the productive forces of Russia in order that the country may recover from the financial extravagances of the Tsar's administration. But it is not simply a question of interest on loans for war expenditure. We have to make up for some years of stagnation or retrogression in industry; and outside the economic sphere, our education, our art and, some would say, even our moral and religious activities are "run down." All this is the cost of the war and not only the belligerents will pay for it. In neutral countries also machinery is deteriorating, ships are decaying, and the population, lacking food and clothing, is gradually losing its physical energy and intellectual or emotional ability. The whole world pays, in modern times, whenever there is a war.

We put aside any estimate of the dangers from which a successful, even if destructive, war may have saved us; and we turn our attention simply to those forces, economic, intellectual and moral, which will be available for reconstruction. For this purpose we must make an estimate of our loss and gain in productive power as affected by the war. The building of the new world will depend upon the stock of imagination and of material which we shall have remaining when peace comes; but most of all it will depend on the increase of productivity. Our power, therefore, of supplying quickly "consumable commodities," our power of reorganising the management of industry and our power to reform education and invigorate life—these are the forces which will govern our reconstruction and we must make a profit and loss account of them.

The loss in the total amount of our productivity is of two kinds, material and mental. For example, we have used up stocks of raw material which will be necessary for producing articles of clothing and, on the other hand, we have been physically and psychically exhausted by our

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efforts. But the calculation of our loss can be still more exact. In the first place and on the material side, we shall produce less because machinery is run down or so worn out as to be valueless; other machinery will have to be adapted to peace output and our productivity will be less than normal because of the delay necessary in making the change. Ships have suffered through lack of repairs: those which survive are slower and more worn out than they were. Buildings have deteriorated or decayed. Again, the lack of transport (railway-trucks and ships) will delay the supplying of the raw material to industry, and our machines, therefore, will not begin to produce at their full power for some time after the war. In countries like the Argentine the same difficulties will delay the supply of food and raw material being sent to Europe.

The material which is necessary for productive work will be in many cases deficient. In Germany particularly there will be such a deficiency that, for example, the great wool industry will not be able to rise to its pre-war level of production: and even if there are ships to bring supplies to France or England, there may be no supplies to bring. Industry may be hampered for some time to come by a world-deficiency of raw material. And with this we should reckon the probable diminution of food supplies which will continue after the war. For the shortage is not due simply to a lack of ships to carry wheat or meat; there is a universal diminution of the available supply which will considerably lessen our productive power. The fields in Russia have been neglected and the stock of beasts in Argentine is less: indeed the productivity of the earth in most of the western countries has seriously diminished owing to a lack of cultivation, the withdrawal of labour and deficiency of fertilisers.

We must add to all this, on the *minus* side, the mortality and disablement of the war, not among soldiers only but also in the civil population of Poland, Galicia and Armenia. The percentage of deaths from disease and from accidents in ordinary industry has steadily increased throughout the

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war and in every European country. New and fatal diseases have appeared and accidents in munition-working have lessened the available supply of labour even outside Europe. The new generation has been decimated by starvation and disease in the Central Empires and parts of Russia. The birth-rate, meanwhile, has declined in almost every western country and there have been an increasing number of births of "deficients," owing to shock, semi-starvation, or overwork of the mothers.

Such are the subtractions we must allow for in our productive energy, so far as mechanism and the supply of labour are concerned. We should connect with this the deficiency of capital. It is generally agreed that all the available capital, not already tied by government action, will be required to restore industry to its old position and that there will be a lack of capital for new ventures. We have in almost all nations been eating into our reserves of stored wealth; and the fear of investors as well as the suspicions of labour may very well cause a financial deadlock after the war. For here too the problem is rather one of psychology than of pure exchange.

Again, and also on the material side, the effect of war on every state will probably be to increase the expenditure on armaments. This means that so much more capital and labour will be withdrawn from productive work in the strict sense. Great masses of material will be accumulated which may never be used and may have to be periodically "scrapped" as the devices of war become more elaborate. The activities of greater numbers of young men will be devoted to preparing for war by drill and camp-life; and women will be periodically mobilised for warlike preparations.

In the more subtle region which unites the material needs and the emotional experiences of men, we shall have to reckon on a soreness between nations which may result in tariff wars. However noble the purpose of these, their result is a lessening of productivity; for a tariff is intended to hamper the natural or economic use of material from

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foreign countries; and if such material can only be had at home by a greater expenditure of energy there is so much the less productivity. But warlike feelings survive wars and men are not likely to count the cost when injuring their late enemies is possible.

The soreness left by war will be found to divide not only nations but also classes within each nation. The early enthusiasms and fellowship of all classes in a common war-service gives place to forgetfulness on the part of the rich and suspicion on the part of the poor. The irritation of each group at the actions of the other is a definite hindrance to productivity; and this irritation is growing and will not cease to grow when the war is over. In 1914 the richer classes were almost awakened to the existence of starving children, overworked women and ill-clothed and ill-housed men. Women and children have not ceased to starve: men other than soldiers still need shelter and warmth, but they are now forgotten. On the other hand, the poor and the skilled workmen in 1914 were in a good humour with those of other classes who were willing to share the same dangers and discomforts. Now, even in Germany there are murmurs and suspicions. The wealthy have become more wealthy: they do not lack food or comfort. And in France where perception is keener than elsewhere the mood of the dispossessed is not by any means acquiescent. Irritation often tending to destructive revolt is increasing everywhere; and chaos is not a good background for productive work. But Society itself may in some regions be dissolved into contending groups. Again, education involves an increase of productive power; but education has suffered more severely than any other human institution during the war. In the purely "practical" sphere we shall find that we lack the normal supply of engineers and doctors. The teachers who have been trained are fewer: the hours of schooling have been shortened. Sentimentalism has taken the place of exact knowledge of history and science: and the atmosphere of violence among adults has lessened the probability that children may respect reason and kind-

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liness. We shall not see the result of this ruin perhaps for twenty years; but meantime we shall have to allow for the fact that the new generation will be less effective as producers than the last has been until 1914.

Finally, it is the nature of enthusiasm, whether in one man or in a group, to be exhausted and to die down. Violent passion, even hate for an enemy, is difficult to maintain for over three years: and enthusiastic devotion to national service has a tendency to be worn out. At its best enthusiasm is fitful. But when all one's energies have been used for long the original spark out of which they grew to flame disappears in the surrounding ashes of ordinary life. It is exhausting even to be regarded as a permanent hero or heroine. Some few may feel enthusiasm for the reconstructing of the world at large but the vast majority will probably be too tired to be seriously revolutionary. If the native human inertia of the majority is counteracted by a lack of food, even then the result may be only some violence as ineffective as the smashing of crockery. Poets, prophets and visionaries may, indeed, arise: one cannot tell. Politicians may become imaginative. But we cannot be confident of such good fortune and, for the present, the indications point to tired acquiescence as the most we can expect of our spiritual force for producing a new world.

There is, however, a credit side to the account. Not even war can altogether deform or suppress the growth of nature and the adaptability of man. The grass grows soon on the shell-torn or trampled fields; and new-born children are, for the moment, "progressives" and "pacifists": for those under two years old seem still to be interested in life rather than in the results of war. There are also various forms of productivity which remain as a reserve for humanity which have not in fact been hitherto used. In the material sphere we must allow for the uncultivated land in various parts of the world which could quickly produce food. There are also raw materials, iron or timber, which only need the application of labour in order to increase

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the amount of our world-supplies. And there are, in the non-material sphere, immense reserves of labour or of genius which will not be used at all if we merely go back to our pre-war methods of organising life. But such forces would be available even if there had been no war: and we may therefore omit them from our present calculation in order to concentrate attention upon the increase of productivity which has resulted from the war.

As regards the material or economic basis of life, mechanical contrivances have been improved. The productivity of many of our old mechanisms has been immensely increased: they can produce more, and more quickly, than they could in 1914. "Automatic" processes have increased the power in the hands of labour and made it possible for a greater number of men and women to produce what was in 1914 the result of "skill." Skill, in fact, is being transferred to the machine. Both in England and in Germany the machinery or "plant" for steel producing and hydraulic rivetting has increased in quantity. The rate is greater at which "half-finished" materials can be passed on to trades which depend on them. The production of "substitute" material for such purposes as clothing may have added to our reserves of power; and some substitutes may be permanently useful. The general health and strength of labour has probably been improved. The soldiers who survive have been comparatively well fed and well clothed and probably they will be in higher spirits when they return to industry than they were before they left it. There may not, there probably will not, be more contentment; but there may be more physical and intellectual vigour among them. Many classes of working people also, at least in England and America, have been better fed and clothed since the war; as for example the coalminers and the munition workers. And all this, quite apart from newly acquired skill, involves an increased productivity. Skill is difficult to estimate, but probably great numbers of women have increased their industrial value by familiarity with machines; and the adaptability of nearly all social classes



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to new kinds of work during the war will certainly result in more force for production. With this we should reckon the discovery made by many that they can "do without" what they would have regarded in 1914 as necessary. Spartan restrictions are not permanent; but it increases power if some at least are freer of inherited custom. Women's dress may be modified and "upper" classes may be less hampered by conventions. All this is gain.

Further, the percentage of unemployment in most nations has steadily decreased since the beginning of the war: but this means that there are fewer people wasting time and strength in the mere expectation of work. If we can devise any method by which the "unemployed margin" shall not be again produced after the war we shall have increased our productivity. And it is quite possible that a bold policy in at least a few states may take account of seasonal or periodic unemployment in order to utilise all available strength. As for the attitude of labour, the value of which is not calculable in terms of price, there has been less restriction of output; and, both in England and Germany, great bodies of men and women have shown enthusiasm for the work they were called on to perform. Against their willingness, which is productive, must however be set the over-strain and the over-work from which many will have suffered. The willingness which it has proved possible to devote to industrial tasks may not survive four years of war. But on the whole something has been learnt by the experience through which we have passed; and if rhetoric or passion could stir labour to an almost reckless devotion for war purposes we may hope that the rebuilding of the social world will arouse no less enthusiasm. A definite and tangible purpose must be before the mind before there is any vigorous effort but so much needs to be done that we may hope for willing co-operation. That is an asset in our account.

Again, there has been an advance in the organisation of industry. Both the financing and the managing of business are probably more flexible and therefore more produc-

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tive than they were before the war. There is a clearer perception than ever before of the need of good-will in the relations of employer and employed. Autocrats and revolutionaries still exist: but the great body of civilised men are willing to assist in a reorganisation of industry.

We may, therefore, as a result of our calculation conclude that we shall have to face after the war a considerable and certain loss in our productivity and on the other hand a gain which is indefinite, the value of which it is difficult to estimate at present. We cannot yet close the account. Very much more may be lost or gained before we reach the period of reconstruction: and while some will be inclined to say that our losses will be increasingly greater, others may expect a gradual diminution of the passions which hamper the development of civilised life.

The calculation does not deal with purely natural forces. We are not merely observers but actors in the issues which are revealed by an examination of the social world: and therefore we cannot simply leave the *plus* and *minus* of productivity to cancel one another or to result in any new equilibrium which may chance to follow. The natural and healthy result of our calculation should be the putting to ourselves of the question—What ought to be done? Clearly we must increase our productivity. This appears to be an opinion common to those of the possessing and to those of the labouring classes. Even clergymen and lawyers have begun to understand the necessity for more vitality and energy in social life, and that in all civilised nations. It is agreed also that in order to increase productivity we shall have to rearrange some of our social system. New methods of banking, new devices of business management, a better articulation of the world of supply and demand—these are all advocated as increasing productivity. But these are all superficial and inadequate corrections of social organization. We must strike deeper if we are to make any real difference to our control of social forces. A little deeper the new methods of education would take us, since education remains the most effective

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power for transforming a social situation. It would be immensely important if the new generation could be given more exact knowledge, greater skill and a freer outlook upon life; for then the race might cast off at last its musty clothing of inherited loyalties to incompetence, of admiration for wealth and of desire for domination. But it seems that the urgency is too great for us to depend upon the effects of education. A starving world in which fewer every day can find opportunity for free and noble life, in which a light-hearted plutocracy drives over the bodies of the poor and the oppressed—such a world is not one which will wait in patience till the new generation is taught a new road to happiness. Different observers will differ in their opinion as to the urgency of the need for some fundamental social change, but the opinion of the majority of thinkers is steadily hardening. Revolution is in the air. Not only the poor are impatient. It is becoming generally felt that we have had enough of tinkering at feudalism and plutocracy in order to diminish their evil consequences while continuing their existence.

And therefore we must face the undeniable fact that it is not the banking system or the property system or the old education only that is at fault but the fundamental and all-powerful system of the relations of man to man. Suppose that we agree to increase productivity, we have at our elbows, first, the gospellers of "scientific management." They will tell us how to use muscle (other men's muscle) more effectively: they will show us how much more may be made if you can use up all the vitality of your workmen. You will give him "welfare" and good food, of course, expecting to get it all back from him in his work for you. Still cruder and more insolent is the assertion that productivity is hampered by "ca-canny" and restriction of output among workmen: for those who make such assertions do not see that the devices of the old trade unionism are defences against exploitation and attempts to secure a new power in which exploitation will be less easy. These simple suggestions as to the increase of productivity will

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not lead to any radical action important enough to make a difference in the crisis we shall have to face. We must go still deeper to find the new sources of productivity. The need is urgent. The only adequate source of a new productivity is a transformation of the position of all who work to live. For when we look more deeply into the problem we see that productivity was hampered before the war not so much by "restriction of output" as by (1) lack of food for workers and their consequent inability to work or even to buy, by (2) industrial friction, both between capital and labour and between contending capitalists, and (3) ignorant and incompetent management.

Generation after generation has wasted its strength by a division of food, shelter and the amenities of life which gives a barren culture to the few and refuses to ninety per cent of the race the opportunities for a full human life. Such a division of our resources is partly the result of inherited and obsolete custom, partly it is due to the working of "natural" and inhuman economic tendencies. There is nothing sacred or unchangeable in the system; and the loss which might be entailed in its abolition would clearly be as nothing if compared with the immense productive forces which would be thereby released. The transformation must be based upon allowing to productive forces a larger share in the results of their labour. We should admit, of course, that accumulated wealth or coal-mines are productive forces in the widest sense of the words; but we must distinguish vitality and energy from such stores of wealth. At present we increase our stores at the expense of our energy, like a man who saves up his muscular strength by not using it. But in order to make up for the waste of war we must give a larger opportunity for all men and women to develop to the full their productive capacity of muscle and of brain.

With a proper supply of the means to live given to those who bear up the world by their labour of hand or brain, the friction of class with class, of trade with trade, and perhaps even of nation with nation might pass away. Men

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who are happy do not easily hate and rage: but a world in which most are underfed and all are over-tired is a world of strikes and wars. This we can modify, if not abolish. And again, the new order must give place to greater imaginativeness in the management of trade and investment. Before the war it was piously believed by many students of history, politics and economics, that "business" men had a grasp of practical issues. That myth is exploded. The majority of business men appear to have the imaginations of cows, when any problem arises beyond the hedges of their own field; and he who cannot see beyond his own field has no practical grasp even of the business with which he is dealing. There are immense resources of imagination and organising ability which have never yet been tapped by our bankers, our merchants and our manufacturers. The devices which have been forced upon us by the war have proved that.

The ultimate source for increasing our productivity, therefore, is moral: and this moral source will influence all our politics, economics and social custom. For the possibility of transforming the relations of man to man depends on the moral imagination. The obstacle we have to contend with is not ill-will but the belief that "it cannot be done"; and there is no sacred or unfailing method for dealing with a lack of moral imagination. We may not be able to transform the outlook of employers or of workmen. On the other hand the moral imagination is susceptible of sudden and astonishing changes. Society during the Middle Ages, for example, was shaken to its foundations by the Friars' movement; and the advent of Christianity in the Roman Empire created a new social outlook even though it did not much affect social custom. We must not, therefore, despair of a transformation of outlook which will destroy or replace the old social order of domination and subservience. It may come suddenly.

It must, however, be confessed that such a transformation is not very probable. The period following the war will probably be too full of distracting problems of detail

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for any wide vision to inspire the action of great masses of people. And a social transformation cannot occur unless the imagination of great numbers is inflamed by a definite desire, such as that for citizenship was in the French Revolution. If the claim is made by great numbers that workers shall have control of the conditions of their work, it cannot be resisted; but probably it will not be made by any but a few and disagreement as to immediate methods will probably render the enthusiasts ineffective. Nevertheless, action can be taken which will inevitably, if slowly, undermine the restrictions placed by our inherited social structure on the productivity of man; such action, for example, as is implied in a new education, the ninety per cent taxation of inherited wealth, the state-control of land and transport and the control of all conditions of labour by the actual workers. These do not imply any immediate social upheaval; but they lead to economic independence and a finer social life and they are all measures which can be adopted in any civilised state. Visionaries and poets must seek to inspire the moral imagination and so to transform radically the structure of our society. But those who are dealing with practical and immediate political and economic problems must carry into effect measures of compromise and moderation which will lead ultimately in the direction of freedom and finer social life. There should be no rivalry between the visionary and the reformer. Both look to the same sunrise: both have to endure without despair the same false signs of a dawn too long delayed.

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A METHOD OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE.

ARTHUR K. ROGERS.

IN THE present paper my purpose is to consider a familiar proposal for bringing about a more equitable distribution of the products of industry, which seems to me on the whole best to meet theoretical demands, while also it shows a reasonable chance of practical success. Limits of space will make it impossible to deal other than by implication with competing methods; and for the general principles which my argument presupposes I shall have to refer to an article in the previous number of this Journal.

It is of course just possible that men may on both sides so grow in wisdom and charity that, without further industrial changes of importance, they will come to a working agreement, and accept some percentage of division as equitable. But it is much likelier that for this to come about, a far more visible identity of interest will be called for than at present obtains. It is all very well to appeal to economic commonplaces to justify a belief in a common interest,—to say that when business is prosperous every one is better off, and so that the more money the employer makes, the better it is for his workmen. But when the laboring man sees his employer buying yachts and automobiles, and giving banquets, and going to Europe, and himself hard put to it to afford a new overcoat or take a week at the seaside, somehow the point of the contention seems to him obscured. It is too much to expect theoretical proofs of identity of interest to count for much in bringing about a better feeling; what is needed is a form of evidence plain and simple enough for the average man, and his wife, to see and estimate.

The most natural direction in which to look for this is already suggested in the statement of the problem. What we need primarily to do is to promote harmony of action, as against the waste and friction of present militant condi-

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tions. Accordingly the nearest issue would be some definite form of co-operation which should extend the control of the laborer over the conditions of his life, while increasing substantially his income through some form of sharing in the added profits of the business that may be expected to result. This plainly would create a tangible proof of community of interest in the form of a larger bank account. It would offer the individual incentive in which modern industry is sadly deficient. And, if rightly managed, it might satisfy measurably those other claims of the worker which have lent force and bitterness to the labor controversy. But of course it is essential that the thing should be conducted on right lines; otherwise the failure which has so often attended well-meant enterprises of the sort will be assured.

It may be taken for granted that no profit-sharing scheme will be a success unless it removes the psychological causes in the workingman which promote discontent. It is not enough to give an employee larger wages; this may easily be done in a way to make him more insistent. The whole motive for profit-sharing involves getting the worker into a friendly state of mind; unless it does this, it is a waste of money from the employer's standpoint. And this does not mean what *you* think *ought* to satisfy him, but what does leave him measurably content. Accordingly it will be necessary, on the negative side, to go to all the pains necessary to allay the suspicion in the workingman that the scheme is a mere device to exploit him more effectively. It must be made decisively clear that there is not the least intention of putting it to the use to which it has sometimes been put,—of making it, that is, a means of discovering how much more the laborer is capable of doing, and then forcing everybody up to the same standard by manipulating wages. To the same end, the division ought not to be arbitrary, but should stand in some acknowledged and discoverable relation to the total profits, large enough not to offend the natural sense of fairness, and under conditions of full publicity. A specially indefensible end, which puts

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a stop at once to the peace-making power of the scheme, is to use it as a club for enforcing submissiveness in the employee, by making the latter's claim dependent on conditions that give first place to the will of the company. Even when the purpose is not intentionally to get the whip hand of the working body, any disposition to make the benefit conferred less than a strict right will be unfortunate. Workingmen have had altogether too much experience of the benevolent employer, who is willing to do things for them so long as it is a matter of the voluntary goodness of his heart, which leaves him, however, free to resent the absence of that grateful recognition which he conceives his due, and to change his mind when he feels like it. The academic person, if he finds it hard to sympathize with this feeling in the worker, might translate it into terms of a pension board to whom it is open at any moment to alter the published conditions of its provisions for him, while reading him a moral lesson at the same time on his unworthiness.

The difficulties in the way of taking such an industrial régime as a satisfactory solution of the industrial problem are of course numerous and weighty, and I can only deal with them in rather general terms. Objections might come in the first place from the side of economic theory. Here a plausible difficulty is that which rests upon the general conditions of wage payment. Any general rise in wages, it might be maintained, is impracticable, since the increase would have to be drawn from capital; and this would mean a lessening of production, and so the growing inability to pay wages. I do not pretend to enter here upon the intricacies of economic doctrine, for which in any case I am incompetent; but there are certain suggestions that are obvious even to the layman. In the first place, if the same number of workers, with the same capital, were to produce more goods, a bettered condition would result in which the laborer might share. And to this result the proposed scheme, if successful, would be conducive. Since its first object is to remove the psychological obstacles which now

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exist to enlisting the full productive power of labor, its outcome ought to be clearly a very considerable enlargement directly of the product of industry.

But there is another way in which the supposed evil results of wage raising might be avoided. There is one form in which, if it could be brought about, profits might be reduced, and the amount added to wages, without any bad economic effects,—if, that is, the increase could be taken not from what is now invested, but from what is spent by the employer on himself and his family. And this would be widely felt to be a gain all around. It is recognized almost universally that extravagant expenditure among the rich has gone too far; if luxury could be curtailed, and a more sensible standard of living adopted, everybody in the end might be better off. And it seems not improbable that here too such a policy as I am considering would exert an influence. There are two instrumentalities by which luxury and unnecessary expenditure could be checked,—by the growth of different standards in society, so that conspicuous waste would no longer be thought the best way of making oneself favorably or enviably known, and by diminishing the amount of money a person has to spend; the last being probably the more direct and certain method. It is not impossible that the healthier human element introduced into the industrial situation would have a salutary effect on prevailing standards; certainly the closer the relationship between the richer and the poorer class, the more the heartlessness, and the bad taste, of much of present expenditure would be apparent. And in so far as the result was an actual reduction of profits to the owner, there would of course be less money to spend, and a fair chance that this might show in a reduction of personal expenditure rather than in decreased savings. Naturally the latter might also be the result. But as this would ultimately be a suicidal policy for the employer as well as for the workingman, since, if his capital were continuously depleted, his means would also lessen, it is not a very violent assumption to suppose that the ultimate tendency

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would be to reinforce ethical motives favoring a more sensible way of living for the rich.

Meanwhile there is a further possibility. Supposing even that a part of profits that might have functioned as capital is transferred to the worker, no harm is done in case the worker also saves this, and invests it. Now that he will do so, or indeed that he is as likely to do it as the capitalist, cannot very well be claimed with confidence. One cannot even make an entirely clear case for urging it upon him as an obligation. Thrift is not so plainly a virtue as it was in the days when the relative poverty of the world made careful saving necessary to provide for an even then too scanty capital. The increased capacity of modern industry has eased the strain somewhat, and may be expected to do so still more in the future, so as to justify a decreased emphasis on the duty of saving, and a greater one upon the positive claims of life and enjoyment. We no longer listen with so keen an approval as formerly to moral exhortations to the poor to give up any thought of getting the most out of life as it passes, and to lay up their money by close economy for a rainy day; it strikes us that this advice, coming from the most part from the well-to-do, who would not for a moment think of following it themselves, rather unduly emphasizes the negative and prudential virtues, and not enough the positive demands of the good life. But it still remains true that capital will not grow unless some one saves; and without the growth of capital wealth will not be increased, and so the material conditions of a good life will simply not exist. That this is a fatal obstacle, however, it would need a good deal of further experience to demonstrate. Even at present small savings form a considerable source of capital; and with appreciably greater prosperity for the masses, these would naturally be increased. And it is to be noted, especially, that co-operation may very well take the shape of an accumulation of the workingman's profits in the form of a share in the business; and in this way the need for capital is automatically met. Both the motive and the opportunity for saving are

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provided here in a degree much greater than at present. Much of the complaint against the improvidence of the poor is true in point of fact; but it also is almost wholly ineffective and irrelevant. It is foolish to expect the industrial virtues, or any other virtues, in the absence of adequate motivation; the only sensible remedy lies, not in preaching to the workingman and telling him how bad he is, but in seeing to it that it is to his self interest to change. The laborer is scolded because he is shiftless and indifferent to the interests of his employer—that gives away the whole case. Why *should* he be expected to be so careful of his *employer's* interest? and yet it is this plainly which looms largest with the employer himself when he makes the indictment. It is said indeed that in this way the laborer will rise in the ranks, and better his own condition. Perhaps he will to an extent, though merit has been known to go unrewarded. But at any rate this is an argument based upon the good, not of labor, but of the special and picked laborer. It does not even pretend that labor as a whole is going to be benefited, but is frankly an appeal to the competitive instinct for the best jobs. So regarded, it has a little the aspect of a lottery; everybody is encouraged to put in his money on the chance that he will be the lucky man, though a moment's reflection will show that all but a few are bound to be disappointed. The only individual who is sure of benefit is the man who runs the lottery. We are still misled here by the tradition of America as the place where everybody has a chance of getting ahead, and fail to notice that the tradition applies to a very different America from that of to-day. When conditions were such that if a man did not like his job he could at any moment turn independent farmer or prospector, the general level of wages was raised by this possibility, and all labor benefited; now, when "opportunity" means chiefly the chance to compete for the better paid positions within the business itself, the level remains unaffected.

The chief drawback to the instalment of co-operative profit-sharing of any thoroughgoing sort does not, however,

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depend on theoretical scruples, but on the unwillingness of the employing class. There are various proposals for benefiting the condition of the workingman which the far-sighted employer will welcome as equally for his own good. It is now generally admitted, for example, that it is not for a man's own advantage, in any normal state of the labor market, to overwork his men. He will get less out of them in the end; and so a more generous policy in connection with hours of labor is also good business. Wherever the result is an increase in the product, it is always possible that after granting something to the men, enough will be left to increase profits as well. This is naturally, therefore, the popular business receipt for settling the labor problem, —to increase productivity so that labor can be better paid without any sacrifice by capital, and even to its advantage. Or, if this is not the case, and an increase of wages is so much added to the cost of production, then the common notion of business fairness is to pass this on, and let the consumer pay.

Now nothing of this sort by itself is, I am convinced, going to make any very appreciable difference to the general industrial discontent. The employer has not simply the congenial task before him of making more money through more enlightened methods; he is bound to grant real concessions also. This means two things in particular. First, and beyond question, it stands for the frank recognition, foreign to the natural temper of the business man, that instead of his business being something that belongs to him alone, to be run precisely as he pleases, and his helpers a part merely of its necessary machinery, it is in some genuine sense a co-operative enterprise, in which all concerned are partners, and have, to the extent of their interest, some hand in the management. The typical well-intentioned employer still has a quite different ideal in mind; and it need not be denied that the ideal possesses certain specious charms. The class-conscious workingman of the present day is not a wholly attractive personality; one may be excused if in some ways he prefers the older

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type of the hard-working, frugal employee, faithful to his master's interest and proud of the concern, but an individualist in his relations to his fellow workmen, and properly scornful of the tricks of the "agitator." But if anything resembling this type is ever to come back, it must certainly be with a difference. Loyalty to the "business" must include, not exclude, loyalty to his fellows; and a share in its success must come not as a favor, but as an admitted right, for the exercise of which adequate co-operative machinery is provided. It is this which the union has set as its implicit ideal,—to make labor a real partner in the business. What it has been fighting for is less this or that wage adjustment in particular, than the right to meet the employer on equal terms, and arrange by consultation the matters which mutually concern both parties; and what the hostile employer has as consistently been determined on is to refuse this claim, to treat the business as his private affair, and the workmen, individually and collectively, as outsiders with no voice in the settling of conditions, who can take what he offers or leave it. And until such an attitude is given up, and given up without reserve, industrial peace is inconceivable.

But also there is something more to be added. Supposing that the workers in a plant have collectively secured the right to help determine the policy of the business, the most difficult question still remains to be settled: on what basis are the profits to be divided? I have held that there is no *a priori* principle of justice to answer this; but it certainly looks as if this much at least were true, that nothing will meet the growing ideal of fairness which simply gives the worker a portion of the increase which he is now, by hypothesis, ready to bring about, and which does not also actually decrease the chance of profit for the employing class. This is something which it is hard for well-to-do people to get into their heads. Not long ago I noticed the report of a sermon by a prominent clergyman in which he read a moral lesson to the laborer, who, so he was told, was quite right in wanting to see his wages raised, but who

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ought not to commit the palpable injustice of expecting this unless he was willing to earn the increase by harder or longer work. In a similar vein, a leading newspaper opens an editorial with the proposition, supposed to be self-evident, that the public, if it chooses to sympathize with a current strike to increase wages, must of course be ready to pay the bills, it being unthinkable, apparently, that the employers should be expected to stand a loss. This naive assumption that labor is getting its fair proportion now, and that this supplies a standard by reference to which the justice of all change is to be measured, shows at any rate an incapacity for getting on common ground with the workingman. What he maintains is precisely this, that labor is *not* getting its fair share. It is just the employer's share, in principle, that should stand the loss for the more general benefit; change should move in the direction of a greater equalization.

It is idle, therefore, to ignore the fact that any system which works on a large scale to reduce industrial discontent, must almost certainly be, not merely a device for getting more out of the men, and so increasing the income of everybody alike, but an occasion for an actual decrease in the profits of the employing class. Certainly the more successful employer now reaps a reward which it is very difficult to justify to the social conscience. To be sure, it may be pointed out that the margin of profit for the average business man is relatively modest, while he may even fail to make a profit at all; and this constitutes a difficulty to be considered. But in reply there are at least two things to be said. While the point would undoubtedly be pertinent if we were proposing simply to raise the rate of wages all around, it is partly taken care of by the particular scheme of co-operative profit-sharing. For of course where there are no profits, the workmen cannot share in them; and since the guaranteed wage under such conditions is likely to approach a minimum, the necessary expense of the business need not be any greater than at present. It is true some complications would be introduced for the in-

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efficient manager. He would doubtless find it harder to get good workmen; and he may be expected to put forward the plea that it is unfair for men to share in profits who do not also take their share of the losses. But *why* should it be considered unfair? To say nothing of the fact that the men *do* in a sense share the losses, since they are compelled to forego the gains that better management brings to their fellow workmen in other concerns, there is a more general answer which seems sufficient. The greater chance of loss is a price the manager ought in justice to pay for the chance of greater gains. And when it is said that there are employers who right now are on the ragged edge, and whom any new demand would push over into bankruptcy, I do not see that it is not competent to reply: If they cannot succeed on terms which are called for by the best interests of the industrial situation, let them fail, and other more efficient business men take their places. When it is the laborer that is in question, we have not been accustomed to be so tender of inefficiency. If we are called upon to pay the leaders fancy prices for their brains, they should take the consequences of failure to use them successfully, and not try to pass these on to their subordinates. Meanwhile there are other advantages to the employer which would offset his money loss to some degree; in particular, he would have a real increment of business security, and this might particularly appeal to the less successful employer. If the workmen were actively interested in advancing the concern, the consequent immunity from labor risks, along with the increased product, would be bound to put the business on a firmer basis. And probably there are many business men who would think this added security a desirable substitute for the chance—the mere chance as it is now—for a larger income.

However, I should hardly be optimistic enough to expect, in spite of these last considerations, the average business man voluntarily to accept a scheme which he knew beforehand was likely to reduce both his power and his profits; if the policy becomes at all general, the chances are that it

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will have to be due not in the first instance to free choice, but to necessity. This might come conceivably from collective or governmental action; but for reasons which I have not space here to enlarge upon, this seems to me both unlikely and undesirable. The alternative is through the present method of class conflict. It has, I grant, a somewhat alarming sound at first to suggest that the only way out of the present very bad situation is to let the rivals fight the thing to a conclusion. And yet if the circumstances are examined, it does not after all seem hopeless. Nor is it without precedent to look, for the settlement of a quarrel, to the new light that sometimes comes to a man after he has got a sound beating in a fair fight.

First, however, there are two plain conditions to be met before we have any right to expect the chance, even, of a permanent peace. On the one hand, no issue can possibly be satisfactory which does not promote efficiency in industry, and production on a scale large enough to provide the material for a widely extended human good. It must therefore find a place for, and stimulate, every available power of hand and brain. A state of general warfare does not do this; and unless, therefore, the conflict takes a form which actively looks toward, and has some influence in furthering, co-operation, the outlook seems rather hopeless. If we have to wait until organized capital or organized labor is brought to its knees and forced to unconditional surrender, we have plainly a long and weary road ahead of us.

This last hope is, however, precisely what the newest philosophy of labor sets before itself as its goal. The ideal of syndicalism is, if my thesis is correct, in its large features not incapable of being justified; but it is tied up to a method which the impartial observer must regard as most unlikely to succeed. Indeed, even apart from practical difficulties, on one fundamental point its method, and its end, seem inherently inconsistent. This is due to its reliance on secret violence. Such a policy has in the nature of the case to be decided on by a few leaders without public

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discussion, and executed by tools; and the inevitable issue is an amount of irresponsible power in a limited number of hands which would be one of the surest ways to wreck the cause of labor. Meanwhile the syndicalist's vision of the outcome toward which he is pointed is extremely sketchy, where it is not plainly absurd. The immediate future is all that lies clearly within his view,—to worry the capitalist, and do him all the injury possible; but what is to happen afterwards is vague to a degree, and where it loses vagueness it becomes rather puerile. How the desired issue—the disappearance of the employer and the taking over of his business by the workmen—is to be mediated, very little attention is paid to disclosing; it is assumed that it will happen without mediation, and as a matter of course. And the further assumption that, when it happens, all industrial trouble is over, that a business has only to be owned by those who do the actual work for antagonisms to cease automatically, as if the mere recognition that one was dealing with fellow workmen would dispel quarrels and insure universal charity,—that "among producers the golden rule will obtain"—is marked by an entire disregard of human nature.

A second condition which syndicalism repudiates is more capable perhaps of being disputed. But to me it appears nearly as plain as any proposition can well be, that no issue to the conflict is conceivable which does not satisfy the ordinary human instinct of good sportsmanship and fair play. For one thing, neither party to the dispute is likely to quit so long as he feels himself a victim of plain injustice. He will prolong the fight as much as possible; and to this end he will be forced to combine with his fellows, and organize his opposition on as large a scale as he can. It is to such inclusive and country wide organizations that we are already approaching; and as the combination is completed, and cemented by the bitterness and hatred out of which the immediate need for it springs, we shall have just the situation most likely to issue in a deadlock, with all its consequences of permanent industrial insecurity.

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But also there is another rôle which justice plays. When for any reason public opinion is quiescent, it is possible for the antagonists to persuade themselves that the good will of the outsider is unimportant; but this is a bad mistake of judgment. No cause is likely to succeed in the face of a really aroused public sentiment. And experience shows that approval turns almost invariably to the side which can make out the strongest case for itself in terms of equity and reason. But this granted, the conclusion which I have already drawn seems to me to follow, that the final issue is bound to be, relatively, a gain for the laborer rather than the capitalist. For it is the laborer who is at present at a disadvantage, whose interests are obviously not very well attended to by the existing order, and whose basic demands a natural sense of fair play is pretty sure to accede to as justifiable. The right to a reasonable measure of control over one's own life, work, and destiny, no one when he questions his own breast can disregard; and to secure this means of necessity a diminution of the power that traditionally has lain in the hands of the owner of the business. So too, in terms of a standard of living, it is plainly much more important that the workingman should have his income substantially increased, than that the comfortable and wealthy classes should avoid a slight or even a considerable loss. Provided, then, that it does not abuse its privileges, the working class has the natural advantage of position, and can count on carrying the sympathy of the majority for the ends which it sets before itself in the class struggle.

If then we find the laborer so often forfeiting the advantage belonging to a just cause, it is hardly to be sufficiently explained as a consequence of the selfishness and obtuseness of the bourgeoisie. Public approval has gone out too often and too spontaneously to the employee to enable the charge of a general lack of sympathy to be sustained. And it will be worth while asking for what reasons this sympathy is found to fail.

The conditions which, in a labor dispute, lead the public to interest itself most unreservedly on the side of the men,

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are plain enough; it is in proportion to the relative weakness of the employee, the lowness of his wages, the length of his hours, and other things that appeal unambiguously to a natural preference for the cause of the under dog. Such a comparison is bound, however, to be a very relative one, after we leave the level of extreme poverty and suffering. It is more difficult to interest the public in a move to increase the wages of workmen who are already, as it is called, well paid; and unfortunately the common notion of what constitutes a fair wage is apt to be determined by the higher reaches of the customary wage, whatever rises much above this being looked on with suspicion. If a skilled workman wants to get his pay increased from four to five dollars a day, the average man is likely to be quite convinced of the extravagance and unreason of his demands, and to interpret it as a clear case of over-pay now rather than of under-pay before. The familiarity of the existing scale leads him to take this as the standard of equity; and he seldom stops to ask himself how adequate even the new standard may be to the demands of a satisfying life, or whether he would be satisfied with it himself. Accordingly any disposition of the public to judge questions of justice in terms of existing standards is apt to fall short of the demands of the industrial situation, and cannot be taken therefore as a permanent limit to the feasibility of the workingman's program, in so far as this depends on the existence of public sympathy for its success.

What does, however, constitute a much more permanent and defensible ground of objection, is the attendent disposition to promote even a justifiable claim in apparent disregard of the interests of others. The plainest case, in principle, is where advantage to a small group of workmen is sought without any heed to the welfare of other members of the laboring class. This selfish policy has done a good deal to moderate the good will of the public. The endeavor to make a trade a narrow corporation, powerful enough to enforce its demands by a policy accruing solely to its own gain, is indeed not a whit more reprehensible than similar

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practices quite the rule in business, and even professional circles; and of course it may be attended with a considerable measure of success. But in the nature of the case, no solution of the labor question is going to be final which does not affect those who need help *most;* and these are the ones least powerful through an exclusive organization. Solidarity, therefore, among workingmen, is an essential element in a program that promises success; since anything that aims at a labor aristocracy not only fails to utilize the power that comes from numbers, and leaves to capital a powerful weapon in the reserves of labor material on which it can draw, but also, in proportion as it is successful, it dries up automatically the springs of sympathy on which labor, like any other part of the social whole, is ultimately dependent.

Closely connected with the disregard on the part of privileged labor of its less fortunate associates, is its equal disregard of the general public. Of course in an abnormal state of affairs we must expect some incidental unpleasantness; and in so far as it is unavoidable, the sensible man will take it calmly. The citizen who complains because he has to walk or pay cab fare for a time, if this is necessary to the removing of real grievances from which city railway employees are suffering, is himself displaying, perhaps in an aggravated form, the same selfishness which he decries in others. But if he has reason to suspect that the unionist on his part is refusing to take into consideration any one's point of view but his own, is ready to sacrifice even weighty interests in order to get his way, and in general is guilty of the same abuse of power that constitutes injustice elsewhere, he is at once inclined, and reasonably so, to take sides against him. Of course it is conceivable that necessity may be so great as to justify a very large amount of incidental evil; but this happens more and more infrequently. The working class has already got an advantageous start, while on occasion it has even acquired something of the power that formerly belonged to capital; in its own interest, therefore, it can afford to move without undue haste, if that would jeopardize success in the long run.

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But now there is a third and more controversial form of the exercise of "fairness" in methods of industrial warfare. The bitterness of the conflict, in so far as the laborer is responsible for this, is mainly due to the fact that he has not on the whole had any too keen a sense of the need for applying the rules of fair play to the employing class as well. There have been many and honorable exceptions; but the temptation has been to regard employers as such as natural enemies, toward whom we are excused from the niceties of ethical conduct. And the result is unquestionably the promotion of hard feelings. If an employer finds agreements repudiated, and attempts made to take advantage of his misfortunes, if he sees himself lumped with other employers less willing than himself to be fairminded, and sacrificed as a tool to get at them when no grievances are held against himself, and if, in general, he is made to feel that his men have no disposition to respond to decent treatment, it would not be human nature not to develop a hostile temper. I do not intend implying that the situation is to be blamed wholly, or primarily, on the unions. On the contrary, it has been the inevitable accompaniment of their fight for recognition against prejudice and obstinate unfriendliness; and since at the beginning it was in the power of the employer, not of the workingman, to set the tone of the struggle, it is more to the former as a class than to the latter that the blame must be attached. But this does not mean much to the individual employer who now wishes to be reasonable; and consequently the unions cannot avoid responsibility for the policy they adopt, no matter what its historical excuse.

Of course I am not suggesting that the workingman has only to abandon methods that violate the general sense of fairness to gain his ends. But it does appear to me that a change of emphasis, of which this is an essential precondition, might very well hold out promise of ultimate success in all reasonable aims. The change of emphasis is this, that rather than make its fight primarily for small increments of wage increase, which holds out no promise of

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other than hostile relations to employers as a class, the union should, instead, aim to attain its ends through making a sharp distinction between employers, and using its weapons first of all to discriminate against such as refuse to do their part toward bringing about harmony of action; and then—the second and essential step—through setting itself systematically, within the field in which the spirit of co-operation is able to supplant that of class warfare, the task, which so far organized labor has almost totally neglected, of experimenting constructively to meet the problem of increasing the efficiency of the industrial process—a task which it could not very well attempt under present conditions without jeopardizing its militant interests, and playing into the hands of the other side.

It is not to be supposed that this would mean giving up either militancy, or, within limits, legislative action. More and more the state is practically forced to deal with the extremer facts of poverty in the laboring class, as it has already dealt with the extreme cases of danger to life and health, on the general principle that uniformity of action is necessary to prevent competitive conditions from annulling the good will even of a majority of employers themselves, and that such uniformity cannot be insured without the power of the state to enforce it. It might be the heroic treatment to leave individuals to suffer till time and private experiment had found a way to remove the conditions responsible for their misery; but we find ourselves continually less able to take here the heroic course. I do not know how far the modern state is likely to go in the direction of palliative measures to relieve the pressure of dire need, or what forms of action it will settle on as least likely to do incidental harm. But what seems clear is that the particular sort of principled justification for legislative action that can be used here, applies primarily only in connection with the extremer forms of need; and unless, therefore, we hold that the labor problem is settled when acute poverty is relieved, and every one assured of a minimum wage and a pension just enough to keep him from the

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work house, there is plenty of room for constructive effort on the part also of the laborer to better his own condition. And furthermore, I do not anticipate that labor organizations will have any lack of occasion to fight for their demands, since the principle of organized co-operation is exactly what calls forth the deepest hostility in a portion of the employing class. But in two ways their position might be strengthened. To begin with, good will would stand a much better chance of being elicited in the more enlightened employer. At present the employer is in a quandary. Though he may agree that the right to organize is indubitable, he yet, in the absence of anything but a fighting program in the unions, sees himself being pushed all the time toward disaster. With no positive goal of industrial construction ahead, his dealing with the union becomes a matter of one wage concession after another, with no limit in view. If he once were convinced of a willingness to turn to the problem of industry itself the energy that now goes into militancy, on terms which, instead of whittling down his margin of safety, gave him a place automatically made secure so long as he proved his worth as a manager, it is certain that with many of the employers the men could get together. Meantime they would also be enlisting economic forces that would make for the industrial survival of their friends, and the confusion of their enemies. If instead of preaching the gospel of the conflict between capital and labor, the union were to emphasize rather the need of co-operation between capital and labor, and a necessary conflict only between labor and those particular capitalists who refuse to accept this ideal, using their good will to help out those who on the contrary are disposed to be friendly by giving them an advantage over competitors, they might very possibly find that they had the situation in their own hands.

It may be said that this does not tell us after all how to settle the ultimate question in dispute—the proper division of wealth. But my point is just this, that, in the first place, while we can assume that the ideal is in the direction

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of equalization, there is no conceivable basis on which to determine how far this equalizing process can safely go apart from indefinitely extended experiment, and, second, that the necessary preliminary for even making a start toward a stable solution is the creation of a human attitude willing to set aside fundamental hostility, and accept a co-operative basis. And to this end some form of non-paternalistic profit sharing, in which labor is willing to shift its immediate objective—except where intolerable wage conditions still rule—to the job of helping out to the extent of its power such portion of the employing class as is well disposed, and experimenting in co-operation with these in the direction of efficiency of production, offers what appears at the present time to have the fairest chance of success. What the final outcome would be, is of course only guesswork. It is quite thinkable that as workmen got more and more a share in the business, and as knowledge of its workings grew with experience, they might gradually come in an amicable way to take it over, paying such a price for management as the state of the market demanded. Or it may be that the owner would continue to justify himself even to his men, by enabling them to earn more than similar shops with less effective management. Quite probably both things might happen in different instances; it really would not matter much so long as economic efficiency had a chance to determine the result, without, as now, leading to the vast discrepancies of fortune that tend to depress one industrial class for the benefit of the other.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

AUTHORITY, LIBERTY AND FUNCTION IN THE LIGHT OF THE WAR. A critique of Authority and Liberty as the foundations of the modern State and an attempt to base societies on the principle of Function. By Ramiro de Maeztu. London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd.; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1916. Pp. 288. Price, 4s. 6d. net.

Mr. Ramiro de Maeztu is a Spaniard and a journalist who has done the cause of the Allies much service by his writings in the press of his own country. In this book, the substance of which has appeared in the form of articles in the *New Age*, he discusses general questions of political theory raised by the war. His knowledge of European philosophical literature seems to be remarkably wide, and he shows a genuinely journalistic ability in turning the most various doctrines to the uses of his argument. He appears to be in general agreement with the Guild Socialism associated with the *New Age*, though there is little discussion of its economic side and none at all of its details. I think the book is very significant, both as a contribution to political thought and in the light it throws on the more recent developments of Socialist theory.

The basis of his political doctrine is the notion of function, but he draws from it conclusions quite different in some respects from those which have been traditionally associated with it. Practically it comes to this—he parts company with Plato and with all his modern followers like Hegel and Green by making the functional principle apply to the state itself as well as to the social groups or social institutions "within" it. This, of course, is a great deal more than merely to insist on the distinction between society and the state. It is common ground that society is the social whole. The difference is as to the state. For the traditional political doctrine the state is society regarded as a unit rightly exercising force on behalf of the best life. For Mr. de Maeztu it is only a particular organ of society charged with certain specific and limited functions—apparently chiefly the maintenance of order and the administration of justice. It has no necessary priority over the others and no authority outside

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its own sphere. Like them, it is altogether subordinate to its function and its function to the thing it serves. This doctrine is not new as a criticism of the sovereignty of the state. In its general character it does not differ much from the ideas that historians like Maitland or Figgis have been working out. No doubt the historical material, mediæval or modern, controlling all these writers has a fundamental identity—the prominence, namely, with which appears the autonomy of the smaller—generally voluntary—group, whether this be the guild or the Teutonic community or the Church or a trade union. What mainly distinguishes Mr. de Maeztu is his attempt to relate his doctrines to very recent logical and ethical and juridical theories. He constantly acknowledges his debt to Husserl and Mr. G. E. Moore. The fundamental error which has haunted political theory is subjectivism, which imagines that goodness or right has an essential relation to some mind. The subjectivist view of law, *e.g.*, treats the location of the sovereignty in a state as the fundamental question, instead of discussing as it ought what the principles are which make the association possible. Objectivity is correlated with discharge of function: subjectivity is reference to autonomous will which need never lead beyond caprice and carries with it no guarantee of value.

This emphasis on the autonomous will gives Mr. de Maeztu the division of his criticism. To use as principle of explanation the will of the social group is the German heresy. The fundamental thing in social life is then the power that society possesses as a whole, and this is the state. From that follow sovereignty and the identification of good men with good citizens and patriots. With this Mr. de Maeztu connects the Hegelian tradition in English and German thought—I think he takes it right back to Kant—and as a species of it, Marxism. But it is also possible to pursue the same fundamental error in the opposite direction. Substitute the will of the isolated individual for that of the group and you have the principle of Liberty. Here Mr. de Maeztu has in mind the Philosophical Radicals and the whole Liberal tradition in England. He devotes a few chapters which reach a very high level of thinking to the political consequences of its hedonism. With it all he connects a most fascinating revival of the doctrine of original sin, obviously largely derived from Sorel. The real trouble, he argues in effect, is that people *will* believe in the goodness of human nature and think the universe friendly,

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instead of looking with a decent Christian humility to the eternal values which lie beyond themselves.

The third section of the book is a discussion of function and values, and an attempt to indicate how society can be based on the functional principle. This applies both to internal and to international affairs. For just as no man has any subjective right to anything, so no state has any subjective right to govern a territory. The rights of states depend on the functions they perform in the development of human solidarity and the increase of values. The fact that there is at present no authority to enforce them is quite irrelevant. That a right is not realised does not affect its objectivity any more than a man's *de facto* legal possession of property shows that he performs any function which justifies him in it. Mr. de Maeztu follows Plato in finding the functional principle at work wherever there is a connected social life, and the attempt to organise life on this principle plainly depends on the growth of institutions corresponding to functions in the state and the self government of these, also on a functional basis. It is unnecessary to argue whether this is democracy. Mr. de Maeztu commonly calls it Syndicalism; he has in mind no more than a reference to what M. Lagardelle calls the "Socialism of Institutions," and this he takes rather differently from writers who have also been influenced by this side of the movement. He does not as I understand him pay much attention either to the autonomy of the corporate groups or to the division among them of the sovereignty of the formally unitary state. This brings him closer than he thinks to the idealist writers and also obscures his doctrine—if he has one—of liberty. Both points are, I think, worth brief discussion.

Mr. de Maeztu would hold that it is his doctrine of function and value that marks him out. This is not so. Idealist political theory has always insisted on function and correlated it with value; and it would agree largely with his criticism of authority and wholly with that of liberty. Further, it can be put in a form which protects it at least in the first instance from the charge of subjectivity. Value no doubt is a character which belongs only to conscious experience, but it is logically connected with objective features of that experience—its harmoniousness and comprehensiveness. In rejecting this latter doctrine Mr. de Maeztu agrees with Mr. G. E. Moore; and therefore his whole political theory lacks the attempt to place in an ordinal series the

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different institutions of social life and to find in them all the one common general purpose differently realised in each, which the idealist calls the state. A divergence like this can be traced to disagreement on points of logical theory; but it implies also a fundamental difference in the content of the social experience used as material.

In the second place, Mr. de Maeztu's anxiety to dispose of the traditional English view of liberty and substitute for it "the primacy of things" brings him near to denying altogether its value. Formally, his doctrine is that values are fundamental and liberty only an instrumental end: even if we take the latter as participation in the government or citizenship (p. 239) it is not difficult to treat the realisation of this in particular individuals as a rather unimportant detail. I do not imagine that Mr. de Maeztu himself takes this view of it, but only that it would be easy for other people to do so on the pretext of maintaining the purity of his own doctrine. In this respect the case is parallel to that of the really characteristic German doctrine of nationality, which holds that the value of a nation is to be judged by its contribution to culture: for which the interesting corollary follows that since German culture is superior to that of other peoples it has a right to impose its culture and its nationality on them. Hence, *e.g.*, neither Polish nor Irish nationality can possibly matter. But the fact is that a nation is constituted primarily by its historical unity and its basis of common sentiment, and other nations should respect and encourage its desire to become autonomous, because only thus will it be possible for it to develop its peculiar contribution to culture. Nationality in fact is not merely an instrumental value; it is itself a source of values. The case is similar with political liberty, which is also a potential value, recognised because it will give birth to others.

The real defect of Mr. de Maeztu's view is, that having set its face sternly against romanticism and its pandering to human self-satisfaction, it has not remembered that values are after all realised in persons and that any general attempt to state what they are does not tell us who are their bearers, and cannot do so. And because this is so even in seeking not after the things which are seen but after those which are eternal we must depend in the first instance on the development and recognition of voluntary groups within society: for this is the principle of toleration and the source of all progress towards the desired end. Original sin

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may be the essence of religion, but we must treat men as if they were made in the image of their Maker, lest peradventure their rulers who always imagine themselves the elect think themselves justified even in this world.

The significance of the book as a product of present-day socialist thought is that it may serve as an indication of the direction in which Syndicalism may develop itself as a theory. The conflict with the older (especially English) Collectivist doctrine may be taken as complete, and the agreement of Guild Socialism with several vigorous elements in recent political thought is no doubt one source of its strength, though whether the latter will always feel quite comfortable with its new ally is doubtful. On the other side, we are a long way from Marxism, and this is not altogether an advantage. No one probably could regard with much satisfaction the more recent orthodox Marxian political philosophers like Dietzgen and some of his American disciples with their use of all that is least intelligible in the Hegelian dialectic. But it is difficult to see why any doctrine should be called specifically socialist which neglects the class-struggle. This is a symptom of Mr. de Maeztu's difficulties in dealing with the historical. Similarly with his treatment of the economic interpretation of history. He asserts that the economic and military powers are identical and finds in the doctrine as the Marxists formulate it a confusion with the historical interpretation of economics To say this is to confuse economic theory with economic conditions, a heresy which Marx himself could scarcely have understood, much less fallen into.

M. W. Robieson.

Belfast, Ireland.

Christianity and Sex Problems. By Hugh Northcote, M.A. Philadelphia: F. A. Davis and Company. (English Depot: Stanley Phillips, 23, Creighton Road, Queen's Park, London, N. W.) Second edition, revised and enlarged. Pp. xvi, 478. Price, 12s. 6d. net.

Mr. Northcote's book is a valuable contribution to the small number of those which deal with sex problems from a point of view at once definitely Christian and scientific. The spirit in which he approaches his subject is suggested in the following paragraph, where he comments on "the broad assertion" made by the Lambeth Conference of Bishops that "a life of chastity for

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the unmarried is not only possible, but is commanded by God." Mr. Northcote writes: "A life of chastity possible for the unmarried! A mere categorical assertion of this kind does little service to the cause of purity, and one could almost comment with some vehemence on the lack of sympathy displayed. No doubt it is the duty of the Christian Church to uphold the ideal possibility of chastity in single life; but should not men who have special opportunities of studying how to render fruitful in their practical application to human life, the lines of ethical thought developed in the Bible, recognize (as St. Paul does) the frequent practical impossibility? Too often we have listened in vain, in the voice of the assembled Church, for the tone of deep fraternal sympathy, for the kind word of encouragement to the young unmarried man who, in his hard circumstances, accepts the obligation to sexual abstinence, but whose nerve-power is strained to the uttermost beneath its weight; who dreads the overhanging cloud of insanity, as he morbidly broods over his boyhood's troubles, and passing through the streets where the prostitutes pace the pavements at dusk, thinks in his lonely, miscalculating ignorance, to mend the error made in solitude by a desperate, debasing venture in fornication."

We make no apology for so long a quotation, for it is characteristic of Mr. Northcote's whole line of approach, and those who are touched by it will wish to read the book itself. It is concerned, as the quoted passage suggests, mainly with sex problems as they relate to men, but very much of what is said is true of women also, and of value to them as human beings subject to the same fundamental laws as men, even in matters relating to sex. The keynote of the book is to be found in Mr. Northcote's conviction that "a vital, progressive Christianity cannot long be out of harmony with any part of science," and that "a science of sex is" therefore "positively necessary to the understanding and appreciation of Christian sexual ethics." To those to whom the supreme reasonableness and sanity of the Christian ethic is its most profound attraction, the progress of scientific discovery and thought must always be welcome, for such discovery continually reillumines for them the noblest and also the most difficult sayings of Christ. But in general the attitude of the Christian student of science has been one rather of terror than of joy! Perhaps this is why there are so few books like *Christianity and Sex Problems.*

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Readers would be well-advised to read the Epilogue immediately after the Introduction—it will not suffer from being read twice over—and it will convince them that the book is better worth reading than is suggested by the sudden outburst of violent and not very successful imagery with which Chapter I unfortunately begins. There is another equally unexpected outburst in Chapter XXIII of this really sober and scientific book. The subject is sufficiently tragic, but its treatment makes it almost grotesque.

A. Maude Royden.

London, England.

Theophrastus and the Greek Physiological Psychology before Aristotle. By George Malcolm Stratton, Professor of Psychology in the University of California. London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd.; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1917. Pp. 228. Price, 8s. 6d. net.

This volume is the first complete translation into English of the fragment *De Sensibus* of Theophrastus. Considerable portions have of course been translated and discussed both by Professor Burnet and Professor Beare; but this volume is nevertheless very welcome. The fragment is certainly the most important single source of our knowledge of early psychology, and to attack Diels's text of it unaided was a severe trial for those of weaker capacity. Moreover, the portions which neither Burnet nor Beare had occasion to discuss in detail form a very compact criticism from the Aristotelian point of view of earlier theories of elementary cognition and throw a good deal of light on the Peripatetic attitude toward psychology in general.

Professor Stratton prints the text, adds an English translation and furnishes also introductions and notes. In the introductions he discusses the general value of the *De Sensibus* and the method and standpoint of Theophrastus' criticism of the opinions in which he is interested. In addition he devotes a good deal of space to the exposition of Theophrastus' own doctrines on the main topics of the *De Sensibus*, drawing incidentally on his other writings such as the *De Odoribus*. Within the limits he has set to himself, Professor Stratton seems to me to have fulfilled his purpose very well. But I am inclined to think that he has been a little too much influenced by the notion that these theories can be regarded as psychology without metaphysics, owing to the ex-

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treme generality of the metaphysical ideas of the Pre-Socratics. No one would deny that there is a great deal of truth in this: but it can be carried too far. In the case of fifth century writers, for example, it is impossible to dissociate their psychology—such as it was—from their physiology and indeed from the whole history of the growth of the medical schools; and these, there is every reason to believe, were greatly affected by Pythagoreanism. Recent advances in our knowledge of Greek Science have come precisely from attending more closely to the interrelations of very general "metaphysical" ideas with what is known of the history of mathematics and natural science. This is true in an intensified sense when you come to the fourth century. Theophrastus' failure to see the point of a good deal of the argument of the *Timæus* (to which Professor Stratton rightly draws attention) is due to the general conflict of his point of view with that of the Academy. Similarly the discussion of Theophrastus' own doctrine would have been made clearer and much more pointed had a brief outline been given of the Aristotelian view of the soul and the nature of sensation. There is no reason to think that Theophrastus diverged to any great extent from his master's views on these matters.

The notes are directed solely to elucidating the meaning of the text. There is a pleasing absence of merely grammatical discussion. Professor Stratton has had the benefit, as he fully and generously acknowledges, of the advice and criticism of Professor A. E. Taylor, whose remarkable learning in every department of Greek Philosophy is constantly apparent. I should like especially to draw the attention of other students to the discussions of the well-known passage on the theory of sense-perception of Empedocles (*De Sensibus 7–9*) and of Theophrastus' criticism of the Platonic doctrine that "heavy" and "light" are relative terms.

M. W. Robieson.

Belfast, Ireland.

Self-Government in Industry. By G. D. H. Cole. London: G. Bell and Sons, Ltd., 1917. Pp. xii, 330. Price, 4s. 6d. net.

Mr. Cole's new book carries further the argument of his earlier *World of Labour* and, although it is planned with reference to the problems of labour which will arise immediately after the war, it is a contribution to the much more fundamental discussion of social and political theory. The book is specially valuable because it

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combines detailed programmes of action and clear statement of contemporary English social forces with a large and inspiring vision of ultimate ideals. The first two chapters deal with the control of industry by the state and the possibility of restoring after the war the Trade Union customs which have been abrogated during the crisis. Even here, in issues which may appear to be merely English, there is an important principle involved. It is absolutely certain that business men assisted by some government officials will aim, after the war, at increasing production at all costs. They may therefore argue that any protection of the worker hampers their full use of his skill or strength. On the other side are those who demand human freedom, even if it endangers the increase of production. Two philosophies of life, two systems of economic thought are thus opposed. And Mr. Cole is rightly insistent upon the practical importance of destroying, once for all, the antiquated economics of business men. The restoration of full power to the Trade Unions is absolutely necessary for the realisation of a humane, as opposed to a material, civilisation. The long chapter which follows deals with the nature of the state: we shall criticise later, but for the present we must explain Mr. Cole's general thesis. "A state," he says, "is nothing more or less than the political machinery or government in a community." "In every community there are many forms and instances of common action in which the state has no part." We may take it as agreed among all who can analyse present social experience without undue regard to Hegel and Plato that the state is not to be identified with society or with the community. State administration provides for the needs of those who live in the same geographical districts. It expresses their interests as consumers or enjoyers. Trade Unions on the other hand are vocational institutions of producers. Thus there may be many forms of social organisation each existing in its own right, and there may be many kinds of social allegiance, not all subordinate to state-loyalty. The individual is ultimately the judge and the link between the institutions which subserve his full development (p. 91). Ideally there should be national guilds, growing out of the present trades unions, which in a Congress of producers would counterbalance the Parliament of consumers in the state. In such a society the wage system would disappear not only because each industry as a whole would bear the burden of any trade depression from which it suffered, in-

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stead of putting the burden upon the hand-workers, but because a man and not his labour, abstracted from his humanity, would be felt to be important. The state might own the instruments of production and control the producers in the interest of the consumers; and men whose manhood was recognised would not be easily enslaved to any Guild. So short a summary does little justice to Mr. Cole's admirable contribution to political thought and practice; and the criticisms which may be offered do not diminish its value.

In the first place with regard to the relation of administration to economic forces, Mr. Cole is not clear as to the policy which should be adopted in an ideal state towards finance. He recognises that "the financier is the supreme power behind the capitalist throne" (p. 178). It appears that the state is to control exchange: but how? It does not appear that Mr. Cole has thought out the function of a class who will be financiers without being fraudulent gamblers and it may be that some element of prejudice survives in him when he thinks of the manipulation of capital. Again Mr. Cole has not sufficiently acknowledged, in his theory of the state, the relation of the state to other human interests as well as industry. Obviously he implies the existence of such interests, but without deliberate reference to the forms of social organisation for other purposes than trade, one cannot do full justice to the "architectonic" quality of politics. The state is not simply administration; it is the force or the feeling or the prestige upon which administration depends for its effectiveness; and this seems to be what the idealists call the Soul of the State. But Mr. Cole tends to forget its existence. These criticisms, however, are perhaps unjust, because no book can contain everything that is to be said, and in relation to industry Mr. Cole's theory is clear and consistent.

C. DELISLE BURNS.

London.

ENCYCLOPÆDIA OF RELIGION AND ETHICS. Edited by James Hastings, with the assistance of John A. Selbie and Louis H. Gray. Volume IX: Mundas—Phrygians. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1917. Pp. xx, 911. Price, 32s. net.

We have become so accustomed to expect every year or so a volume of a thousand pages or thereby from Dr. Hastings and

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his collaborators that it is difficult to realise the enormous labor that must go to the production even of one of them, if the standard of the earlier volumes is to be maintained. Yet all the usual features appear in this the ninth of the series—its international character, the almost unfailing judgment exhibited in the choice of contributors, the subdivision of the greater subjects, a remarkable typographical accuracy, and so on. Not less striking than before are the number and fulness of the anthropological articles. Religion and ethics have this in common: both are rooted in anthropology: and there will probably exist nowhere a more complete summary of the evolution of moral and religious ideas than in these volumes when completed.

Since religion on its theological side expands into metaphysics and even into logic, we have two connected articles by the late Professor Royce on Negation and Order, the latter of which contains an attempt to bring out the importance of the study of types of order in the moral and social world. For the rest it follows quite closely the ideas put forward in his paper in the Windelband-Rüge Encyclopædia. On another side there are several biological articles—Pangenesis, Ontogeny and Phylogeny, and others. The long composite article on Nature treats it almost exclusively as object of worship: nothing for example, could be more to the point than Dr. L. R. Farrell's contribution on Nature (Greek). The extreme catholicity and impartiality of the work are sufficiently evidenced by the very reasonable article on Occultism (Mr. G. R. S. Mead), the exposition on New Thought (Mr. A. L. Allen), and the subdivision of many modern religious subjects.

Curiously enough there happens to be little in this volume of purely ethical interest, but the articles on general philosophical subjects are ample compensation. Dr. M'Taggart's discussion of Personality is a distinctly original contribution to philosophy and will attract the attention of all students. Admittedly a development of certain suggestions of Mr. Russell, it attempts to prove that each of us perceives himself, perception being used in the sense of awareness of an existent. The chief argument is that since "I" cannot be known by description there must be knowledge of it by awareness, otherwise no statements containing "I" as a constituent are justifiable. Amongst other points, it is also argued that the inclusion in selves of other selves or their parts is impossible. The article on Ontology by J. Turner

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is realistic in tone and contains an interesting sketch of a treatment of the categories which to me is rendered difficult to follow by an extremely obscure theory of relations. Dr. Tennant's article on Natural Law is excellent: but Rev. W. D. Niven's on Naturalism suffers from too narrow a use of the term for critical purposes.

As usual the Encyclopædia is particularly strong on the historical side. Among the larger articles in history of philosophy may be mentioned that on Neo-Platonism (Dean Inge) and on Peripatetics (Mr. R. D. Hicks). Mr. J. W. Scott discusses the Neo-Hegelian movement in England and lays just stress on its relation to the state of culture in the first half of the century. The composite article Philosophy contains of course a good deal of historical material, especially in respect of Non-European thought. Church History gets its full share of attention. The most notable articles on the history of dogma are those on Nestorianism (Dr. A. J. Maclean) and Pelagianism (Rev. R. G. Parsons). The controversial topic of The Holy Office is carefully discussed by Father Herbert Thurston: that of the Papacy from a distinctly hostile point of view by Rev. A. Fawkes.

The general articles are of great value, each of them, however short or relatively unimportant, being in the hands of a specialist. There is a long composite article on Music. Dr. E. Graf, to whom the section on Greece and Rome is allocated, has surely allowed the statement that the Greeks knew nothing about shortening the string of a lyre by means of bridges to remain by an oversight, in view of what he says about Pythagoras. Dr. Percy Gardner goes delicately among the controversies on Greek Mysteries and produces a model article. Special mention should be made of the brilliant discussion of Mysticism (Christian, Roman Catholic) by Father Chapman, with its account of the Scholastic theory of the nature of mystical knowledge. In view of some tendencies in recent psychology with reference to the significance of certain symbols whenever and wherever they occur, nothing could be more salutary than Mr. E. S. Hartland's article Phallism. It is refreshing to have these aspects of primitive religion discussed by a writer who really knows something about the subject. Amongst the biographical articles the most interesting is that on Neitzsche by Dr. Havelock Ellis, which contains a most discriminating discussion of his ethical doctrine.

Omissions are almost unknown in Dr. Hastings' work; in this

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volume the only point that has occured to me is that when Natural Law has an article Natural Right deserves at least a cross-reference.

M. W. ROBIESON.

Belfast, Ireland.

In addition to the above notice it may be convenient to note the chief contents of this volume under the five headings of Philosophy, Ethics, Religion, Logic, and Various.

In Philosophy, the article on Philosophy is good and long and subdivided into thirteen parts dealing with different systems, principally ancient. It may be noticed that Scottish Philosophy will have a special article of its own, but that English and German Philosophy and French Philosophy (if this last can be said to exist) are not mentioned as such. However, there are articles on Neo-Kantianism and Neo-Hegelianism. Other philosophical articles are the long and excellent article Nature, and also Mysticism, Object, Ontology, Occultism, Natural Law, Occasionalism, Personality, Neo-Cynicism, Peripatetics, Neo-Platonism, Neo-Pythagoreanism, Perception, and Nietzsche.

In Ethics we may count such articles as Nationality, Neutrality, Peace, Pessimism and Optimism, and Philanthropy. In particular the article on Nationality contains references to quite modern states of affairs.

In Religion may be reckoned the articles Penance, Persecution, Passivity, Nonconformity, Papacy, Old Catholicism, Oxford Movement, Newman, Pascal, Pantheism, Mysteries, Naturalism, Perfection (Christian), Obscurantism, Nihilism (Buddhist), Mythology, Orthodoxy, and Paul.

To Logic seem to belong more particularly Royce's two articles on Negation and Order, and the article Paradox.

As various may perhaps be classed the long, learned, and detailed article by many scholars on Music, in which religious music has of course a leading place; and the articles Names, Perseverance, Organic Selection, Oath, Personification, Negroes, Old Age, Ordeal, Ontogenesis, Pangenesis, Parthenogenesis, Obedience, Patience, and the long article on Numbers.

The last article mentioned is principally devoted to numbers as they appear in Aryan and Semitic literature, and the somewhat obscure ethical and philosophical implications of numbers with the Pythagoreans are only rather briefly referred to (p. 406).

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It would perhaps have been pleasing to many people to see rather more about this subject, and also more about the modern theory of number and infinity than is given in the very able article by Prof. A. E. Taylor on Continuity in one of the earlier volumes, and which seems to have aroused philosophical and religious interest. For the rest it may be noticed that there is not even a cross-reference to other articles for people who are anxious to find out something about Oratory, Pederasty (or Paiderasty), Pedagogy, and Philolans.

PHILIP E. B. JOURDAIN.

Fleet, Hants, England.

SHORTER NOTICES

THE MAKING OF WOMEN: OXFORD ESSAYS IN FEMINISM. By A. Maude Royden and others. Edited by Victor Gollancz. London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1917. Pp. 217. Price, 4s. 6d. net.

The best of these Essays is the careful and discriminative estimate and forecast of "Education" by Elinor Burns. The Editor also makes some timely comments, *e.g.* that "except in a free society women cannot be free." Why is it that in spite of the knowledge, ability, and enthusiasm of individual contributions, the whole collection suffers from an academic blight of unreality and incompleteness? I think Miss Maude Royden's essay on "Modern Love" supplies the answer. She claims the right of women to full human individuality with the graceful eloquence and ethical idealism which one has learnt to associate with her name.

With much that Miss Royden says, both in this essay and in that dealing with "The Future of the Women's Movement," all feminists must entirely agree, but she obstinately ignores and evades the full conclusion of the line of argument she adopts. A little clear thinking on these lines is worth much eloquence about "purity."

F. W. STELLA BROWNE.

London, England.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHYSIOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY OF SEX. By S. Herbert, M.D., M.R.C.S., L.R.C.P. London: A. & C. Black, 1917. Pp. xvii, 148. Price, 3s. 6d. net.

An admirably clear and frank attempt to "give the elementary facts of the physiology and psychology of sex in a simple yet scientific manner." Dr. Herbert adopts the "biologic approach" recommended by another distinguished eugenist, Miss Norah March, and gives a terse and carefully illustrated account of the processes of reproduction throughout organic life. In his treatment of the ethical and psychological side of sex, he is careful to emphasise the need for a new social order, if sexual disharmonies and abuses are ever to be even partially abolished. The two most valuable chapters are those dealing with "The Sexual Norm," and "Aberrations of Sex," respectively. They are open-minded, definite and dignified, and entirely free from Christian cant. The author's treatment of emotional sex differences seems to me much less satisfactory; such a phrase as "The

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female, always more a mother than a wife," is misplaced and mischievous dogmatism, out of keeping with the general tone of a valuable book, but against this, must be balanced the admission that "there exist innumerable gradations of sex, and we must recognise intermediate mental types."

On the whole Dr. Herbert's book is a welcome oasis in the wilderness of ignorant ecclesiastical twaddle and furtive pornography, which constitute the bulk of what is written about sex, and it would bring help and enlightenment to many perplexed people.

F. W. STELLA BROWNE.

London, England.

WOMAN'S EFFORT: a chronicle of British women's fifty years' struggle for citizenship (1865–1914). By A. E. Metcalfe, B.Sc., with an introduction by Laurence Housman. Oxford: B. H. Blackwell, 1917. Pp. xxiv, 381. Price, 3s. 6d. net.

Woman's Effort presents a mass of documentary evidence relating to the feminist movement of the early twentieth century in a compact and convenient form; and (apart from the still further summarised earlier history) is, as the writer claims, a plain unpretentious narrative of actual events connected with the movement down to the outbreak of war. Refraining from argument and theory, this chronicle in headed paragraphs, year by year, presents, in this concentrated form, a picture both of sporadic lawlessness on the part of militants and government incompetence. An unnecessary amount of space is given to the suicide of Miss Davison on Derby Day, 1913, and her funeral pomps.

F. S.

London, England.

NATIONALISM. By Sir Rabindranath Tagore. London: Macmillan and Company, Ltd., 1917. Pp. 136. Price, 4s. 6d. net.

Sir Rabindranath Tagore is a Chrysostom, and his book, which is chiefly concerned with political theory, is a prose poem. Especially beautiful are the passages describing the secular life of India under her rulers and conquerors. "But her thrones were not her concern. They passed over her head like clouds now tinged with purple gorgeousness, now black with the threat of thunder." But all this was as it were "a drift of cavalry and foot soldiers, richly caparisoned elephants, white tents and canopies, strings of patient camels bearing the loads of royalty, bands of kettle-drums and flutes, marble domes of mosques, palaces and tombs like the bubbles of the foaming wine of extravagance; stories of treachery and loyal devotion, of changes of fortune and of dramatic surprises of fate." But with these earlier conquerors he has no concern; his book is an arraignment of the Western state organised for power. He causes his readers some discomfort by his peculiar use of the word "nation" for "state," and we have constantly to translate "nation" by "state" before it is possible to get at Sir Rabindranath's meaning of the state organised for power.

India's most intimate experience is with the British nation, and "as far as government by the nation (*i.e.* by the organised state) goes, there are reasons to believe that this is one of the best." But the aspect of any one of the western states organised for power is anathema to him, driving as it does its tentacles of machinery deep into the soil; and to him therefore what he calls nationalism is "a crude epidemic of evil." Like Ruskin, he passes judgment upon our commercialism, with its barbarity of ugly ornament, and the standards of value of the western industrial state and its

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mechanical progress in which "the civilization of humanity has lost its path in the Wilderness of Machinery." "The nation has thriven long upon mutilated humanity. Suddenly, all its mechanism going mad, it has begun the dance of the Furies, shattering its own limbs, scattering them into dust. It is the fifth act of the tragedy of the unreal." He hopes, it would seem, for a Utopia such as Samuel Butler's, where men have destroyed the machine they had made.

M. J.

NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL IDEALS IN THE ENGLISH POETS. A lecture delivered in the John Rylands library, 4th January, 1916. By C. H. Herford, M.A., Litt.D. Manchester: The University Press; London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1917. Pp. 24. Price, 1s. net.

Mr. Herford illustrates from English poets the three types of national ideal: "simple" patriotism; the patriotism of the German type, which is extraordinarily fervent and self-conscious, but on a very low plane in regard to the well-being of other nations; and the third phase, which regards the nation chiefly as a member of a community of other nations. Mr. Herford does not quote one of the most definite expressions of international idealism, Tennyson's "Parliament of Man, the federation of the World," but he brings into due prominence that remarkable characteristic of the greater English poetry of the nineteenth century, imaginative fellowship with nations such as France and Italy. It is enough to mention the names of Byron and Shelley, Swinburne and Meredith.

M. J.

THE FRAMEWORK OF A LASTING PEACE. By L. S. Woolf. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1917. Pp. 154. Price, 4s. 6d. net.

Mr. Woolf has gathered together the various schemes for securing a lasting peace for the purposes of comparison; and No. VII, the draft treaty of a Dutch committee, translated from the original French, is also included. The point that strikes any reader is the essential similarity of these schemes, and Mr. Woolf's introduction, in which he does not "propose to drive another furrow through this field" already broken up by the ploughing of many competent thinkers, does well in emphasising this most hopeful feature. Mr. Woolf admits that political institutions alone cannot eliminate war, but very truly points out that "the absence or presence of international organisations is *part* cause of the existence of the will-to-war or the will-to-peace."

Another delusion he makes short work of is the idea—born of disappointment—that there is, and will be no more international law.

M. J.

THE WORLD OF STATES. By C. Delisle Burns, M.A. (New Commonwealth Books). London: Headley Bros., Ltd., 1917. Pp. 143. Price, 2s. net.

Mr. Burns' short study of the state is written in his usual lucid and interesting manner. Like Mr. Lowes Dickenson, he lays stress on the fact that there is really not very much difference between the world of states and the nation of individuals. We must see them and not "states" as the fundamental interest of politics; and certain delusive beliefs must be done away with, such as that "mystical belief concerning nations which implies that they are large bodily organisms." The future of the World of States

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must lie in the establishment of political humanism,—about which Mr. Burns might be a little more illuminating. The present world of states he describes forcibly as a "formless world, a chaos, a nebula half-formed and insecure," and to make it a world in the sense of a cosmos or orderly system, each state must take its part as an integral portion of the whole. To this the best of modern political thinkers have been tending. Like these, Mr. Burns proposes as a stage in the world organisation, international conferences and a League of States; and as an initial step he suggests that the British Empire and the United States (which had begun to move towards "political humanism" by the arbitration treaty of 1914) should lead the way in the formation of an inter-state polity. The thoughtful book is independent in its testing of political problems which are now especially of general interest.

D. R.

London, England.

OLD WORLDS FOR NEW: A STUDY OF THE POST-INDUSTRIAL STATE. By A. J. Penty. London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1917. Pp. 186. Price, 3s. 6d. net.

Mr. Penty believes that we should improve our social structure and increase the general well-being by going back to a Guild system. He connects his Guilds with the National Guilds of Mr. G. D. H. Cole and others; but he appears to be more influenced by the historical tradition than by the organisation of industry at present. He tilts against quantitative production. He rightly condemns the gospel of output: and holds up for contrast a production in which quality of the product shall be the chief interest of the producer. Repetition seems to him to be of the essence of machine production; but his chief instance of the value of quality as against quantity is the production of furniture. That industry is surely in a very exceptional position. There are some confusions even in the history, as the late sixteenth century is treated as mediæval, Aquinas and Ambrose are jostled together, and the Guild Merchant is spoken of as though it existed throughout the Middle Ages. But the book is on the whole stimulating, in spite of strange statements such as that "morality is a negative thing, whilst art is positive and can tell us what to do." Mr. Penty seems to be better at expressing a sentiment than at clearing up a confusion.

C. D. B.

IDEAS AT WAR. By Patrick Geddes and Gilbert Slater (The Making of the Future Series). London: Williams and Norgate, 1917. Pp. xvii, 256. Price, 5s. net.

This book, the second of a series which aims at gathering together existing elements and reconstructive doctrine and presenting them as a body of truth is prepared from lectures given at a summer meeting at Kings' College in 1915. The authors discuss the facts of European history and the causes of the war, and the aspects of the "mechanical-financial age," the future of art and education, and the revival of regionalism. As in *Cities in Evolution*, by Professor Geddes, a popular presentment of civism, stress is laid upon the city as "the crown and fulfilment of regional life." The book smacks too much of the informal but arresting lecture in its inclusion of simple jokes, such as that "Petersburgia was Retrogradia" (p. 144).

M. J.

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A LASTING PEACE THROUGH THE FEDERATION OF EUROPE AND THE STATE OF WAR. By Jean Jacques Rousseau. Translated and edited by C. E. Vaughan. London: Constable and Company, Ltd., 1917. Pp. 128. Price, 2s. net.

Mr. Vaughan, the editor of the *Political Writings* of Rousseau has given an excellent translation of Rousseau's *A Lasting Peace*, written in 1756, and *The State of War*. The former professes to be no more than an abstract of the earlier work on the same subject of the Abbe St. Pierre, but is actually a fairly free treatment of the prolix original; and the introduction is pure Rousseau. The second part is an independent essay criticising St. Pierre's scheme, which he declares to be not Utopian, indeed perfectly practical and beneficial, yet the selfishness of kings and ministers controlling the destinies of Europe will, Rousseau believes, stand in the way. "To be sane in a world of madmen is in itself a kind of madness." Rousseau's solution was a federation of Europe, with a representative court, whose decisions were to be enforced by a federal army;—the latter a not very practical measure, especially to-day.

M. J.

SOME ASPECTS OF THE WAR, AS VIEWED BY NATURALIZED BRITISH SUBJECTS. By A. Cohn. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1917. Pp. 20. Price, 6d. net.

A pamphlet issued by the Council of Loyal British subjects of German, Austrian or Hungarian birth (founded in May 1915) with a view to confuting allegations of German publicists. It emphasises the complete lack of any anti-German feeling in England before the war; and states that one of the members was permitted to see and study every one of the German diaries published in the appendix to the Report of Lord Bryce's Committee, and "can bear witness to the scrupulous fairness and meticulous care with which those diaries have been used."

M. J.

THE GODS IN BATTLE. By Paul Hyacinthe Loyson. Translated from the French by Lady Frazer, with an Introduction by H. G. Wells. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1917. Pp. xxx, 290. Price, 3s. 6d. net.

M. Loyson was before the war a pacifist, "a good democratic Socialist," and the Editor of the *Droits de l'homme*, a man whose chief aim was to secure some measure of friendship between France and Germany. His record makes this series of open letters the more significant. To some extent the letters relating to America (XIX–XXIII) are out of date, and the *chasse* of M. Romain Rolland too detailed and too vindictive; but no one can read the book with its characteristic French rhetoric, directness and fire, without enjoyment. One of the most telling of his open letters is that addressed to Brandes, who when asked why he had not protested over the violation of Belgian neutrality, replied: "If I were obliged to draw up protestations every time there happens in the world an event of which I disapprove, I should have nothing else to do." As M. Loyson points out, Brandes had "had a mania for making protestations every time anything happened of which he disapproved. He spent all his time in doing that and nothing else." The translation reads like a translation; and while allowing for the difficulties of translating French rhetoric into

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English prose, such phrases as "the tawny aggressors," the "German staff-officers who unmuzzled the hyenas of the sewer," are not happy.

M. J.

IN THE WAKE OF THE WAR: PARLIAMENT OR IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT. By Harold Hodge. London: John Lane, 1917. Pp. x, 226. Price, 5s. net.

Mr. Hodge's book is a tract for the times, full of pungent criticism of the parliamentary system. He is out of patience with parties and the demoralisation of party politics and he proposes as a remedy to withdraw matters of imperial concern from Parliamentary control and hand them over to a council of ten, nominated by the king. The council would be obliged to refer certain fixed questions to the whole body of electors every year and other questions involving changes. The scheme is not a workable one; the referendum solution is cumbrous, and it seems improbable that anyone would propose to add to the powers and functions of kingship.

M. J.

HIGHER LIVING. By Smith Baker, M.D. Boston: Sherman, French and Company, 1917. Pp. x, 404. Price, $1.75 net.

This book consists of a series of brief essays which offer a kind of inspirational guidance on many problems of personal and family life—marriage, homemaking, the training of children, and others. Each chapter is prefaced by a page of "inspired" quotations. Some typical chapter headings are: "The Joyous Outlook," "The Wedding Day," "The Sweet New Life," "Unforeseen Dangers," "Personal Freedom."

E. A.

HEALTH AND THE STATE. By William A. Brend, M.A., M.D., B.Sc. London: Constable and Company, Ltd., 1917. Pp. xii, 354. Price, 10s. 6d. net.

A valuable study and criticism of English state efforts to promote healthy conditions of living. Here, in spite of the large sums spent with this aim, the value of these efforts is lessened by the division of administration among a number of uncoördinated and overlapping authorities. An excellent scheme for complete reorganisation of the public health service is sketched, and the foundation of a Ministry of Health urged (p. 313), which should undertake sociological medical research; and wide discretionary powers are suggested for local authorities in public health administration. The central ministry would prevent the present overlapping and determine policy while the advantage of stimulating hygiene reforms by saddling each locality with a part of the cost of their health services is obvious.

M. J.

HUMAN IDEALS. By Frederick A. M. Spencer. London: T. Fisher Unwin, Ltd., 1917. Pp. viii, 280. Price, 6s. net.

This book is an attempt to indicate some of the ways in which humanity may be expected to develop itself—moral, religious, social, industrial, intellectual and domestic—in the near future, a future in all probability brought nearer by the present world war. To those who believe that a return to the eighteenth century outlook over life, reinforced by the knowl-

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edge, but untouched by the reactions, of the nineteenth, is greatly to be desired it will be welcome. It is conceived in the spirit of Rousseau's *Emile* and of Thomas Day's *Sandford and Merton;* the writer being an up-to-date Mr. Barlow, who, however, has devoted more attention to the New Testament than that excellent man.

A. F.

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS, 1815 AND 1914. By H. R. Hodges, B.Sc. London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1917. Pp. 91. Price, 2s. 6d. net.

This book, originally written under the title of the "Economic Condition of the People of England in 1815 in comparison with the Present day" won the Paul Philip Reitlingen Prize in the University of London in 1915. It is a summary, elucidated with many clear and useful tables and diagrams, of the century's progress in England from the close of one great war to the inception of another. The author remarks that as the past has been devoted to the accumulation of wealth, the future is devoted to its more equal distribution.

M. J.

RELIGIOUS EDUCATION AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY. By Walter S. Athearn. Boston: The Pilgrim Press, 1917. Pp. xi, 394. Price, $1.50.

The author of this book puts forward a plea for a system of church schools under co-operative, non-ecclesiastical control, reaching from the cradle roll to graduate schools of religion, and correlated at every point in the matter of academic credits with the public school system. The book abounds in classified bibliographies and outlines, almost to the exclusion of all discussion, though perhaps for the audience of church readers for whom the book is intended no discussion is necessary. The author rejects the Dewey theory of education, all of his references to it being in connection with Bagley's review of *Democracy and Education* in *School and Home Education*, 36: 1. His point of view with regard to a critical study of the Bible is that "there is certainly a place for this critical study, but that place is in the graduate school and not in the undergraduate years. The undergraduate needs the results of research, not the methods and processes" (p. 320).

E. A.

WHAT IS QUAKERISM? By Edward Grubb, M.A. London: Headley Brothers, Ltd., 1917. Pp. 244. Price, 1s. 6d. and 2s. 6d. net.

This compact statement of the position and history of Quakerism is extremely useful. There are chapters on the "Inward Light," the "Testimony for Peace," Philanthropy and Social Reform, and the present outlook, written from the point of view of an English Quaker by the author, who has in other books dealt with the theological aspect of the subject, and was for many years Editor of the *British Friend.*

M. J.

LA GUERRA ETERNA E IL DRAMMA DEL ESISTENZA. By Antonio Aliotta, della R. Universita di Padova. Napoli: Francesco Perrella. Lira 4.

Professor Aliotta's book has a topical title, but except for a patriotic passage at the end he confines himself to philosophical issues. His task is

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a popular presentation of a species of Humanism. Sig. Aliotta comes out of the idealistic tradition, and has developed a relative idealism, with a strong propension toward Pure Experience. His Empiricism stops at the subject-object relation, beyond which he believes we can penetrate no further. He begins by an assault upon naturalism and positivism ("freedom is an inner experience"); and no less forcibly attacks absolute idealism (*e.g.* Royce's absolute will, p. 43), and the "Spirit" of neo-Hegelians (a "spirit" which is not the spirit of any concrete person). "The primitive fact" in his own words "is the experience of an individual subject in time." From experience "it is impossible for us to escape; we must not grieve thereat, because this is the concrete reality, the living model of any and every conceivable form of existence" (p. 59). "The object is only real in its relation to the subject, and vice versa . . . outside of this relationship the two terms are mere abstractions."

I have not been able to trace the links between this thesis and the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, which Professor Aliotta holds with equal emphasis. Nor is the theory of Evil—as a conflict of wills which is disappearing in the "progressive co-ordination" of the world—altogether satisfactory. Is the ideal of civilisation *merely* organisation? Professor Aliotta seems to think so (pp. 163, 185). And there is perhaps a little trick of passe-passe in his argument for vitalism versus mechanism (p. 187). But the book is vigorous and entertaining, and is not intended as a technical treatise of the bullet-proof sort. It is pleasant to find that Croce and Gentile are spoken of as "polluting (at least *contaminando*) Hegel with Bergson."

T. S. E.

BRAHMADARSANAM, OR INTUITION OF THE ABSOLUTE. Being an introduction to the study of Hindu Philosophy. By Sri Ananda Acharya. London: Macmillan and Company, 1917. Price, 4s. 6d. net.

A good brief introduction to Indian philosophy is still much to seek. Such a work ought to be both historical and comparative. It ought to draw the line very clearly between the religious intuition, which the various schools of philosophy all assumed, and the interpretations, which are widely diverse; it ought to make quite clear to the Occidental mind the difference between the Vedas and the Upanishads, which are properly religious texts, and the earliest philosophical texts of the primitive Sankhya. There is, though native writers are apt to obscure the fact, as certainly a History of Indian philosophy as of European; a history which can be traced in the dualistic Sankhya, for instance, from the cryptic early couplets through the commentary of Patanjali to the extraordinarily ingenious and elaborate thought of Vachaspati Misra and Vijnana Bhikshu. There is, moreover, extremely subtle and patient psychology in the later writers; and it should be the task of the interpreter to make this psychology plausible, to exhibit it as something more than an arbitrary and fatiguing system of classifications.

Sri Ananda has written a small book which is better than most attempts of the kind; and as there is so little in this field that is worth a layman's attention, his book is to be recommended. The historical method is hardly developed, and the author is too much concerned (as is perhaps natural) with refuting some of the European scholars' dates. He places Kapila, for instance (who may or may not have existed) as early as 3000 B.C., and Buddha himself much earlier than the seventh century. These are unimportant points, however; it is more important that we are not

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shown the real *development* of Indian thought. Sri Ananda devotes most attention to Vedanta; but it is good to get a book which discusses the Sankhya at all. It ought to be made clear that Prakriti (Pradhanam) is not equivalent to Matter, but sometimes is almost the sense-data of the Realists. The lectures (for such is the origin of the book) are interestingly written.

T. S. E.

DEMOCRACY AFTER THE WAR. By J. A. Hobson. London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1917. Pp. 216. Price, 4s. 6d. net.

This is a valuable book. It contains not merely a warning of the struggle which democracy will have to enter if the war ends, but a statement of the growth of antidemocratic tendencies in a war period. The analysis of the "Enemies of Democracy" is admirable. Militarism is connected with Capitalism; and both with Protectionism and Imperialism. The various political and intellectual reactionaries are noted; and the author then turns to the possible defences of democracy. The chief effort should be to capture the state, which is at present in the hands of the enemies of democracy, even if their phrases are democratic. The few democrats who are connected with administration or legislation are easily overcome or persuaded into impotence in a war period. The effects endure long after the war. On the other hand, democracy is disunited. Different groups aim at different social or political reforms. What is most essential, therefore, is some unity of all progressive minds based upon fundamental principles. The book should be read by all who are not yet reduced to mental inertia; and it may even prove to be a protection against such inertia. If war becomes a permanent institution it may be necessary for a few to preserve the ability to think for themselves, in case that ability may at some time be again valued by their fellows.

C. D. B.

THE COMING DEMOCRACY. By Hermann Fernau (translated). London: Constable and Company, Ltd., 1917. Pp. viii, 320. Price, 6s. net.

Herr Fernau's book, of which the original German edition was published at the end of February, before the Russian Revolution, is touched with the same sort of vigorous patriotism as *J' Accuse*. The defects of the German Constitution were well known to thinking Germans before the war, but he is quite justified in his hard-hitting and effective recapitulation of them. Of his fellow Germans' electoral rights, he has to confess that they are only a pretence. "We have neither ruling statesmen nor responsible ministers, neither a legally guaranteed position as against our government, nor soldiers sworn to uphold our constitution. Thus we are not free citizens of a constitutional state, but the subjects of a God-appointed ruler," and a ruler who could pronounce, in 1901, that "an art that disregards the laws and limits I have laid down is no longer an art." His personal activities, as laid bare in the recently published Willy-Nicky telegrams, are a confirmation of Herr Fernau's thesis that absolute dynasties are bad in the long run; but it is not perhaps reasonable to regard them as the root of all evil in international relations. Democracy must be organised by a League of Nations before the danger of war is practically eliminated. The independence of the author, hammering away at his thesis in exile, is everywhere apparent in this honest and effective book.

M. J.

Broadwinsor, Dorset.

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THE INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL OF ETHICS

JULY, 1918.

WHAT DO WE MEAN BY DEMOCRACY?

RALPH BARTON PERRY

MR. FREDERIC HARRISON opens a recent article[1] with the following paragraph:

"The war of Nations is being entangled with, is merging into, the war of Class: about sovereignty, ranks, upper and lower Orders; but essentially, between those who hold Capital and those who Work with their hands. National wars, as we see, unite men in nations: Class wars suppress the spirit of nationality, for they herald what Socialists promise as the grander form of Patriotism, the brotherhood of labourers. At the opening of the great European War Democracy was appealed to, and nobly it answered the call in the name of the Nation. But now, in this fourth year of war, we see all over Europe how democratic patriotism is expanding into the new Industrial Order which dreamers for two generations have imagined as the Social Revolution."

Whether we applaud or regret the change which Mr. Harrison describes, we cannot well dispute the fact. His account may be exaggerated, but beyond doubt the war, after its initial effect of solidifying nationalities, has come more and more to heighten class consciousness and international fellow-feeling. The immensity of the war lies not only in its area and volume, but in the profoundness and complexity of its issues. It is not a mere struggle for power among rival nations, but a struggle for ascendancy among rival forms of government, economic policies and social philosophies. The outcome is going to determine not merely what nations shall survive, but what institutions

[1] "Obiter Scripta," *Fortnightly Review*, January 1918.

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and ideals shall survive. It is not merely a question of *who* shall prove strongest, but of *what form of life* shall prove strongest. Thus we, the people of the United States, are not fighting merely in order that we may continue to exist; though this is a very genuine and very proper motive. We are also fighting in order that we may exist in a certain specific way; or in order that a certain specific form of life may through us retain a place in the world. We usually call this specific form of life by the name of "democracy." If we are to be taken at our word, then, we not only intend to exist, and to exist with undiminished strength; but we intend also to be democratic, and to be more fully and more consistently democratic than we have as yet grown to be. We have repeatedly professed this creed on many solemn and public occasions. Do we *really mean* it? And if so, *what* do we mean by it?

If the average man were honestly to express his mind on democracy he would say, adapting Audrey's words to Touchstone: "I do not know what democratic is. Is it honest in word and deed? Is it a true thing?" Of course, living in this time and place, he would be prejudiced in its favor. Democracy is a word to conjure with; and its meaning is so dim and so equivocal that almost anybody can conjure with it. Recent events have increased its vogue, but have at the same time led many persons to ask questions about it. Since its credentials are not clear, some sceptically minded persons are inclined to reject it as a superstition; while credulous persons, on the other hand, are inclined to cling to it all the more tenaciously by an act of blind faith. Many reject or accept it on account of what is supposed to be implied by it. Thus in so far as woman suffrage or the initiative and referendum are said to be democratic those who object to these policies are beginning to say that they never really believed in democracy anyway; while others are confirmed in their democracy from hope of the greater political power that is promised in its name. But precisely what *is* implied by democracy, is so doubtful that both the advocates and the opponents of

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compulsory military service have made it the fundamental premise of their arguments. In as much as we are at present more than ever disposed to derive our policies from it, democracy should be more than a symbol like the flag or national anthem. It should have so far as possible an articulate meaning, and a meaning widely recognized and consciously adopted by all in whose decision the choice of policy lies.

There are three great ideas associated with the democratic tradition, *Equality*, *Liberty* and *Popular Government*. Of these three ideas the last two, Liberty and Popular Government define what we mean by political democracy. The idea of liberty means that in exercising restraint upon the individual's action the state shall be guided by the principle of guaranteeing to each individual under the law *the largest possible sphere* within which he may act in accord with his own desires and judgment. Popular Government means that the sovereignty of the state shall be distributed among those whose interests are at stake; that the government shall periodically secure the consent of the governed. Political democracy is the union of these two ideas, of *liberality* and *responsibility*. Whether government of this type shall assume the form of a republic or of a constitutional monarchy is another and a less fundamental question. We are fighting in this war not to substitute presidents for kings; but to substitute parliaments and representative leaders for slave-drivers and autocrats. But political democracy lies outside the scope of the present paper. I propose to confine myself to the idea of *Equality*, as defining what we sometimes call "social democracy." And I must still further limit my subject, by omitting the notion of equality as a dignity to which men are born. One may argue for democracy on the ground that men *are* equal, or on the ground that they ought to be equal,—according as one thinks of equality as an innate possession or as a more or less far-off good thing to be attained only by social progress. I shall here conceive equality not as premise, but as an ideal of social reconstruction.

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Equality is a potent symbol, an emotional explosive, indispensable to the arsenal of any poet or orator who wishes to inflame an audience. Like every symbol it is somewhere connected with the living interests and sentiments of men. What, then, are the values that equality represents? When men applaud it, what good thing does it signify to them, that it should so warm their hearts? To what motive does it appeal?

1. *Compassion.* Equality is rooted, first, in the motive of compassion. This motive, instinctive and inalienable, but peculiarly cultivated, intensified and extended by Christianity, prompts men to relieve the manifest distress of their fellows. Compassion is felt for individuals; and it is excited by the aspect which life presents at the lower end of the scale of happiness. On the one hand, then, it regards life concretely as an aggregate of suffering, struggling, hoping men and women; with the result that it tends to the comparative neglect of institutions, laws, and general principles. On the other hand, it is essentially remedial, rather than constructive. It applies itself to raising the minimum rather than the maximum. It halts the vanguard of civilization in order that those who are dropping by the way or lagging in the rear may be brought abreast of the marching column. It is less interested in the perfection of the few, who demonstrate the heights to which human nature can attain under the most favorable conditions; it is more interested in providing the unfortunate man with the staple goods of health, food and protection. It is distributive and extensive in its effect, rather than qualitative and intensive. It is, then, clearly an equalizing motive.

It is this motive which is stronger in women than in men; which is just now more alive to the suffering of individual soldiers and civilians than to the larger issues of the war; which dwells upon famine, pestilence, and cruelty, and is liable to ignore questions of political or economic policy. The range and effect of this motive have been enormously extended by the recent increase of intercommunication

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between classes, nations, continents and hemispheres. The feeling for all mankind as a vast aggregate of suffering individuals is no longer a vague and pious sentiment, but a powerful spring of action which must be reckoned with as a force in human affairs. It is the link between democracy and humanity.

The motive of compassion does, it is true, tend to the comparative neglect of the broader considerations of policy; and to the comparative neglect of the arts and sciences. In so far as this is the case it is open to criticism, and even defeats itself. Nevertheless it is essentially sound; not to be rejected, but to be supplemented and corrected. The essential truth which it bespeaks, is this: that in the last analysis the units of life are individual, sentient beings. The merit of any social system is to be judged by the happiness which it creates. And a social system may as fairly be judged by the lot of men at the bottom as by the lot of men at the top. It is comparatively easy to devise a system that shall make some men happy, provided the majority may be sacrificed for the purpose. The great task of civilization is to achieve a happiness that may be generally shared, by which the good of one man shall also enhance the good of another. Until this is achieved civilization may fairly be regarded as on trial. So far, then, the idea of equality means this community and mutuality of life, in which all men shall achieve happiness and perfection together, at a pace which requires neither the abandonment nor the exploitation of the unfortunate.

2. *Emulation.* The second motive of equality, is *emulation.* Men desire to overtake or surpass their fellows in the race of life. Every activity of life,—art, science, and public service, as well as money-getting, politics and "society," matches one man against others, and distributes the competitors who are entered in a scale of comparative failure and success. The motive of emulation prompts a man to exceed the attainment of others, and it also makes him resent another's victory when it is not earned. Emulation begets the demand for fair-play, or for a "square deal."

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The race must be to the swift, not to those who from the start find themselves already at or near the goal through no efforts of their own, or to those who are assisted from the side-lines. The man who wins despite initial disadvantages, the "self-made man," is doubly honored; but such initial disadvantages are none the less regarded as contrary to the code of sportsmanship. All competitors must be given an even start; or, as we say, opportunity must be equalized. A social hierarchy in which the accident of birth or "connection" rigidly distinguishes the fortunate from the unfortunate, must according to this code, give place to a more flexible system of interchangeable stations, in which success shall be determined by talent and energy.

That this motive has powerfully affected modern social reconstruction, no one can deny. "Every great social and economical change in modern Europe," says Mr. Cliffe Leslie, "has helped to clear the passage through the crowd, and through the world, for the humblest man with any real individuality."[2] The enormous extension in modern times of the opportunity for eminence is illustrated by the fact that from the arrival of the Saxons in Britain to the accession of Edward III, only seven great names are recorded in English history, Alfred, William the Conqueror, Henry II, Edward I, Anselm, Becket, and Roger Bacon, of whom four were kings and two were priests. The history of Europe was once a record of lost opportunity; it is now a record of rise from obscurity. The extension of facilities for education, the increase of inter-communication, the abolition of special privilege, the wider and more equal distribution of wealth,—these are some of the means by which this change has come about, and is being accelerated. No one, I think, would propose to retard this change. Not only does it enrich the collective life by utilizing talents which would otherwise remain buried under superficial strata of mediocrity; but it is sound in principle, since it

[2] *Essays in Economic and Moral Philosophy.*

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requires that every form of organized restraint shall have a liberal and provident intent.

A friend of mine has recently made a practice of asking the foreign-born Americans of his acquaintance what motive prompted them to come to this country. With very few exceptions they have answered that it was because they could "get on" here; meaning that they not only could make a living, but always enjoyed at least the chance of prosperity and wealth. The fact that extreme revolutionary propaganda has made so little headway in this country, that labor as a class has not usually found it necessary to form a distinct political party, is due to the fact that the working classes do find a genuine opportunity in the existing system. They are as a whole successful and hopeful. They do not feel an irreconcilable bitterness toward the *bourgeoisie* because, as my friend has expressed it, the more energetic and intelligent among them hope some day to belong to the *bourgeoisie* themselves. They hesitate to destroy a station in life which they think they may someday occupy.

But this represents the attitude of skilled, rather than of unskilled labor; and latterly with the larger immigration from southern Europe and the rapid growth of centralized industries, it has become less and less universal. Even if this were not so, we must recognize the fact that those who enjoy a chance of success are going to insist upon increasing that chance. Prosperity does not always beget contentment. It also increases ambition and sense of power. It was once customary to compare the relatively great opportunity afforded by American life with the relatively meagre opportunity afforded by life at home, in "the old country." But it is now customary to demand more, and to judge opportunity by the standard of the more fortunate rather than by the standard of the less fortunate. We may reasonably expect that no man in the long run is going to be satisfied with anything short of the fullest opportunity that appears consistent with maintaining the total productivity and wealth of the country.

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There is a significant phrase in the report of a committee recently appointed by the Labor Party to formulate a program of reconstruction after the war. I refer to the phrase "effective personal freedom." This means freedom that can actually be used to advantage. It implies that that opportunity which is wanted must be a positive and liberal opportunity which is not to be obtained by merely letting things alone, but only by contriving a more favorable situation than that in which the working man now finds himself. If you drive a man up a tree and station a bear at the foot of it, it does not gratify him to be told that he is now free to do as he chooses. If you dismiss your son from your door without food, money or education, and tell him that the whole wide world is now open to him, you have not given him "effective personal freedom." Circumstances may compel him to accept your terms, hard and dictatorial though they may be. Freedom in such a sense is a threat and not a promise.

Similarly if you rear a man in a low social station, in the midst of poverty and ignorance, with the necessity of livelihood forced upon him from an early age, and then tell him that he may rise even to be President of the United States, he is to be forgiven if he does not appear enthusiastic and grateful. If you throw a man into stormy waters far from land, and then tell him that there is nothing to prevent his swimming to shore and making a nice dry warm place for himself there, you do not confer a boon on him. For first he has got to keep his head above water. Even if by great and prolonged exertions he can do that, there is little chance of his living to achieve more. The man who demands "effective personal freedom" wants to be put on shore to start with. He understands that there is a tyranny of circumstance more fatal than that of man; that the worst of all tyrannies is the tyranny of existing things, of that established system which has grown out of human action, but for which no human individual now feels responsible. From men and institutions he demands more than passive permission to do what he can for himself. He knows that for

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him the chance of success is an off-chance. He demands that men and institutions shall annul the tyranny of circumstance, and reconstruct the existing system so that the richness of his opportunity shall be somewhere nearly commensurate with his capacity and interest. We must not deceive ourselves by giving the name of opportunity to mere neglect. More often than not, equal opportunity has to be created by actively intervening against established injustice. And we must remember that for all alike to have some chance of the highest success, does not at all imply that they have a like chance even of the smallest success. There is all the practical difference in the world between a fair chance and an off-chance.

3. *Self-respect.* A third motive to equality is *self-respect*, or the resentment of arrogance. No high-spirited man can tolerate contempt. In proportion as a man is conscious of his natural powers and is ambitious to excel he must inevitably believe in himself, and retaliate upon those who habitually treat him as an inferior. This is a different thing, as we shall see, from the dislike of superiority. It is dislike of *conscious* superiority, or of the airs of superiority; because, in the first place, these aggravate accidental advantages and ignore merit; because, in the second place, they imply an attitude of disparagement toward oneself, and force one to self-defense.

But "dislike" is too weak a word. Humiliation begets the most implacable hatred. The sting of humiliation was one of the most powerful motives in the French Revolution. Monsters of cruelty, such as Marat and Carrier, were seeking balm for the incurable wounds inflicted upon their self-love when they were despised subordinates in the establishments of great nobles. Even Mme. Roland, as Le Bon says, "was never able to forget that, when she and her mother were invited to the house of a great lady under the *ancien régime*, they had been sent to dine in the servants' quarters." The same author points out that it was not those who had the most solid grievances who led the Revolution, but the *bourgeoisie*, who despite their wealth or

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professional success, were contemptuously snubbed by the aristocracy. In a measure, then, Napoleon was justified when he said: "Vanity made the Revolution; liberty was only the pretext."

But this explanation ignores the deeper aspect of the motive. Vanity is accidental and temperamental. The main-spring of revolt was not vanity, but the self-confidence and self-respect which must necessarily accompany attainment. A man who succeeds, or even aspires to succeed, must believe in himself. A democracy of opportunity must be at the same time a democracy of personal esteem. In a society which enables the majority of its members to taste success, or to dream of it, the sentiments of pride, honor and dignity will be widely disseminated. They can no longer be regarded as the exclusive prerogatives of a social caste. This fact is as pertinent to-day as ever. If a fashionable class, an employer class, a "respectable" class, a "high-brow" class, a Bostonian clan, or a white race, feel themselves to be superior, that feeling will infallibly be scented, and will arouse a resentful and rebellious spirit among those who have become conscious of their own worth. There is no escape from this dilemma. Either the masses of mankind must be broken in spirit, and convinced by subjection of the utter helplessness of their lot; or, if they are once allowed to travel on the highroad to success, their pride must be respected. A man cannot be given opportunity without the acknowledgment of his dignity.

4. *Fraternity.* A further motive to equality is to be found in the sentiment of *fraternity.* This is a feeling or attitude which naturally develops among men who recognize their common lot. It develops among lost souls who seek a common salvation, among fellow-adventurers who suffer common hardships, among competitors who acknowledge the same standard of success, or among partners who feel their mutual dependence. It is the converse of the motive which we have just considered. Self-respect demands the esteem of others, and resents

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disparagement. Fraternity acknowledges the just pride of others, or accords that which self-respect demands. It is the only possible relation between two self-respecting persons. It does not imply intimacy or friendship, for these must depend upon the accidents of propinquity and temperament; but it implies courtesy, fairmindedness, and the admission of one's own limitations. It must underly the closer relations of family, neighborhood, or vocation; but it must be extended to the broader and less personal relations of fellow-citizenship and fellow-humanity. It is the essential spirit of that finer companionship which even kings have coveted; but in a diffused and rarified form it is the atmosphere which is vital to a democratic community.

It is the motive of fraternity which justifies that freedom of manners which we properly associate with a democracy. A fraternal democracy does not fail to acknowledge superiority; indeed democracies are proverbially given to an extravagance of hero-worship. But they do not like to have superiority too conscious of itself. They do not like to have superiority converted into an institution. Hence they attack every form of class-stratification, and are suspicious of titles and decorations. The great man is always on trial, and can never settle comfortably and permanently into the exalted position to which success and popular applause may have raised him. Furthermore his success is never confused with his person, and is not recognized as an essential attribute. As a statesman, or captain of industry, or general or admiral he may have achieved glory and distinction, but as a man he still ranks with his fellows.

When once this fraternal spirit is strong and widely diffused it has effective ways of protecting itself. In a thoroughly democratic community arrogance is not angrily denounced; it is blighted and withered before it has a chance to mature. If any one were to set himself up in this country as a *wirklicher Hofgeheimrat*, as a genuine court privy counsellor, after a fashion popular in Central Europe, he would not be execrated and mobbed. He would get no

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notice at all except in the funny columns of the newspapers. And he would soon learn to take the same attitude himself. The fact that is it is pretty hard to feel personally superior, if nobody agrees with you; or to look down on people, if you can't get anybody to look up to you. Those who care greatly for the external expression and recognition of superiority do not belong in a democratic society. There is a place where they will feel quite at home. Only those will be happy in a democracy who prefer to be greeted neither by the upward slant of obsequiousness nor by the downward slant of condescension, but by the horizontal glance of fraternal self-respect.

5. *Envy.* Finally, we must recognize the motive of *envy.* This motive prompts men to dislike, not the consciousness of superiority, but the substance of superiority. It is doubly vicious. In the first place, it is negative and destructive. The motive of emulation prompts men to exert themselves, and to resent only that which prevents their earning their deserts. Envy on the other hand prompts men to retard those who excel them; or to visit upon others those very disabilities which emulation seeks to escape. Envy is malicious. It derives satisfaction from defeat and failure. Whereas emulation seeks equality by clearing the course and speeding up the race; envy seeks equality by slackening the pace and impeding the leaders. A true sportsman does not resent being fairly beaten; and admires those who achieve the success to which he aspires. He devotes himself to a cult of merit, and aims to exalt the record of attainment by removing every artificial hindrance. But the envious man would rather win unfairly in a slow race, than be surpassed by his fellows in a swift.

In the second place, envy gives rise to a cult of vulgarity. In so far as this motive is widespread and powerful, it leads to a pretence of mediocrity for the sake of conciliating opinion. Men cultivate a sham colloquialism of speech, or roughness of manners; they hide their knowledge or their wealth or their power behind an affectation of inferiority. But dissimulation and dishonesty is not the worst of it.

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It discourages every sort of eminence, and robs society of the services of the expert and the leader. It confuses and depresses all standards of excellence. And it confirms the inferiority of the inferior, removing the incentive to excel, and teaching him to be proud of that failure which should fill him with discontent and shame.

There is a good deal of this envious democracy abroad in our land to-day. There is a dislike of "experts," a prejudice to which our demagogues so effectually appeal. In education we like to have everything made easy. We don't want to learn; we want to be taught; we don't want to find out, we prefer to be shown. In this, and in other fields of activity, instead of climbing the ladder we sit comfortably at the foot and wait for an elevator. If the higher things don't come easily, and they rarely do, then we belittle them; while for the same reason we over-rate the shallow and common-place attainment on which we can safely count.

Now a democracy of classes and persons is something to aspire to, but a democracy of values is corruption and nonsense. The best things have got to be worked for, and belong only to those who excel. "Rome was not built in a day." Without patience, and slow cumulative effort, the great things are not attainable, nor ever will be. To disparage or despise the best things and the great things, is an offense to mankind. For what is the use of opportunity, if there is nothing worth gaining? It is better to admire even wealth or power than to admire nothing. There is this much of truth even in Nietzsche. In insisting upon the principle of *Rangordnung*, or order of rank, he was in part protesting against the abolition of standards. If we condemn his demand for a gradation of persons and classes, we must echo and reaffirm his demand for a gradation of values. We must believe that nothing is too good for a democracy. Science, philosophy, art, virtue and saintliness, must be as reverently regarded, as earnestly sought and cultivated as formerly. Otherwise the much-prized opportunity which a democracy affords, is an equal opportunity for nothing.

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These several motives which underly the love of equality, are the motives which justify or discredit the ideal of social democracy. In so far as social democracy means a compassionate regard for all human beings as having feelings, powers and capacities of the same generic type; in so far as it means the equalizing of opportunity, and a mutual respect, it rests upon sound and incontrovertible ethical grounds. But, on the other hand, in so far as it exalts failure, inverts standards, and acts as a drag upon the forward movement of life, it is reactionary and abhorrent.

This, or something like this, is what we mean by democracy as a social ideal. Now, do we *really mean it?* The fact is that we have long since committed ourselves to it. We have encouraged the poor to aspire to wealth, the ignorant to seek light and the weak to covet power. We have done more than this,—we have shown them the way. For we have compelled every man to secure the rudiments of education and thus to become aware of the world about him. We permit the organization of the democratic propaganda, we supply the motive, and we bring every man within the reach of it. Last and most important of all we have distributed political power equally among men of every station and condition; with the result that the very few who are fortunate may at any time be outvoted by the overwhelming majority of those who are relatively unfortunate. Does any sane man suppose that what has been scattered broadcast can now be withdrawn? Or that those who possess the opportunity and know it, are going to refrain from using it?

But I do not believe that there are many Americans who would withdraw the pledge and profession of democracy if they could. We have not lost conviction. We need only the courage to see it through.

First, our courage will be tried by the internal readjustments which will be necessary, which are already proving necessary, in so far as social democracy goes forward. It would be fatuous to shut our eyes to the fact that social democracy will have to be paid for. Are we prepared to

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pay by surrendering personal advantages that we now enjoy? We are all like Artemus Ward ready to sacrifice our wife's relations on the altar of our country. But this sacrifice will touch our affections more nearly. Most of those who read these words would lose materially by a more equal distribution of opportunity, wealth and power. Now if we enjoy more than the average good fortune, are we willing that it should be curtailed until such time as those who enjoy only the minimum shall be abreast of us? Are we willing to give up our own dear and familiar satisfactions? Or are we democratic only in so far as we expect to gain by it? Are we democratic only in a rhetorical and vaguely sentimental sense, as many profess Christianity or mean to be "good"? If so, we are not ready for the future. This is a time to retrench, not merely in the consumption of luxuries, but in the desire for them. The whole of democracy will be less indulgent to us than the half of it we have so far achieved. Without some previous self-discipline we shall many of us greet the dawn with a wry face. But in so far as we have learned to live more austerely, and to find our happiness in those things which are not diminished by being widely shared, we may in the time to come, have the heart to be cheerful despite the realization of our ideals.

But, second, our courage will be tried by the exigencies of the present war. To have the courage of our democratic convictions means a willingness to fight a long hard fight, to endure a wearing and galling strain, in order that we and other peoples like us may be permitted to proceed with democracy. If we are democrats, then Germany as at present governed, motivated and inspired is our irreconcilable enemy. To have the courage of our democratic convictions implies that we accept this challenge. We have first to win the privilege of being good democrats. As our brothers in Russia are learning to their cost this privilege is not to be had for the asking. It is idle for peace-loving democracies merely to interchange their sentiments *when they and their sentiments with them are in mortal peril.* You remember the man who assured his

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anxious friend that his dog would not bite him. "You know it," said the friend, "and I know it, but does the *dog* know it?

We have recently been told that it is our duty to support the President's democratic and pacific professions "up to the hilt." I like the metaphor, and I subscribe to this opinion. I should like only to add that the men who are most unqualifiedly supporting the President "up to the hilt," are the men who have their hands *on* the hilt. I count no man a resolute adherent of democracy or of peace, or of any other good thing who will not, if needs be, fight for that good thing, and with the weapons which will most effectually meet the danger that menaces it. For that reason I salute as just now the best democrats among us all those fortunate men who are in France or on their way.

RALPH BARTON PERRY.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

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THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES.

WILLIAM E. DODD.

FOR nearly four years now the world has been engaged in a most desperate struggle—it has developed into a struggle for democracy, and men now talk democracy and equality of opportunity who never before did anything but resist and fight democracy. The President of the United States now speaks to the whole world as if, by prescriptive right, we were the leaders in the new-old cause. What is even more significant the people of the country support the President with more of zeal and real unity than ever before they supported any cause. Is there some wide-reaching misunderstanding or have we overnight become a democracy?

To make plain the meaning of this paper, it may be well to define closely what democracy is. Democracy is equality, economic, political and even social in large measure. Democracy is much the same thing as Christianity, as it was in the beginning—a social organization in which all normal men and women have their proportionate voice in the determination of public policy, in which all have free opportunity to earn a livelihood, share according to capacity in the common prosperity, and bear their just portions of the burdens of war or other disaster. In such a society government flows from the decisions of the majority, whether those decisions are wise or not, and administration is not hindered or obstructed by executives or judiciaries. The American Declaration of Independence is its charter and perhaps the British Government is today its best illustration.

If this is democracy then the American ought to think twice before he declares himself a democrat. For, in this country, while most men are certainly democratic in manners and ideals, it is a hard thing to be a democrat, as

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hard as for that certain rich man to enter the kingdom of heaven. Most of our legal arrangements and constitutions, both state and national, were designed to thwart and defeat democracy. A popular decision is never directly and immediately effective; and the cost of a national campaign is almost prohibitive to any but great parties with wealthy and un-democratic leadership.

This was not the purpose of our ancestors of 1776. They were poor men, small land owners and tenants and village shop keepers, who were substantially equal one to another. They lived in log cabins, roamed the hills and mountains in search of game, of furs or of their wandering cattle. They were in revolt before 1776, in almost every colony, against small cliques and place hunters who controlled things in the local governments. They protested against established churches, against privilege and above all against the British commercial monopolists who were turning the government of England into an "affair among friends."

The Americans of 1776 made but little more than they consumed. The total wealth of that day was hardly more than half a billion dollars and the annual export of goods was never as large as the annual volume of imports. The monthly pay of a day laborer was five or six dollars, the net return of a year's work was perhaps fifteen or twenty dollars. Every family made its own clothing, supplied its own foodstuffs and found its chief entertainment in monthly attendance upon "divine services." To be sure there were a few cultured men who lived less simply, some traders and planters who bought things from "home" as they called England, and drove carriages to the courts of quarter session, and made stately appearance at the balls of the royal governors. But these, like the great planters of the South in 1860, composed less than a tenth of the people who revolted against the Tory government of Lord North.

Farmers and men of the common sort made the backbone of the party of Samuel Adams, of Benjamin Franklin and Patrick Henry; farmers and common men overturned

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the royal governments in Massachusetts, in Pennsylvania and Virginia. But in Pennsylvania alone did they set up a democracy. There they made an assembly of one house, subordinated governor and courts to the annual assembly of the people and wrote a constitution which gave equal units of the population equal voice in law making. The suffrage was greatly expanded. Pennsylvania under the tutelage of Benjamin Franklin was a democracy. For that reason well-to-do Philadelphia was in a state of semi-revolt throughout the war and voted for the Federal constitution in 1788 with an enthusiasm akin to ecstacy.

A similar revolution was intended in Virginia by the democratic Jefferson and his followers, but the gentry who owned slaves and held sway in the assembly by an unfair proportionment of representation exacted a constitution from the majority which left them in power, as the price of their support of the common cause. It was the same in Massachusetts and in most of the other communities. The men who were in the majority and who fought England in part because of unequal and unfair representation of their interests and ideals in the British parliament were, by the nature of things, compelled to submit at home to unequal and unfair representation. In order to free themselves from an intolerable state of things in the empire they were compelled to fasten upon themselves in almost every state constitutions which set up a privileged church in New England and a privileged slave-holding gentry in the South. Nor were they able to subject the commercial men of the Middle States and East to the level of common and unprivileged men. Thus the Revolution was not an untainted struggle of democracy against privilege.

Still, the farmers were the driving force. They seized the reins of leadership in those enthusiastic years of 1775 to 1777. They intimidated opponents and coaxed unwilling or timid men into heroic action. Under the stimulus of Tom Paine's *Common Sense*, which most respectable Americans of later times have affected not to read, and the early military successes against the British the Declaration

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of Independence was brought to a favorable vote in the Continental Congress. The fervor of democracy was so great that John Adams got a cold chill on his way home after one of the sessions of congress when shop keepers and shoemakers assumed equality with himself.

II

But I have said the farmers of 1776 had little wealth. They had less ready money. The only way to raise the means to fight England was the issue of credits. Credits went well for a short time when men thought the war would come to an end in a year or two. Democratic wars are always supposed to come to an end quickly. Enthusiastic men filled with a new faith expect their ideas to win them ready victories. But harsh facts somehow belie the hopes of good men. At any rate the Americans had hardly begun their war at the end of the first year; and their general was retreating to the hills of Pennsylvania with a broken army. Paper money lost value. Still there was no other way to buy the provisions of farmers or pay the soldiers their stipends, then as now several times as much per man as European soldiers received. The states confiscated the property of increasing numbers of loyalists; they continued to seize horses and cattle and grain, giving in payment mere slips of paper signed by Patriot generals; they set slaves to work upon fortifications and even put rifles into black hands. All this created debts, more debts.

That was not enough. The legislatures issued money in unprecedented volume, money secured only by the promise of final success. This money lost value till it took a thousand dollars to pay for the grazing of a horse for one month. Then the states set up scales of depreciation for their own obligations. Poor men paid rents in "easy money" and rich men lost most of their wealth but their lands and slaves. Not only the states issued credits. The Continental Congress outdid all its competitors. Hundreds of millions of paper dollars were issued by that body. And these ran a similar course to the state issues. Before the

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struggle was over members of congress paid their expenses at the sessions by bringing with them the produce of their farms and exchanging them for services rendered. A hundred dollars in Patriot money was worth one in gold at the end or worth even less than that. The total debt of the country in 1783 as expressed in paper was about five hundred millions. Independence came dear.

The Revolutionists had run amuck in their finances. Revolutions generally take that turn. High ideals and humanitarian purposes do not seem to pay. And this was the jeer of those who had opposed the "high-flying talk" of Henry and Sam Adams. Before 1783 the silent doubters of democracy had joined the vocal loyalists and they were about to get the control of legislatures and governors and courts. The financiers who dwelt in the towns and who had never paid too much of their own earnings to the common cause were quick at the end to see that worthless paper, receipts for goods delivered to generals, stocks of states and the like must speedily rise in value when peace and success became a reality. Before the war was well over the floating capital of the country had been purchased for a tenth, or less, of its face value by the small groups of traders who lived in Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore and Charleston. Of course the new holders asked for payment in full.

Here was a problem. Farmers who had fought the war now returned to their farms. They were asked to pay interest upon these enormous sums. That is, they were expected to pay in full for the cost of sending them to the war. Nor was this all. In the treaty of peace with England it was agreed that the Confederate government would help British creditors collect the many millions of dollars which had been due, or partly due, when the war began seven years before. The Virginia planters alone must have paid about thirty millions if these debts had been collected. If all this burden of debt were to be "carried," it were almost as well to have remained under the British yoke.

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Further, the Revolutionists of the commercial and planter types, led by John Adams, Washington and the Pinckneys, had grown very nervous about the excesses of democracy long before the war came to an end. In 1783 there were large groups everywhere who were genuinely afraid of the majorities in the various legislatures, notwithstanding the fact that representation was in most of the states heavily balanced against democracy. Under the most favorable conditions there must have arisen a party of conservative reaction.

It was plainly a question of whether the democracy that had been planned so nobly could survive if a debt were saddled upon a people who could not pay the interest upon half of it. To have validated all that was lawfully due would have burdened our ancestors worse than a debt of two hundred billions would now burden us. Clearly independence was costly. For three years the leaders of the propertied groups jeered at democracy, and lawyers and courts undertook to annul enactments of legislatures whose majorities seemed willing to repudiate legal obligations and grant stay laws to men who were in financial straits. A new party was forming. The commercial men of the East, the officers of the army, the loyalists who were then returning to their abandoned homes, the clergy of the established church of New England and the wealthier planters of the South ranged themselves behind the leadership of young Hamilton of New York, Washington, and the Pinckneys. Most of what we call to-day the articulate elements of the various states united in their demand that a new and stronger power be created in order to overawe the "ignorant, the poor and the vicious."

The fruit of this organization was the famous convention of 1787 which gave us the constitution of the United States. This convention was plainly undemocratic and its members made no pretense of any deep and abiding faith in the common man. The great document which was drawn, submitted to the people in conventions and finally adopted against the most violent protest in our history set up any-

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thing but a simple democracy. It created a government of checks and balances, so complex that only a small proportion of our people have ever yet understood its workings. A house of representatives, elected biennially, was balanced by a senate which never went out of existence and whose members held office for six years. Both house and senate were balanced by a president who held office for four years. And all three, house, senate and executive were balanced by a supreme court which might veto laws that seemed to be unconstitutional. Thus a governmental machine was wound up like a clock and set going. At no time could the people intervene and change its policy, unless they could work up such a commotion that house, senate, president and court could all be changed at the same time—a feat which has never been performed.

Moreover, the new constitution forbade states to issue paper money; it made contracts inviolable and it fixed upon the country the institution of slavery so firmly that only a devastating civil war uprooted it. It represented a complete reaction against the principles of the Declaration of Independence and the direct democracy that had been intended in 1776. It meant that the well-to-do and the fit should govern and that the people must know again the strong arm of authority.

This outcome was natural, perhaps inevitable. In every country there are two countries, the one democratic, optimistic and tending toward the ideal; the other aristocratic, skeptical of the motives of others and convinced that some men are divinely commissioned to rule, others to obey and serve. The former had won their way to the helm in 1775–6 and they had not been able to "make good," as we are prone to say to-day. The latter group was in the ascendency from 1789–1801. Laws were enacted in pursuance of their philosophy. Policy and social etiquette made evident even to the way-faring man that common men and sweaty laborers were not to approach too near the seat of power. Men must be disciplined, guided, compelled to do right. The debts of the Revolution

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were compromised at about a hundred millions including State and Confederate obligations. Nearly all of this debt was held by men who lived in the towns and who had not been distinguished for personal service to the cause of freedom. It had cost its holders from a tenth to a fourth of its value. A community which exported ten or fifteen millions worth of produce a year was paying from six to eight millions a year interest on the cost of its independence.

This was probably a just arrangement according to the lights of that day. Yet Americans had never been accustomed to paying taxes, not even their quitrents to the crown. Now they were taxed as English statesmen had never dreamed of taxing them. Still the Federalists made good though they were never popular. Three things saved them from early disaster, the ability of the leaders to cover the taxes in tariff laws, the existence of a vast wilderness beyond the Alleghanies to which the restless and ambitious poor could retreat and the unparalleled popularity of Washington who gave the weight of his great name to the cause of reaction. The first president who followed Washington, John Adams by name, collapsed; not even the rich foreign commerce which came as a result of the great wars in Europe could save a régime based upon the idea that one man has a right to rule another against the will of that other.

At the end of twelve years of reaction and four years of turmoil, Thomas Jefferson, the leader of the backwoodsmen and the farmers, came to power. Men recognized again the voice of the man who wrote the great Declaration. Poor Tom Paine, buffeted by a world caught in a wave of reaction, saw in the new city of Washington the revival of the faith he had preached with matchless eloquence twenty-five years before. He came back from war-torn France to his adopted country. Simple folk visited their great men at the capital and beheld with amazement the great marble buildings that arose from their foundations on the banks of the Potomac. Having a very shrewd leader the democracy of 1801 made a better showing than their fathers had made, but even then the stars in their courses were set

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against them. Napoleon declared war afresh on England and the rest of Europe, and Jefferson did little to lift the country to the ideal atmosphere in which he imagined all men would like to breathe. He paid large installments of the debt in order to be rid of pensioners upon the public; he abandoned the aristocratic pretenses of his predecessors; and he bought vast areas of land on which he fondly hoped that his ideal democracy of farmers would be erected.

But in reality, long before Jefferson's retirement in 1809, the privileged owners of slaves who had professed to be democrats had seized the leadership of the new party of the people. The opposing party was the party of commercial men. One of these became a Southern party; the other an Eastern party. The people, the farmers and trappers of the West and the inarticulate men of the East, must build a new organization and perhaps rend the Union asunder if they came to power. For half a century the sections struggled for the mastery. Democracy was still a dream.

III.

Finally in 1860, the democratic West, still poor like the men of 1776, was able, by a sort of miraculous combination of circumstances, to put Abraham Lincoln into the presidency. But Lincoln fell immediately into that civil war so long predicted. Instead of making a reality of what democracy there was in his party, he was compelled to lend all his energy and make all possible bargains and combinations to save the country whole, save the terrain of democracy. He won his great war but, like the struggle for independence, the cost was such that it might well have caused him to doubt the value of the result. To find the means of beating the enemies of democracy, he was compelled to yield the control of the national finances to opponents of democracy. The vast market of the East and the West was given as a practical monopoly to industrial leaders who speedily grew to be millionaires who claimed the right to dictate the future policy of the government. In order to get the best service possible from the railroads,

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he yielded so much of the control of the very arteries of the rising nation to owners of roads that they later domineered the house, the senate, the presidency and the courts. The bankers, the captains of industry and the presidents of railway systems were at the end of the civil war masters of the fluid wealth of the country.

The total wealth of 1866 was not much greater than it had been in 1860, in view of the losses of war; that is it may be estimated at twenty billions. Of this nearly three billions was in the form of bonds of the Federal Government; perhaps the states and cities had put out another three billions; the railroads were capitalized at six billions in 1870; and the industrial securities must have amounted to two billions. The revolution was remarkable. In 1860 the wealth of the country had been sixteen billions, mostly in the form of lands, slaves and houses. Now out of twenty billions, something like twelve billions was in the form of stocks and bonds, of which at least a fourth represented what we call water. The owners of this fluid wealth were undoubtedly more powerful than the Government; they were relatively quite as important as both the financial and slave-holding elements of 1788 had been.

There had been only a few millionaires in the country in 1860 and these were fairly well distributed among the sections. Only three or four could have been called multi-millionaires. During the war a thousand millionaires appeared in New York city alone, if we may judge from the contemporary newspapers. They were the owners of securities, of real estate whose value depended upon industry and railroad termini. Their power was immense in comparison with the power of the simple folk who had fought the war and had now come home to their farms to earn the money with which to pay interest and freights and dividends. I need hardly say that the holders of fluid wealth promptly took control of the Republican party, the party of democracy in 1860. They dictated the policy of reconstruction in the South and they insisted that every dollar of the national debt must be paid in gold, although a large share of that debt had been contracted in depreciated paper.

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The democracy of the time tried to speak through President Johnson, but Johnson was broken like a reed. It tried to function through George H. Pendleton and the Democratic party, but Pendleton was beaten by Seymour and the Democratic party fell into the hands now of Tammany Hall, now of conservative men who feared the rule of the people. From 1866 to 1900 the price of wheat, cotton, corn, tobacco and other products of the land fell steadily. Men made more cotton every year, but received less money every year. The returns from agriculture were so meagre that farmers were driven year after year into debt, while the returns from industry mounted both actually and relatively with each passing year. Never has there been a period in American history when the average man, the owner of a small farm or the tenant on the land of another, fared so ill or was driven so near to the abyss.

In place of the domineering slave master who had for so many decades directed the affairs of the country, there grew up during the first decade that followed the war, a group of party leaders, Conkling of New York, Cameron of Pennsylvania, Oliver P. Morton of Indiana and John A. Logan of Illinois, whose power rested securely upon the support of the owners of fluid wealth and who spoke with even more thundering tones to presidents and judges than ever Jefferson Davis had dared to speak. One president who endeavored to steer a middle and moderately righteous course was denounced by the masters of his own party; another who defied Conkling lost his life.

There were struggles, constant struggles, of common men to resume the control of their affairs. In Ohio, Thurman and Allen pressed what was called the Ohio Idea year in and year out; but by narrow margins the forces of industry, of organized finance and of the railroads defeated them. Then came the Granger movement with its almost savage attack upon the railroad companies. It failed. Next the Greenbackers put forward a platform, in 1880, which read very much like the Declaration of Independence. The inherited allegiance of most men to one of the two older par-

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ties enabled the opponents of democracy to win once again. The houses of congress did divide, now one, now the other favoring democracy somewhat; but the president was always safely on the side of those who feared democracy. The supreme court and most of the Federal district and circuit courts ranged themselves, like the courts of antebellum days and like Napoleon's god, upon the side of the biggest battalions.

Moreover the changes in nearly all the legislatures, the city governments and voting machinery favored those who were in power. Legislatures ceased to be annual, except in one or two states. City charters were so drawn and city governments so organized that the people could not readily administer them. And if one went into the election booth with the purpose of improving things a bit, one found that in two minutes one must decide among hundreds of meaningless names which were the better candidates. The idea that popular election of officers was a guarantee of democratic control had been made the basis for the more perfect control of the community, for the men who put up the candidates were the real governors.

In the year 1896, after years of fruitless endeavor, great masses of men, half in desperation, half in the hope of capturing the machinery of one of the great parties, followed Mr. William J. Bryan into the historic Chicago convention and there drove out of the seats of leadership, the men who had directed affairs. They set up a platform which only half stated their faith and then went to the country preaching the new-old faith with a crusade-like zeal. They hoped to gain control of congress, the presidency and the courts all at the same time. For a time men thought they would succeed. Southern farmers fraternized with western farmers and even laboring men threatened to break away from their employers. But the industrial East once aroused was more dangerous than ever. The fear of Bryan sent their hands into their pockets deeper than hands had ever gone before. Three or four or perhaps five or six millions of dollars were found to pay the cost of "educating the people." They were educated.

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The great campaign failed. The old régime was returned to power with greater majorities than they had had since the first election of President Grant. And any student of the conditions and the temper of the times must recognize that the success of Mr. Bryan in 1896 must have been worse than defeat. The United States was no longer the farmer republic, although the farmers were in the majority, and the leadership of simple folk could no longer suffice. What was wanted was a group of intellectuals, students of the new economic world and its complicated machinery. Such men were few in the United States in 1896 and not many of that few supported the half-desperate democracy of that year. Men were afraid to try to restore democracy.

The McKinley administrations gave evidence that the "awful scare" had effect. The old day when the owners of securities dictated what policies should be adopted in Washington was passing. The men around McKinley were afraid of the next election. The war with Spain came to give them a new issue. It was imperialism, one more step further from democracy, for none will say that it becomes a democracy to hold other peoples in subjection. And there was still another godsend: The turn of things in the great world outside tended to raise prices of farm products. The pressure from the great rural population declined. Then the organization of all business and all the greater transportation systems of the country into close associations in which prices were fixed and conditions stabilized not only enriched beyond all former dreams the owners of stocks and bonds, the owners of city lands and urban railway systems. It gave increased demand for the meat, the corn, the cotton and the sugar of the farmers. The financial and industrial despotism of New York city proved for a time to be a benevolent despotism. The wealth of the country increased between 1900 and 1914 from 89 billions to 190 billions. To be sure this wealth was not equitably distributed. A score of men living in New York held the business of the country absolutely at their mercy. There had never been anything like this in

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the United States. It was like that state of England at the outbreak of the American Revolution when a few men of London dictated the economic and political conduct of the empire. But whatever the facts, the United States was a power that must be reckoned with throughout the world. And there was a seeming acquiescence in the steady subsidence of democracy.

That is what gave Roosevelt his world position and what lent such tragic interest to his quarrel with President Taft in 1912. Roosevelt was not the man to take his orders from New York city; he was not the man to stir a revolt like that which Tiberius Gracchus stirred up in the ancient Roman republic. He denounced malefactors of great wealth; he took huge campaign contributions from malefactors of great wealth; he "stole the thunder" of Mr. Bryan; yet he denounced candidate Bryan in language that would have been becoming to Grub street a hundred years before. Roosevelt was a transition president. He clung to the past and he at the same time pointed the way for bolder men to move in the future. But his hand picked successor, Mr. Taft, could not be two things at one and the same time. He took the side of the big battalions, as quiet and orderly men are prone to do, and tried to have a peaceful administration. But peace and quiet were impossible. The democracy that had always hoped and prayed and struggled was not entirely hushed by the prosperity of big business, a prosperity which after all was on sufferance. A half dozen men might wreck it any day, if it seemed to their interest to do so.

But when President Taft took positively the side of big business, Roosevelt, just returned from a spectacular trip to the jungles of Africa, took the other side and cried aloud from every housetop the doctrines of democracy, of democracy as he interpreted democracy—a sort of Napoleonic democracy with one main objective. This broke the historic Republican party into halves. The convention which met in Chicago on June 18, 1912 completed the breach. Two candidates for the presidency were set up, Taft with

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the majority of big business behind him and Roosevelt with the minority of big business and a great mass of aspiring smaller men following him. Just as in Lincoln's time, it was the opportunity of democracy, if only the right candidate could be found.

As good luck would have it, the Democratic party, under the lash of Bryan, put up its only democratic leader, Woodrow Wilson; and Wilson was easily elected. More important still, there were many, very many students of politics, of economic conditions and social movements who either sympathized with the new President or had actually voted for him. There was, after a hundred and forty years a real chance for democracy in the land of democracy. If only the dogs of war should not break loose! For it had been a long and trying war that spoiled the Revolution; war in Europe ruined Jefferson; and domestic war ruined Lincoln.

IV.

But there was already a legacy of war for Wilson when he came to office. Mexico was the scene of a bitter prelude to the greater war that waited upon the lap of the near future. If Wilson had known what was to come, how could he have had the courage to have done anything? The blessings of ignorance are sometimes man's greatest boon. The owners of a billion dollars' worth of property in Mexico tried every day to force the new President to "clean up" Mexico; excitable men on the border tried to stampede Wilson into hasty action; a newspaper campaign of unprecedented intensity ridiculed his "watchful waiting." Quiet, democratic men everywhere hoped that we should not be drawn into war for mere gold or more doubtful concessions, nor even on behalf of the venturesome people who had gone to the troubled country to mend their fortunes.

Wilson held aloof. He had greater work to do—he divorced the financial affairs of the people as a whole from New York city; he reduced the tariff, although only too moderately; he secured the enactment of an income tax

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measure that has proved the great blessing of the present time; he set up the Federal Trade Commission; and he endeavored to give relief to the growing body of tenant farmers. Never since the Federal constitution has been in effect has so much been done that looked toward democracy as was done under the vigorous and pressing leadership of Wilson. Congress became the weapon of accomplishment, an unwilling weapon sometimes. The world ought to be thankful that the new and untried hand was so successful during those first years of the new régime. A moment's delay might have left great things undone and then the world war would have made their doing impossible. Keeping out of war with Mexico alone proved to be of the utmost importance.

Then came the deluge of August 1914, when the new democracy had hardly two years of successful administration to its credit.

Who knows that Wilson and his party could have been successful if they had been allowed to go to the country with their list of remarkable reforms. Wise men of the reactionary forces thought he would be swept away either in the congressional elections of 1914 or at latest in the presidential contest of 1916. Times were becoming "hard," great business interests were involuntarily heading toward a "stringency" and how many smaller men were not already saying that the tariff and the banking laws were the cause. As fortune would have it, war came and with it came new problems, new interests and some distress which none dared charge to Wilson. The election of 1914 turned on nothing in particular and everything in general; and the democracy did not lose vitally. The turn of the road had been passed; but the great trial of 1916 lay ahead.

If Wilson failed in 1916, the reactionary forces might find themselves in power; if he succeeded he might give sufficient momentum to intelligent liberalism, to democracy even, for it to last. Wilson, therefore, kept all hands off the great war, declared himself neutral in spirit even. It was plain if he went into the war the opposition would attack him for

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doing so; if he kept out, it was equally plain that he would be blamed. But the country was plainly not conscious that the war touched the United States at any vital point. The East was uneasy and quickly developed a nervous fear that she would be ruined if we did not enter the great world struggle against Germany; the South, hardly recovered from the disasters of the Civil War, had no wish to get into another fight; and the West was busy growing wheat and raising pigs for the belligerents. The body of the people who lived outside of the great cities thought it was "dog-eat-dog" in Europe.

Wilson had as good an ear for underground communication as Lincoln was supposed to have. He listened to the talk of the great "unwashed." Keeping out of the war two years added another seventy billions of wealth to the national power. The President decided to go before the electorate in 1916 with the claim that he had kept us out of war. The other party must then make an issue on the charge that we should have gone into the war. On that issue any party must have failed; and Wilson had a peculiar interest in having his opponents fail. The whole democratic world, as it turned out, was equally interested in having those opponents fail. Mr. Hughes, a good man who must have agreed with the President in most that he had done and said, was practically compelled to become the opposing candidate. He had no valid platform, no real issue, for he did not say that we should have gone to war or that, if elected, he would go to war. He talked about the outworn protective tariff, the prescriptive rights of American trade and petit party jobs. The violently anti-democratic, and anti-German Security League of New York spent its money and the hot breath of its speakers shouting for Hughes. At the same time the German Alliance spent von Bernstorff's money and intrigued for the benefit of Mr. Hughes. It was a false position into which that great man should never have allowed himself to be placed.

Wilson was elected because he kept us out of war. Yet it was an open secret in Democratic circles that he would

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clear the decks for war before the inauguration. A German public man has said that the Germans lost their chance of success when they allowed Mr. Wilson to be re-elected. What Wilson played for was a united country. He attained it. Never has the country been so united. The East wanted war in any event; the South and West would go to war if the President said it was necessary. It was not a difficult thing for the President to show even the wayfaring man that it was necessary in the spring of 1917. The German Government did what it could to help Wilson; nothing hastened the unity of all sections quite so much as the intrigues of the German foreign minister and the brazenry of Ambassador von Bernstorff.

But for a democracy to go to war is to take its life in its hands. Armies are hostile in nature and in purpose to democracy. If the United States went into the great war, there would be instant demand for universal military service. There would be the expectation of business men that commercial advantage must come as a result of bloodshed. And great bankers would expect to make their millions handling the loans of Government. Manufacturers would demand their profits. A democracy, I repeat, goes to war at the peril of its existence. But there was no other way in 1917, for not to go to the aid of the allied nations of western Europe would surely have doomed democracy throughout the world for many, many years to come.

The predestination of Woodrow Wilson still played him safe. He was in a position to enter a great world conflict on his own terms. He could wield the two hundred and fifty billions of American wealth on behalf of democracy everywhere. He could make his enemies at home and his rivals abroad hold up his arms while he accomplished their overthrow. That was not possible to Jefferson; nor could Lincoln think of dictating terms to the great capitalists who loaned him money in 1862. Never in the world's history has a leader been so lucky in the circumstances of his position. It happened that Wilson was also in mind and spirit democratic. The struggle for democracy in the

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United States had come to its happiest turn. The very billions that had been wrung from the hard toil of two generations of simple farmers and foreign-born industrial workers were now to be mobilized in behalf of democracy. It seemed easier to make the world safe for democracy than it had ever been to make our own country democratic.

It was in 1917 a great moment in world history; it is still a great time. For if Wilson and the allied statesmen draw the treaty which gives the world peace at the end of the war, it will not resemble any other great treaty in history. It will look toward peace, a definite peace for all mankind. It will set up a law against armaments; a league of nations for the maintenance of the world's peace; it will endeavor to restore to life every submerged nationality of Europe; it will guarantee the greatest possible measure of international free trade; and it will undertake to protect the backward countries of the world against capitalistic exploitation.

The ratification of such a treaty would not be the end of our struggle for democracy, that struggle can never end. There would be many and powerful men among us who would not wish to see such an arrangement succeed. It would be a bar to business on a huge scale; it would be a world in which the peoples would have too much to say in the matter of loans and markets and concessions. Great corporations, masters of large fortunes and parasitic men who live upon these or who pander to them cannot but oppose any new system—any régime of real democratic complexion. Against these all good men must strive.

And when the war is over there will be a debt of many billions on which the people will be expected to pay interest. It will be the business of good leadership to have the interest on these billions paid out of the surplus incomes of the very wealthy. This will occasion much heart-burning; it may lead to bitter fights. Moreover the trade of the United States will be several times as great in volume at the end of the war as at the beginning. If that trade is continued it will tend to break up the good understanding among the guarantors of the international treaty. If it be radically

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curtailed, thousands and even millions of American laborers will be thrown out of employment. It will be difficult to maintain the right balance and to guarantee fair dealing among the interested parties.

At the end of the great war the laboring groups of the country will be accustomed to receive very high wages, farmers will be accustomed to very high prices for their products. To reduce wages would be very difficult in the present state of our industrial life; to satisfy millions of farmers whose wheat and cotton constantly declined in value would be much harder than it was during the forty years which followed the Civil War. With both laborers and farmers, Government would have to deal more constructively than Government has ever dealt before.

Whatever may happen at the end of the war, we shall be in a different world from that which we have known in the past. It will not be another period of reckless self-seeking, another forty years of debauchery of the national resources or the national opportunity. We shall never go back to the old methods. Perhaps the United States will become a democracy in fact as it has been in name. If it does, these years will ever be great years in our lives; and the leaders whom we have known and admired, or known and hated, will be the immortals of all time. It has been a long and a doubtful struggle, that of our farmer republic of 1776 which has grown into the complex farmer-industrial society which now occupies the foremost place in the world. There has been much to regret in our history, much that our successors will wish not to read about; but it has nevertheless been a great struggle. And the end bids fair to offer a sufficient reward to those who may live to see it. We shall, if the plans of our best public men go well, become not another vast Roman republic exploiting all who come within our ken, nor another Roman empire subjugating all the weaker nations of the earth; but a great democracy, rich and generous, kindly and helpful. Would not that be an eighth wonder of the world?

WILLIAM E. DODD.

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THE IDEALS IN THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT.[1]

JOHN P. FREY,
Editor, *International Molders' Journal.*

IT HAS seemed to some superficial observers that organized labor's ideals consist of nothing more than higher and higher wages, shorter hours of labor, more and more control, and additional rules and regulations affecting employment. Perhaps the ideals which have guided the trade-union movement of our country are not generally known to the public because trade-unionists have been more busily engaged in working for their attainment than in crystallizing them into set phrases. In discussing labor's ideals, or the ideals of any other group, it must be borne in mind, that human activities are influenced by more than one motive and that it may be possible to lose sight of the ideals which have influenced men because other motives may also have actuated them.

We justly honor and approve of the ideals of freedom and independence which influenced the American colonists and inspired them during the period of the Revolutionary War, yet without doubt, some of those who were genuine patriots did not lose sight of the broad acres they might be able to secure should the effort for independence succeed, or the public offices which they might hold. These motives, however, if they existed, did not necessarily dim the high ideal for which they risked their fortunes and their lives.

It is my desire to convey an understanding of what underlies the efforts and tendencies of trade-unionism so that you may discover the ideals which guide organized labor and influence it more profoundly than anything else.

[1] This paper, originally delivered before the City Club of Chicago in a symposium on Ideals of Contemporary Life, is printed in this JOURNAL by permission of the City Club, and of A. C. McClurg & Co., the publishers of a forthcoming volume, entitled "Ideals of America" in which it will appear, together with other papers of the symposium.

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Brotherhood.

Humanity is under heavy obligations to trade-unionism because of the ideals which it has established, and in particular, our country owes a great debt of gratitude to the trade-union movement of England for the special service it rendered to our Nation during the darkest days of the Civil War. The instance I have in mind unfortunately, like many other great deeds of organized labor, has been passed over lightly or remained unmentioned by our historians. It will be remembered that early in the Civil War cotton was declared contraband of war by our Government and that this action produced far reaching results in the cotton spinning and weaving industry of England. As the war progressed, mill after mill was forced to shut down and thousands of cotton operatives were thrown out of employment.

English bankers and mill owners united in demanding that the British Cabinet should recognize the belligerency of the Confederate States and all of the methods which capital can set in motion were utilized to bring pressure upon the British Cabinet. The plea was made that Britain's great cotton industry would be destroyed, the invested capital lost and labor suffer as never before. It was known that the British Cabinet was divided upon the question. In time blockade runners anchored in the Mercy, their holds filled with contraband cotton. Had the Government permitted the unloading of this cotton, it would have been forced to recognize the belligerency of the Confederate States. It was at this time that English trade-unionists declared themselves so definitely and so determinedly that the British Cabinet hesitated and finally in face of a rising public opinion, determined to continue its refusal to give recognition to the southern belligerents.

From the beginning of our Civil War, the British unions had taken a lively interest in the principles involved. They recognized that one of the vital questions was that of the freedom of labor. Mass meetings were called throughout the land at which the question was discussed. One of these,

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a mass meeting of trade-unions, held in St. James hall in London was addressed by John Bright, and a few lines from his oration will help us better to understand the trade-union sentiment.

"You wish," he said, "the freedom of your country, you wish it for yourselves, you strive for it in many ways . . . impartial history will tell that when your statesmen were hostile or coldly neutral, when many of your rich men were corrupt, when your press which ought to have instructed and defended was mainly written to betray, the fate of a continent and of its population being in peril, you clung to freedom with an unfaltering trust that God in his infinite mercy would yet make it the heritage of his children."

Throughout England the trade-unions were aroused, and none more than in Lancashire where the closing down of cotton mills had brought untold suffering upon the workers. These trade-unionists were determined that the Government of the United States should be sustained in freeing the slaves; they were determined that contraband cotton should not be landed on English soil, and the demonstrations of their determination were so vigorous, that the Cabinet and Parliament were forced to take notice. These trade-unionists realized that the success of their efforts meant continued privations and sacrifices on their part, and yet it was with this knowledge that they served notice upon the British Government that the introduction of contraband cotton would mean a strike on the part of all of the cotton operatives. These trade-unionists in their hour of self-sacrifice were guided by something which we are justified in accepting as the highest ideal.

Soon after I became a member of my local union and before I had any adequate grasp of the industrial problems or understanding of trade-unionism, it was my good fortune to come into contact with some of the veterans in our movement. One Sunday I went to Boston to secure advice from John F. O'Sullivan, who for many years in addition to his newspaper work, was actively engaged in organizing and assisting the trade-union movement in Massachusetts. Shortly after reaching his home, another man entered and

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I was introduced to Frank E. Foster, one of the most brilliant laymen whom the American trade-union movement has produced, and while we were talking another rap came at the door and in a moment I had the pleasure of meeting Henry Abrahams who for twenty-five years has been Secretary of the local Cigar Makers' Union and who has served the Central Labor Union of Boston as its Secretary for seventeen years.

It seemed strange to me to find an Irishman and a Roman Catholic, a descendant of the old New England stock and a Protestant, and a man whose ancestors had heard the thunders of Mt. Sinai, greet each other as though they were members of an affectionate family and then devote an afternoon to the discussion of ways and means for assisting the wage earners of Massachusetts to secure legislation which would prevent injustice from being done to workers, male and female, union and non-union alike. I was able to understand that something which these men had acquired as trade-unionists had enabled them to feel that there was no division between them because of ancestry, race, religion or political affiliations, but that in their interest in each other and their interest in all those who toil, they were as one.

The public gathers its limited knowledge of trade-unionism mostly from newspaper items and editorial comment, and particularly when some acute industrial dispute is in progress. The public knows but little, if anything, about the every day activities which are carried on year by year. Practically all trade-unions have a sick committee who not only visit sick members and attend to their wants, but who in addition see that proper comforts and necessities are provided. The newspapers seldom tell of the beds endowed by trade-unions in the hospitals of our cities. The public is unaware of the enormous sums of money contributed voluntarily by trade-unions locally for the purpose of assisting the distressed of their own and other organizations.

What is implied by these activities? Is it not that the trade-union movement has brotherhood as one of its ideals,

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brotherhood so broad and so deep that it obliterates the lines of nationality, race, creed, politics? Brotherhood which extends without reservation to all of the toilers of the world? The space at my disposal will not allow me to present the unbounded material evidence which indicates the ideal of brotherhood which we hold, but I cannot pass without calling attention to some evidence with which you should be made familiar.

For many years the members of the Typographical Union have maintained a home in Colorado Springs, where without cost, members afflicted with tuberculosis and those who have lost their health are given all of the care which skilled physicians can supply, a home where comfort and kindliness surrounds each inmate like sunshine falling upon the flowers. The Pressmen's Union maintains a similar institution in Rogersville, Tennessee. Many of our Unions pay out enormous sums each year in sick and death benefits to their members. The International Molders' Union of North America up to December 31st of last year had paid out $4,128,377.70 to its members in sick, death and disability benefits. Last year the Unions affiliated with the American Federation of Labor paid out to their members $3,482,842.59 in death, sick, traveling and unemployment benefits, and this sum does not take into account the enormous amounts paid out to members from local treasuries.

Trade-unionism in America is international. The boundary line to the north does not exist so far as our unions are concerned. The delegates from Canada and the United States meet as members of but one organization. They have but one trade-union Constitution; they have but one set of officers; there is but one treasury into which their dues are placed, and so far as their activities as trade-unionists are concerned, they are the members of but one organization.

But in a still broader sense the American trade-union movement is international, for it is a part of the International Federation of Labor which includes the trade-union organizations of America and Europe. These conditions

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serve to indicate the progress which the trade-unionists of the world have made toward their ideal of brotherhood.

Education.

If we could examine the constitutions of those trade-unions representing skilled or semi-skilled trades, we should find them containing provisions for the education of apprentices. Some, we should discover, provide that the apprentice after a certain period must be placed at work between two journeymen, so that he can have their assistance in qualifying himself as a craftsman. We should find other organizations providing for the technical education of apprentices. Again we should discover local efforts, such as that in Chicago, through which some of the unions, the Carpenters for instance, have made special provisions for the education of their members, as well as the apprentice, in the theory and practice of their craft.

Some of the International Unions finding that no other satisfactory medium existed have established schools of their own, one of the best known being that organized by the Typographical Union, where through a correspondence course the members are taught the theory and art of their important craft. The Pressmen's Union has established a school at its headquarters, and members from all over the United States and Canada go to Rogersville, Tennessee, to increase their proficiency and acquire a broader knowledge of their trade. During the winter months, many local unions hold courses of lectures for the education of their members.

For reasons which it is unnecessary to discuss at this time, the trade-union movement of the United States has never been given the degree of credit to which it is entitled, for the prominent if not predominant part which it played in the establishing of our public school system. But a few years ago, the wage earner's child was practically a charity pupil, the opportunities for an adequate education being confined almost exclusively to the well-to-do. The history of trade-unionism in this country from 1825 to 1835 is filled

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with evidence that the trade-unions of that period were carrying on a tremendous campaign, which had for its purpose the establishing of a public school system, supported and directed by the State, which would guarantee to every wage earner's child the opportunity of securing at least an elementary education.

At a mass-meeting of trade-unionists held in New York City in December, 1829, the following resolution was adopted:

"*Resolved:* That next to life and liberty, we consider education the greatest blessing bestowed upon mankind.

"*Resolved:* That the public funds should be appropriated to a reasonable extent for the purpose of education upon a regular system that shall insure the opportunity to every individual of obtaining a competent education before he should have arrived at the age of maturity."

In September of the same year, a mass meeting of trade-unionists in Philadelphia adopted resolutions of like import, the preamble of which read:

"No system of education which a free man can accept has yet been established for the poor, whilst thousands of dollars of public money have been appropriated for colleges and academies for the rich."

At a trade-union meeting held in Boston in 1830, it was resolved:

"That the establishment of a liberal system of education obtainable by all should be among the first efforts of every law giver who desires the continuance of our national independence."

And shortly afterwards the general trade-union movement of Cincinnati issued an appeal to the West stating that their efforts would be directed toward elevating the condition of the workmen and obtaining a national system of education. The trade-unions have been foremost in working for the passage of legislation establishing free text books, and one of the prime motives which has led to extended trade-union activities for the prevention of child labor has been the intention that the children of the poor should secure at least an elementary education before facing the problems of life.

But the trade-unions go farther than this in their efforts to educate their members. Their literature includes the

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discussion of civic problems, civic duties and responsibilities. Their publications abound with articles dealing with economics, sociology and industrial history. Continual efforts are made to teach every member those things connected with self government which are essential to every citizen. No group in the community has realized more keenly that education is essential to their welfare and that without education their ideals are unattainable. Trade-unionists look upon education in its broadest sense as one of the corner stones upon which the structure of trade-unionisn is erected.

Education then in its truest and broadest sense is one of the ideals of labor, and as an evidence that this is so today let me quote a few sentences from the report of the Committee on Education which was unanimously adopted at the convention of the American Federation of Labor in San Francisco in 1915:

"Education," the Committee reported, "is necessarily the foundation of any republic. Education is necessary to the perpetuity of any republic. It is therefore the essential duty of this Republic to guarantee every child an adequate education. Everybody believes in education. Differences arise not upon its value, but upon the questions of what a true education should consist; who should be educated; how far and by what methods they should be educated, and what persons should conduct such education.

"Education should include whatever we do for ourselves and whatever is done for us by others, and for the express purpose of bringing us nearer to the perfection of our nature. In its largest conception education should comprehend even the indirect effects produced on character and on the human faculties, by things by which the direct purposes are different, by law, by forms of government, by industrial arts, and by modes of social, economic and civic life. Education should comprehend the culture which each generation gives to those who are to be its successors, in order to best qualify them for at least keeping up, and if possible for raising the improvement of humankind which has been attained."

The Standard of Living.

It may appear to those who have not seen beneath the surface, that the trade-union ideal is, "more and more,"—higher and higher wages, shorter and shorter hours of labor, more control in industry and additional rules and regula-

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tions affecting labor. It has even been held that the wage earner in securing an advance in wages is in effect acquiring what the stockholder secures when dividends are increased.

But what we must understand if we are to grasp the trade-union ideal is the trade-union viewpoint. What is it that the trade-unionist aims to secure through an advance in wages? What do shorter hours of labor mean to him, and why does he struggle so persistently and courageously to secure both? What are wages? What do they mean to the wage earner?

They are not so many dollars and so many cents,—they are the man's life, they are the factors which determine what measure of decency, of comfort and of opportunity the wage earner will have in this life. The amount of these wages determines whether the home shall be a back room in a crowded tenement district or whether it will be a separate dwelling surrounded by pure air and sunshine and conducive to health and comfort.

These dollars and cents which come in the weekly pay envelope determine the quality and the quantity of the food which shall enter the home. They determine the comforts and conveniences and opportunities which the wage earner's family can enjoy. They determine whether his body shall be nourished and vigorous or whether it shall be underfed and weakened. These wages determine still more,—they determine the physical, mental, and moral standards of the overwhelming majority in all of our industrial centers. If there is anything in the realm of human activities which has been uncontrovertibly demonstrated by scientific investigation during recent years, it is that wages profoundly influence physical and mental standards.

The vital statistics of both Europe and America demonstrate that the home environment and the quality of the food largely determine the physical and mental characteristics of the toilers and determine also the degree of vitality with which their children enter into this world.

A recent federal investigation in Montclair, New Jersey, indicated that the average infant mortality was 84 per

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thousand; but in the homes where lower paid workers lived, the rate was 130 per thousand; that where the income to the family was $12 per week the death-rate was twice as large as where the income was $23 or more. And analyzing still further it was found that where the fathers were business or professional men the infant mortality was but 41 per thousand. Among the higher paid workers the death-rate rose to 74 while, in the families of the less skilled and low paid, the infant death-rate rose to 101.

In a residential ward of Johnstown, Pennsylvania, where comfort and wealth abound, the infant mortality was but 50 per thousand, while in the tenement district where the lower paid workers were forced to live, the death-rate was 271 per thousand. The report of the medical officer of Finsbury, London, for 1906 shows that the death-rate of adults in the one room tenements was 39 per thousand, while in the four room tenements and upwards it was but 16.4 per thousand. This same report also indicated that the infant mortality in the one room tenements was 211 per thousand while in the four room tenements it was reduced to 121. In the inquiry made by the Local Government Board of London in 1910, it was found that the death-rate was 15 per cent greater in back to back houses built in long rows. Statistics compiled in England some seven years ago indicated that the children of the lower paid workers at sixteen years of age weighed nineteen pounds and a half less and were three and three-quarters inches lower in stature than the children of the well-to-do.

What do wages mean to the worker? They mean his very life, the vitalizing quality of the blood that flows through his veins and nourishes his body, the degree of vitality with which his children shall enter the world, they determine his physical and mental welfare in a predominating manner.

Why does the trade-unionist struggle to secure a shorter work day? Let the trade-unionists speak for themselves! They desire a shorter work day among other things so that there may be opportunity for leisure and recreation. They

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desire to terminate each day's labor with sufficient vitality left to enjoy the society of their fellow men, to study and to better prepare themselves for the problems which face them as wage earners, to enjoy some of the blessings which the Almighty has so bounteously spread at every hand.

The American wage earner has known from practical experience what it meant to labor from sun to sun; what it meant to give most of the waking hours to hard manual toil; what it has meant to return home so tired, so exhausted from the day's labor that all their being cried out for rest. The trade-unionist has learned that housing conditions, the quality and quantity of the food, the sanitary conditions of the shop, wages and the hours of labor not only affect his physical well-being and reflect themselves in his offspring, but that they also very largely influence his length of life.

I know of no statistics more striking or more convincing of this fact than those presented by the Cigar Makers' and the Printers' Unions from their records of death benefits paid to members. In 1888, 51 per cent of the union cigar makers died of tuberculosis, in 1911 this had been reduced to 20 per cent. In 1888, the average age at death of members of this Union was 31 years, 4 months and 10 days; in 1911 the average age at death had been increased to 50 years, 1 month and 10 days. In 1900 the average age at death of members of the Typographical Union was 41 years and 3 months, and in 1915 it was practically 50 years and 11 months. During these periods the eleven, ten and nine hour day had been displaced for the eight hour day, sanitary conditions had been established in the shops, and the wage-rate had been considerably advanced, in some cases being almost doubled. Wages and hours of labor and the conditions which they established had reduced deaths from tuberculosis over 50 per cent. They had lengthened the average life of union cigar makers 19 years and had lengthened the average life of the printers over 9 years.

It is because of these and similar facts that the trade-unionists see something more than dividends in wages, see

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their very life and that of their descendants determined by the money in the weekly pay envelope and profoundly influenced by the hours of labor during which they are called upon to toil under modern industrial conditions. The trade-union movement believes that man was made for something more than mere labor, eating and sleeping. They believe that opportunities for self development are as important as labor and that unless the wage earner is afforded opportunities for recreation and self development that the standard of the mass of our people will go downward and backward instead of upward and forward.

The term I am about to use may not adequately describe the ideal but for the present let me call it the ideal of a standard of living—the ideal which the trade-unionist has in mind when he endeavors to increase his earnings and shorten his hours of labor. The trade-unions believe that childhood should be dedicated to growth, play, and education, youth to character building, and manhood to the development of the highest qualities of citizenship. The wage earners' standard of living, which rests so largely upon the wages received and upon the hours of labor, determine the physical, mental and moral foundations of the masses upon which the structure of our American institutions must rest.

The masses of those who labor in our industries constitute the foundation upon which our American institutions are erected and the trade-union ideal aims to make this foundation deeper, broader, more secure than it ever has been in the past, by continually elevating and advancing the wage earners' standard of living through higher wages and shorter hours of labor.

Industrial Democracy.

There is but one more ideal which I desire to place before you at this time, and this is the ideal of freedom. Human freedom. Freedom in the industries. Democracy in the government of industry equivalent to democracy in the government of our country. No ideal has urged organized

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labor forward more energetically than that of industrial freedom. The trade-unionist's ideal is the full application of the principles and mechanisms of democracy in the industries and the relationship of employer and employe. Freedom is essential to the workers' development and the trade-unionists can see no practical way of establishing industrial liberty except through the methods of industrial democracy. Labor's ideal is freedom,—freedom to work out its own salvation. Brotherhood and education are essential ideals, but without industrial freedom it would be impossible to achieve the ideals of a steadily progressing standard of living.

Since the dark ages there have been three great struggles for the ideals of liberty. One was for religious freedom, the right to worship the Almighty according to the dictates of one's conscience, and some of the bloodiest wars which history records were fought for liberty of conscience and the right to worship the Almighty as men pleased.

But liberty of conscience was not enough. While one set of men had it within their power to determine the laws under which others must live, men could not develop as they should and tyranny flourished. And so other wars were fought, thrones were overturned and dynasties passed away, in the struggle which men made for the right of political freedom, the right to have their voices count in the making of the laws under which they must live.

And while these contests were being waged, labor passed from slavery to serfdom, serfdom to peonage, and peonage to freedom, but the freedom accorded them in the industries was not that same quality or degree of freedom which was theirs in religious and political activities. The wage earner is not industrially free, cannot be industrially free, so long as employing capital by itself, and without let or hindrance, determines the terms of employment and the conditions of labor. And so the trade-union movement has exerted itself in the past, has made sacrifices, is making them today, and will continue to make them, will continue to use its efforts without ceasing, so that there may be

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established that condition where government or regulation in the industries like the government of our country shall exist only by and with the consent of the governed.

The trade-union ideal is equality of rights and opportunities for employer and worker alike, equality before the law, equality in daily practice, equality of rights and opportunities and responsibilities at all times, and under all circumstances. We should hold that any people who would allow themselves to be governed by others without protest, or who would waive their rights to a voice in determining the laws under which they should live would be servile and unworthy, and we are equally justified in holding that workers who would be willing to have their terms of employment and conditions of labor determined wholly by the employers, or who should be forced to work under these conditions where they were not allowed a voice, would be servile, the employer would be a master and the worker would not be a free man in the full sense of the term.

The ideals of brotherhood, education, a standard of living, and industrial freedom animate trade-unionism and it must be apparent that to the degree that these ideals are realized, to that degree the quality, physical, mental and moral, of the masses of our people in the industries will be determined. The ideals have steadily guided labor, which have shone like a beacon light while labor has been tossed by the storms which sweep over our industrial seas. They are the ideals which have inspired men to devote their lives to the trade-union movement with the same zeal, enthusiasm, devotion and self-sacrifice which marks those who have some higher purpose in life than their personal comfort and self interests.

It is these ideals of trade-unionism animating the army of organized labor which hold out the brightest prospects for the future of our social structure and which give assurance that trade-unionism is a constructive force, accomplishing for labor what no other institution has been able to achieve.

JOHN P. FREY.

CINCINNATI.

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DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES.

CHARLES A. ELLWOOD.

THAT all is not well with democracy in the United States has been perceived by the friends of democracy the world around for some time. Before we undertake to make "the world safe for democracy" it might be well, therefore, to consider some of the foes of democracy in our own household. These foes are, in general, not new ones that have made their appearance with the present war. To be sure, democracies are notoriously not built for war, and during war many of the characteristics of democracy may have to go, at least temporarily, into eclipse. Moreover, since all of the autocracies of the world, so far as anthropology and sociology can discover, have arisen in one way or another through war, there is always grave danger to democracy in prolonged war and militaristic institutions.

But for the most part, the dangers which threaten democracy in the United States are of long standing; and war, at most, has thus far merely aggravated them. In large part, too, the dangers which threaten American democracy are those of partial and incomplete development. For democracy, in the modern sense, is an achievement of humanitarian civilization and its fate is bound up with the fate of that civilization, whose evolution is manifestly only just beginning.

But before we can discuss clearly the dangers to democracy in American society, we must first set forth what we conceive to be the essence of democracy. We mean, of course, something much larger than a mere form of government. Political democracy cannot long exist, or be very successful, without a democratic spirit in the social life generally. We mean by democracy a social spirit, rather than a mere form of government or society. It is a stage

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in the evolution of the social mind and of social control—that stage in which the opinion and will of every member of the group enters into the determination of group behavior. As commonly phrased, it is "the rule of public opinion." More happily, Hobhouse describes it[1] as a phase of social life which "founds the common good upon the common will, in forming which it bids every grown-up, intelligent person to take a part."

This is, to be sure, no new thing in the world. Very primitive human groups may be ruled by the opinions of their members, by the democratic formation of a group will. But modern social conditions make modern democracy something quite different from this primitive democracy. The primitive tribal democracies depended for the likemindedness which united their members upon custom and the sentiment of kinship. But the sentiment of kinship plays little part in modern nations, and customary likemindedness has little or no function to perform in the dynamic world in which we live. Static democracy of the primitive type is now practically impossible and has little in common, after all, with what we call modern democracy. Modern democracy has to do with social change. Its likemindedness accordingly must be a rational, rather than a traditional or customary likemindedness; its social unity, a unity built upon ideal, rather than upon instinctive values. It is the type of social control in which the unity of the group is secured, not through custom and tradition reinforced by the sentiment of kinship, nor through coercive authority, but through the sympathetic understanding and intelligent purpose and will of the whole population. Rational likemindedness and a fraternal feeling which transcends the artificial distinctions created by class, race, or cultural conditions are, accordingly, the foundations of modern democracy.

But rational likemindedness is possible in a group only through the free interchange of ideas and opinions, that is, through free public discussion, which is the only instrument

[1] *Liberalism*, p. 228.

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for rational selection among ideas in a group and for reaching that more or less rational judgment of the group which we term public opinion. Modern democracy, accordingly, depends for its success upon inner freedom of thought and judgment in the individual, upon freedom of intercommunication among individuals, and upon the untrammeled expression of public opinion and will. There is thus good reason for calling modern democracy "free society" in contrast to the custom-ruled and authoritarian societies of all the human past. What rational self-determination is to the individual, that democracy in the modern sense is to society. And manifestly it is a new stage of social development upon which the world is just entering.

But democracy still depends upon good will, as much as it did in the primitive kinship group. Only the good will which modern democracy must draw upon must be more of an ideal creation. It must spring from that understanding and sympathy in a large population which may be called "fraternalism." Without such understanding and sympathy and resulting good will there is no possibility of like-mindedness and psychic unity in large populations. They are, accordingly, the necessary affective and volitional foundations of modern democracy, taking the place of the sentiment of kinship in primitive groups. Things which destroy sympathy, understanding, and good will in a population are not less menacing to democracy than things which destroy free thought, free speech, and the untrammeled expression of public opinion. On its ethical side modern democracy is closely associated, then, with what we know as the development of humanitarianism. It strives to secure "an adequate life for all." The growth of barriers that obstruct sympathy and understanding among different elements of the population will, in the long run, probably be just as fatal to democratic society as the growth of barriers limiting the free interchange of ideas and the free expression of popular will.

It is evident that the liberty and equality of democracy are relevant to its work as a means of social control.

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Democracy is not a step toward anarchy, as it has been so often represented to be by its enemies. It is not a system of pure individualism, or of absolute liberty for the individual to do as he pleases; such individualism would be the negation of social control. But modern democracy is rather a form of social control which attempts to reconcile the freedom of the individual with the needs of objective social life. It does not mean, therefore, the emancipation of the individual from social control. Rather its success must depend upon the development of a social intelligence and a sense of social obligation within the individual. It reconciles liberty with objective social needs by appealing to the social intelligence and will of the individual. It cannot inculcate absolute liberty without destroying itself; for such liberty would lead to anarchy and to the exploitation of the weak by the strong. *Democracy*, if anything, *demands a more highly socialized will in the individual, in order to be successful, than other forms of social control.* This again shows its dependence upon fraternalism, and that its liberty is relative to fraternity. In a family group there is no difficulty in seeing this; and as Cooley shows, it is from the primary groups, the family and the neighborhood, that we have undoubtedly derived in the last analysis our ideas of democracy.[2] Liberty in the family is relative to fraternity; so also in society at large.

In the same way the equality of democracy is relative to its working as a means of social control. Absolute equality cannot and does not exist in human society. Men are not only born with unequal gifts and capacities biologically, but they inevitably become unequal also through the circumstances of life. Social life involves fundamentally a division of labor, and the division of labor makes men unequal with reference to the same capacity. Even a foot ball team has to have its captains, half backs, and full backs; and no more than a foot ball team can any human group get rid of such fundamental classes as the "chiefs"

[2] *Social Organization*, chap. iv.

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and the "people," the "intellectuals" and "manual workers." In a world where efficiency counts, absolute or dead-level equality in any social group would be fatal. What democracy protests against are the artificial inequalities produced by artificial social distinctions. It recognizes the potentially equal social worth of every man, and it would give to every man an equal chance to demonstrate his social worth; but it does not object to such class distinctions in society as are based upon individual merit and fitness. No system of social control could work for long that did not recognize fully the social importance of individual merit, that is, of original and acquired differences among individuals, and that did not give different rewards for different services.

But democracy insists that all men must be treated as of potentially equal social worth, and be given equal opportunities to demonstrate their social worth. It insists upon what in religious phraseology, we term "the preciousness of the individual soul." This shows again the substantial identity of democracy with humanitarian ethics, and that fraternalism is its fundamental principle. There is a fundamental social and moral equality of individuals in all democratic society, because they all participate in social control according to the measure of their social ability; but it is not of such a character as to preclude the recognition of the necessity and value of social inequalities which spring from differences of individual merit or from necessities of the social division of labor. There are movements, to be sure, in all democratic countries toward absolute social equality and absolute social liberty—known as "egalitarianism" and "anarchism"—but these should not be confused with democracy. They may be mistaken interpretations of its spirit; but they are menaces of democracy, for they both negate social control.

One illustration will suffice to make our meaning clear. A democratic solution of the negro problem in the United States would not be to give the negro absolute freedom from social constraints, or absolute equality with the

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whites, regardless of individual fitness. It would rather imply the meeting together of both races upon a fraternal basis, with such mutual sympathy and good will that they could, through free discussion, reach such a rational solution of the problem as would conduce to the harmonious adjustment and mutual welfare of both races. Such a democratic solution would emphasize justice and fraternity, but it would make the liberty and equality of individuals relative to these.

Now, democracy in the sense in which we understand it, —a free society which is a brotherhood ruled by rational likemindedness in meeting the problems of its common life —is, like Christianity, a sort of a counsel of social perfection. Like Christianity it has never seriously been tried. The peoples of the world are discontented with the old authoritarian forms of social life, and they are groping toward a new and higher form of society without a clear perception of what it really means. Consequently, the so-called democracies of our time tend continually to revert to authoritarian or autocratic principles, or else to go off in the direction of *laissez-faire* individualism or egalitarianism. Previous to the War, American democracy fluctuated first in one direction, then in the other, with a tendency especially to *laissez-faire* individualism. The common conception of democracy was that everybody should be allowed to do as he pleased, provided he did not interfere with certain "natural rights" of other individuals. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century in the United States this conception of democracy was undoubtedly dominant. Along with it went a tendency to dead-level equality which interfered more or less with social control, social organization, and social efficiency. The tendency was to consider one man as good as another, often even when it came to very responsible public positions, and to discount the need of experts in public business. Consequently the American people have been very slow to attain to efficient social and political organization. For example, American cities grew up very largely upon this basis of *laissez-faire* individualism

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and of a crude egalitarianism. The solidarity of the interests of the community was in many cases almost the last thing considered. Hence American cities, while beautified in spots where wealthy and prosperous individuals lived, became for the most part dingy "monuments of human greed" in their poorer quarters, or at best altogether chaotic in their development. And the development of American cities has typified, in general, the development of the whole social life of the American people during the latter half of the nineteenth century.

While the spirit of *laissez-faire* individualism and egalitarianism was dying down during the nineties and the first decade of the twentieth century, at least among the more intelligent classes of American society, another and more menacing foe to the development of a democratic social life appeared; and that was the loss of mental and moral freedom. This was, in large part, due to the rise of great vested interests, wealthy individuals or powerful corporations, who sought to control public opinion to their own advantage. It was also due, however, to the splitting up of American society into non-fraternal groups and classes who gradually drew apart in mutual distrust and antagonism. To be sure, this was no new thing in American history. While the American people have always prided themselves in the belief that their social and political life is ruled by the free and untrammeled formation of public opinion, yet even in the old slavery days freedom of thought and discussion regarding the peculiar institution of slavery was, except in a few localities, almost impossible previous to the Civil War. Examples of lack of mental and moral freedom among the American people along many other lines might also, of course, be given.

The truth is that the American people have appreciated only within very narrow limits the rôle which free thinking and free discussion play in a democratic social and political life.[3] They have always been afraid to be free in this most

[3] A more extended discussion of the rôle of free thinking, free public discussion and a free press in democracy will be found in the writer's *Introduction to Social Psychology*, chap. vii.

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important matter for democracy. Even their universities, where freedom of thought and discussion should rule if anywhere, have not been free, or at best only partially free. The great private foundations have too often been under the influence of private or sectarian interests, which have kept a "string on them." The state universities have fared no better, because threatened political interference has often made too great freedom of thought or discussion indiscreet. But the main organ of the free interchange of ideas, of discussion, and of the formation of public opinion in the complex social life of the modern world is the public press. In America this press has boasted of its freedom, but aside from the fact that a large part of the press in the United States has been without any adequate sense of its social function and responsibility, there is ample evidence too often of control by mere pecuniary interest and of recent years of the consolidation of the public press into the hands of a very small class of owners.[4] Government controlled newspapers and publishers would not, of course, remedy such a state of affairs because a government controlled press would manifestly at the present time be very far from a free press. One of the big problems before the American democracy of the immediate future, then, is to win back, or rather develop its mental and moral freedom; for free public criticism, free public discussion, and the free formation of public opinion and will are the very breath of life of free institutions.

While free thinking, free discussion, and the free formation of a public opinion are difficult enough in peace time, because undemocratic interests are hostile to them, and because there is always a tendency for free speech to overstep the bounds of courtesy, morality and legality, they are even more difficult to maintain in war time, when there is not infrequently a justifiable fear of seditious utterances on the part of a disloyal few. The first casualties in every

[4] See article by Oswald Garrison Villard in *The Atlantic Monthly*, January, 1918, pp. 62–66.

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great war, accordingly, are infringements upon these liberties so necessary to democracy. War hysteria seizes whole classes and communities. The impartial utterances of scientifically-minded persons or of radical humanitarians are taken to be indications of disloyality, or at least of unpardonable neutrality. High minded and public spirited citizens become afraid to criticise the conduct of affairs in any particular, lest their loyalty be questioned. Worse yet, laws which seriously invade constitutional rights are threatened or enacted by legislative bodies. Only the loyalty of President Wilson to the great traditions of democracy apparently prevented the American Congress from placing the punishment of seditious and disloyal utterances in the hands of military tribunals, rather than civil courts. While these words are being written, a metropolitan daily[5] comments as follows upon the attitude of the American Congress: "Congress is still debating the question whether a clause in the espionage bill declaring that speaking the truth with good motives and for justifiable ends is not an offense shall be restored to the bill or left out in accordance with the decision of the Conference Committee. It is not easy to imagine circumstances under which honest truth speaking for a justifiable end could be anything but commendable."

Even more pointed are the comments of a leading liberal religious periodical:[6] "Discussion is the a b c of freedom: where that elementary right is abridged by public opinion or by a governmental department, freedom is denied just as surely under elective officials as under hereditary monarchs. To-day in America the liberal and radical press is terrorized, a large number of papers, some of them strongly pro-war, have been barred from the mails, either for one or more numbers or altogether. For this situation and its danger to liberty not one official but a heedless, unreflective public opinion which supports such autocratic legislation is responsible.

[5] *The St. Louis Republic*, April 28th, 1918.
[6] *The New World*, May, 1918.

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"The consequences are very plain. We have in the President the outstanding leader of our time. His foreign policy is the hope of the world; yet it has behind it no body of organized public opinion in America and its real understanding and support are found in the British Labor Party."

One can only add to the above comment that when people generally and lawmakers, sworn to defend democratic institutions, show such an attitude it is clearly evident that they are profoundly ignorant of the nature of democracy and of the method of its life. The optimistic view is, of course, that such recrudesences of autocracy are only temporary and will pass away as soon as peace is again restored. But it is evident that those who are laboring for the development of democracy must be on their guard, and that only constant education as to the possible social consequences of such undemocratic attitudes will obviate the menace which they bring.

Such political happenings of the present are more readily understandable when we remember that democracy in America has always strongly adhered to the principle of "absolute majority rule." Strangely enough there has never been a wide-spread perception among the American people that democracies of their very nature cannot be absolute governments. But the American people have shown but little tendency to recognize the rights of minorities. They have been adverse to schemes like proportional representation which would give minorities a representation in public affairs. In short, they have not had the fraternal conception of democracy. This explains the long persistence of the spoils system in American politics. To the victor, *i.e.*, to the majority, belongs the right to dominate the whole situation. "Limited majority rule" is as yet recognized by only an intelligent few as the true principle of democracy.

Now, in the complex populations of modern nations it cannot be denied that democracy must proceed upon the principle of "majority rule." The unanimity rule of the

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static democracies of primitive times is out of the question. The decisions which democratic governments reach, accordingly, can at best be only decisions reached by a majority. But in nations consisting of millions it would be foolishness to contend that any social will had been formed when a bare majority had decided some social issue. Unless the principle of limited majority rule is recognized in a general way by a democratic people, they are bound to convert their democracy into oligarchy or autocracy. For absolute majority rule is bound to infringe upon the freedom of thought, speech, and conduct of the minority; and the minority will lose its right to try to convert a majority to its views by using free speech and a free press to show that a social mistake has been made. It may be said, of course, that when a social decision has once been made by a majority, the minority should always acquiesce and accept it without using free speech and free discussion to undermine such a decision. But if this position is taken it is evident that there is no way of correcting social mistakes made by the majority unless the majority themselves perceive the error. This is an impossible position; free society is destroyed by such a doctrine. There can be no absolute government, then, in a true democracy. A government of the people which attempts absolute majority rule becomes an autocracy; only it is the autocracy of a majority instead of a few; but it inevitably speedily degenerates into the autocracy of a few, because the right of the minority to participate in the formation of public opinion and will is denied.

But if rights of minorities must always be recognized in true democracies, and if, on the other hand, successful action in a group requires unity of thought, feeling, and will, how can democracies be anything more than loosely knit, inefficient social aggregates? This latter has been largely the case in American democracy, despite its tacit acceptance of the principle of absolute majority rule. Limited majority rule does not necessarily interfere with the formation of a powerful public opinion and a unified public will.

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Political and social education is the antidote for any such weakness of democracy. The best political and social education of all comes, of course, through the constant public discussion of public questions. Thus citizens of a democracy provide for themselves a mutual education in social and political matters. Public discussions of social and political questions by all classes of citizens meeting together were very common in the early history of the United States, but fell more or less into decay with the rise and development of the daily press, until recently when they have been revived by the wholesome movements to establish "social centres" and "public forums."

But American democracy has been strangely negligent regarding social and political education. Only when there is a proper diffusion of social knowledge among the masses and an adequate inculcation of the sense of social obligation can there be any hope for the success of true democracy. It would seem like the most refined treason to democratic government to permit children to graduate from our public schools, and even young men and women who are supposed to have been trained for social leadership to go forth from our universities, without a knowledge of the structure and ideals of democratic society and of the social problems with which it must deal; yet this has been the case in American democracy. Owing to certain traditions received from non-democratic times, the social sciences have rarely been given the first place in the curriculum of our public schools. Under *laissez-faire* individualism public schools in the United States until recently have aimed to turn out individuals who would be successful in their private careers rather than good citizens.

The War has helped somewhat in the education of the mass of our citizens in public affairs and especially in matters pertaining to international relations; but it has had a disastrous effect upon educational standards, and our school system. Instead of keeping children and adolescents in schools and colleges and of making better provision for their education in the duties of citizenship, the tendency

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has been to allow both children and adolescents to leave school when they ought not to and to emphasize in their studies chiefly physical science subjects, or the like, which are supposed to be directly connected with winning the War. Thus the nation at a critical period is failing to provide for that social leadership which alone can insure the safety of democracy after the great struggle of the present is over.

This lack of provision for universal social and political education in American democracy is, of course, connected with the lack of appreciation of expert social leadership of which we have already spoken. Democratic societies, in general, seem to have been slower at least than German autocracy in appreciating the value and need of expert social leadership. Not only have our universities been organized more for the conquest of physical nature and the extension of trade and commerce than to train social leaders, but the American people have never been conscious of the value or need of such trained leaders. The false conception of democracy as egalitarianism has prevented the American people from realizing that democracy, like any other form of society, needs leadership in order to succeed; and that the democratic way to provide such leadership is to open up equal opportunities for political and social education to all.

Connected with the *laissez-faire* individualism and crude egalitarianism of the American people has been their curiously unwise immigration policy of the past, both as regards the admission of immigrants and their treatment after admission. Such freedom of immigration as is consistent with rational social control is, of course, democratic and humanitarian. But to complicate needlessly the struggle toward democracy by introducing illiterate elements, or those who through race, language, or tradition are incapable of becoming rationally likeminded with the rest of the population, is the height of political unwisdom. For democracy depends upon rational likemindedness, and rational likemindedness cannot be reached through free discussion without the aid of such means of intercommuni-

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cation as will enable the various elements of the community to understand and adjust themselves to one another. A too widely open door for non-assimilable elements has made it impossible to develop a democratic community life in many places in the United States, and even has made possible the existence of whole classes and communities alien in their sympathies and ideas to democratic institutions. The War has revealed this clearly, however, and is likely to result in the adoption finally by our Federal Government of a scientific immigration policy.

Only the dominance of the non-fraternal conception of democracy, as *laissez-faire* individualism, is adequate to explain the little demand for democracy in industrial relations which the American people have hitherto shown. They have been content to let exploitation in economic life go on under the forms of law, at least as long as the game was equally open to everybody. Yet, nothing could be more opposed to the essential spirit of democracy than an industrial life organized upon the basis of a *laissez-faire* individualism. Such an industrial life necessarily results in the exploitation of the economically weak by the economically strong, and the increase among the masses of that hopeless form of poverty which we call industrial poverty. Such poverty prevents the normal development of intelligence and character in citizens, destroys social sympathy and likemindedness, as well as equality of opportunity and legal right. In brief, it destroys "free society." As Hobhouse says,[7] "People are not fully free in their political capacity [even] when they are subject industrially to conditions which take the life and heart out of them."

Yet the American people have shown little understanding of the need of industrial democracy as a necessary complement of social and political democracy. Even an industry so organized as to serve the welfare of the whole nation has scarcely been a popular demand until the present War. That there should be such collective control over

[7] *Liberalism*, p. 249.

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industry that the opinion and will of every citizen in the nation should count in the determination of industrial policies, is a proposition which would probably still be denied by a large majority of American working men and capitalists alike. That there should be fraternity in the management of industrial enterprises and a consequent democratic participation of the workers in their management, but not to the exclusion of the public which is served, would be regarded by most Americans as an impracticable and utopian doctrine. The question is not necessarily as to whether socialism is a logical outcome of democratic society or not. For socialism as ordinarily understood is often non-democratic, aiming rather at the supremacy or dominance of the working class, or at a bureaucratic organization of industrial life. Socialism, at any rate, has existed in many forms of society in the past which were not democratic. But plainly, democracy, of the sort which we have described, in industrial life could not tolerate the individualistic and predatory tactics which have been too often in evidence in the American business world. Probably the greatest foe which democracy confronts in America, as well as in the whole world, is predatory, non-democratic, non-fraternal business.

It is such *laissez-faire* individualistic business which has bred in American society a spirit of ultra-conservatism in some classes, and of revolutionary radicalism in other classes; and both of these spirits are foes of democracy in America as well as elsewhere. Conservatism would preserve institutions of the past which are no longer adapted to the present. Such institutions hamper the development of some section or class in society. To maintain them under such conditions rapidly becomes social injustice, and injustice long maintained destroys good will and mutual understanding, and so the necessary basis of democracy. Thus is born revolutionary radicalism which invokes the immediate use of force to redress real or fancied grievances; and this also destroys good will and is in itself the negation of democracy. Thus American de-

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mocracy is threatened, as is democracy in all the world, by the division of society into two extreme hostile camps, both thinking not so much of their duties to society at large as of the rights of their class. And in the United States there is as yet lacking a strong, organized social liberalism which can mediate between the opposing camps. Under the leadership of President Wilson, it is true that such a social liberalism is rising and, perhaps, becoming regnant; but, as the periodical above cited says, the real understanding and support of President Wilson's policies are best found thus far in the British Labor Party.

The safeguarding of democracy in the United States evidently demands a higher development of social intelligence and character in the mass of individuals. It awaits the development of humanitarian civilization in the whole world. Its fate is evidently bound up in the question whether at the end of this War there shall be secured a just, democratic peace, which will not only recognize the rights of all nations to equal freedom, but the consequent necessity of international organization and the abolition of militarism and of competitive national armaments. To this extent the fate of democracy is bound up with the triumph of internationalism and with the future peaceful development of higher civilization. If such a peace can be secured and made secure through international good will, then the outlook for democracy may be reasonably regarded as most encouraging. For this War has taught the democracies of the world much. It has shown them the necessity of social solidarity, or fraternalism. It has demonstrated the need of leadership, and that group efficiency is a function of social leadership and social organization. It has also indicated, clearly enough, the need of social and political education if democratic ideals are to be realized; and that in war time, as well as in peace time, free thinking, free discussion, a free press, and an untrammeled formation of public opinion and will are the best safeguards of democracy within a nation.

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BIRTH CONTROL AS A SOCIO-ECONOMIC PANACEA.

NAHUM WOLF GOLDSTEIN.

WHATEVER one may think of Malthus' theories of the disproportion between the increase of population and the increase of food, of the eternal struggle between man and mother earth, one may find for them a certain justification.

A hundred and twenty years ago Europe was just beginning to emerge from the protracted and horribly dark night of feudalism. Intensive agriculture was practically unknown. The great scientific discoveries as to soils, manures and plant constituents, which have poured new life into agriculture, were yet to come. The science of chemistry was still in its elementary stages, and the genius of technical invention, which has charmed into being gigantic forces of production and transportation, had not spoken its mighty word as yet. On the other hand, the new transatlantic world with its inexhaustible wealth of grain and wheat was nothing but a revealed promise, a mighty dream of the future, which few could decipher in all its magnitude.

The creative power of European society appeared insignificant and circumscribed. Out of a boundless wealth of natural soil, out of our unlimited kingdom of matter, the as yet uncultivated and relatively impotent human effort could but mould and shape into being a limited amount of products. And economists like Malthus, compelled to shrink their vision and cut their socio-economic observations short at the boundaries of their own economic epoch, could not but see a conflict between the rapidly striding reproduction of the human species and the slowly moving reproduction of matter. What was in reality a temporary and conceivable dissonance between unlimited matter and limited application of human pro-

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ductivity, Malthus construed into the eternal conflict between unlimited population and limited matter. Or, to be more precise, the disparity between two phases of evolution inside of the social organism, Malthus had assumed to be a disparity between the social organism and nature.

So much justification for Malthus. So much vindication for his theoretical delusion, born in a melancholy world of incapacity and limitation, and borne on the crest of a profound social pessimism.

But what of our Neo-Malthusians, who have the mighty stretch of a century of marvelous development to look at? How in the face of this development can they call us back to the antiquated, out-of-wind-and-air-created philosophy of Malthus.

The vital fallacy of Malthus and the Neo-Malthusians lies in their conception of overpopulation and poverty as a result of natural forces. To them there are two forces running counter in nature—the force of population and the force of produce. The first is whirling wildly, madly, bent upon one aim—the attainment of the greatest possible quantity. The second is of a more sparing and reserved character. The increase of food always lagging behind the increase of population, a state of affairs results, where the food to be distributed in society becomes inadequate for its maintenance, where an overpopulation appears on the scene, and poverty and disease smite humanity. Poverty is thus derived from a friction of purely natural forces: the nature of man and the nature of soil. And since it is called forth and fostered by natural phenomena, it must of necessity partake of the same qualities; it must be regarded as a natural law itself, as part and parcel of an organic system.

Thus Malthus and his modern disciples are led by the iron hand of their own logic to that point, where poverty in greater or lesser degree is perpetuated and made to cast its eternal shadow in the endless path of man. Since poverty is reduced to a natural law, it follows that it can-

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not be eradicated and stricken from the fabric of existence; that it can only undergo certain evolutional changes and reforms. And the best way to smooth the path for this evolution, is to intermeddle with the generative processes of humanity, to introduce order and consciousness into the chaotic and blindly-proceeding multiplication of society!

In so far Malthus of the eighteenth century and the birth-controlists of the twentieth century stand on one and the same sociological ground. Their theoretical conception of overpopulation and poverty, the practical solution of these problems they arrive at, bear the strictest relation. They only dissent as to the methods to be employed. The ascetic and reserved Englishman dreams of a world transformed into a monstrous ice-house, of a world dissolved into millions of little monasteries, where "moral restraint" is practiced, and where there is no mellow yielding to the charms of love and passion. In contradistinction to this, the modern birth-controlists, unsubmissive to Jesuitic morality, preach full indulgence in passion—only passion shorn of its innermost vision, blank and dead as to its relation to eternity and immortality—passion reduced to a mathematical formula.

II.

Modern political economy has time and again shattered to pieces these Malthusian theories of population. It has, to paraphrase the great economist Marx, proved Malthus' philosophy of poverty to be nothing more nor less than the poverty of his philosophy. Irrefutably and infallibly it has established the fact, that overpopulation and poverty spring, not from biological sources, but solely and exclusively from sources social and economic.

In ancient society, where man was incessantly wrangling with nature for the elementary means of his subsistence, where the results achieved by his labor never equalled the amount of labor spent, overpopulation and poverty came as a direct consequence of underproduction. The scarcity

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of products yielded by nature to society spelled superfluity of population, bore sole responsibility for its poverty.

Retracing mentally the steps of his slow social advancement, searching in the winding path of his misery and sorrow, the ancient man came bluntly and abruptly upon nature as the primary source of all his troubles. Spiteful and controversial, unwilling to unlock her hidden riches, she seemed to the ancient man to signify an enormously oppressing force of evil and hamper. And we find that he struck back to whence his blows came. To counterbalance the parsimonious tendency of nature to withhold her products he vowed to withhold and stint in the generation and upbringing of new life! An eye for an eye! A tooth for a tooth!

Centuries have since gone into oblivion. The unabated search of man for the key to mother earth has ultimately been crowned with success. He found it. He opened up vast and gigantic new lands. He bent to his will and subjected to cultivation what seemed to be eternally barren and sterile deserts. He invented an immense and complicated mass of tools of production—and to-day it is no more a question of underproduction that confronts individual and society, but largely one of diametrically opposite character, that of overproduction. It is a well known truism that the intensity of human labor developed through its adaptation to the speed of the machine, coupled with the enormous development of technique, tend toward the greatest productiveness possible. As a result, present day society at any given moment finds itself in the possession of infinitely more products than are actually indispensable for its maintenance. With the augmentation of this chronic overproduction, with the ever increasing incursion of the machine into the domain of industry and agriculture, there goes an ever decreasing demand for hands. Men are driven to vacate their jobs and leave humbly for the ranks of the gloomiest and most vanquished army on earth—the army of the unemployed. Or they slide and fall into that terrible pit from which there is no return: they find

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virtual death in the alleys of shameful and crumb-begging pauperism.

We are thus able to draw a demarcation between ancient and present society. In antiquity overpopulation and poverty emanated from underproduction, and individual poverty was conditioned mainly upon poverty of society. In our modern social organization overpopulation is largely due to overproduction, and individual poverty is nothing but a legitimate child of social wealth. The inference to be drawn therefrom is that whereas in antiquity the reduction of population in the form of infanticide and abortion could be regarded as a justifiable answer to overpopulation and poverty, in our present order of superabundance and wealth the answer to the social question lies exclusively in the economic sphere, in the just rearrangement of socio-economic relations.

III.

Is there any *raison d'être*, then, for the apprehension birth-controlists and Neo-Malthusians are instilling into the slums and ghettos as to the economic fallacies of uncurbed propagation? Can the economic question come within any decent approach of solution if birth control by chance assumes mass proportions?

There can be no question that in single isolated cases the adoption of the small family system may lead to a higher economic plane. But let the working class as a whole be permeated by birth-control ideas, and society will spring its surprise upon them; wages will soon go down and adapt themselves to the lessened needs of lessened families. Numerical retarding of society, or what is equal to it, depopulation may effect certain changes in a given social organism, but must of necessity remain feeble and impotent in its application to poverty as an organic whole, as a gigantic evil, whose roots penetrate so deeply into the soil of history. Inasmuch as the birth control movement does not strive actively to readjust economics to population, inasmuch as its basic aim is to passively readjust the pro-

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cesses of population to the processes of economics, it barely touches upon the edge of poverty and it neither destructs nor constructs any tangible economic values whatever. Moreover, by lulling the masses into dreams of reforms to be swept into their midst through passive means, the birth-control movement indirectly preaches political abstinence, and thus reacts to the detriment of real social advancement. It may be well remembered what glowing enthusiasm the appearance of Malthus' "Essay on Population" called forth on the part of the British aristocracy. By shifting the burden of responsibility for their misery to the masses themselves, by ascribing all the social evils to their unascetic and inferior habits of exaggerated prolificness, Malthus came to be recognized as the champion of the unassailable privileges of the "ruling minority." Perpetual poverty, misery as a law of nature, famine and war as the divine predestination of the Creator—what else was there left to be desired by British reaction? What else could restore the pose of the dominating British classes after the severe jolt Godwin had given them with his forceful teachings of social and economic equality?

History is now turning back on its heels. Our modern birth-controlists are preaching the same gospel. They likewise make it appear that the responsibility for all the social and economic maladjustments of to-day rests upon the shoulders of the masses, that the bearer of the cross is blamable for the cross itself!

NAHUM WOLF GOLDSTEIN.

NEWBURYPORT, MASSACHUSETTS.

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THE FUTURISM OF YOUNG ASIA.[1]

BENOY KUMAR SARKAR.

1. A "Critique" of Social Philosophy.

TOWARDS the end of the eighteenth century Immanuel Kant wrote the "Critique of Pure Reason," the "Critique of Applied Reason," and the "Critique of Judgment." The basic idea of this Critical Philosophy was to examine the methods and achievements of the human intellect between the great awakening of the Renaissance and the epoch of the French Revolution. Kant's criticism was "creative." It led to a "trans-valuation of values" as deep and wide as the "ideas of 1789." On the one hand, he established the validity of the physical sciences initiated by Galileo and Torricelli; and on the other, he pointed out their limitations by postulating the "categorical imperative" of man as a "moral agent."

If it is possible to generalize the diverse intellectual currents among the Turks, Egyptians, Persians, Hindus, Chinese, and Japanese of the twentieth century into any suitable formula, probably it should be called the "Critique of Occidental Reason." Through the political, industrial, literary, and educational institutions and propagandas of the Orient today there runs a common idea of "criticism." Young Asia has been taking a survey of the social philosophy and culture-anthropology which Eur-America has brought to the forefront between the "industrial revolution" (*c.* 1815) and the unsuccessful rising of the Chinese Boxers in 1900. Scepticism is the fundamental feature in the *Aufklärung* of the modern Orient. The "storm and stress" that is bringing a future Asia into being has its *élan* in the Mephistophelic doubt as to the validity of the Occidental pretensions.

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[1] A lecture delivered at Clark University, November, 1917.

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2. The Doctrine of Superior Races.

Probably the most universally accepted postulate in the thought of Europe and America is that the Occidental races are superior to the Oriental. The burden of school lessons, university lectures, and newspaper stories in these countries is to emphasize this notion. The whole world-culture of the previous five thousand years is assumed to be but as an insignificant preamble to the grand domination of the non-whites by the whites during the last few generations.

But how does the same history appear to the Oriental from his angle of vision? In his eyes it has been the historic rôle of Asia to be always the aggressor and of Europe to be ever on the defensive. By the test of arms the superior races of the world have been the Asians more often than the Europeans.

We need not go far back into the periods covered by Egyptology and Assyriology. We may begin with the Persians. During the fifth century B. C. the "Isles of Greece" were over-run by Darius and Xerxes. Their armies were recruited from every race of Western and Middle Asia, including the Hindus of the Punjab in India. Alexander's raid into Asia in the fourth century B. C. was but Europe's reply to the previous Asian adventure.

During the seventh and eighth centuries A. D., the Moslem Saracens pushed their arms into Europe as far as Spain and Southern France. Ask Charlemagne, he knows. The Pyrenees mountains became the Western boundary of Asia, and the Mediterranean Sea an Asian lake. The crusades started towards the end of the eleventh century (1099) were but attempts of the Christians at self-defence. It was against the tremendous "Asian peril" that these were directed by more or less pan-European alliances.

The "expansion of Asia" was undertaken from the north also by the Buddhists and Shamanists through the hordes of the Scythians, Mongols or Tartars of Central Asia. The Carpathian mountains, and not the Urals, remained for centuries the north-western boundary of Asia. "In Asia

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and eastern Europe," as Yule remarks in his *Travels of Marco Polo*, "scarcely a dog could bark without Mongol leave from the borders of Poland and the Gulf of Scanderoon to the Amur and the Yellow Sea." The whole of Russia was a "dependency" of the Mongol Emperors of China during the thirteenth century. It was only towards the end of the sixteenth century that the counter-movement was set on foot by the Russians to avenge themselves on the long-endured Asianization of Europe.

But, in the meantime, Europe had to swallow another aggression from Asia. This began with the capture of Constantinople by the Turks in 1453. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Turkish empire was one of the greatest powers in Europe. Louis XIV knew it. The eastern boundary of Europe shrank under Asian pressure as far to the interior as Venice on the Adriatic Sea, and Vienna, the capital of the Habsburg emperors. The Turks laid siege to that imperial city once in 1529 and a second time as late as 1682. It was not until 1699 that the Holy League of the Venetian republic, the King of Poland, the Habsburg emperor, and Peter the Great succeeded in resisting any further advance of the Crescent into the lands of the Cross.

What, then, is the verdict of history on the question of superior races? Did not the Asians enjoy "spheres of influence" in Europe all through the Middle Ages down to the beginning of the eighteenth century? The period of Asian hegemony covered, in fact, a full thousand years, from a century before Charlemagne till Peter the Great and Louis XIV. Has not the number of Oriental aggressions into Europe been greater than that of Occidental into Asia? Whatever pseudo-history may be taught in the schools and colleges of Europe and America, among the Orientals themselves the memory of their own military superiority is a potent factor in their modern consciousness. It cannot easily fade away, because this was not a romance of legendary heroes in an ante-diluvian age. It is a fact of the "history of our own times."

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The recent history of the world from the European success at Plassey in 1757 to the Asian victory at Port Arthur in 1905 is certainly the story of European expansion. But in the first place, this, again, is only the reaction of Europe to the Asian event of 1453. And in the second place, does this series of events during 150 years entitle the sociologist to propound the jingo cult of difference between the East and the West? This is the first question in the Critical Philosophy of Young Asia.

3. The Logic of the Occident.

Once upon a time a piece of painting was shown to a lion. It was the picture of a lion being trampled down by a man. The lion was asked as to how he liked that art-work. He replied: "Of course I have enjoyed it very much; but if a lion had painted this, the man would have been at the feet of the lion."

In modern times the entire Orient from Tokyo to Cairo has been a continent of peoples more or less "subject" in one form or another to the Occident. It is the "master" races that have studied the life and institutions of their dependencies, colonies, protectorates, spheres of influence. The mirror that has been held up to servile and semi-servile Asia by Eur-America has therefore naturally reflected this "lion in the painting" of the fable.

But let Asia get a chance to paint not only herself but also the culture of the Occident. She would at once proceed to imitate the *modus operandi* of Tsin Shi Hwangti (B. C. 221–210), who brought China for the first time under one Imperial Administration. The Confucian *literati* of his time seem to have been obstacles to his work of political consolidation. So, anticipating the "nation-makers" of the present day, he instituted a thorough-going censorship of thought and letters. He ordered a wholesale burning of all the ancient Chinese Classics. By destroying every vestige of the past he intended to inaugurate a new era of enlightenment and progress. It may be conjectured legitimately that if another Shi Hwangti were to appear in Asia

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today he would begin by declaring a bonfire of a considerable portion of the Occidental literature on the Orient.

The archæological, exploratory, and translation work done in Asia during the nineteenth century and since under the auspices of Eur-American Governments, Research Societies, and sumptuously financed savants is indeed marvellous. It is in the *interpretation* of the unearthed facts, however, that the superstition of the "superior" race chiefly manifests itself.

We shall best understand the methodology of Occidental scholars with regard to Oriental culture if we apply it, say, to the First Book of Homer's "Iliad." We should then be announcing to the world that the Occident has never known what it is to act in union. The besetting sin of the European races, we should argue, has always been the mutual jealousy of their leaders. This has rendered the presenting of a common front against an enemy impossible, even on momentous occasions. The scandalous altercation between King Agamemnon and General Achilles on the Field of Troy is an evidence of this. The treason, the anti-national and Trojanizing wrath of Achilles was caused, moreover, by a most ignoble and detestable feature of European morals, viz., concubinage. The girl Briseis had been captured by Achilles. But King Agamemnon ordered him to deliver her to the royal camp for his own use. Passages from the "Iliad" may be quoted to prove also the polygamous practices of Europeans, the licentiousness and despotism of their rulers, and the universal subjection of women to a position of servility.

This type of interpretation would be easily condemned on the simple ground that one must not generalize about millenniums of Occidental civilization from single verses of a single poet. But this very truism disappears from the consciousness of Eur-American scientists while they apply their brain to the interpretation of what they choose to call the heart or soul or spirit of the Orient. The injustice of this method is probably the greatest of all factors that have contributed to the rupture of fellow-feeling between

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the East and the West. And the futurists of Young Asia have their permanent fountain of inspiration in the intellectual pain and ill-treatment they have been accustomed to get from Eur-America's men of science.

4. The Alleged Pessimism of the Orient.

Max Müller wrote "India: what can it teach us?" The main trend of his thesis was to indicate that India can teach nothing but "sublime" speculations of an other-worldly character, the psychology of the soul, the ethics of retreat from the struggles of life, the metaphysics of the Infinite, etc. And Schopenhauer, himself a pessimist of the blackest dye, had brought to prominence some of the quietistic passages of the "Upanishads" and the Buddhist "Dhammapada." Since then it has become almost a fetish in the western world to take the Orient and pessimism as convertible terms. Especially is Buddhism known in the Occident as the cult of pacifism, annihilation, inactivity, nonresistance, monasticism, and so forth; and all other cults of the Orient are alleged to approximate this ideal more or less closely.

This notion about Oriental quietism and pessimism is one of the greatest *idolas* of the modern world. It cannot stand the least historical criticism.

First, the man Shakya-simha, called the Buddha (enlightened), was but one of the hundreds of India's leaders in the fifth and sixth centuries, B. C. They counted among them physicians, surgeons, logicians, publicists, diplomats, metaphysicians, sophists, etc. Shakya did not monopolize the whole thought and activity of the time.

Secondly, Shakya was not only the organizer of an order of monks and ascetics, like Pythagoras, but was the teacher also of duties for householders, consuls, archons, kings, merchants, and soldiers. Personally he was a firm believer in republicanism. The kingless polity of the United States of the Vajjians found in him its greatest champion. Quietism was the furthest removed from his teachings. Most of his followers were energists and active propagandists. They

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founded charitable institutions, schools, rest-houses, and hospitals both for human beings and animals. Asoka the Great (B. C. 270–230), the so-called Constantine of Buddhism, was an internationalist. He brought the whole of Western Asia, Egypt, Greece, and Macedon within the sphere of Hindu culture.

Thirdly, the religion called Buddhism was never a paramount religion and never had an exclusive sway in India, China, or Japan. The terms "Buddhist India," "Buddhist China" or "Buddhist Japan" are thus misnomers. They cannot apply to any epoch of the country's history. Besides, in India especially, no religion has ever dominated the policy of rulers and ruling classes. The Hindu state has never been "theocratic" in theory or practice.

Fourthly, even those who called themselves Buddhists did not make it a rule to fly away from the sufferings of the world. They could still be fighters, citizens, presidents, and kings. They took part in political intrigues and court revolutions, and were casuists, when necessary, like the Jesuits of Europe. There are many instances of Buddhist monks organizing themselves into military orders in the mediaeval history of China, Japan, and India.

Further, the alleged pessimism of Shakya-simha's teachings had practically no influence on the general mass of the population. The rulers of India proceeded to their work according to the principles of statecraft. These were as far removed from *ahimsa* or non-killing as Macchiavelli's *Prince* and Treitschke's *Politics* from Jesus' "My kingdom is not of this world." Thus, for instance, the *Artha-Shastra* (text book of politics) was compiled within about a century after Shakya's death, by Kautilya, the Bismarck of India. The following are some of the injunctions which this code of militarism lays down (Book X, ch. iii):

(1) "Women with prepared food and beverage should stand behind, uttering encouraging words to fighting men." This is out-Spartaing Sparta. Here is a system of real "universal" conscription.

(2) "Physicians with surgical instruments, machines, remedial oils, and cloth in their hands . . . should stand behind uttering encouraging words to fighting men."

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Besides, military service was not the monopoly of a special caste in India. The entire nation could be drilled at need. (*Ibid.*, Bk. IX, ch. ii.)

It is on such historic truths that the futurism of Young Asia is nurtured.

5. The So-Called Opening of China.

In 1842, at the end of the Opium War, China is said to have been "opened" by the treaty of Nanking. Since then more than 120 treaties have been concluded between the Chinese and the "Powers." Each treaty is a document of concessions of some sort or other wrung from the "sick man" of the Far East.

Between 1858 and 1885 almost the whole of the present-day French Indo-China was carved out of the Chinese Empire. By 1898 Russia, Germany, England, and France were masters of "possessions" on Chinese soil. Korea and Manchuria, parts of "Greater China," were passing into Russian hands. As the Chinese were too weak to resist, resistance was offered by Japan in 1904–1905 because her own independence would otherwise have been precarious. In 1910 Korea became Japanese territory. Since then Manchuria, Mongolia, Kashgaria (Turkestan), and Tibet have virtually passed out of China's hands. China has been opened indeed.

The number of foreign possessions within the bounds of China proper is not yet large. But there are over 100 stations, including treaty ports and stages on the Yangtsze River and the West River, which have been opened to international trade. There are "foreign settlements" in ten of these places; and there is not a single harbour in all the three thousand miles of coast line in which the Chinese can mobilize their own ships without the consent of the foreigners.

The consular authorities of the foreign powers rule their "settlements" practically as possessions. Besides, throughout Chinese territory the foreigners are immune from China's jurisdiction. With regard to this "extra-territo-

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rialty" the following remarks about Japan of 1911 would indicate the present status of the Chinese in their own territory:

"A nation which had to accept some of the conditions contained in these treaties was not really autonomous. For instance, the Japanese were not allowed to impose more than a small tax upon imports—a limitation which deprived them of the control of their own fiscal system, and affected the building up of industries. Moreover, the treaties exempted foreigners, residing in Japan, from the operation of her own criminal laws and secured to them the privilege of being arraigned solely before tribunals of their own nationality. These provisos were disliked, not only because it sometimes happened that a foreigner was judge in a suit in which he was personally concerned, but because of the implication that Japan was unfit to exercise one of the fundamental attributes of every sovereign state—judicial autonomy." (Porter: "Japan: the new World-Power.")

Mining, railway, and industrial concessions are enjoyed by foreign commercial syndicates. These lead to the play of back-door influence, and are the perennial sources of intrigues. The little political life that pulsates through the corpse of China is thus thoroughly demoralized.

What through financial indebtedness, what through commercial and industrial wire-pullers, what through extra-territoriality, and what through the sympathy and charity of professional friends, Young China has to undergo every day all the "intervention" that Austria wanted to enforce on Serbia in July, 1914. Only, China has to submit to the demands of half a dozen Austrias at least. This is the meaning of the "open door" policy loudly proclaimed by all with equal vehemence.

What is the justification of this high-handed intervention in the rights of Chinese sovereignty? The sociologists, students of race-culture, and apostles of peace movements are ready with their scientific answer. The interests of humanity, democracy, and civilization are said to require that China must be opened at the point of the bayonet. It is alleged that by nature the Chinese are averse to foreign intercourse, and that exclusiveness is their greatest national vice.

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According to the Critical Philosophy of Young Asia this allegation about China's exclusiveness and "splendid isolation" is perhaps the greatest untruth propagated by the "superior races" of the Occident. Can the combined intellect of Europe and America point to a single period of Chinese history in which the country was closed to foreigners? Is there any "cycle of Cathay" during which the Chinese refused to receive new arts and sciences from outsiders? Is there any epoch of Chinese culture that does not indicate the assimilation and imbibing of extraneous influences?

During the second century B. C., Chang Kien, the general of the famous Han emperor Wuti, penetrated into Western Asia (B. C. 135). He is known to have introduced the Persian vine into China. The opening of the route between the Far East and the "Roman Orient" was thus effected by a Chinese.

During the first century A. D., the Han emperor Mingti sent a deputation to the Central Asian province of "Greater India" in order to import the images of Buddha and Sanskrit texts (67 A. D.). According to a Chinese record, in the reign of Hwanti (147–168), Tienchu (India), Tatsin (Rome, Egypt, or Arabia) and other nations came to China by the Southern Sea, and Canton became the port of intercourse with foreigners. China's trade with the Byzantine empire is noticed in Cosmas' "Christian Topography" (530 A. D.). With the rise of Saracen Power, Chinese intercourse was established with the Mohammedans also in the seventh century.

The greatest epoch of Chinese civilization is the age of the mighty Tangs and brilliant Sungs (618–1260). It was an era of Renaissance in poetry, painting, philosophy, and what not. This was a direct product of the "holy alliance" between India and China for centuries. The Chinese of this their "Augustan age" were not only open to foreigners, but were also sending out thousands of missionaries, statesmen, scholars, and architects in order to civilize the islands of Japan.

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Under the Tangs, the Chinese empire had more than one city which was, like the cities of modern America, the babel of tongues, and the melting-pot of races. At Singan-fu, the capital, in the North West, there lived thousands of Hindu families, as well as Zoroastrians, Mohammedans, and Nestorian Christians. In 877 an Arab trader, Abu Zaid, described the port of Canfu near Hangchau, as the city in which 120,000 Mohammedans, Jews, Christians, and Magians were engaged in traffic.

The Chinese historians were always interested in "barbarian," *i.e.*, foreign countries and peoples. The official histories of the period from the Han to the Tang dynasty supply accurate information about Syria, Persia, Greece, and Parthia. The Chinese account of Constantinople is, according to Williams in *The Middle Kingdom*, more definite and exact than any contemporary Western account of the Chinese capital.

During the thirteenth century Marco Polo, the Venetian, was very well received by the Mongol emperor Kubla Khan. Many monks, Italian, French and Flemish, came on diplomatic missions to the Grand Monarch. Mongol dignitaries also went to Rome, Barcelona, Valencia, Lyons, Paris, London and Northampton.

During the next period, that of the Mings, the Portugese first arrived in China in 1516. From that date until 1724 in the reign of Yung-cheng, the Manchu, the representatives of the modern European nations were heartily welcomed into the Chinese empire. Christian missionaries were entrusted both by the Ming and the Manchu emperors with the work of reforming the Chinese calendar according to European improvements in astronomy. The Chinese did not display any extra conservatism, but were receptive enough to be taught by foreigners. But the Christians soon made themselves "undesirable aliens." It was extreme political necessity, arising from the open intrigues and aggressions of the foreigners, that compelled the Chinese, as it had previously forced the Japanese, to declare their country closed. The Chinese did not forbid

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the Europeans to enter China in the inhuman and humiliating way in which the enlightened, democratic, and humanitarian America of 1916 has deliberately proclaimed herself a forbidden land to the peaceful and industrious but flagless Aryans of Hindustan.

The cumulative effects of such aggressions, both positive and negative, have led the Orient to one inevitable conviction, viz., that the pseudo-science of open door is based on two arguments: (1) that nations have a right to "open" any country on earth only if they are backed by powerful guns, and (2) that a country can be "closed" to the only race on earth that has no right to bear arms. This belief has been a mighty feeder in the futurism of helpless Young Asia.

6. The Comparative Method.

The convenient perversion by jingoes of the historical truths about China's traditional foreign policy is but an aspect of the superstition to which the modern Eur-American mind has been inured by the dogma that naturally accrues to domineering and triumphant races. The futurists of Young Asia are therefore prepared to challenge the entire scientific machinery of the Occident in the study of culture-history. The work of Western sociologists is normally vitiated by one fundamental fallacy. This consists in a systematic malapplication of the comparative method in estimating the values of the Occidental and Oriental achievements.

Generally speaking, the "Orientalists" commit three fallacies in the application of the comparative method to the study of race-questions:

(1) They do not take the same class of facts. They compare the superstitions of the Orient with the rationalism of the Occident, while they ignore the rationalism of the Orient and suppress the superstitions of the Occident. They compare the thoughts and activities of the higher intellectual and economic grades of the Occident with those of the illiterates, paupers, and half-fed masses of the Orient. Intellectual fairness demands, however, that mentality and

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morality should be compared under "the same conditions of temperature and pressure."

Christian missionaries and even scientists of research societies take a morbid delight in picking up the worst features of Oriental life and thought. Ultimately through the movies, theaters, and journals, the Orient has become to their nationals a synonym for immorality, sensuousness, ignorance, and superstition.

But, was it not in Europe that political philosophy and political propaganda were based on the following wisdom?

"The sun is superior to the moon—St. Peter gave two swords to Christ. The Pope is like Sinai, the source of the oracle of God, and is superior to all kings and princes because Mt. Sinai is higher than other hills. Adam was the first king, Cain the first priest. The most perfect polity can be discovered within the pages of the Old and New Testaments. . . . The actions of Samuel or Uzziah or Jehoida or Ehud could be made into a system whereby all future political methods could be judged." (Figgis: *From Gerson to Grotius.*)

Again, while expatiating on Oriental erotics, Eur-American scholars with a safe conscience manage to forget the Greek romances of Heliodorus, Longus, and Tatius among the ancients, the Provencals and Troubadours of France, the "Wächterlieder" of the German minnesingers, the Italian cult of feminine beauty summarized by Burckhardt, and the "courtly love" in Chaucer and Gower. They are not at all moved by the fact that from the adultery among the gods described, *e.g.*, in the "Odyssey" (Book VIII) down to the sex-exciting advertisements of to-day founded on the principles of experimental psychology (applied to business), erotics of an intense and direct character has had a continuous sway throughout the Occidental world.

(2) The Eur-American sociologists do not apply the same method of interpretation to the data of the Orient as to those of the Occident. If superstition and sexuality have to be explained away or justified in one instance by "historical criticism," or by anthropological investigations, or on the strength of studies in adolescence, Freudianism, psychoanalysis, etc., they must be treated in the same way in the other.

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(3) The Occidental scholars are not sufficiently well grounded in "comparative chronology." They do not proceed to the work of striking a balance between the claims of the East and the West, age by age, *i.e.*, idea by idea, and institution by institution, in a time-sequence. They compare the old conditions of the Orient with the latest achievements of the Occident, and they ignore the fact that it is only during the last few decades that the same old conditions have disappeared from the West.

7. *The Age of Modernism.*

The present is the age of pullman cars, electric lifts, bachelor apartments, long distance telephones, zeppelins, and the "new woman." In their Oriental studies the Eur-American scholars seem to assume that these have been the inseparable features of the Western world all through the ages. If they were really conscious that some of these were not known to their grandfathers, and others even to their fathers, they could easily resist the temptation of finding some essential distinction between the Occidental and Oriental "ideals." Most of the emphasis laid on the influence of latitude, altitude, temperature, and "general aspects of nature" on civilization and "Weltanschauung" could then be automatically condemned as unhistorical.

Even in the days of Goethe, as described by Lewes, alchemy maintained its place among conflicting hypotheses, and the philosopher's stone had many seekers.

So far as economic conditions are concerned, nobody in the eighteenth century could announce the dictum: "East is East, and West is West." In spite of all the advantages of climate there was no "industrial revolution" in Europe till towards the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century. The people of Asia from Chandragupta to Kanghi would not have found any fundamental difference in Europe from Pericles to Frederick the Great. Modern sociologists who are following in the wake of Bodin, Montesquieu, Buckle, and Hegel, in the "geographical interpretation of history" should carefully ponder over this fact.

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The sociologist who likewise seeks to find a distinctively new type of humanity in the Oriental woman can supply his own correctives if he remembers the facts exhibited by Professor Calhoun in his *Social History of the American Family.*

The history of criminal law and capital punishment in England indicates, again, how late into modern times barbarity and inhumanity reigned in Europe. During the second quarter of the nineteenth century there were about two hundred and fifty offences for which the sentence was death. It is only since 1861 that capital punishment has been restricted to the offences of murder, treason and piracy.

Education is to-day the birth-right of every man and woman in the Occident. But such a statement could not be made before 1870. The educational advance in Eur-America during the last half-century must not be regarded as the norm of the Western world for the previous three millenniums.

Of the English people married even so late as in 1843, 32 per cent of the men and 49 per cent of the women could not read and write. They signed their names on the marriage register with a cross.

In 1833 Guizot, the French minister of education, instituted an inquiry into the educational condition of France. "Here are some of the sad results of the inquiry; all the teachers did not know how to write, . . . the ignorance was general."

Are the philosophers and scientists then justified in making a case for the historical difference in the "views of life" or outlook on the universe between the East and the West? The Critical Philosophy of Young Asia says "No" on the strength of comparative history.

8. The Event of 1905.

The story of modern Japan is a verification of this critical philosophy of Young Asia. The triumph of Japan over Russia is thus of profound significance to social science.

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The fact is generally misinterpreted in the Western World. Diplomats in Eur-America see in this the nucleus of a pan-Asian crusade against the whites. But the fear is utterly unfounded. Neither religion, nor race, nor language, nor all combined are necessarily strong cementing principles in the making of alliances. No effective federation could be formed among the little Hellases of antiquity. The confederacy of Delos, the Achaean League, the Aetolian League were all failures. The Mohammedan Caliphate broke very early into three sovereignties, subsequently into myriads. The alliances in mediaeval Europe were kaleidoscopic in character. The Christian Powers have for the last four hundred and fifty years failed to organize a common policy against the "infidel" Turks. Even the success of Japan was due to the fact that Russia was not actively assisted by her Christian brethren against the non-white pagan. An Asian Monroe Doctrine under the auspices of Japan would be as big a dead letter *in practical politics* as the famous message of the American President in 1823.

The event of 1905 is a formative force in the futurism of Young Asia from altogether another angle. In the first place, the recognition of Japan as a first class power has purged the atmosphere of the science-world of a great part of its arrogance and superstition. It has compelled moderation in the tone of the Occident with regard to the Orient. It has demolished the "papal infallibility" which Eur-American scholars had been ascribing to their races during the nineteenth century. The logic of the "white man's burden" has thus become an anachronism except only to the blindest fanatics.

In the second place, the events at Port Arthur and on the Tsu-shima Sea, the Marathon and Salamis of Asia, have proved in the only manner intelligible to the human mind that modernization is neither the monopoly of the Albinos, nor a very complicated and difficult process. The time-value of the sum-total of modernism is, pragmatically speaking, not more than twenty-five or thirty years. Let us note the facts.

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In 1853 Commodore Perry presented Japan with the electric telegraph, steam locomotive, telescope, clocks, maps, agricultural machinery, etc. But it was not till 1870 that the first line of telegraph was set up between Yokohama and Tokyo. The first railway line of 18 miles was constructed in 1872. And it was really during the period between 1880 and 1886 that the Japanese seriously commenced their novitiate in Eur-American culture. Within two decades of her "freshman" stage, however, Japan was master enough of the new arts and sciences to be able to browbeat a white aggressor. If there had been any difference between the East and the West in 1853, or 1867, or 1886, it was completely broken down in 1905.

It is clear that in spite of the epoch-making "industrial revolution" brought on by steam the West had not gone very far ahead of the East. The year 1905 has demonstrated, further, that the Asian civilization with which Japan started on the race about 1870 was not radically distinct from the Eur-American, but that it was slightly poorer and "inferior" only because it had not independently produced the steam engine. Scientifically speaking, there is thus nothing miraculous in the phenomenal developments of new Japan.

Since 1905 Japan herself has indeed been anxious to proclaim to the world that she is different from, and superior to, the rest of Asia in her ideals, institutions, and methods. But this notion is confined within the circle of a few diplomats, such professors as virtually hold diplomatic posts, and journalists who have touch with the jingo members of Parliament. It is, in fact, preached, in foreign languages only, by a section of those who have to come across, or make it a point to write for, Eur-American statesmen, scholars and tourists. The masses of the Japanese, and these diplomats themselves at home, are always conscious that ever since the days of Shotoku Taishi (A. D. 573–621) and Kobo Daishi (774–835), *i.e.*, since the very dawn of their civilization, the constitution, social hierarchy, architecture, moral notions, gods and goddesses, and even

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the folk-lore and superstitions of Japan have been Chinese and Hindu.

But it is not difficult to explain the tone and trend of some of the recent Japanese manifestoes and publications. These are designed to report to foreign governments, universities, and libraries that Japan is fundamentally different from the Asia that is under subjection to the Powers. These statements are perfectly legitimate measures of self-defence on the part of the Japanese. Without such shifts Japan apparently cannot come into line with the other "superior races," whose logic has been ruling the market. She has learnt by bitter experience that the first class powers of the world would not admit her into their caste if she were to appear to them in indigenous *kimono* and *geta*, or were to offer to foreign guests her unsugared *ocha* (green tea) without milk, and *khasi* cakes. Japanese bankers and officials, captains and policemen, are compelled to have the Eur-American paraphernalia of public life. This is abhorred by most of them in their heart of hearts. But they have to swallow it. They must pay some price for their recognition as citizens of the only "civilized" state of Asia.

The recent Japanese attitude of "superiority," though very limited, to Chinese and Hindu civilization, is merely an aspect of this compulsory Occidentalization. Unless the claim of separateness from the Asians is strongly put forward, the Occident would not care to treat with Japan as a peer. It was by urging such distinctions from the semi-subject Chinese and the subject races of India that she induced the United States to modify the Immigration Bill of 1916 especially in her favor. Young Asia accepts the entire situation as an inevitable corollary of the long-standing aggression of the Occident, of the tyranny of Albinocracy in the world. It does not, therefore, find fault with Japan, but rather pities her isolated condition.

Old Asian institutions and ideas are indeed still paramount in Japan. It is not a fact, and it cannot be psychologically conceived, that the Japanese were Eur-Americanized during the brief period under review. None of her

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Asian characteristics have thus stood in the way of Japan's growth as an "industrial power."

We get a bit of social Japan in the Japanese scholar Uyehara's "Political Development of Japan": "Young people of England and America would be shocked if they were told that boys and girls are not allowed to choose their life partners for themselves."

A class of "untouchable" outcasts still exists in Japan. They are called Etta. They live in the outskirts of towns and villages. Though they have been legally enfranchised since 1872 the social prejudice against them has survived. The Japanese deities can be grouped as (1) stellar bodies, (2) the elements of the earth, air, fire, water, (3) natural phenomena, (4) prominent natural objects, as mountains, trees and caverns, (5) men, (6) animals. There is a Japanese proverb to the effect: "What god we know not, yet a god there dwells."

In spite of all these social features objectionable from the latest Eur-American standpoint, Japan has succeeded in making herself into the "great Far Eastern ally" of England and the phobia of the United States. Young Asia therefore naturally asks the question: "Are not the customs and conventions of the Orient of at least the same political and military significance as those of the Occident?" The answer has been given in the event of 1905.

9. The Demand of Young Asia.

In the name of religion the missionaries, and in the name of science the scholars, have been rousing the worst passions of Oriental humanity. They dare do this because they know that Young Asia is unarmed and disarmed. And they can afford to exasperate pretty nearly one thousand million human beings as long as these men and women remain unrepresented by independent armies and independent navies.

The existence of Japan as the only free soil of the Asians is not an effective means of bringing the Western world to its senses. Japan, no doubt, is a first class power. But she

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is not strong enough to command the respect of the nations. She has not really stood on her legs as yet. It was but a few years ago, in 1911, that the humiliating "extra-territoriality" clauses were withdrawn by the Powers from their treaties with Japan. She is too weak even to suppress the anti-Japanese journalism of the aliens in the heart of her capital. And in foreign politics she is in perpetual danger of being cornered by the Whites. In fact, the subjection of the rest of Asia to the non-Asians is a standing menace to her own safety. She has ever to be on the alert against another "Russian advance" of 1904.

Events are everywhere tending to the great cataclysm when the adjustment of the relations between the East and the West would have to be submitted to the final court of appeal—the arbitrament of the sword. But before that inevitable day comes the road to world's peace may be considerably smoothed through the judicious co-operation of the intellectuals of the Occident and the Orient.

Young Asia does not want sympathy or charity. The demand of Young Asia is justice. It is nothing short of the equality of treatment as between the whites and the non-whites. And this not only in ambassadorial speeches, and parliamentary manifestoes, or presidential messages, but also in the discussions of learned societies, in school rooms, theaters, moving picture shows, daily journals, and monthly reviews.

The abolition of race-prejudice existing at present is possible only under two conditions:

(1) There must be an ethical revolution in Eur-America. The Occident must learn to treat the Orient—its morals, manners and sentiments, its struggles and failures in the only way which would be tolerated by the dignity of man. There must not be one standard for judging human flesh in the West and another standard for judging it in the East.

(2) There must be a psychological revolution in Eur-America. The very attitude from which scientists have approached the Orient will have to be completely abandoned. The fact of nineteenth century success and over-

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lordship must not be allowed to prejudice the brain of scholars. Oriental culture must be weighed in the balance under the same conditions of study as the Occidental.

Only under these conditions, in the recovery by Young Asia of its natural rights from the temporary aggressors and illegitimate usurpers, would sanity prevail in the deliberations of the great Peace-Council convened by the Parliament of Man. The futurists of Young Asia are looking forward to that spiritual rebirth of the world.

BENOY KUMAR SARKAR.

NEW YORK.

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AIR RAID REPRISALS AND STARVATION BY BLOCKADE.

MARGARET JOURDAIN.

I.

WHAT are commonly spoken of as "the laws of war" have been recognized as binding on civilised nations for a considerable period before they were codified; and at a time when they existed "only as a body of custom prescribed by military tradition, and in the works of international jurists. Their authority has been derived from the unwritten consent of nations, as evidenced by their practice."[1] This popular moral code was fundamental and international; and the international regulations were merely an attempt at a clear definition, an enforcement of it. A difficulty arises in the case of new methods of warfare. The poisoning of wells, the abuse of the white flag, would not be officially recommended by any civilised nation, but in the case of a new "barbarous" method there is only an outcry of the shocked popular conscience, not a strong body of military tradition to set against it. Such a new method was the use of poison gas against enemy troops, which was only adopted by the English and Allied forces after some delay and repugnance. When the Germans first used poison gas, they were vigorously denounced, and the Bishop of Pretoria considered it impossible that we should deliberately descend to the German level.

Generally speaking the apologists for the innovation treat it (1) as a development of past practice or (2) state that the enemy had been the first in the field; and that therefore their own use of the innovation, such as gas attacks, is in the nature of reprisals. The latter is the justification of a writer in the *Frankfurter Zeitung*.[2]

"It is even probable that missiles which emit poisonous gases have been used by us, since the German leaders have made it plain, that, as

[1] T. E. Holland, *The Laws of War on Land*, Oxford, 1908, p. 1.

[2] Quoted in the *Times*, April 29th, 1915.

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an answer to the treacherous missiles which have been used by the English and French for many weeks past we too shall employ gas bombs or whatever they are called. Do the English and the other people think that it makes a serious difference whether hundreds of guns and howitzers throw hundreds of thousands of shells on a single tiny spot . . . and make the German trenches a living hell, as was the case at Neuve Chapelle, or whether we throw a few shells which spread death in the air?"[3]

A new method or weapon (if successful) used against an army resulted in intensive slaughter of soldiers, but a different situation was created by military methods and weapons, which resulted in promiscuous slaughter of non-combatants. This was especially the case in aerial offensives. The distinction between combatants and non-combatants practically disappeared during the European war, because it was impossible to observe it. The German air raiders dropped their bombs impartially on munition centres, ports and factories, and the dwelling houses of the people, but happened to miss the first.

In the present war what had been hitherto a difference in kind became merely a difference of degree. The women-munition makers were described by a visitor as the "battalion of death"; and "to speak of whole nations as belligerents is no longer a rhetorical exaggeration but a sober statement of the new facts of warfare."[4] It might have been put forward as a justification of the German methods that the civil population was killed because it had ceased to be civil, but was a feeder of the army, directly or indirectly. A railway centre is a point of military importance, a post office a centre of communication, but this consistent attitude towards the inevitable "frightfulness" of air raids does not seem to have been adopted in Germany. A raid on January 19th, 1915, on the Norfolk coast, King's Lynn, Sheringham and Yarmouth, by German naval airships attacked (according to the official accounts) "fortified places on the East Coast."

[3] Germany was signatory to the Declaration of the Hague Conference of 1899 interdicting the use of asphyxiating gases in war.

[4] *Nation*, July 14th, 1917.

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Opinion in England differed widely whether the bombardment from the air of towns not immediately within the zone of military operations was a peculiar act of atrocity or merely a part of war. Was it similar to, or different from the bombardment of defended places by siege howitzers?

On the subject of bombardments the existing international conventions distinguish not between "fortified" and "unfortified" places, but between "defended" and "undefended." Undefended places are by the Hague regulations declared to be exempt from bombardment or attack "by any means whatsoever." Therefore bomb-dropping from air-ships or aeroplanes over such places—whatever may be said about bombing defended towns—is clearly a breach of international law. But what is an undefended place? The term is not defined by the Hague regulations.

Defended places include towns where troops are quartered, and where there are government establishments, storehouses, or railway stations used for the transport of troops. Antwerp in August, 1914, and London are defended places. Much indignation was expended on the bombardment of Antwerp in August, 1914, yet Antwerp was, as was pointed out, a defended place and a formidable fortress, protecting a very strong army, and its bombardment is permissible. Bombs dropped from aircraft are not more destructive than great shells fired from field howitzers. In the bombardments of defended places the civil population is not exempt, and even the British *Official Manual* declares that in operations against such places "the towns and forts form an indivisible whole." The case of London was discussed in April, 1914, and Sir David Henderson, speaking at the Royal United Services Institution, gave his opinion that to sail an airship over London and drop bombs here and there would be "quite opposed to the ethics of warfare as we at present understand them."[5] A correspondent[6] writing a few days later pointed out that

[5] *Times*, April 23rd, 1914.

[6] Col. L. Jackson, *Times*, April 30th, 1914.

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London would only be safeguarded from attack if not defended.

In April, 1914, the question was an academic one; not so from 1915 onwards. When English towns were bombed, there was, inevitably, a strong feeling for the employment of counter raids as reprisals. Now, reprisals is a technical term, which has been defined as "retaliation to force an enemy guilty of a certain act of illegitimate warfare to comply with the laws of war";[7] and the acts of illegitimate warfare complained of were the bombing of open, undefended towns. But to the majority of English people the bombing of London appeared fully as opposed to the ethics of warfare as the bombing, say, of King's Lynn. What was obvious was that in both cases it was civilians that suffered.

There was much discussion about the expediency of reprisals. The aim of reprisals is stated to be protective,[8] or contributing to the success of our arms by breaking the morale of the civilian population. "Briefly," writes Mr. Henry Morris (October 1st) in the *Times*, "the object is, in the words of Herr Haussmann, 'to paralyse the enemy's war spirit;' to make the Germans realise that their Kaiser and military despotism are unable to give them security. Nothing is more likely to break down their spirit than scaring this race of bullies by means of air raids. The scenes enacted by aliens in the underground railway during these recent air raids support this opinion." Yet, except for the concentrated panic of aliens (and others) in the underground railway, London was calm.

The Bishops passed a resolution in the Upper House of Convocation on February 16th, 1916, against a policy of reprisals, but the Bishop of Bangor dissented and expressed his belief that "if one hundred aeroplanes started from our shores and dropped bombs over the rich business part of Frankfurt, where a great part of the wealth of Germany is

[7] Oppenheim, *Land Warfare*, II, p. 41.

[8] By drawing off German airmen to defend their own country and also as a deterrent.

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concentrated, it would cause a profound effect throughout Germany, and the German people would at once say that the sending of Zeppelins was a blunder, and we should probably never see another Zeppelin here, because of the German fear of retaliation."

Unless we assume the German popular feeling to be very different from our own, a policy of reprisals might merely exacerbate the war. The bombing of London gave rise to the British cry for the bombing of Cologne and Essen; and it is probable that the bombing of these towns would cause a German outcry for more bombs on London. The actual damage to life and property in England as the result of air raids has not as yet been so widespread as to interfere with the supply of essentials to the army or to cause a stop-the-war movement among the civil population. The small number of casualties prevent the method having the effect of the continuous pressure of frightfulness used in dealing with the civil population of Belgium in occupied towns and villages in the early days of the war.

Another dissuasive line of argument was that our reprisals would spur the Germans to outdo our efforts. In a competition of criminality it is the greatest criminal that will win.[9] "Deliberate reason and experience of the past alike condemn them. At such a game we are sure to be beaten, just because the enemy is more unscrupulous than we are. Whatever we do, he will do something more, then throw the blame on us."[10] "We shall have started a competition in frightfulness in which we shall not contend on equal terms," writes the Bishop of Ely.[11] "In my belief," writes the Archbishop of Canterbury, "such action (*i.e.*, counter raids with intention to kill non-combatants) would be altogether futile as a deterrent: the Germans would always outdistance us in ruthlessness."[12]

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[9] *Nation*, June 23rd, 1917.
[10] W. Sanday, writing in the *Times*, February 7th, 1916.
[11] *Times*, April 23rd, 1917.
[12] Letter in the *Times*, June 22nd, 1917.

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On the ethical side, the expressions of opinion by the clergy have been singularly wide of the mark. They agree in denouncing a raid which had as its object the killing of non-combatants, women and children, as if the British government were proposing to abandon military objectives and were planning raids upon a German *Kurort*. Generally speaking the Bishops distinguish between a raid on "fortified" and "unfortified" towns (whereas the distinction is between "defended" and "undefended"), and give no indication whether they consider a German manufacturing town where war-work is being carried on, which is supplied with anti-aircraft guns, but is a considerable distance behind the lines, defended or undefended.

The Bishops in Convocation recorded their conviction that "the principles of morality forbid a policy of reprisals, which has, as a deliberate object, the killing and wounding of non-combatants," and would "permanently lower the standard of honourable conduct between nation and nation." The Archbishop of Canterbury, commenting upon this resolution in a letter (printed in the *Times*, June 22nd, 1917) distinguishes between the wounding and killing of non-combatants incidental to the bombardment of a *fortified* town[13] as "sometimes inevitable." "Quite different from this," he adds, "is an attack the direct object of which is to harm or kill non-combatants, either for reasons of vengeance, or in order to promote terror or in the hope of deterring the enemy from perpetrating outrages." The Bishops of Oxford and Ely in a joint letter (printed in the *Times*, October 15th, 1917) regard the "prospect of a new policy on the part of the government with regret and misgiving. . . . A practice which we adopt now . . . will for the next great war be regarded as the recognized custom. Further, while we are thankful to note General Smuts's words: We shall use every endeavour to spare as far as humanly possible the innocent and defenceless,' experience seems to show that such a qualification will

[13] The distinction is, as has been pointed out earlier, between *defended* and *undefended* places.

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prove to be nugatory." There is no essential difference between bombing Frankfurt or Karlsruhe, and the bombing operations freely carried on on towns and railway centres behind the German lines in France or Flanders.

There are, however, advocates for reprisals. The Rev. J. S. Roose, President of the Metropolitan Free Church Federation, is quite sure that Christ would not have disapproved of reprisals.[14] He ends his letter with the following argument: "If a man attacked my children, I should knock the brute down without the slightest hesitation."

Another justification for the justice of reprisals is collective responsibility. "Must not," writes the Dean of Salisbury, "the punishment of a criminal necessarily affect his family, the sins of the father being visited on the children? The crime of attacking non-combatant men, women and children should certainly be punished, and so punished as to be a deterrent, even though the criminal's punishment affect the family."

The Dean does not apply the doctrine of collective responsiblity. Either the whole German nation is the criminal,[15] or else only those persons responsible for the initiation and execution of the deeds in question. If the former, why talk of the family of the criminal? If the latter, reprisals do not propose to affect only the families of the German Air Board, and officers and men of the Flying Corps.

II.—Bombardment and Siege.

By the Hague regulations the attack or bombardment by whatever means of towns, villages, habitations or buildings which are not defended, is prohibited.

But what is the definition of "undefended?" In the Hague Convention, dealing with naval bombardment, "military works, military or naval establishments, depots of arms or war material, workshops or plant which could

[14] Quoted in the *Nation*, June 23rd, 1917.
[15] *Nation*, June 23rd, 1917.

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be used for the needs of a hostile fleet or army" may be destroyed by bombardment in spite of the place being "undefended." In the Hague regulations the commander of the attacking force is recommended[16] to take steps to warn the inhabitants of the impending bombardment, but he need not do so, nor give non-combatants notice to leave.

In the case of the German bombardment of Scarborough, December 16th, 1914, some troops were quartered in the place and there was a wireless station behind the town. It appears in the Army List as a cavalry station. According to Professor Oppenheimer, in *Land Warfare*,[17] the presence of troops in a town, even if they were only marching through it, would bring it within the definition of defended. The Germans, according to their practice, committed, not a breach of a technicality, but of the unwritten conventions of honourable campaigning—attacking what was practically a small open seaside town with no defences but an old Russian 60-pounder, a Crimean relic.

III.—Blockade and Siege.

Unlike the question of air raids, the question of blockade had long been familiar. A blockade has been described as a siege carried out at sea, but under more elastic conditions than a land siege. The question of the inhumanity of cutting off food supplies by blockade is exactly paralleled by the cutting off supplies by siege from a town, which "is rigorous, almost brutal, but it is war, and war admits of no half measures which come within the code of civilization; and this method, extreme though it be, has long been recognized as legitimate warfare."[18]

It is admitted that armies—say the French army—have the right to set up barriers against the export of food into Germany. Yet the British "blockade" is reprobated by the descendants of the besiegers of Paris in 1870–71. The

[16] Hague Regulations, Article 26.

[17] P. 34 (para. 119).

[18] Sir F. Pigott, *The Neutral Merchant and Contraband of War and Blockade.* London: 1915, p. 42.

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English "would like to make the whole of Germany one vast concentration camp"[19] according to Dr. Eltzbacher, and Herr von Jagow, Secretary of Foreign Affairs (February, 1915) said that "England is trying to force upon the German civilian population death by starvation." The antiquity and respectability of the method of starvation and the parallel between siege and blockade has been freely recognized by the Germans themselves, both in the past and at the present day. The *Vorwärts*[20] admitted that "starving out is the oldest method of war and a method privileged by international law to the present day. Of course the object is not really that human beings should die of hunger. The purpose is only, by the pressure of the stomach to compel people to make peace." The "pressure on the stomach" was applied ruthlessly by Germany in the siege of Paris, which lasted from September 19th, 1870, to January 28th, 1871. During the siege the limited supply of milk was sold at 2 francs a *litre* and it consisted of three quarters of water. The price put it out of the reach of the poor. Mr. Washburne, who was in Paris during the siege, writes in his diary, November 12th, 1870, that "during the last few days the suffering has greatly increased. The crowds at the offices of the various mayors . . . are very large and all are without food."[21] On November 23rd he notes the following prices for the day; for cats, a common cat, 8 francs, for rats, a common rat, 2 francs, long-tailed rat, $1\frac{1}{2}$ francs; for dogs, a cur of low degree, 2 francs a pound.[22]

It was suggested that the country people who had been

[19] "The concentration camps of the Boer War afford the latest proof that the English gentleman is not ashamed to make war against women and children; now England desires to use this well tried weapon on a large scale and would like to make the whole of Germany one vast concentration camp." *Germany's Food. Can It Last?* A study by German experts, ed. by P. Eltzbacher. English trans.: ed. S. Russell Wells, M.D., London. University of London Press, 1915, p. 2.

[20] March, 1915. Quoted in the *Times' History of the War*, vol. v, 175.

[21] *Recollections of a Minister to France, 1869–1877*, London, 1887, vol. i, p. 221.

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 235.

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caught in the environs by the rapid advance of the German army might be allowed to leave. The request was refused.

Count Caprivi, speaking in the Reichstag on March 4th, 1892, made a very complete statement on the subject of the parallel between siege and blockade.

"Whoever is engaged in war wishes to attain his object, and if he is vigorous he will employ every means to attain it. In a naval war the cutting off of an enemy's trade is one of these means. No one can forego it. And really is it anything more than is done on land? If, during the siege of Paris, someone had equipped a train with food stuffs for the Parisians, the train would simply have been stopped. Exactly the same happens at sea. If someone equipped a ship to supply the wants of the enemy, then the other side would try to capture those supplies, even if they consisted only of food stuffs and raw material indispensable for the enemy industries. And I must say that if States act in this way they use only the means which war gives them. In such conduct I should see absolutely no barbarity or any difference from the measures taken in a war on land. And I believe that, inasmuch as no naval war has been waged on a large scale since the days of Nelson, views about naval war have arisen which underestimate its force and power."

Again, Prince Bismarck was asked in 1885 by the Kiel Chamber of Commerce to protest against the action of the French fleet in preventing the importation of food stuffs into China during the war then in progress, and wrote that "any disadvantage our commercial and carrying interests must suffer by the treatment of rice as contraband of war does not justify our opposing a measure which it has been thought fit to take in carrying on a foreign war. . . . The measure in question has for its object the shortening of the war by increasing the difficulties of the enemy and it is a justifiable step in war if impartially enforced against all neutrals."

As to the Allied "blockade," as it is popularly termed, as the fundamental test of contraband is: "Are the commodities in question indispensable to the prosecution of the war?" and as the answer to this is yes, food is as essential to the forces as bullets and therefore equally seizable; there is really no difference with regard to the consideration of food as contraband of war. If it is consigned to or placed under the exclusive control of the government, the

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natural presumption is that it is destined for the government's soldiers,—whether exclusively or not is immaterial.[23] The responsibility of the feeding of civilians rests with the government that has assumed control of the country's food and has rationed them in the interests of the army.

When the German government in the autumn of 1914 saw the necessity of dealing with the problem of food supplies, the British blockade was described as the *Aushungerungsplan*—the British starvation scheme, and with the intention of creating prejudice, it was stigmatised as "war on women and children." But within a few weeks of the opening of the war, the Germans sank ships carrying food to British ports, such as the American *William P. Frye* carrying a cargo of wheat from Seattle to Queenstown, while the *Karlsruhe* sank the Dutch *Maria* (September, 1914) which sailed from California with a cargo of grain consigned to Dublin and Belfast, and so on.

As the German government had (January 26, 1915) announced its intention of seizing all stocks of corn and flour and forbade all private transactions as from that morning, grain became "a munition of war." The British government accordingly directed that the *Wilhelmina*, bound for Hamburg from the United States, should be intercepted and her cargo seized. The German government then issued, February 6th, 1915, a decree repealing the former provision requiring flour and grain to be delivered only to certain government controlled organizations. This would normally have restored food stuffs sent to Germany to conditional contraband.[24] But, as Sir Edward Grey pointed out in the British Note[25] "in any country in which there exists such a tremendous organization for war as now obtains in Germany there is no clear division between those whom the government is responsible for feeding and those for whom it is not. Experience shows that the power of

[23] Coleman Phillipson, *International Law and the Great War*, London: 1915, p. 346.

[24] Coleman Phillipson.

[25] February 10th, 1915.

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requisition will be used to the fullest extent in order to make sure that the wants of the military are supplied, and however much goods may be imported for civil use, it is by the military that they will be consumed if military exigencies require it."

Germany replied by announcing a blockade of Britain as from the 18th of February, and notified that "all enemy ships found in this area will be destroyed, and all neutral vessels may be exposed to danger." This amounted to a claim to torpedo at sight any merchant vessel under any flag. On March 1st came the British Declaration of a counter stroke, followed by an order in Council which outlined measures for preventing any commodities whatever from reaching Germany. The word blockade is not mentioned, for the measures did not fulfil the conditions of a technical blockade; and they were avowedly retaliatory against Germany.

The possibility of starving Germany is, of course, a question apart from our alleged intention of starving Germany. It was certainly the view of German experts, both before the war and in the autumn of 1914, that, provided the various methods they recommended were adopted, the nation, even if isolated, could not be starved. "It is true," writes Professor Elzbacher, "that rigid economy will have to be practised and that irksome restrictions will have to be submitted to, and that a complete readjustment of production and standard of living must take place; and it is also true that the margin is a narrow one, but with proper foresight and wise regulations, the home production of Germany is . . . sufficient to feed her large population."[26]

The fact that Germany is not starved in the fourth year of war is a confirmation of their views.

MARGARET JOURDAIN.

LONDON, ENGLAND.

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[26] *German Food: Can It Last?* p. xii. See also, W. J. Ashley, German Resources under the Blockade. *The Atlantic Monthly*, 1915, p. 819.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

NIETZSCHE THE THINKER—A STUDY. By William Mackintire Salter. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1917. Pp. x, 539.

Everyone who is familiar with the articles upon Nietzsche which Mr. Salter has contributed to various periodicals during the last few years must welcome his completed volume as sure to contain a scholarly and impartial presentation of the teachings of this most enigmatical of thinkers. The current conception of Nietzsche's writings as one of the intellectual forces responsible for the war and for the mode in which it has been conducted by the Central Powers is naturally not conducive to the unbiased examinations of Nietzsche's theories, and Mr. Salter's study should be of great service in correcting many popular errors on the subject. There has been in the past no lack of books purporting to contain all that one needs to know about Nietzsche, the man, and Nietzsche, the philosopher; but so many have been written from a superficial knowledge, indeed, in some cases, with what seems to be wilful misrepresentation, that they are worse than useless. Many, too, confine themselves to the unimportant rather than to what is really distinctive, and so give rise to distorted ideas. It is easy to make a collection of daring aphorisms which will catch the attention and shock the reader; but at the end he knows no more of Nietzsche's philosophy than he did at the beginning. Doubtless this sort of writing appeals to its own public, but for the man who really wishes to know and who is willing to take the trouble to do some serious thinking, Mr. Salter has now provided the means of acquiring genuine knowledge. His work is by far the best that has been done in English, and ranks with the hitherto unrivalled studies of Riehl and Lichtenberger.

Nietzsche's position in the intellectual world of to-day is a curious one. Several of his striking phrases, a few of his most radical ideas, often distorted beyond recognition, have permeated every civilized country and greet one at every turn. Extravagantly lauded by his little coterie of admirers, to whom he fills the place Kant occupied for their fathers, he is there rather the center of a cult than the object of critical study. Important as he is, however, even for serious students, he does not rank, in

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the writer's opinion, among the very greatest; and it hardly seems probable that Mr. Salter's prophecy will be fulfilled when he says that we shall some day be speaking of a pre-Nietzschean and a post-Nietzschean period of philosophy, and that a philosopher's position will depend upon whether or not he has reckoned with Nietzsche. Great he is, but to place him beside Kant is to give him more honor than is his due.

There has come to be a general recognition that Nietzsche's philosophical activity falls into three well marked periods, of which the third is by far the most important. Through them all there runs a common end or ideal, which Mr. Salter characterizes as religious, though he admits that the outcome would not ordinarily be called by that name. Nietzsche's nature, he thinks, was deeply reverent, and after the beliefs of his childhood had been destroyed by study, it came to be his great problem to find some mode of satisfying the instincts thus thwarted. He could live without God, but not without the godlike; and in the same way, though he felt obliged to discard Christian morality, he was equally compelled to find a substitute for it. The will to power, the superman, the supreme value and importance of a strong personality, these represent the outcome of his thinking, and are what he came to regard as the great realities.

If Mr. Salter's book can be charged with any one great fault, it is with what often seems to be an excessive sympathy with the philosophical fortunes of its subject. Just as he is at great pains to defend Nietzsche's character against adverse criticism, claiming even in the face of his own quotations that an overwhelming sense of his own importance had no place there, so he is always concerned to establish, if possible, the originality and consistency of Nietzsche's doctrines. He would have, for instance, the theory of eternal recurrence a logical necessity and an ethical postulate, but fails to point out its deterministic implications. On the contrary it has always seemed to me that the reason why Nietzsche regarded the theory as a touchstone for men was precisely because it could contain no moral stimulus. Knowing that in spite of all your futile struggles your life is determined down to the slightest detail, can you dare face the certainty that it will be repeated through all eternity? If you can, you are a Dionysiac pessimist and worthy to bring about the superman.

Mr. Salter gives at length and in some respects more clearly

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and effectively than any of his predecessors the details of Nietzsche's criticism of moral obligation. For instance he insists upon Nietzsche's declaration that our present morality is a group morality and so of importance merely in relation to the group. It satisfies the average man but the thinker has gladly turned his attention elsewhere. Moreover a group morality is binding only upon the group and so cannot be extended beyond the limits of the latter. There can be no moral relationships between different nations and different societies. It is worthy of note in passing, especially because it is overlooked by most critics and is hardly made clear by Mr. Salter, that Nietzsche's famous statements concerning the moral compatibility of kindness toward members of the group, with cruelty to those outside it, all refer to the current morality. Under present circumstances such statements naturally catch the attention; but while there is nothing to show that Nietzsche would himself condemn the procedure in question, they nevertheless refer especially to the morality he has set aside.

One of the best chapters in Mr. Salter's book is the one in which he sums up the conclusions of Nietzsche's destructive criticism. Morality, in the ordinary sense of the term, has been characterized as a danger. It stands aside from the main issues of life and is even a menace to them. It weakens purpose and would like to see everybody comfortable. The higher man is warned against it. As he values his soul, he must have nothing to do with this creation of slaves. Mr. Salter is not always correct, it seems to me, in his treatment of details, but his conclusions are admirably drawn and admirably stated.

What, then, is the superman for whose sake the present moral order is to be discarded? In the answer Mr. Salter finds the revelation of Nietzsche's genius. "Nietzsche used this significant language, 'Once, when men looked on the far-stretching sea, they said God; but I teach you to say Superman.' The conceptions are in a way correlative." Nietzsche "belongs to the company of those, or of One, who said, 'be ye perfect' and set up as the standard the infinite perfection of God." "Man (as he exists) is something to be surpassed: that is his starting point." "For man as he is is not a happy throw of nature's dice; there is something fundamentally wrong with him. . . . He is tentative material merely; the failures predominate; broken fragments, ruins are what we see about us. Hence suffering is Nietzsche's main

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feeling. We thirst, he says, for great and deep souls, and discover at best a social animal. Only a living, habitual sense of perfect things could beget a dissatisfaction like this."[1] Life, the highest life, is the end, and as such provides a standard that is independent of personal feeling or opinion. But though abundance of life is his *summum bonum*, Nietzsche has no sympathy with the prevailing admiration for social service. The community is not invariably higher than the individual and to be a "servant of the common life" is to destroy all chance of individual greatness. He will have no gregariousness, no common rights and common duties, no equality in any sense, but the strong personality, that rejoices in being different from other men, that finds its pleasure and its inspiration in the rare and difficult. Such men learn to set aside all the ordinary love for comfort and security; they can endure pain and want and sickness,—perhaps must do so, for they are to be a new type of saints, and no saint has ever been able entirely to dispense with asceticism.

In spite of what is at times a certain cumbrousness of expression Mr. Salter has succeeded in catching and reproducing the exalted tone of enthusiasm with which Nietzsche himself sets forth his ideal. Many critics, resting their case especially upon passages from *Also sprach Zarathustra*, have given biological significance to the theory and regarded the superman as a new species to be evolved sometime in the future. Mr. Salter, unwilling to press doubtful passages, thinks it more probable that Nietzsche gradually came to think of the superman as simply the extraordinary individual, the great personality, free from all artificial restraints and strong enough to live his own life as he chose, without regard to the demands of society.

It would take too long to go into Mr. Salter's excellent account of Nietzsche's social and political theories. They are often inconsistent, but they provide much intellectual stimulus for the reader who is not too much concerned with systematic form. One question, however, can hardly be omitted at the present time, and that is the one concerning Nietzsche's share in the responsibility for the Great War. Mr. Salter's book, he tells us, was written for the most part before the outbreak of hostilities; and though he has inserted an occasional reference to the

[1] Pp. 341–344

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subject, he has purposely omitted its discussion. It is his opinion, however, that Nietzsche, instead of leading the German or even the European thought of the present, goes directly counter to its main tendencies, and that the strong feeling now existing against his very name is merely a prejudice due to ignorance of his real position. To a certain extent it seems to me that Mr. Salter is right in this respect. Nietzsche's popularity, at least in the past, has always been greater outside the German Empire than within its limits; and no one could feel less sympathy than he with the commercial and imperial aims now summed up in the first line of the famous anthem, *Deutschland über alles*. He was constantly maintaining that the Germans had no Kultur that was worthy of the name. Nevertheless I do not see how he could have failed to welcome the war, and to regard it as the one great opportunity for Germany to save her soul alive,—perhaps even as the means of acquiring the soul that he sometimes seemed to think she lacked. He greatly admired Napoleon and often cited him, together with Caesar Borgia as an historical instance of the superman. It is absurd to say that Nietzsche brought about the War, but on the other hand it is no more than the simple truth to recognize that in his theories are to be found a justification for all that his countrymen have done or may still do.

GRACE NEAL DOLSON.

ELEMENTS OF CONSTRUCTIVE PHILOSOPHY. By J. S. Mackenzie, Emeritus Professor of Logic and Philosophy, University College, Cardiff. London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd. New York: The Macmillan Co. Pp. 487. Price, 12s. 6d. net.

Dr. Mackenzie is heartily to be congratulated on the completion of a task which has occupied him in spite of many interruptions for upwards of a quarter of a century. He is so anxious to seek light wherever it may be found and so ready to adjust his views in order that they may reflect as much of it as possible that one can hardly avoid wondering how many drafts were cast aside in the process. The result is a volume which reflects extraordinarily well recent philosophical tendencies. Readers of Dr. Mackenzie's previous writings do not require to be told that he takes the utmost pains to make his meaning clear and assists the student with ample references to a wide range of philosophy and literature. The plan of the book is simple enough. The first part discusses certain general problems about knowledge and its relation to reality. In the second there follows a con-

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sideration of some more special metaphysical problems, causality, modes of unity, and these general conceptions which bear particularly on ethics and politics. The scheme is completed by an attempt to determine how far we are justified in regarding the universe as a cosmos or perfect order. Such a book must be of the utmost use to senior students as well as those people (if there are any) who take a general interest in philosophy. And it does not matter how senior the students are.

The first few chapters may be thought disappointing, because so many important and interesting problems are raised, discussed briefly, and then dropped. Later on however they are taken up again and the earlier sketch filled in. Some difficulty of this sort is bound to arise in treating a complex and closely inter-related subject-matter. As a whole Dr. Mackenzie's scheme and method of treatment seem to be very ingenious; and though there are few philosophical problems on which he does not say something, his final treatment is never really scrappy or disconnected. But it makes it far from easy to say anything about one element in his doctrine without dragging in the others.

The most obvious feature of Dr. Mackenzie's position is that while remaining broadly idealist in basis and structure it constantly takes account of, and is greatly influenced by, realism. Nothing, we know, could be more typical of the last quarter of a century, unless it be that in a serious metaphysical work pragmatism gets only a very small share of attention. The fact that the idea of choice seems most central in the system does not contradict this; for its function is only to unite knowledge and action. A man's choice exhibits itself in his beliefs as well as in his overt actions. In neither case are the grounds completely known: and the endeavour to work them out raises the problem of objective orders; which, in a particular and highly important instance, is that social order, the spiritual unity of mankind, which is the basis of moral and political obligation. This emphasis on the notion of order marks a departure from the strict Hegelian tradition and the influence of Driesch and Royce. From the side of knowledge what seems most to distinguish Dr. Mackenzie's present view is his treatment of belief. Knowledge, in fact, is correct belief together with the apprehension of its ground. To distinguish belief from judgment certainly makes it possible to deal with some of the difficulties which have frequently been urged against Idealism. He will not admit, for example, that

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there can be degrees of truth, though there are degrees in the correctness of belief. Similarly he denies that there are degrees of reality, though here his position is not so definite. Yet he maintains the coherence theory of truth, and takes it to mean that the meaning of any judgment either is or is not in conformity with the structure of the system to which it refers. A proposition is true if it is implied in the system; for only in relation to the system have truth and falsehood any meaning. This position is extremely difficult to understand, but it seems an essential part of Dr. Mackenzie's view, and may be brought out along with some other aspects of his thinking by a consideration of his ethics, which receives as such only a summary statement here, though we can appreciate pretty fully its relation to his metaphysics.

Although he expresses agreement with Mr. Moore's views on intrinsic value, Dr. Mackenzie maintains that there is a sense in which ethics is a metaphysical science. By this he seems sometimes to mean that it involves the study of certain fundamental ideas such as value or obligation in their objective significance, and that no idea can be taken as fundamental except on metaphysical grounds. This appears to involve an inconvenient sense of the term metaphysical, and is not what has usually been meant by those who have insisted most strongly on the close interrelation of ethics and metaphysics; for they have held that when we try to ascertain what good or value really means and what things are worth having for their own sake, we find that we cannot answer the question adequately without discussions which involve a theory of the structure of the universe as a whole. (This is quite a different thing from holding that ethical truths provide material for metaphysics.) Now Dr. Mackenzie sometimes seems to lean to this second view. The earlier part of his discussion of value is excellent; the objectivity of value and the difference of intrinsic from instrumental value are carefully explained. Then he proceeds to argue that while Truth, Beauty, and Goodness are the objects that most obviously present themselves to us as having the former character, "no one of them could be accepted as really satisfactory, if the others were absent." From this I should have thought it followed that only the wholes in which all these elements (each of which, by the way, requires further definition) occur have intrinsic value. Something might perhaps be said for this view; but Dr. Mackenzie goes further, and for a most instructive reason. "It is

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a mistake," he says, "to speak of the value of any single object as such." From which he concludes that it is doubtful whether anything can really be said to have intrinsic value except the cosmos. Yet "provisionally Truth, Beauty, and Goodness may be regarded as having intrinsic value" (p. 291). This is the difficulty about the coherence theory of truth over again. Dr. Mackenzie does not defend it on the usual grounds, because by a judgment he means a proposition and not a fragment torn from experience, the living unity of subject and object. I am at a loss to discover on what precisely he bases it. A system of truths may be inter-connected; it may be possible to infer one from another. But this does not mean that only the system is true. A world may be made up of a number of things, and each of them may have value; as also may wholes in which they occur.

I should like to notice in detail the most interesting discussion of personality and the super-personal by which Dr. Mackenzie works out more fully his view of moral and political life, but I shall pass them over, remarking only on two points. The first is that a more specific treatment would have been desirable of the way in which there can be reconciled the traditional idealist conception of the soul, which treats it on the whole as equivalent to the world as experienced and brought together in a focus, with that more generally (though not at all exclusively) associated with realism, which quite sharply distinguishes the self from the body and treats the former as a collection of mental states or even as a substance. The former view is dominant in Dr. Mackenzie's discussions of the social unities and of immortality, the latter in his sections on consciousness and knowledge. Secondly, what he has to say about the general will is particularly good; he is most careful to distinguish sharply between society and the state.

The final part of the book explains what grounds there are for regarding our universe as part of a cosmos, which is by hypothesis completely self-explanatory and perfect. Instead of trying to do this directly Dr. Mackenzie argues that those features in the universe which seem most obviously to conflict with such a possibility are, properly understood, compatible with it. This requires both a discussion of the meaning of the idea of a cosmos and a detailed examination of the nature of contingency, change, and evil. Special attention is devoted to the problem of infinity and its bearings on the nature of time and eternity, and a wel-

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come attempt is made to bring some of the ideas of Indian philosophy into relation with Western theories of the Absolute. This rather empirical method is very attractive; and Dr. Mackenzie undoubtedly throws much light on the solution of these problems. But the same difficulty to which I have before referred re-emerges here. The spiritual unity of mankind, which has been called "the ultimate source of moral obligation" (p. 339) is, it is argued, not really self-explanatory, for it develops in relation to an alien world. It is difficult to see in what sense the world is alien to knowledge or beauty or love, or how its special character can affect the general conditions of moral action. Perhaps Dr. Mackenzie means that until you appreciate the cosmos fully you cannot certainly know that Truth and Beauty and Goodness are really worth having. Correction of belief is, I suppose, always possible. But no more than this recognition is required, unless you mean that any or all of these three are to be identified with the self-explanatory; in which case a judgment is true or a life good in so far as it expresses the whole; it has more of reality in it. But this, I take it, Dr. Mackenzie denies. "It is very misleading," he says, "to say that what is important or valuable is more real than what is less important or less valuable" (p. 127). Nevertheless the latter is the usual idealist view. The source of the difficulty is much as before. If the whole is a system, are its parts intelligible only in relation to the system, or not? Do they possess their own character and also enter into the system, or does the system possess all the character there is? If you maintain then that the whole is perfect, that need not on the former of these views mean that it has any moral character, though it may contain a number of highly moral people. Virtue is the mark, not of a world, but of a member of one. Whatever God is, on any traditional view of his nature, he cannot be moral. Dr. Mackenzie appears to hesitate at this conclusion; but if the idea of the cosmos is admitted at all, it seems inevitable. Moreover it has orthodoxy on its side.

The most striking characteristic of the whole volume remains to be mentioned. Very few philosophical works are written with the same admirable candour as this, or an equal determination to state fairly and try to solve every difficulty. Even if it had no other merits, it would give to the student an impressive lesson in the proper spirit of philosophical enquiry.

M. W. ROBIESON.

Belfast, Ireland.

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A DEFENCE OF IDEALISM: SOME QUESTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS. By May Sinclair. London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd. Pp. xxii, 396. Price, 12s. net.

The general argument of this book is somewhat difficult to disentangle, because its logical structure is not very clear or distinct. It has not much in common with those arguments in favor of idealism of which Dr. Bosanquet's Gifford lectures are the most typical example; though its general conclusions are plainly intended to be in harmony with those of Mr. Bradley. This is in fact the most striking thing in it. Miss Sinclair is not the only idealist writer recently who has abandoned the detailed study of the "self-movement" of experience and of the lines of division and therefore of explanation which run through it which (it is generally supposed) is the special characteristic of idealism, in favor of a final appeal to certain high immediate experiences and their very general analysis and defence against criticism. Such a procedure has no doubt certain advantages. It avoids a number of difficulties in reference to the real center of individuality; it permits a constant appeal without much criticism to desires and their satisfaction; and it makes a generous inclusion possible of all sorts of opposing views. I should even be tempted to say that it allows one to maintain one's prejudices intact in one's philosophy; and, most significant of all, that psychical whole which seemed lost may come again by its supposed rights. But all this is at the expense of those elements in the discussion of idealism which are, I should think, its real heart; where its adherents find its greatest values and its opponents think it most of all fails to make good its case. Nor can there be much room for doubt as to the reasons for this tendency, indicating as it does a certain failure of nerve. The formidable advance of realism has induced some of the adherents of idealism to offer a much less bold front. Miss Sinclair sees this clearly enough, and devotes a long and interesting chapter, which I should like to discuss in detail, to a criticism of the New Realism. It purports to show that though such methods are perfectly sound up to a point, they end finally in contradictions which realism cannot solve but in which the idealist merely rejoices. Further, and more important, it cannot establish what conclusions it does reach definitely enough to make appeal to the experiences of the mystic irrelevant or finally untrustworthy.

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I agree that against such certainties there is no arguing: but few or no realists would deny it. It hardly requires proof; and though Miss Sinclair raises many interesting points and commits many still more interesting errors, her argument can hardly prove what is obvious. It is against the idealist who storms the strongholds of the Absolute by a frontal attack armed with weapons of logic that realism is most threatening, for it denies the coherence theory of truth. But then this sort of idealist—if he can make good his case—gets precisely what Miss Sinclair misses, the certainty of consolidating securely whatever ground he gains.

Though such a standpoint really rests on a distrust of the intellect, Miss Sinclair maintains that logic is the backbone of philosophy, and the absence of it, together with an appeal to immediate ends and interests, the defect of Pragmatism. Her own logical methods are peculiar, and for an idealist they are loose. Reality is spirit; it is the ultimate reality of things and the ultimate reality of consciousness; it is one and it is psychical, appearing in and informing all things. Spirit may be defined as that "which thinks and wills and energises in one undivided act" (p. 335).

Beginning from the consideration of individuality, Miss Sinclair shows that it does not lie in memory; or in any other arrangement of experiences; nor can it be found in self-feeling; nor in will, though this brings us much nearer; nor in short in anything less than the whole, for the unity of consciousness must be all-inclusive and more than the sum of experiences. In the case of each of these arguments Miss Sinclair develops her own theory on the basis of more or less friendly criticism of the well-known philosophical writings of S. Butler, of the Vitalism of M. Bergson, and of the "Animism" of Dr. MacDougall. In each case also, particularly, I think, in that of Butler, she has a great deal to say which is true and many incidental remarks which are both amusing and valuable. All the same the general basis of her doctrine as to personal identity does not carry much conviction; it would be greatly modified by a real maintenance of the distinction of memory, in the strict sense of recollection, from retentiveness. All that is strictly required for personal identity, so far at least as we can tell by empirical evidence, is the latter, and this is compatible with very great gaps in recollection. In order to account for the facts it is not really neces-

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sary to introduce the hypothesis of a self above and independent of particular experiences.

The tentative establishment of a form of animism as against the parallelists which is the conclusion of Dr. MacDougall's *Body and Mind* is however not enough for metaphysics. Its completion demands a unity beyond the unity of consciousness and that of all physical things; and this cannot be an unknowable. And the position of the objective idealist is not any better; for consciousness also falls short of being the whole of the real. The common error of all these views is that of "mistaking one or other set of appearances for ultimate reality, or one part of reality for the whole" (p. 143). We want a term for that which underlies all these and that which has slipped from them. Spirit fulfils this need. It leaves a wide margin for the unknown.

Sufficient has been said to show that the plan of this argument is idealistic without being very exact or strenuous. But the endeavour to show how the highest human experiences lead beyond themselves to the whole is more definitely apparent in the second half of the book, which attempts two things: (1) to defend the position against the attacks of pragmatism and realism; (2) to work out in greater detail by the consideration of higher experiences the nature of Spirit as the absolute and ultimate reality, and to define to some extent its relation to finite experiences. This is possible "provided that Monism lowers its claims to something less than certainty" (p. 272).

The chapter on the New Mysticism seems to me easily the best in the book. It is distinguished by a considerable acquaintance with the literature of mysticism and a great sympathy with it, accompanied by a determination to face the criticisms that may be brought against it. The most significant of all these is that of the Freudians who see in it nothing but a reversion, due to repression, to primitive elemental desires, and the psyche thrown back on the remote stages of its course. Miss Sinclair shows both here and elsewhere a wide knowledge of the psychology of Freud and Jung and—what is much rarer—an appreciation of the philosophical and ethical as distinct from the merely psychological problems which arise out of their work. She fully admits that mysticism has a bad history and that the careers of its remote ancestors will not bear examination; also that the conditions under which much mystical experience occurred were extremely favorable to pathological manifestations. Yet she

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argues that there may in some cases be a real sublimation; we may in fact have a new faculty emerging; and if so that it should have a close kinship in some respects with morbidity is no more than we should expect, for the strain on the soul will in fact show itself along the usual lines. This of course is to follow the argument of Mr. F. W. Myers as to the distinction between the developmental and the degenerative, and as a guide the idea seems to me sound in principle. By mysticism at its best Miss Sinclair seems to mean Kabîr and Rabindranath Tagore, and nothing that she has written is more interesting than the contrasts she draws between eastern and western mysticism. The defect of the latter, which it overcomes only very occasionally in the case of great mystics like Lady Julian of Norwich, is its persistent asceticism; it can never reach completeness because the flesh though suppressed will continue to rise up against it. Eastern mysticism is joyful and robust; it gathers difference within itself because "its aim is not to acquire but to realise." Kabîr says: " . . . stay where you are and all things shall come to you in time."

The final chapter contains the conclusions to which the argument points. On the whole the discussion of finite appearances, of evil, and of the way in which the distinctness of the finite selves is maintained in and through their fusion with the infinite self follow pretty familiar lines. That of immortality, as might have been expected from a writer so much influenced by eastern mysticism, does not. Miss Sinclair, if I understand her aright, thinks immortality indicated though not proved by her argument; it helps to make intelligible the evil in the existing universe; it is in accordance with the strong desire of the soul, a desire more strongly felt as its vitality is higher and the content of the self richer; but it is not really personal, for it involves the forgetting of previous experiences as a condition of more perfect consciousness.

Miss Sinclair is anything but a professional philosopher, and in some respects the style of her book benefits from this difference of training. In places however it is allowed to degenerate to a degree of looseness she herself would never permit in a novel. Nevertheless she has succeeded in producing what she evidently set out to produce—a serious philosophical work. Though I disagree with a very great deal of her argument, I regard her book as most interesting and even as important. She tells us that she

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hopes to follow it up by another volume dealing with the problems raised by psycho-analysis. Since it is in this region that her work is at its best, we shall anticipate the new book with interest; and shall do so the more if it is to possess what its predecessor lacks—an index and a table of contents.

M. W. Robieson.

Belfast, Ireland.

The Limits of Pure Democracy. By W. H. Mallock. London: Chapman & Hall, Ltd., 1918. Pp. xx, 398. Price, 15s. net.

Mr. Mallock's book is a brilliant study of democracy, very remote from "that sentimentality, mainly of middle-class origin, which suggests impossible estimates of what justice demands for all men." It improves on a second reading, when his full and patient demolition of some lost causes, his somewhat academic discussion of certain problems, take their place in his leisurely and well-rounded argument.

Mr. Mallock, who began to write this book early in 1914, has found himself among the prophets. Begun without any thought of the war, he now finds his thesis of such importance that all practical controversies may be said to turn on it; while Russia, falling into anarchy by practising the principles he criticises so ably, is illustrating it with unexampled abundance. The book is in part a praise of oligarchy, in part a criticism of certain crude ideals of democracy, many of which had already become discredited. It rounds off Mr. Mallock's argument, however, to shatter into fragments anew Rousseau's famous phrase and the economics of Marx. Pure democracy is restricted to primitive communities or to some settlements kept together by the bond of religion. But in some few communities, such as a large modern state, he has no difficulty in showing that such phrases as the general will are without meaning in respect to the composite and complex questions forming the bulk of the matter of politics, though the general will can be expressed with regard to such questions as the necessity for the preservation of order, or the declaration of war against Germany. Indeed, in problems such as the best form of anti-aircraft defence, or the adoption of protection, the will of the many is not sufficiently enlightened, and needs the lights of the few. Mr. Mallock's conclusion is that democracy only realises itself through oligarchy, which

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brings order out of chaos, like the Spirit moving on the face of the waters. Just as industrial life on a large scale is not possible without business management, so democracy has need of controlling persons. "In business enterprises or experiments in Socialism, when the worker dispenses himself of the aid of a specially able directorate, the total product, instead of being maintained or increased, shrinks to a fraction of what it was when the ability of the directorate was operative." When the Jesuits were a power in Paraguay, they taught the natives the art of watchmaking; but when the Jesuits were driven from the country, the native watchmakers were helpless. There was no longer a question of which did the most in the making of the new merchandise, the mind of the directorate or the labour of the men directed. Mr. Mallock rightly emphasises the fact that the great increase in wealth during the nineteenth century is due to the directorate of organisers of large businesses, a truth already admitted widely, and pleasantly expressed in the confession Mr. Mallock quotes from the *Vorwärts* that the Marxian theory that manual labour is the only source of wealth is as superannuated as Thales's belief that the universe is formed of water.

In some interesting chapters Mr. Mallock seeks to extract the residuum of truth contained in the philosophy of economic discontent. He devotes one chapter to the "right to respect," that is, the right of every man to be treated with courtesy by his employer (an obvious concession, but one of which the employer still needs to be reminded), and pronounces in favour of a minimum wage.

M. J.

London, England.

SHORTER NOTICES.

PROBLEMS OF THE PEACE. By W. H. Dawson. London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd. Pp. 366. Price, 7s. 6d. net.

Mr. Dawson concerns himself in this interesting book not with the war, but with the prospects of an after war settlement, a good "peace," the "delimitation of the boundary line of civilisation and the determination whether Germany shall for the future fall within or outside the line." As Mr. Dawson does not limit himself to mere adherence to the League of Nations scheme, but like Mr. Brailsford commits himself to definite proposals on the most vexed of European and colonial questions arising out of the war, there is much to be learned from the book, especially as his discussions are throughout remarkable for their wisdom and modera-

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tion. Each question, the future of Alsace Lorraine, of Poland, and of the German colonies, the possibility of measures of reparation and of the organization for peace is treated in a conciliatory spirit, for the outlined policy is designed to cool not to inflame, to supplant international division by unity, and so to set Europe and the world on a better, safer, saner path.

Mr. Dawson proposes that the part of England should be, as at the Congress of Vienna, that of a mediator and conciliator; and there is no doubt that the question of European territorial adjustments can be treated by English writers with a spirit of detachment that is rarely found in the countries more directly interested. In a question in which the British Empire is directly concerned, the future of the German colonies, Mr. Dawson does not sufficiently stress the reasons against these being returned to Germany. In his claim for a parliamentary control of foreign affairs and a widely diffused public instruction respecting them and abolition of secret diplomacy Mr. Dawson is at one with an influential group of modern writers.

E. F.

A League of Nations: Contributions by Various Writers. London: The League of Nations Society, 1917. Pp. 30. Price, 6d.

This pamphlet is an attempt to popularize the idea of the League of Nations and to rebut the obsession that its supporters are but a handful of cranks building an impracticable Utopia. It contains two excellent papers by Mr. G. P. Gooch, on "The Concert of Europe and the Balance of Power," and by Dr. T. J. Lawrence on the development of international arbitration. Other contributors are Mr. L. S. Woolf and Mr. Noel Buxton. It is unfortunate that the idea of a League of Nations, familiar in the weekly and monthly periodicals, has been allowed so little publicity in the daily press, which is the most effective organ in fostering or discouraging the "international mind."

M. J.

The Commonwealth at War. By A. F. Pollard, M.A., Litt.D. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1917. Pp. viii, 256. Price, 6s. 6d. net.

Most of these essays have been published, and their republication serves, like turning over the piles of newspapers for the war-period, to show the vanity of human forecasts. For, in the words Thucydides puts in the mouth of the Corinthian envoys, "war least of all things proceeds according to programme." But though the writer sees no further than the rest of us in regard to the next turn of this kaleidoscope of war there are some weighty lessons which are more valuable than forecasts. The war is to him the epitaph upon the latest age of scientific progress, and the clamour for a more materialistic education is a reflex of this age in which the growth of man's control over physical forces outran his control over human passions. Dr. Pollard lays stress on the fact that this is no war of nations, but the civil war of the human race, and upon whose issue "depend the principles of the government of man"; that history is a light to guide us, that historical students will understand the Napoleonic wars all the better for having felt a similar tension, and that communion with the past is essential to the continuous life of humanity.

E. F.

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LIBERTY AND DEMOCRACY AND OTHER ESSAYS IN WAR-TIME. By Hartley Burr Alexander. Boston: Marshall Jones Company, 1918. Pp. viii, 229, Price, $1.75.

In the preface to this book of war-time essays Professor Alexander explains their appearance in this form (for they are all reprints of articles from this and other journals) by his belief that "the urgency of thought is such that every citizen who prizes his citizenship should publicly and repeatedly express the best that is in him" (p. vi). The dominant note of the essays—and indeed the only unifying idea—is this belief in the efficacy of reason and individual responsibility. Reason is the essence of true freedom and must be sought in a democratic state (p. 21). "None has suffered the delusion of a more colossal unintelligence than has Germany; none has so ghastlily grained the horror of unreason into the souls of men" (p. 41). Reason dispells the fear of the mechanical—of industrial mechanism, political mechanism, and German mechanism. Reason, the guiding principle of Rousseau's democracy, elevates the ideals of humanitarian France to a place far above those of Darwin and Nietzsche. Faith in reason is the core of Americanism.

Several of the essays have reference to rather limited situations, such as the discovery of pro-German sympathy in our country at the time of our entrance into war, or the question of minority opinion during war-time. One of them, the longest, is a review of Rousseau's political humanitarianism, called forth by the appearance of Vaughan's edition of Rousseau, and related to the other essays by the fact that they are all more or less definite attempts to interpret the ideals of the various warring countries. In this attempt Professor Alexander is successful insofar as he is concerned with the restatement of these ideals in current idealistic vocabulary. Perhaps a less brilliant and passionate style might have lent itself more illuminatingly to a search for the practical import of such concepts as reason, progress, national ideals, the causes, in terms of ideals, for which the several nations are fighting. What, for example, is the interpretation of his conclusion that "Democratic liberty means, then, tolerance of individual judgment, for the sake of the cultivation of reason . . . It does not extend to conduct, except where conduct involves no mutual interference" (p. 150). What is the bearing of such a statement upon the problem of the conscientious objector? Even one who would agree that "general principles must be the first rules of all telling practice" (p. vi) would surely add that without specific problems of practice there can be no need for general principles. E. A.

FREEDOM. By Gilbert Cannan. London: Headley Bros., Ltd., 1917. Pp. 106. Price, 2s. net.

Mr. Cannan is afraid of the fate of liberty. To-day "there is no nation under the sun where liberty is not everywhere conspired against"; women are in "captivity" and marriage is not what it might be. Punishment is "a blasphemous idea, an impertinent outrage upon the moral law which shines through all nature."

Mr. Cannan mistakes strong language for strong thinking.

M. J.

THE FREE PRESS. By Hilaire Belloc. London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1918. Pp. viii, 102. Price, 2s. 6d. net.

With the thesis of this little book most people will agree, but Mr. Belloc's treatment could be more succinct. The case against the capitalist

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press, its position in forming and misinforming public opinion is, however, effectively put, but Mr. Belloc does not point out the effect of "official" suppressions and perversions, a growing distrust of the official organ. Characteristic of Mr. Belloc's style are *boutades* such as "there never was a time in European history when the mass of people thought so little for themselves" (p. 83) and (speaking of certain suffragists) "I have never quite understood why these wealthy ladies wanted such an absurdity as the modern franchise, or why they so blindly hated the Christian institution of the family. I suppose it was some perversion" (p. 28). The main outlines of the danger of a press in which enormous power over public opinion is placed in the hands of a few people were ably stated by Mr. Chesterton in an article in the *British Review*, 1913.

M. J.

TERMS OF INDUSTRIAL PEACE. By Alexander Ramsay. London: Constable & Co., Ltd., 1917. Pp. xii, 144. Price, 3s. net.

Mr. Ramsay, who has seen both sides of the problem of the relation between capital and labour, states his case with full and sober knowledge. He has some practical suggestions to make in his criticism of English business methods as compared with the American, and the one-sided action of trades unions. In the interests of speeding up, he suggests that if it has been possible in the past for the Unions to punish a man for doing what they consider too much work, it is equally possible for them to punish him when he obviously does too little. Another good point he makes is the hitherto unsystematic use made of arbitration in our industrial system. The chapter on "Moral responsibility" is an appeal to public spirit. "The treasure of the world is mankind . . . if the time came when there were no circumstances to suggest the possibility, or justify the existence, of industrial war, the dawn would break on such a day as this land of ours has never seen. A day on which would be seen the development of a bigger and better race; of men full grown, not only in physical but in moral and spiritual qualities, the love of justice in their hearts, the passion for social righteousness in their souls."

M. J.

TOWARDS INDUSTRIAL FREEDOM. By Edward Carpenter. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1917. Pp. xvi, 224. Price, 3s. 6d. net.

Some of these papers have appeared before, in pamphlet form, but their re-issue at the present time is opportune. The most definite and concrete are "Small Holdings and Co-operation," and "The Village and the Landlord." "British Aristocracy and The House of Lords," is an unsparing exposure of one of the most mischievous and expensive anomalies in the world,—and one which is equally remote from either the democratic or the true aristocratic ideal. The concluding essay on Chinese civilization does not pretend to be an exhaustive or an impartial summing up of the pros and cons for this immensely stable type of social order; it frankly enumerates and emphasises its excellences alone, and is none the less interesting because we cannot accept as an ideal anything so static and allowing so little scope for human individual diversity.

F. W. STELLA BROWNE.

THE ESSENTIALS OF PHILOSOPHY. By R. W. Sellars. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1917. Pp. x, 301.

This is an excellent outline of the field and problems of philosophy. It is frankly written from the author's standpoint of critical Realism. The

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style is clear and straightforward. The definitions are logical and illuminating. Problems are illustrated by references to their historical treatment and by occasional brief quotations. The close relation between philosophy and the sciences, particularly psychology, is emphasized. Teachers of introductory courses in philosophy will find the book of value in presenting a balanced and comprehensive view of the subject. It will probably serve better to systematize discussions and readings of diverse, first hand materials than to create the beginnings of philosophical interest. The references in connection with each topic treated are well selected and represent current as well as historical literature.

E. S. A.

THE WORLD AS IMAGINATION. (Series I.) By Edward Douglas Fawcett, London: Macmillan & Co., 1916. Pp. xlii, 623. Price, 15s. net.

The essential parts of the book reveal themselves as Part I, Chapter II. and Part II, Chapter I. Here the creative imagination is disclosed. Imagination is the "primeval reality, itself unresolved, into which all else can be resolved" (p. 7); and Mr. Fawcett persuades us toward this reality by examining the rôle of imagination in scientific hypothesis. An hypothesis advanced in explanation of natural phenomena is an "imaginal makeshift for sensible experience" (p. 26). A physical hypothesis has meaning for us only if we can supply in imagination "all the so-called secondary qualities . . . which are present in experienced nature but absent from the conceptual or mechanical substitute." Here "makeshift" appears to be used in the Bergsonian rather than the pragmatist sense. The imagining is a mental "substitute-fact": it is "true" if it is sufficiently like the reality in nature. But if the imagining is to be *like*, it must be of similar nature, and we therefore conclude that ultimate reality is "imaginal." But Mr. Fawcett adds "*presupposing, of course* (italics mine) acceptance of the main thesis of this essay" (p. 27).

Here the author's idealistic bias shows itself; and while he criticises the orthodox philosophy severely, and on the whole justly, I am not sure that he does not stick closer by it than he thinks. His absolutist tendency is most apparent in connection with the problem of evil. Evils are real (p. 569); and some space is devoted to a protest against explaining them away. But evil belongs only to the time-process (p. 584); "there can be no evil in the cosmic imagination considered apart from the creative episodes." Evil is born with a "change," aptly described as the "Fall." "The victimiser and the victims are the same reality . . . this is tremendous truth" (p. 587). Tremendous, but yet a household word. It is our old acquaintance, the Red Slayer, *la plaie et le couteau!*

If, however, one can accept imagination as a term of ultimate meaning, apart from contexts, then one can accept Mr. Fawcett's essay as a highly important work; and those who do not so accept it must yet admit that the thesis is elaborated with great ingenuity and care, and that many penetrating criticisms and observations have been scattered by the way. We must be grateful to Mr. Fawcett also for his outspoken denial of personality to the cosmic imagination.

T. STEARNS ELIOT.

A PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM OF THEISTIC IDEALISM. By James Lindsay, D.D., M.A., B.Sc.; F.R.S.E., etc. Edinburgh and London: Wm. Blackwood and Sons, 1917. Pp. xi, 530. Price, 12s. 6d. net.

Dr. Lindsay's work is an exposition and defence of theistic idealism, and claims to present a system intelligible, self-consistent and contra-

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vened by no known fact. It is critical as well as constructive; and its criticism extends to thinkers British, American, German, French, and Italian. The contents of the volume are: Chapter I, "Foundations of Idealism: Laws of Logic and Psychology"; II, "The God of Theistic Idealism"; III, "The Metaphysics of Creation"; IV, "The Metaphysics of Time and of Eternity"; V, "History and Providence in Theistic Idealism"; VI, "The Philosophy of Nature"; VII, "The Philosophy of Science"; VIII, "The Philosophy of Art"; IX, "Freedom in Theistic Idealism"; X, "The Moral Order, and the Spiritual World, in Theistic Idealism"; XI, "Immortality in Theistic Idealism." Also, a very full index—twenty-eight columns—of authors and subjects.

Dr. Lindsay points out that the work belongs to universal philosophy, and that in its discussions all the philosophical disciplines are laid under obligation. But, for the present JOURNAL, it is important to observe that Ethics receives great attention through almost the whole work, particular emphasis being laid on the ethical aspects of individuality, of Deity, of history, of value, of art, of freedom, and of immortality. Neo-Hegelianism, Neo-Kantianism, Pragmatism, Bergsonism, Voluntarism, etc., receive critical though incidental treatment, and Realism receives some greater justice than is usual in works on Idealism. The range and character of the work, however, can be gathered only from its study.

L.

THE LIVING PAST: A SKETCH OF WESTERN PROGRESS. By F. S. Marvin. Third Edition. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1917. Pp. xvi, 296. Price, 3s. 6d. net.

This excellent work is a short introduction to general history from the earliest times down to quite modern times. The subject of universal history was due, in essentials, to Kant and the philosophers of the eighteenth century, and Comte seems to have a very great influence on the modern school of general historians. The ideal of general history is utterly opposed to the ideas made rigid by tradition of "history" as an appendage of politics (cf. pp. 5, 57, 179, 223). The chapters of the book, after a first chapter on "Looking Backward," are on the childhood of the race, the early empires, the Greeks, the Romans, the Middle Ages, the Renascence and the New World, the rise of modern science, the industrial revolution in England, the French Revolution and the allied social and political revolutions, progress after revolution, and "Looking Forward." The contrast with the usual books on history is shown more particularly in the chapters beginning with that on the Middle Ages. We see how religious organization in the Middle Ages was the center of Western evolution, but by the end of the thirteenth century the Crusades and the revival of study in the universities had set in motion new currents of thought, while the Papacy, by overstraining its authority, fell from its supremacy. In the fifteenth century we have the discovery of the New World and the resulting economic and intellectual ferment. In the seventeenth century the "physicomathematical" sciences become the most potent links in human society, and pave the way for the industrial revolution in the eighteenth and early part of the nineteenth centuries. During the nineteenth century science became more biological than mechanical and work of scientific reform brought the nations together and made "the strongest safeguard against international strife" (p. xvi). With regard to the present war, Mr. Marvin confidently hopes "that the cause of human unity will ultimately prevail, and perhaps even gain by the terrible blows which now

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seem to be shattering it" (p. 258). A very interesting point is that commercial rivalry as a cause of war is certainly one cause but by no means the chief cause (p. 259). "The links of commerce were always stronger than its jealousies. It thrives on intercourse and goodwill. . . . A common activity is a better defence than a common alarm; and those activities are most easily internationalized which contain most science" (p. 260). The last chapter is mainly devoted to emphasis on the needs of the future generation. The whole book is devoted primarily to that Western civilization which at present dominates the world. Mr. Marvin's work can hardly be too highly recommended.

PHILIP E. B. JOURDAIN.

THE ECONOMIC ANTI-CHRIST: A STUDY IN SOCIAL POLITY. By the Rev. W. Blissard, M.A. London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1917. Pp. 253. Price, 6s. net.

The Anglican Church had, not long ago, a mission to call the nation to repentance. There are signs that some churchmen, such as Mr. Blissard, feel that it is the Church that is in need of repentance for its opportunist complicity with what the author terms "economic militarism," with its consequent loss of human values, and for "increasing the supreme peril of aborted faculty by functioning mainly in spiritual individualism." As far as the primary causes of social impulse matter, the Church has gone into retreat and remains there, and in the modern industrial world it is Trade Unionism that is applied Christianity. Mr. Blissard is a hard hitter and gives the Church some honest hammering. In the last pages of his book he repeats the conclusions of his earlier work, *The Ethics of Usury and Interest*, that capital is the Anti-Christ, and the industrial system an economic militarism without conscience or morality.

M. J.

THE CHURCH IN THE COMMONWEALTH. By Richard Roberts. London: Headley Brothers, 1917. Pp. 151. Price, 2s. net.

This book, the second volume of a new series called "The New Commonwealth Books," is a brief and effective plea for disestablishment, on the ground that the national church almost always suspends its functions in times of crisis. "There is no case on record of a state church which has refused to follow the drum" or bless any military venture. The author, a Presbyterian, insists on the democratic view of the State, his ideal is what he calls a "Federal State," granting free play to the life of groups and adjusting harmoniously their external relations.

M. J.

WOMEN AND THE SOVEREIGN STATE. (New Commonwealth Books.) By A. Maude Royden. London: Headley Bros., Ltd., 1917. Pp. 142. Price, 2s. net.

This survey of the relations of women and the State is a fervently and persuasively written expansion of the thesis that women are a servile class in the community, and helots among the Spartan males. The position of woman is, in her eyes, due to what she believes to be the subjection of woman to man, the refusal of her claim to any other than a sexual life. The lines of the argument are familiar.

G. S.

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LAST WORDS ON GREAT ISSUES. By John Beattie Crozier, LL.D. London: Chapman & Hall, 1917. Pp. xiv, 226. Price, 10s. 6d. net.

This collection of papers by Dr. Crozier is, according to the author, valedictory, and by way of winding up his literary career. The papers are also what he considers the most significant pages of his long lifework, his last will and testament in a nutshell. They range from religion and religious experience to protection, from spiritualism to socialism. What has limited Dr. Crozier's public has been his preference during his career for the unpopular side. He was a protectionist before Chamberlain, a rebel against the reigning Victorian kings of thought, Darwin, Spencer, and Mill. Now at the present time the general drift of his opinions are shared by a wider public. The fragmentary letters to the press (Chapter XII) are hardly worth reprinting. In "A Literary Outcast" he compares his long run of neglect to the fate of Samuel Butler, who was "obliged to throw his stack of unsold books at peoples' heads on the chance that some poor devil might read them," but even assuming that the fluctuations of Butler's reputation have a parallel in Dr. Crozier's, there are worse fates than that of the isolated and forgotten Butler, who has now become the headstone of the corner.

M. J.

FROM PERICLES TO PHILIP. By T. R. Glover. London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1917. Pp. xii, 406. Price, 8s. 6d. net.

Dr. Glover gives a vision of Greek life during the century and a quarter between the birth of Pericles and the accession of Philip, not in the form of a continuous history, but in ably written studies of Greek life as it showed itself in a traveller (Herodotus), a poet (Euripides), a historian (Thucydides) and in education, in the market and in home-life. The reason why he chooses a personal illustration in so many cases is because significant events are "not deposited in history naked and solitary like the boulders shed by the ice floes on the southern shore of the Gulf of St. Lawrence," but are apt to be associated with the personality of some man, who has helped to make the atmosphere of his own day or the age following.

Athens was an education for Greece, Pericles said; what came out of Athens is still the basis of our own education. There are, besides, points of contact between the political philosophy of Athens and of European states today; and the danger of imperialism, the result of setting up of precedents of "frightfulness," as in the *andrapodizing* of Melos, the strain of a long war and the readjustment of all life to conditions that raise question and doubt, the endeavour to re-found society are not only of great historical significance: Athens is still a teacher by its example; and Dr. Glover's book is another proof that we have not yet exhausted the Greeks.

M. J.

THE STATESMANSHIP OF WORDSWORTH: AN ESSAY. By A. V. Dicey, K.C., Hon. D.C.L., etc. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press, 1917. Pp. viii, 134.

The recent biography of Wordsworth by Professor Harper has created a fresh interest in his life, his poetry, and his social and political ideas; and now this little book by Mr. Dicey emphasizes the political side of his work in a very striking way. Mr. Dicey seeks to show that Wordsworth's attitude towards the political problems of his time was, on the whole, consistent throughout; and that, in many respects, he had a more profound insight into these problems than that which was displayed by

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the professional politicians. Wordsworth, he contends (at any rate during the period of his statesmanlike activity) "was neither a Whig nor a Tory." "You cannot," he says, "better sum up the peculiarity of Wordsworth's political creed than by the statement that he imbibed the best truths which Burke could teach, and yet at the same time retained unshaken that complete faith in freedom, and that hope of human progress, which formed the truest part of the revolutionary dogmas." He supports this contention by many quotations both from Wordsworth's prose writings and from his poetry; and he appears to have succeeded in establishing his case. He urges that Wordsworth was essentially "a Republican who saw that the French Revolution, looked at from its best side, was a step in the progress of mankind." It led to "the political creed that every State, at any rate in Europe, ought, if possible, to be inhabited by citizens who were, or felt themselves to be, one nation, and that no nation should be governed by any foreign power." By insisting on this principle, Mr. Dicey claims that Wordsworth "anticipated by more than twenty years the nationalism of Mazzini."

Mr. Dicey's object, however, in calling attention to Wordsworth's statesmanship, is neither a purely biographical nor a purely historical one. He seeks to bring out the close parallelism between the main problem that presented itself to Wordsworth a century ago and that with which we are confronted at the present time. "In his statesmanship, as in his poetry, Wordsworth's eyes were always fixed upon fact. He preached in season and out of season, in poetry no less than in prose, that in his day the one duty of England was to deliver the world from Napoleonic despotism. He, being dead, yet speaketh. He tells us that our duty to-day is to deliver the world from the far more brutal and the far more dangerous despotism of the Kaiser."

Wordsworth's poetry took a long time to gain the appreciation that it deserved; and it is probably true that his statesmanship has taken still longer to gain it. In both cases this may, no doubt, have been largely due to the strong individuality and aloofness of his temperament; but certainly we ought now to be able to overcome that difficulty. Professor Harper did much to make all the aspects of his work more intelligible; and, on the more purely political side, Mr. Dicey's book adds a very valuable supplement.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

AN ETHICAL SYSTEM BASED ON THE LAWS OF NATURE. By M. Deshumbert. Translated from the French by Lionel Giles, M.A., Litt.D. Chicago and London: Open Court Publishing Company, 1917. Pp. xvi, 241. Price, 2s. 6d. net.

M. Deshumbert endeavours, with meticulous detail and infinite seriousness, to prove that "the object pursued by Nature is not merely life, but life reaching the highest possible pitch of activity, morality and intelligence." His book is a storehouse of interesting and significant facts about animal and plant life, and he clearly emphasises the double duty of human beings, to care for and protect domesticated animals and "to inflict no unnecessary suffering" on the wild species. He is also emphatic on the need for mutual help and co-operation between human beings. Unfortunately his method of expression is very heavy, and the personification of "Nature" needlessly cumbrous and misleading. The pages of moral aphorisms might well be omitted.

Dr. Salceby contributes his usual self-advertising preface.

F. W. STELLA BROWNE.

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

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